In re Adoption of D.K.A.T.

2024 UT App 145

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF D.K.A.T.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

D.C.T.,
Appellant,
v.
E.K.S. AND A.R.S.,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20231102-CA
Filed October 10, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Su Chon
The Honorable Dianna Gibson
No. 222900174

Steve S. Christensen and Wesley D. Hutchins,
Attorneys for Appellant
Larry S. Jenkins and Lance D. Rich,
Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 D.K.A.T. (Child) was born in Minnesota, where she lived
for over two and a half years until her biological mother (Birth
Mother) relinquished her to a Utah adoption agency (the Agency).
Birth Mother misrepresented to the Agency that Child’s biological
father was unknown. The Agency placed Child with E.K.S. and
A.R.S. (Adoptive Parents), and some seven months later, a Utah
district court finalized their adoption of Child. A week later,
D.C.T. (Biological Father) filed a paternity action in Minnesota
In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

district court, claiming to be Child’s biological father and seeking
to establish parental rights. A few months later, Biological Father
filed motions in Utah district court seeking to intervene in the
adoption proceeding and to set aside the adoption. Following a
two-day trial in Utah, the court concluded, among other things,
that Biological Father had not fully complied with Minnesota law
to establish parental rights and denied both motions.

¶2 On appeal, Biological Father raises several challenges to
the denial of his motions, including that his right to due process
was violated when he—a Minnesota resident—was subjected to
Utah law and that the adoption decree was based on fraud and a
misapplication of law. We affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

¶3 In 2015, Biological Father and Birth Mother began a
romantic relationship and soon moved in together. At all relevant
times, Biological Father and Birth Mother were residents of
Minnesota. Their “relationship was, at times, toxic, hostile and
destructive.” In 2016, following a domestic dispute, Biological
Father pled guilty in a Minnesota court to one charge of making
terroristic threats, and the court entered a no-contact order
prohibiting him from contacting Birth Mother. Biological Father
and Birth Mother separated in December 2017 or January 2018.

¶4 In early April 2018, Birth Mother married another man
(Husband). Less than a week later, on April 7, Child was born in
Minnesota. Biological Father was not named on Child’s birth
certificate. That same month, Biological Father conducted a home
paternity test, which indicated a 99.99% probability of a biological
relationship between Biological Father and Child. But the test
results came with a warning that because there was no strict chain

1. We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
findings. See In re adoption of B.H., 2020 UT 64, n.2, 474 P.3d 981.

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of custody of the genetic samples, the result may not be accepted
in a court of law. Because Birth Mother was married at the time of
Child’s birth, Husband was Child’s presumed father under
Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 257.55(1)(a) (2024). Biological
Father testified at trial that a month or two after Child’s birth, he
learned that Birth Mother had married Husband prior to giving
birth. Biological Father and Husband never rebutted Husband’s
presumed fatherhood by signing a recognition of parentage, as
provided for by Minnesota statute. See id. § 257.75(1)(a).

¶5 Birth Mother and Husband divorced in September 2018.
Neither the joint petition for divorce nor the divorce decree
addressed any children born during the brief marriage. Biological
Father testified at the trial in our case that he resumed living
intermittently with Birth Mother in September 2018 and that he
lived with her full-time from October 2018 until April 2019. But
the trial court found this testimony to be “inconsistent,” and it
noted that other than GPS data, which did not conclusively prove
his assertion, 2 Biological Father “provided no evidence, such as
mail, utility bills, tax returns, or other documents, to show that he
openly resided with [Birth Mother] on the dates he claims.”

¶6 Biological Father testified that after he moved out of Birth
Mother’s home, Child regularly visited him every other weekend
at his parents’ home from June 2019 until July 2020. In support of
this claim, several video clips of Child playing with members of
Biological Father’s family were submitted into evidence, and
various family members testified regarding Child’s visits to
Biological Father’s parents’ home. But the court noted that
Biological Father did not appear in any of the video clips and that

2. The trial court discounted the GPS data because it did not
include data for “every day or even every workday” and because
the data could not distinguish between whether he was visiting
Birth Mother or living with her.

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the family members’ testimony was limited to their visits with
Child.

¶7 Biological Father also testified that he regularly and
consistently provided financial support for Child until at least the
summer of 2020. He submitted a summary of monthly rent
receipts for amounts ranging between $300 and $400 that he
claimed to have paid for Birth Mother from November 2017 to
May 2020. But the trial court noted that some of the MoneyGrams
he used to compile the summary were “either difficult or
impossible to read” and that they “do not specifically show that
any of the money was actually sent to [Birth Mother], her bank or
to a landlord.” Biological Father also provided between 20 and 30
receipts for items he claimed he purchased for Child, but the court
noted that some of the receipts indicated that the items were
purchased by his family members and that some of the receipts
were dated after or just before Child was placed for adoption in
Utah and that none of those items were sent to Child. Some of
Biological Father’s family members also testified regarding
purchases he made for Child, but evidence of those purchases was
limited to the family members’ testimony. Biological Father also
submitted receipts for three weeks of daycare for Child. But the
court noted text messages between Biological Father and Birth
Mother that were submitted into evidence “do not show that
[Biological Father] provided much, or any, financial support to”
Child. Based on these evidentiary issues, the court stated that
“[u]nder the circumstances, [it was] unable to put a monetary
value on what, if anything, [Biological Father] paid towards the
Child’s support.”

¶8 In June 2020, apparently feeling that she could no longer
care for Child, Birth Mother left Child on the porch of Biological
Father’s parents’ house. Child remained with Biological Father’s
parents for a few days until child protective services placed her
with her maternal grandmother, who soon returned Child to Birth
Mother’s care. But later that month, child protective services
removed Child from Birth Mother’s home following an

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altercation with Biological Father. 3 Although Biological Father
testified that Child resided with him for the rest of June and part
of July 2020, the court found more credible his mother’s testimony
that Child resided with her during that time.

¶9 Around this time, a caseworker repeatedly told Biological
Father that he should pursue custody of, or secure visitation rights
with, Child. But Birth Mother regained physical custody of Child
in mid-July, from which point Biological Father had “little to no
contact” with Child. He testified he last saw or spoke with Child
in July or August 2020.

¶10 In October 2020, Birth Mother texted Biological Father that
Child was sick and pleaded with him to purchase medicine. She
also told Biological Father that Child did not have a coat. The trial
court found that Biological Father “made no effort or offer to
check on the Child, take her to the doctor, or to get any medicine
for her.” In his text messages, Biological Father asserted that Child
only had allergies and was not sick. He also stated that Child
already had a coat, but the court noted that he testified he had not
seen Child for approximately three months and would not have
known if she had a coat that still fit. Biological Father told Birth
Mother that he did not mind providing for Child, but he did not
wish to get caught up in Birth Mother’s “drama.” There was no
indication from the text exchange that Biological Father ever
purchased the requested medicine or coat for Child.

