Williamson v. Farrell

2024 UT App 111

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS WILLIAMSON AND JENNIFER WILLIAMSON,
Appellants,
v.
ANNE FARRELL, DAVE FARRELL, AND LAURA BLACK,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20221084-CA
Filed August 8, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Patrick Corum
No. 170902215

Erik A. Olson and Christopher D. Ballard,
Attorneys for Appellants
John R. Loftus, Christine E. Ellice, J. Mark Gibb, and
Matthew J. Orme, Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Thomas and Jennifer Williamson (collectively, Plaintiffs)
brought an action against Anne Farrell, Dave Farrell, and Laura
Black (collectively, Defendants) seeking a declaratory judgment
that Plaintiffs did not commit elder abuse against Thomas, Anne,
and Laura’s mother, Ruth Williamson. 1 By the time of trial,
Plaintiffs’ action had been limited to five grounds of elder abuse
under Utah statute. Of the five grounds, the trial court ruled that

1. As is sometimes our practice, we refer to family members by
their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent
informality.
Williamson v. Farrell

Plaintiffs abused Ruth by causing her harm, but it concluded that
they did not commit elder abuse under the remaining four
statutory grounds it considered, including that of financial
exploitation. Because we hold that the trial court only had
jurisdiction to adjudicate whether Plaintiffs financially exploited
Ruth—and not the other four grounds—we vacate the court’s
judgment except for its ruling related to financial exploitation.
And because our resolution of the jurisdictional issue raises new
questions regarding whether Defendants are entitled to attorney
fees under Utah’s bad faith statute, we remand this matter for the
trial court to reconsider Defendants’ attorney fees request in light
of our resolution of this appeal.

BACKGROUND

First Appeal

¶2 Ruth and George B. Williamson had six children: Thomas,
George, Anne, Sue, Patricia, and Laura. During their lives, Ruth
and George B. accumulated substantial assets, including
income-producing real property in California and Utah. They
executed several estate planning documents, naming their
children as beneficiaries in some of them. For over thirty years,
Thomas’s income has come from his management of the family
businesses and assets.

¶3 After George B. passed in 2009, Ruth continued to live in
her home of fifty years located in Palos Verdes Estates, California.
In March 2016, Ruth moved to Utah, where she passed away that
November at the age of ninety-one. At the time of her death, Ruth
was residing with Plaintiffs in their home.

¶4 In December 2016, Thomas filed a petition in Utah’s Fourth
District Court (the Probate Action) seeking to formally administer
Ruth’s estate, of which he claimed to be the rightful personal

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representative. In February 2017, Anne and Laura objected to the
petition, alleging that Thomas was “unsuitable to serve as a
personal representative” because he had, among other things,
engaged in self-dealing and elder abuse. Concerning the
allegations of elder abuse, the objection stated that Anne and
Laura were “compiling further evidence that reflects that
[Thomas] engaged in elder abuse against [Ruth] while she was
living under the laws of the State of California and [they were]
addressing that issue with California counsel toward the end of
pursuing a formal action in that regard.” Shortly afterward, in
April 2017, Anne and her husband, Dave, filed declarations in the
Probate Action alleging that Thomas had taken Ruth to Utah in
March 2016 under false pretenses,isolated her, and prevented her
return to California, causing Ruth to suffer from depression as
well as mental and emotional anguish. Dave’s affidavit
mentioned that Jennifer, Thomas’s wife, helped block Ruth’s
communication with other family members.

¶5 Also in April 2017, Plaintiffs filed the current civil action
against Defendants in Utah’s Third District Court seeking “[a]
declaratory judgment that [they] did not commit elder abuse
against Ruth Williamson, [they] did not violate any statutory or
common law duties owed to Ruth Williamson, and [Defendants]
have no actionable claim against [them] pertaining in any way to
Ruth Williamson.”

¶6 Less than a week after Plaintiffs filed the current action,
Defendants commenced an action in California against Plaintiffs
and eleven others (the California Action). That complaint alleged,
among other things, elder abuse, elder financial abuse, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress related to the care of
Ruth and her estate. Jennifer was eventually dismissed as a
defendant in the California Action for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

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¶7 Later, in the current action, the district court granted
judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint based on
common-law efficiency grounds and its determination that a
declaratory judgment “would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-404 (LexisNexis 2022). 2 Specifically, the court stated that
“a judgment in this case would not conclude the litigation in the
other cases.” The court further noted that “there has been nothing
presented in the complaint or the pleadings since as to whose
definition or standard of ‘elder abuse’”—Utah’s or California’s—
Plaintiffs were “actually asking the court to apply.” The court
stated that if Utah law applied, “then a declaratory judgment in
this case would potentially have no bearing on the California
actions” and that if California law applied, then “the California
courts are in a far better position to interpret and apply their own
laws.”

¶8 Plaintiffs appealed, resulting in our earlier decision in this
matter, Williamson v. Farrell, 2019 UT App 123, 447 P.3d 131
(Williamson I). In that appeal, we reversed the district court’s
dismissal of the current action and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. ¶ 23. We held that “the district court took too
broad a view of its statutory authority to abdicate,” id. ¶ 15,
because the declaratory judgment statute’s use of the singular
term “proceeding” indicates “that it refers to the specific
declaratory judgment action at hand, and not to any larger web of
disputes between the parties,” id. ¶ 14. We also held that the court
improperly dismissed the action insofar as the dismissal was
premised on the court’s common law discretion because Jennifer
was not a party to the California Action or the Probate Action and

2. Because the applicable provisions of the Utah Code in effect at
the relevant times do not differ from those in the most current
printed version in any way material to this appeal, we cite that
version of the Utah Code for convenience.

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because the California Action was filed after the current action. Id.
¶¶ 20–21.

Remand

¶9 Shortly following remand, in response to the district
court’s request for clarification regarding the scope of their
complaint, Plaintiffs submitted a letter stating that

the focus of [their] declaratory relief claim is to
obtain a declaration from the Court that they did not
commit elder abuse against Ruth Williamson in any
way, including physical or financial elder abuse.
Accordingly, the “statutory or common law duties
owed to Ruth Williamson” referenced in the
complaint refer to statutory and common law duties
relating to elder abuse. These duties are outlined in
Utah Code § 62A-3-314[3] as well as Utah common
law governing claims for elder abuse, breach of
fiduciary duty, and confidential relationships.

¶10 Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. In their motion, Plaintiffs argued, in relevant