¶11 On December 8, 2020, Birth Mother relinquished Child—
then over two and a half years old—to the Agency in Utah, which
placed her with Adoptive Parents. The Agency’s executive
director testified that Birth Mother told the Agency that Child was

3. Biological Father testified that after he and Birth Mother argued
in a restaurant, she left Child behind with him without a car seat.
He said he then drove Child back to Birth Mother’s apartment,
where Birth Mother damaged the dashboard of his car with a
screwdriver and kicked in a window.

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conceived during a sexual assault by an unknown man while she
was unconscious. Birth Mother also included a version of this
claim in a signed document she submitted to the Agency. The
director also testified that the Agency did not know that Birth
Mother was married to Husband at the time of Child’s birth and
that the Agency was unaware of Biological Father’s claim to be
Child’s biological father.

¶12 The next day, on December 9, Birth Mother informed
Biological Father that she had relinquished Child for out-of-state
adoption, and she texted him photos of Child with Adoptive
Parents’ family. Three days later, she texted Biological Father
more photos of Child with Adoptive Parents and commented on
how happy Child looked. A few days after that, Birth Mother
texted Biological Father a picture of an invitation to her prior
wedding to Husband and a screenshot from a website that
indicated that unmarried fathers who do not establish paternity
have no rights toward a child. She told him, “I tried to build a
relationship with you by asking you to sign her birth certificate
but you didn’t want to.” Biological Father replied, “No need to
contact me anymore!! I’ll do what I gotta do!!!” At trial, Biological
Father testified that he was referring to taking legal action. He
contacted an attorney that month, but no action was taken at that
time. Prior to the finalization of Child’s adoption in July 2021,
Biological Father neither filed a paternity action nor registered as
her putative father with the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption
Registry.

¶13 At the end of December 2020, Birth Mother texted
Biological Father, “BITCH YOUR DAUGHTER IS DEAD,” and
she sent a picture of a child lying down with closed eyes. She also
texted, “WE DON’T HAVE A KID TOGETHER,” followed by
another personal insult. But Biological Father testified that four
days later, Birth Mother called and informed him that Child was
still alive and living in an undisclosed location. And a week later,
she texted him more photos and videos of Child with Adoptive
Parents. Sometime that December, Biological Father contacted

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police in Minnesota to conduct a welfare check on Child. The
police informed Biological Father as early as January 2021 that
Birth Mother had told them that she had relinquished Child for
adoption.

¶14 On July 6, 2021, the Utah district court entered an Order
and Decree of Adoption (the Decree) declaring Child legally
adopted by Adoptive Parents. Child was about three years and
three months old at the time. The court’s associated findings of
fact and conclusions of law indicated, in relevant part, as follows:

• Birth Mother “was unmarried at the time of conception and
birth and chooses to exercise her right of privacy pursuant
to Utah Code § 78B-6-102(7) and not disclose the identity
of the biological father”;

• “Evidence was presented that no unmarried biological
father registered with the putative father registry of Utah
or Minnesota”;

• “Pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-121, the consent of the
birth father is not required, and he has surrendered,
forfeited or waived any right in relation to the child
including the right to notice. The final Decree should reflect
and decree that the birth father has failed to assert or claim
his rights and therefore his rights are forever waived,
surrendered, forfeited or terminated”; and

• “The parental rights of birth parents have been waived,
surrendered, forfeited, and permanently terminated.”

¶15 On July 13, 2021—over seven months after he was first
informed that Child was relinquished and placed with Adoptive
Parents and one week after the Decree was entered—Biological
Father filed a paternity action in Minnesota district court.
Husband was not named a party to the action. Biological Father
also filed a motion requesting sole physical and legal custody of

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Child, which the Minnesota court denied stating that it “cannot
grant [Biological Father] custody, even on a temporary basis, until
he has been adjudicated the biological father of” Child. The court
also indicated that at the upcoming review hearing, the parties
must be prepared to discuss, among other things, “[i]f there is a
final order for adoption from this state or any other” and whether
Biological Father “has registered for the Fathers’ Adoption
Registry and the effect that this registration or failure to register
would [have on] a pending or finalized adoption proceeding.” By
the time the Utah district court entered its amended findings of
fact and conclusions of law following the trial on Biological
Father’s motions to intervene and to set aside the adoption, the
Minnesota court had not entered any ruling adjudicating
Biological Father as Child’s father. Nor had Husband, as Child’s
presumed father, been joined as a necessary party in the paternity
action.

¶16 On August 27, 2021, Biological Father’s Minnesota counsel
sent a letter to the Agency informing it of Biological Father’s claim
to be Child’s biological father and of the pending Minnesota
paternity action. The Agency’s executive director testified at trial
that this was the first time the Agency became aware of Biological
Father and his claims. Counsel’s letter to the Agency also
recognized Husband’s status as Child’s presumed father and
suggested that he was a necessary party who needed to be joined
in the Minnesota paternity action.

¶17 On October 5, 2021, Biological Father filed in Utah district
court a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding, a motion
to set aside the Decree, and a motion seeking custody of Child.
Adoptive Parents opposed his motion to intervene, arguing that
it was untimely and that he was not entitled to notice of the
adoption because he had not been adjudicated as Child’s
biological father prior to the adoption. The court granted
Biological Father “limited intervention to determine whether he
is the biological father and whether he timely established parental
rights.”

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¶18 In February 2022, Biological Father filed a motion to unseal
the entire adoption file. He asserted that he might have additional
grounds on which to set the Decree aside, such as fraud, and
requested that the file be unsealed so that he might pursue that
potential avenue. The court entered an order allowing the
adoption file to be unsealed for any documents relating to
Biological Father’s motions to intervene and to set aside the
Decree but denying his request to unseal the entire file. 4

¶19 The court held a two-day bench trial on the matter in May
and July 2022, and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which it shortly thereafter amended following a stipulated
motion by the parties. The court’s amended findings are
summarized above.

¶20 Turning to its legal conclusions, the trial court stated that
“entry of the adoption decree on July 6, 2021, is of great
importance.” It also acknowledged the competing interests
between an unmarried biological father’s “inchoate interest in a
child,” the adoptive parents’ and child’s “statutory and
constitutional rights in their relationship with each other,” and the
State’s interest in providing stable and permanent homes for
adoptive children and in preventing disruption of their
placements.

¶21 Referencing Minnesota law, the court held that Biological
Father did not timely file his Minnesota paternity action because
he filed it a week after the Utah court had already entered the
Decree. See Minn. Stat. § 257.57(6) (2024) (“If the child has been
adopted, an action may not be brought.”). The court also noted
that Biological Father’s paternity action was further complicated

4. Judge Su Chon entered the Decree and issued the order
allowing for Biological Father’s limited intervention, while Judge
Dianna Gibson ruled on Biological Father’s motion to unseal the
adoption file, conducted the trial in this matter, and ruled on his
motion to intervene and to set aside the Decree.

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by Husband being Child’s presumed father under Minnesota law
and by Biological Father’s failure to join him as a party. And the
court held that due to chain of custody issues, the home paternity
test Biological Father completed was insufficient to create a
parental presumption under Minnesota law.

¶22 As for Biological Father’s motion to set aside the Decree,
the court noted that Minnesota Adoption Procedure Rule 47.02
sets a 90-day post-adoption deadline to file a motion to set aside
an adoption and that here, Biological Father filed his motions to
intervene and to set aside the Decree in Utah district court 91 days
after entry of the Decree. Accordingly, the court concluded that
Biological Father “seeks a remedy [in Utah court] that would be
procedurally barred as untimely under Minnesota law.”

¶23 Next, the court addressed whether Biological Father was
entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding and whether his
consent was required under Utah law. In conducting that
analysis, the court stated that “[t]he requirements of Section
78B-6-121 do not apply if the unmarried biological father does not
know or have reason to know of a ‘qualifying circumstance’
pursuant to Subsection 78B-6-122(1)(a) prior to the birth mother
signing her relinquishment or consent to adoption of the child.”
Thus, because it was undisputed that Biological Father “did not
know and could not have known of a ‘qualifying circumstance,’”
the court focused its analysis on whether Biological Father
“strictly satisfied the other requirements of Section 78B-6-122 as
well as other sections of the Utah Adoption Act.” As part of that
analysis, under section 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B), the court addressed
whether prior to Birth Mother’s relinquishment of Child on
December 8, 2020, Biological Father “fully complied with the
requirements to establish parental rights and duties in the child,
and to preserve the right to notice of a proceeding in connection
with the adoption of the child, imposed by” Minnesota law.

¶24 The court pointed to the fact that, despite knowing within
a couple of months of Child’s birth that Birth Mother was married

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to Husband when Child was born, Biological Father did not
timely pursue legal action to rebut the legal presumption that
Husband was Child’s father. The court further held that even if
Biological Father had filed a paternity action and joined Husband
as a necessary party prior to entry of the Decree, he still would not
have “qualif[ied] as a presumed father or for notice of the
adoption under” Minnesota law. Specifically, under Minn. Stat.
section 257.55(1)(d), a man is the presumed father if, “while the
child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his biological child.” And
under Minn. Stat. section 259.49(1)(b)(4), a father must receive
notice of an adoption proceeding if he “is openly living with the
child or the person designated on the birth record as the natural
mother of the child, or both.”

¶25 At trial, Biological Father claimed to have lived with Child
from October 2018 until April 2019 when he moved in with Birth
Mother shortly after her divorce from Husband and for several
weeks in June and July 2020 after child protective services
removed Child from Birth Mother’s care. Concerning the first
period, the court reasoned that even if the GPS data Biological
Father submitted proved that he lived with Birth Mother and
Child at that time, “he provided no evidence that he shared an
address with [Birth Mother] on mail, utility bills, tax returns, or
other documents.” The court also noted that Biological Father did
not submit into evidence any photographs of himself with Child,
much less of the two of them at Birth Mother’s apartment.
Accordingly, the court concluded that even if he resided with
Birth Mother at that time, “it does not appear that he was doing
so openly.” As for the second period, the court found the
testimony of Biological Father’s mother credible that Child
resided with her after Child was removed from Birth Mother’s
care. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that Biological Father openly resided with
Birth Mother and Child “for any period of time.”

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¶26 The trial court also rejected Biological Father’s argument
that he was entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings
pursuant to Minn. Stat. section 259.49(1)(b)(2), which requires
notice to a parent who “has substantially supported the child.”
The court again discussed the problems with the evidence
Biological Father provided to support his claims that he
contributed toward Birth Mother’s rent and that he purchased
clothing, groceries, and other items for Child. The court also noted
that text messages between Biological Father and Birth Mother
showed that Biological Father “was reluctant to step up and agree
to an order of child support.” The court indicated that a “prime
example” of Biological Father’s “failure to provide sufficient
financial support” for Child was the October 2020 text message
exchange in which Birth Mother pleaded with Biological Father to
purchase medicine and a coat for Child. In light of all this, the
court held that although Biological Father “may have provided
some financial support for the Child, . . . such financial support
was not sufficient to meet the Child’s needs and not substantial
enough to require his notice to the adoption” under Minnesota
law.

¶27 Next, the court held that even if Biological Father “had
timely established parental rights and the right to notice in
Minnesota, he was required to have demonstrated a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities under the totality of
the circumstances” pursuant to Utah Code section
78B-6-122(1)(b). The court then analyzed each relevant factor
listed under that section, one of which was whether Biological
Father “offered to provide and, unless the offer was rejected, did
provide, financial support for” Child or Birth Mother. Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-122(1)(b)(iv) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). 5 In addressing

5. Because the applicable provisions of the Utah Code in effect at
the relevant time do not differ from those in the most current
printed version of the Utah Code in any way material to this
appeal, we cite that version of the code for convenience.

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that factor, the court stated that Birth Mother’s text messages
submitted at trial “strongly suggest that she would have accepted
financial support from him if he had been willing to offer it.” The
court then indicated that Biological Father’s claims that he
provided financial support to Birth Mother by contributing
toward her rent and purchasing groceries and other items were
not “fully” supported by the documentation. And the court stated
that, in any event, even if it “were to believe some or all such
claims,” Biological Father’s claimed financial support “did not
meet the Child’s needs.” After considering the other factors listed
in section 78B-6-122(1)(b), the court concluded that under the
totality of the circumstances, Biological Father had “not
demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities
to” Child.

¶28 The court also concluded that Biological Father’s consent
to the adoption was not required under Utah Code section
78B-6-120.1(3)(c) because he gave implied consent by “knowingly
leaving the adoptee with another person, without providing for
support, communicating, or otherwise maintaining a substantial
relationship with the adoptee, for six consecutive months.” The
court pointed to Biological Father’s lack of contact with Child after
child protective services returned Child to Birth Mother’s care in
July 2020 and to Biological Father’s failure to take legal action to
obtain custody of Child even after Birth Mother informed him that
she had relinquished Child for adoption. The court noted that
although Biological Father asserted that Birth Mother prevented
him from contacting Child, the evidence showed that Birth
Mother reached out to him seeking assistance to care for Child
and Biological Father provided no evidence that he furnished any
financial assistance after July 2020. The court thus found that
Biological Father “knowingly” left Child with Birth Mother
“without providing for support, communicating, or otherwise
maintaining a substantial relationship with the Child for at least
six consecutive months” and that Biological Father thereby gave
implied consent to the adoption.

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¶29 Lastly, citing Utah Code section 78B-6-106(1)–(2), the court
held that Birth Mother’s misrepresentations and “failure to
identify [Biological Father] as a potential biological father of
[Child], although unfortunate and regrettable, do[] not excuse
him from strictly complying with the statutory requirements.”
The court further stated that although Birth Mother’s
“misrepresentations to the [A]gency are reprehensible, the effect
of her misrepresentations could have been avoided had
[Biological Father] taken prompt legal action to establish parental
rights to” Child. That is, if Biological Father had filed a paternity
action or registered with the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption
Registry prior to entry of the Decree, the Agency and Adoptive
Parents would have been made aware of his asserted parental
interest in Child.

¶30 Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the trial court held that Biological Father’s “consent to the
adoption was not required pursuant to the Utah Adoption Act”;
Biological Father’s “consent to the adoption is implied”;
Biological Father had not established grounds for setting aside the
Decree; and “[b]ecause the adoption was valid, [Biological Father]
has no grounds for custody of” Child. Accordingly, the court
denied Biological Father’s motion to intervene, motion to set aside
the Decree, and motion seeking custody of Child.

¶31 Biological Father subsequently filed a motion for a new
trial and a renewed motion to unseal the adoption file. Among
other things, Biological Father argued that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding and
personal jurisdiction over the parties. He also contended that the
Decree should be set aside under rules 60(b) and 60(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure for fraud. Specifically, he asserted that
Birth Mother, the Agency, and Adoptive Parents conspired to
deceive the trial court into entering the Decree.

¶32 The court denied both motions. It held that because
Biological Father was not entitled to intervene in the adoption

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case, he lacked standing to challenge entry of the Decree, which
included raising jurisdictional challenges. And in addressing the
renewed motion to unseal the adoption file, the court stated that
because Biological Father’s motion to intervene was denied, his
motion to unseal was likewise denied.

¶33 Next, in addressing Biological Father’s fraud arguments,
citing Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171, the court first
distinguished “fraud on the court” from “fraud or
misrepresentation which may occur in the context of a
proceeding.” See id. ¶ 28 n.10. The court then held that Biological
Father “failed to present evidence to support that there was a
conspiracy to deprive him of his parental rights.” The court stated
that although Birth Mother’s statements filed with the court
contained misrepresentations, the evidence showed that the
Agency did not know of Biological Father’s claims until he moved
to intervene in the adoption case, and there was no evidence
showing that Adoptive Parents were aware of Biological Father.
Thus, the court concluded that while “there were
misrepresentations made in the context of the adoption
proceeding, the evidence does not support that there was a ‘fraud
on the court.’” The court then reiterated that although Birth
Mother’s misrepresentations to Biological Father (i.e., that Child
had died, which she corrected four days later) and to the Agency
(i.e., not disclosing the existence of Biological Father or Husband)
“are concerning,” “the biggest impact on [Biological Father’s]
parental rights was his own failure to establish himself as
[Child’s] legal or presumptive father under Minnesota law.”

¶34 This appeal followed.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶35 Biological Father raises several issues for our
consideration. He first argues that because he is a Minnesota
resident not subject to Utah law, the trial court’s denial of his

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motion to intervene violated his right to due process.
“Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due
process, are questions of law that we review for correctness.” Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 47,
299 P.3d 990 (quotation simplified).

¶36 Biological Father alternatively contends that the trial court
erred as a matter of law—both at the time the Decree was entered
and when it denied his motion to intervene—in ruling that he was
not entitled to receive notice of the adoption proceeding and that
his consent to the adoption was not required under Utah law.
“The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law which we review for correctness.” McFarland v.
McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 19, 493 P.3d 1146 (quotation
simplified). Also, “as a general matter, the factual findings
underpinning an intervention ruling are subject to a clearly
erroneous standard while the district court’s legal conclusions are
reviewed for correctness.” Gardiner v. Taufer, 2014 UT 56, ¶ 13, 342
P.3d 269 (quotation simplified).

¶37 Biological Father also asserts that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding.
“Whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law and we review the district court’s determination
for correctness.” Summerhaze Co. v. FDIC, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 8, 332 P.3d
908 (quotation simplified).

¶38 Biological Father next argues that the Decree should be set
aside due to fraud under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. 6 “A district court has broad discretion in ruling on a

6. Biological Father also asserts that the Decree “should be set
aside based upon outright fraud and/or fraud upon the Court
under Rule 60(d).” But rule 60(d)—which provides, with our
emphasis, that rule 60 “does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
(continued…)

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motion to set aside an order or judgment under rule 60(b), and
thus, we review a district court’s denial of a 60(b) motion under
an abuse of discretion standard.” In re Discipline of Spencer, 2022
UT 28, ¶ 11, 513 P.3d 759 (quotation simplified).

¶39 Relatedly, Biological Father argues that the trial court erred
in denying his renewed motion to unseal the adoption file, which
would allow him to gather additional evidence of fraud. We
review a trial court’s decision on a motion to unseal an adoption
file for an abuse of discretion, but we review the court’s
underlying legal conclusions for correctness. In re adoption of M.A.,
2024 UT 6, ¶ 10, 545 P.3d 241.

ANALYSIS

I. Due Process

¶40 Biological Father argues that he, “as a resident of
Minnesota, was under no obligation to strictly comply with” any
requirement of the Utah Adoption Act (the Adoption Act), see
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-101 to -146 (LexisNexis 2022 & Supp.
2023), and that requiring him to do so violated his right to due
process. 7 Accordingly, he asserts that because he had no

order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court”—does not apply because Biological Father did not file an
independent action for fraud on the court. See In re Estate of Willey,
2016 UT 53, ¶ 11 n.7, 391 P.3d 171.

7. Biological Father raises two additional constitutional
challenges, neither of which we reach on the merits. First, he
argues that the trial court failed to consider whether Child had a
constitutionally protected right to know and to be with her
biological father. But because Biological Father made this
argument for the first time in a post-trial motion and the trial court
(continued…)

20231102-CA 17 2024 UT App 145
In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

obligation to comply with Utah law, “his right to intervene in this
case, as well as his rights to seek all other relief, including setting
aside the Decree, remain fully intact.”

¶41 “At its core, the due process guarantee is twofold—
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.” In re adoption
of B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 16, 356 P.3d 1215. These guarantees serve as
“a significant protection against the arbitrary extinguishment of
important rights.” Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015 UT 34, ¶ 23, 345 P.3d
719. However, an unmarried biological father’s right to develop a
parental relationship with his child is “provisional” and “due
process requires only that an unwed father have a meaningful

did not address the merits of that argument, this issue is not
preserved for appeal, and Biological Father has not argued that it
qualifies under an exception to our preservation rule. See Donjuan
v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ¶ 21, 266 P.3d 839 (“Generally, the fact
that a party is asserting constitutional claims does not excuse him
from complying with the preservation rule.”); State v. Pinder, 2005
UT 15, ¶ 46, 114 P.3d 551 (“Although a new argument may be
advanced when moving for a new trial, the trial court may refuse
to consider the merits of the argument because it may find the
issue waived. If the trial court refuses to address the merits of the
newly advanced argument, the issue remains unpreserved for
appellate review and may be addressed only if the challenging
party can show plain error or exceptional circumstances.”)
(quotation simplified).
Biological Father also argues that the denial of his motion to
intervene violated the Open Courts provision of the Utah
Constitution. See Utah Const. art. I, § 11. Biological Father’s
argument on this issue, which is limited to three short paragraphs
and contains several conclusory statements, is insufficient to carry
his burden of persuasion on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8);
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 9, 194 P.3d 903 (“An appellate court is
not a depository in which a party may dump the burden of
argument and research.”) (quotation simplified).

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

chance to preserve his opportunity to develop a relationship with
his child.” In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ¶ 11, 298 P.3d 1251
(quotation simplified). See id. ¶ 18 (“Under both federal and state
law, an unwed biological father has an inchoate interest in a
parental relationship with his child that acquires full
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming
forward to participate in the rearing of his child.”) (quotation
simplified).

¶42 Our Supreme Court has held that “a father’s due process
right to be heard is infringed where his rights are foreclosed for
failure to comply with the Adoption Act but he could not
reasonably have expected his baby to be born in Utah, or he did
not know and could not reasonably have known that his child
would be placed for adoption in Utah.” In re adoption of B.Y., 2015
UT 67, ¶ 33 (quotation simplified). Conversely, “a father who
knows of a pregnancy and has reason to suspect that his child will
be born in or placed for adoption in Utah must fulfill the
requirements of the Utah Adoption Act.” Id. ¶ 34.

¶43 This due process standard is codified in Utah Code
section 78B-6-122 (Section 122), which identifies certain
“qualifying circumstances” that indicate the likelihood that a
mother would place her child for adoption in Utah. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-122(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). Section 122
further requires an unmarried biological father’s consent to the
adoption if:

(A) the unmarried biological father did not know,
and through the exercise of reasonable diligence
could not have known, before the time the mother
executed a consent to adoption or relinquishment of
the child for adoption, that a qualifying
circumstance existed;

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

(B) before the mother executed a consent to
adoption or relinquishment of the child for
adoption, the unmarried biological father fully
complied with the requirements to establish
parental rights and duties in the child, and to
preserve the right to notice of a proceeding in
connection with the adoption of the child, imposed
by:

(I) the last state where the unmarried
biological father knew, or through the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known, that the mother resided in before the
mother executed the consent to adoption or
relinquishment of the child for adoption; or

(II) the state where the child was conceived;
and

(C) the unmarried biological father has
demonstrated, based on the totality of the
circumstances, a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities . . . .

Id. § 78B-6-122(1)(c). Accordingly, under Section 122, “a father’s
right to contest an adoption remains intact so long as he fully
complied with the adoption requirements of the state whose laws
he could have expected to apply.” In re adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67,
¶ 34 n.6 (emphasis in original; quotation simplified). Section 122
thus “supplies a choice-of-law solution that avoids the significant
due process problems that could follow from holding a father to
the elements of the Utah Adoption Act where the father lacks a
sufficient basis for anticipating its application.” Id. Here, it is
undisputed that Biological Father did not know and had no
reason to know of any qualifying circumstance indicating a
likelihood that Birth Mother would place Child for adoption in
Utah.

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

¶44 Biological Father argues that our Supreme Court’s decision
in Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015 UT 34, 345 P.3d 719, is controlling. At
issue in that case was a paternity action initiated in Utah district
court over a child who was conceived in Colorado but who was
born in Utah and placed for adoption in Utah. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. The
child’s unmarried biological father did not know and had no
reason to know of the mother’s plans to give birth in Utah and to
place the child for adoption in Utah. Id. ¶ 14. The district court
dismissed the paternity action on the ground that the father did
not take any affirmative steps under Colorado law to establish
paternity over the child. Id. ¶ 8. Although the court acknowledged
that Colorado law did not require the father to take identified
affirmative steps, the court interpreted Section 122 “to require a
father to affirmatively establish paternity before acquiring any
right to notice of an adoption proceeding.” Id. ¶¶ 8, 14. Our
Supreme Court reversed. Id. ¶ 47. In relevant part, the Court held
that the district court’s interpretation of Section 122 “would
implicate serious due process concerns, as it would require an
unwed father in Colorado who had no idea of any plans for a Utah
adoption to construe Colorado law through the lens of the Utah
statute.” Id. ¶ 15. In other words, requiring the father “to fulfill
requirements not imposed on him by Colorado law” would hold
“him to a legal regime to which he could not reasonably have
expected to be bound,” thereby violating due process. Id.
¶¶ 25-26.

¶45 Biological Father asserts that like the father in Nevares, he
“cannot be reasonably expected to comply with a Utah law that
Minnesota law does not impose upon him.” But here, Biological
Father does not provide any analysis of what Minnesota law
requires to establish paternity—much less assert that he complied
with those requirements—nor does he challenge the trial court’s
analysis of Minnesota law. Minnesota law expressly precludes the
initiation of paternity actions “[i]f the child has been adopted.”
Minn. Stat. § 257.57(6) (2024). And although Child was over three
years old when the Decree was entered, and despite knowing

20231102-CA 21 2024 UT App 145
In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

Birth Mother was married to Husband at the time of Child’s birth,
Biological Father took no steps to establish paternity until a week
after the adoption was finalized in Utah. 8 The trial court also held
that even if Biological Father had filed a paternity action prior to
the adoption, he still would not have “qualif[ied] as a presumed
father or for notice of the adoption under” Minnesota law because
he never openly lived with or substantially supported Child. See
id. §§ 257.55(1)(d), 259.49(1)(b)(2), (4). Because Biological Father
has not provided focused analysis on Minnesota law—
particularly whether the affirmative steps he could have taken
were mandatory or, like Colorado law, optional—he has not
carried his burden of persuasion on this issue.

¶46 Biological Father further contends that his right to due
process was violated when the trial court relied on Utah Code
section 78B-6-106 in ruling that Birth Mother’s misrepresentations
and “failure to identify [Biological Father] as a potential biological
father of” Child in the documents she submitted to the Agency,
“although unfortunate and regrettable, do not excuse [Biological
Father] from strictly complying with the statutory requirements”
of the Adoption Act—more specifically, Section 122. That statute
states, in relevant part, that “[a] fraudulent representation is not a
defense to strict compliance with the requirements of [the
Adoption Act] and is not a basis for dismissal of a petition for
adoption, vacation of an adoption decree, or an automatic grant

8. Biological Father also asserts that the trial court erred in
concluding that he was required to comply with Minnesota law
“before [Birth Mother] executed her relinquishment and consent
to adoption on December 8, 2020.” See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). But he does not
address the court’s conclusion that because he filed his paternity
action in Minnesota district court a week after the adoption was
finalized, the action also was untimely even under Minnesota law.
See Minn. Stat. § 257.57(6) (2024) (“If the child has been adopted,
an action may not be brought.”).

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

of custody to the offended party.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-106(2)
(LexisNexis 2022).

¶47 We need not directly address the interplay between
section 78B-6-106 and unmarried biological fathers who did not
know and could not have reasonably known of Section 122’s
qualifying circumstances because Birth Mother’s
misrepresentations, although inexcusable, did not affect
Biological Father’s ability to comply with Section 122—which was
the basis of the trial court’s denial of his motions to intervene and
to set aside the adoption. Biological Father’s argument focuses on
Birth Mother’s misrepresentations to the Agency and to the trial
court at the time the Decree was entered. Specifically, he asserts
that the documents Birth Mother submitted to the Agency and to
the court contained over ten misrepresentations regarding Child’s
biological father, including that she did not know who he was, the
extent of his relationship with Child, and that Child was
conceived during a sexual assault. But because Biological Father
did not know and did not have reason to know of qualifying
circumstances, the relevant inquiry was whether he had complied
with Minnesota law to establish his parental rights, which
analysis the trial court conducted, thereafter concluding
Biological Father had not complied with Minnesota law. 9

9. Biological Father lists a number of other provisions of the
Adoption Act that the trial court referenced in its findings of fact
and conclusions of law. But Biological Father has not argued how
such references violate due process in light of the trial court’s
conclusion that he was not entitled to notice of the adoption
proceeding or to give consent to the adoption under Minnesota
law. Even assuming the trial court erred in addressing provisions
of the Adoption Act in addition to concluding that Biological
Father would not have been entitled to relief under Minnesota
law, any such error “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Benson, 2014 UT App 92, ¶ 30, 325 P.3d 855 (quotation
(continued…)

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

¶48 In sum, because Biological Father has not challenged the
trial court’s holding that he failed to comply with Minnesota law
to establish parental rights—which law Biological Father would
reasonably have expected to apply—this case is distinguishable
from Nevares, and Biological Father’s due process argument fails.

II. Notice and Consent to Adoption

¶49 Biological Father alternatively argues that the Decree
should be set aside due to the trial court’s misapplication of Utah
law, which resulted in the deprivation of his rights to receive
notice of the adoption proceeding and to give his consent to the
adoption. 10

¶50 When entering the Decree, the trial court’s associated
findings of fact and conclusions of law indicated that “[e]vidence
was presented that no unmarried biological father registered with
the putative father registry of Utah or Minnesota” and that
“[p]ursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-121, the consent of the birth
father is not required, and he has surrendered, forfeited or waived
any right in relation to the child including the right to notice.”
Although the court did not identify which subsection of section
78B-6-121 (Section 121) it relied on in concluding that neither

simplified), cert. denied, 333 P.3d 365 (Utah 2014). Indeed, as
discussed in greater detail in Part II below, nothing in the
Adoption Act expressly precludes an unmarried biological father
who fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 122 from
attempting to additionally establish a right to notice and consent
under section 78B-6-121 of the Adoption Act—but by doing so,
the father is availing himself of Utah law.

10. Based on the premise of this argument, namely that Utah
statutes were violated, in this section we focus our analysis
exclusively on Utah law and do not consider whether the
application of certain provisions of the Adoption Act violated
Biological Father’s right to due process.

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

notice nor consent was required, Biological Father asserts that the
court’s reference to a “putative father registry” suggests that the
conclusion was based on subsection (3). See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-121(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2022). Biological Father further
argues that the court’s presumed reliance on subsection (3) was
erroneous because that subsection applies only to adoption cases
where the child “is six months old or less at the time the child is
placed with prospective adoptive parents,” id. § 78B-6-121(3), and
here, Child was two years and eight months old at the time she
was placed with Adoptive Parents. Biological Father asserts that
the court was instead required to conduct an analysis under
subsection (1), which applies to cases where the child is more than
six months old at the time of the child’s placement with
prospective adoptive parents. See id. § 78B-6-121(1). Specifically,
he asserts that the court was required to determine whether he
“developed a substantial relationship with” Child and whether he
“openly lived with” Child prior to her placement with Adoptive
Parents. Id. § 78B-6-121(1)(a)–(b). Based on this omission,
Biological Father asserts that the court sidestepped legal
prerequisites before entering the Decree.

¶51 As an initial matter, the court’s reference to a “putative
father registry” does not implicate only subsection (3). Rather,
subsection (7) directs that in cases involving a child who was not
“conceived or born within a marriage,” 11 regardless of the child’s
age, petitioners must file a certificate stating “that a diligent
search has been made of the registry of notices from unmarried
biological fathers described in” subsection (3). Id.
§ 78B-6-121(7)(a). Thus, although we agree with Biological Father
that, given Child’s age at the time of her placement with Adoptive
Parents, subsection (1)—and not subsection (3)—governed

11. Because Birth Mother was married to Husband at the time of
Child’s birth, subsection (7) technically does not apply to this case.
But at the time of the Decree’s entry, based on Birth Mother’s
misrepresentations, the court was unaware of her marriage.

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

Child’s adoption case, it is more likely that the court’s reference
to the registry was based on subsection (7). Accordingly, there is
no strong indication that at the time of entry of the Decree, the
trial court erroneously applied subsection (3) instead of
subsection (1).

¶52 In any event, after Biological Father moved to intervene
and to set aside the Decree, the court—which was previously
unaware of his existence—held a trial and ruled on the issue of
whether notice of the adoption and Biological Father’s consent to
the adoption were required, ultimately concluding that they were
not. But even then, the court sidestepped the required subsection
(1) inquiry, stating that “[t]he requirements of [Section 121] do not
apply if the unmarried biological father does not know or have
reason to know of a ‘qualifying circumstance’ pursuant to [Section
122] prior to the birth mother signing her relinquishment or
consent to adoption of the child.” This was in error. The trial court
was not precluded from conducting an inquiry under Section 121
in this case.

¶53 Section 121 and Section 122 address the circumstances
under which an unmarried biological father is entitled to notice of
the adoption proceeding and his consent to the adoption is
required. 12 Section 121 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]xcept as

12. The right to notice of the adoption proceeding is included in
Section 121 and Section 122 through Utah Code section
78B-6-110(2)(a), which mandates that notice be given to any
person whose consent is required under section 78B-6-120 or
Section 121. Section 78B-6-120(1)(f), in turn, incorporates Section
122 by requiring the consent of an unmarried biological father
who “fully and strictly complies with the requirements of [Section
121] and [Section 122].” Additionally, Section 122 states that “[a]n
unmarried biological father who does not fully and strictly
comply with the requirements of [Section 121] and [Section 122] is
considered to have waived and surrendered any right in relation
(continued…)

20231102-CA 26 2024 UT App 145
In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

provided in Subsections (2)(a) and 78B-6-122(1) . . . , with regard
to a child who is placed with prospective adoptive parents more
than six months after birth, consent of an unmarried biological
father is not required unless the unmarried biological father”
satisfies certain requirements. Id. § 78B-6-121(1). Section 122
states, among other things, that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions
of [Section 121], the consent of an unmarried biological father is
required with respect to an adoptee who is under the age of 18 if,”
prior to the birth mother’s relinquishment of the child or
execution of a consent to adoption, the father “did not know, and
through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have
known,” of a “qualifying circumstance,” and if certain other
conditions are met. Id. § 78B-6-122(1)(c) (Supp. 2023). See also id.
§ 78B-6-122(1)(a) (defining “qualifying circumstance”).

¶54 Under Section 121’s plain terms, notice of the adoption
proceeding and consent to the adoption are required only if the
unmarried biological father satisfies certain requirements. Section
121 also expressly states that one of the exceptions to its
subsection (1) is set forth in Section 122. Section 122, in turn,
provides additional circumstances that, if satisfied, trigger the
requirement of notice and consent—the threshold requirement of
which is that the father did not know and could not have
reasonably known of certain “qualifying circumstances.”
Accordingly, if a trial court were to conclude that the
requirements of either section are met, notice and consent are
required, and the court need not additionally determine whether
notice and consent are required under the other section. But if the
court were to conclude that the requirements of one of the sections
are not met, the father might nonetheless be entitled to notice and
consent if he satisfied the requirements of the other section.

to the child, including the right to . . . notice of any judicial
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child.” Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023).

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

¶55 This is not what happened here. Because it was
undisputed that Biological Father “did not know and could not
have known of a ‘qualifying circumstance,’” the trial court
analyzed whether Biological Father satisfied Section 122’s other
requirements, concluding that he did not. But the court did not
then address whether Biological Father was nevertheless entitled
to notice and consent under Section 121. Instead, it simply stated
that Section 121 does “not apply if the unmarried biological father
does not know or have reason to know of a ‘qualifying
circumstance’ pursuant to” Section 122. Nothing in either section
supports that conclusion. Rather, as discussed above, having
concluded that notice and consent were not required under
Section 122, the court was not precluded from addressing whether
they were nonetheless required under Section 121.

¶56 Nevertheless, Biological Father is not entitled to reversal.
As an initial matter, the trial court entered sufficient findings of
fact—which Biological Father does not challenge on appeal—to
allow us to conclude that Biological Father would not have
satisfied the Section 121 requirements.

An appellate court may affirm the judgment
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even
though such ground or theory differs from that
stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling
or action, and this is true even though such ground
or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by
appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was
not considered or passed on by the lower court.

Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (quotation
simplified). See Olguin v. Anderton, 2019 UT 73, ¶ 20, 456 P.3d 760
(“It is within our discretion to affirm a judgment on an alternative
ground if it is apparent in the record.”) (quotation simplified).

20231102-CA 28 2024 UT App 145
In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

¶57 Section 121 provides that in cases involving children who
are over six months old at the time of their placement with
prospective adoptive parents, notice and consent are not required
unless the father satisfies the requirements of either subsection
(1)(a) or subsection (1)(b). Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(1)(a)–(b).
Based on the trial court’s extensive findings, we hold that
Biological Father did not satisfy the requirements of either
subsection.

¶58 Subsection (1)(a) requires an unmarried biological father to
have, among other things, “demonstrated a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood by financial support of the child
of a fair and reasonable sum in accordance with the father’s
ability.” Id. § 78B-6-121(1)(a)(iii). This is similar to Section 122’s
requirement that the father demonstrate, “based on the totality of
the circumstances, a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities.” 13 Id. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(C). And for purposes of
that inquiry, subsection (1)(b) of Section 122 provides a list of
factors that a trial court must consider, if applicable, as part of this
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, including “whether he
offered to provide and, unless the offer was rejected, did provide,
financial support for the child or the child’s mother.” Id.
§ 78B-6-122(1)(b)(iv).

¶59 As part of its Section 122 analysis, the trial court addressed
and considered each of the factors and ultimately concluded that
based on “the totality of the circumstances,” Biological Father had
“not demonstrated a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities to” Child. Concerning the financial support factor,

13. This requirement reflects the principle under federal law that
“an unwed biological father has an inchoate interest in a parental
relationship with his child that acquires full constitutional
protection only when he demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate
in the rearing of his child.” In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ¶ 18, 298
P.3d 1251 (quotation simplified).

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

the court indicated that various text messages Birth Mother sent
Biological Father “strongly suggest that she would have accepted
financial support from him if he had been willing to offer it.” The
court also stated that Biological Father’s claims that he provided
financial support to Birth Mother by contributing toward her rent
and by purchasing groceries and other items were not fully
supported by the evidence. The court further found that even if it
believed “some or all such claims,” the claimed financial support
“did not meet the Child’s needs.”

¶60 The court also addressed financial support in the context of
deciding whether Biological Father was entitled to notice of the
adoption under Minnesota law. After again discussing the
evidentiary issues with Biological Father’s claims that he paid
Birth Mother’s rent and purchased groceries and other items, the
court found that based on certain text messages between
Biological Father and Birth Mother, Biological Father was
“reluctant to step up and agree to an order of child support.” The
court further stated that a “prime example” of Biological Father’s
“failure to provide sufficient financial support” for Child was
when Birth Mother asked him to purchase medicine and a coat for
Child, who was sick at the time. Biological Father told Birth
Mother that he did not mind providing for Child but he wished
to stay out of Birth Mother’s “drama.” He also “made no effort or
offer to check on the Child, take her to the doctor, or to get any
medicine for her,” and the text messages do not indicate that
Biological Father ever purchased the requested medicine or coat
for Child.

¶61 In light of these findings, we conclude that Biological
Father likewise has not satisfied Section 121’s requirement that he
“demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by financial support of the child of a fair and
reasonable sum in accordance with the father’s ability.” Id.
§ 78B-6-121(1)(a)(iii). Biological Father was unwilling to agree to
regular child support, the trial court was not persuaded by
Biological Father’s claims of financial support he gave Mother,

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

and, in any event, the claimed financial support was insufficient
to meet Child’s needs.

¶62 Biological Father also would not have satisfied subsection
(1)(b)’s alternative requirement that he “openly lived with” Child
“for a period of at least six months during the one-year period
immediately preceding the day on which” Child was placed with
Adoptive Parents. Id. § 78B-6-121(1)(b)(i)(A)(I). Birth Mother
relinquished Child to the Agency on December 8, 2020. The
Agency placed Child with Adoptive Parents either that same day
or the next day, as evidenced by the pictures Mother sent
Biological Father on December 9 of Child with Adoptive Parents.
To satisfy subsection (1)(b), Biological Father needed to live with
Child for at least six months between December 9, 2019, and
December 9, 2020.

¶63 Biological Father testified that he lived with Birth Mother
and Child full-time from October 2018 until April 2019. 14
Biological Father testified that after moving out, Child regularly
visited his parents’ home every other weekend until July 2020.
Child lived with Biological Father’s parents for a few days in June
2020 after Mother left her on their porch. Not long afterward,
Child returned to live with Biological Father’s parents for a few
weeks in June and July 2020 after being removed from Birth
Mother’s care by child protective services. Biological Father
testified that he last saw Child in July or August 2020.
Accordingly, Biological Father did not live with Child at all in the

14. The trial court found this testimony to be “inconsistent,” and
it noted that the GPS data he submitted into evidence did not
conclusively prove his assertion and that Biological Father
“provided no evidence, such as mail, utility bills, tax returns, or
other documents, to show that he openly resided with [Birth
Mother] on the dates he claims.” See supra note 2. But even taking
Biological Father’s testimony at face value, this is not sufficient to
satisfy subsection (1)(b) as those dates fall outside the applicable
one-year range.

20231102-CA 31 2024 UT App 145
In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

year prior to her placement with Adoptive Parents, and
subsection (1)(b)’s requirement is therefore not met.

¶64 Biological Father is also not entitled to reversal because he
has not challenged the trial court’s alternative ruling that,
irrespective of Section 121 or Section 122, he gave implied consent
to the adoption. See Kendall v. Olsen, 2017 UT 38, ¶ 12, 424 P.3d 12
(“We will not reverse a ruling of the district court that rests on
independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges
only [some] of those grounds.”) (quotation simplified).

¶65 Utah Code section 78B-6-120.1(3)(c) provides that consent
to adoption may be implied by, among other things, the act of
“knowingly leaving the adoptee with another person, without
providing for support, communicating, or otherwise maintaining
a substantial relationship with the adoptee, for six consecutive
months.” 15 In concluding that Biological Father gave implied
consent, the court relied on the lack of evidence that he ever saw
or financially supported Child after she was returned to Birth
Mother’s care in July 2020. The court also pointed to Biological
Father’s seven-month delay in taking legal action after Mother
informed him in December 2020 that she had relinquished Child
for adoption. Biological Father has not appealed any aspect of this
ruling.

¶66 In sum, because the trial court’s findings support the
conclusion that Biological Father did not satisfy the applicable
Section 121 requirements and because Biological Father has not
challenged the trial court’s alternative ruling that he gave implied

15. Utah Code section 78B-6-110(2)(a)(iii) provides, with our
emphasis, that notice must be given to any person whose consent
is required under Section 121 or section 78B-6-120, “unless that
right has been terminated by” implied consent. Accordingly,
Biological Father’s implied consent to the adoption further
obviates any notice requirement.

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consent, we affirm the court’s conclusion that Biological Father
was not entitled to notice and consent under Utah law.

III. Other Issues

¶67 Biological Father raises three other issues for our
consideration. We address each in turn.

¶68 Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Biological Father asserts that
because Adoptive Parents were not residents of Utah and because
Child was born in Minnesota, the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to enter the Decree pursuant to Utah Code section
78B-6-105(1). 16 That statute states, in relevant part, that

(1) An adoption proceeding shall be commenced by
filing a petition in:

(a) the district court in the district where the
prospective adoptive parent resides;

(b) if the prospective adoptive parent is not a
resident of this state, the district court in the district
where:

16. Biological Father’s argument concerning subject matter
jurisdiction also nominally invokes a personal-jurisdiction
challenge. But Biological Father does not provide any meaningful
analysis on personal jurisdiction, much less provide citations to
legal authority. Biological Father also suggests that the trial court
“likely” lacked jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding
pursuant to the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. See
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g). But other than quoting the relevant federal
statute, his argument is limited to a single sentence. Biological
Father has thus not carried his burden of persuasion on either of
these issues, and we do not address them further. See Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(8).

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

(i) the adoptee was born;

(ii) the adoptee resides on the day on which
the petition is filed; or

(iii) a parent of the proposed adoptee resides
on the day on which the petition is filed[.]

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-105(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). Although
Biological Father acknowledges this court’s prior holding that the
statute “speaks to venue, and does not limit a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction,” In re adoption of B.N.A., 2018 UT App
224, ¶ 24, 438 P.3d 10, he asserts that “[e]ven a cursory review of
the possible venues listed in the statute reveals that no district
court in Utah can establish venue, thereby effectively stripping
Utah of any jurisdiction over the case.” We disagree.

¶69 Utah Code section 78B-6-134(3) directs that at the time a
child is relinquished to an adoption agency, “the agency shall
have custody and control of the child” and that “until the final
decree of adoption is entered by the court, the agency has the right
to the custody and control of the child” even if the child is placed
with prospective adoptive parents. Additionally, this court has
held that Utah “has an interest in protecting adoptees who are in
the custody and control of Utah-based agencies, regardless of
whether those adoptees are born in or placed with adoptive
parents in Utah,” In re adoption of B.F.S., 2020 UT App 149, ¶ 12,
478 P.3d 46, and that it “makes little sense to deny an adoption
agency the benefit of the law based on a venue provision
premised on the location of prospective adoptive parents,” id. ¶ 8
n.3. Accordingly, Biological Father’s subject matter jurisdiction
challenge premised on section 78B-6-105(1) is unavailing.

¶70 Fraud. Biological Father argues that the Decree should be
set aside because it “was obtained through either fraudulent
misrepresentations and/or fraud on the court” under rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, he points to Birth

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

Mother’s misrepresentations to the Agency and to the trial court
that Child was conceived during a sexual assault and that the
identity of her biological father is unknown. 17 But Biological
Father’s argument does not address the trial court’s denial of his
rule 60(b) motion to set aside the Decree, much less explain how
the court’s denial constituted abuse of the “broad discretion”
afforded trial courts in ruling on such motions. See In re discipline
of Spencer, 2022 UT 28, ¶ 11, 513 P.3d 759 (quotation simplified).
Accordingly, Biological Father has not carried his burden of
persuasion on this issue, and we do not consider it further.

¶71 Motion to Unseal the Adoption File. Lastly, we address
Biological Father’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his
renewed motion to unseal the adoption file. The court based its
denial of that motion on its denial of his motion to intervene.
Because we affirm the trial court’s determination that Biological
Father was not entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding and
that his consent to the adoption was not required, we likewise
affirm the court’s denial of the renewed motion to unseal the
adoption file.

17. Biological Father also asserts that the Agency and Adoptive
Parents perpetrated fraud on the court by misrepresenting Child’s
age to induce the court to apply subsection (3) of Section 121
instead of subsection (1). Biological Father bases this belief on the
trial court’s reference to a “putative father registry.” But, as
discussed in Part II above, the court’s reference to the registry was
much more likely based on subsection (7), which the court would
have applied regardless of Child’s age. See supra ¶ 51.
Moreover, in denying Biological Father’s motion for a new
trial, the trial court stated that the evidence showed the Agency
was unaware of Biological Father’s existence and claims until after
he moved to intervene in the adoption case, and there was no
evidence indicating that Adoptive Parents were somehow aware
of Biological Father.

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In re adoption of D.K.A.T.

CONCLUSION

¶72 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial
of Biological Father’s motions to intervene, to unseal more of the
adoption file, and to set aside the Decree.

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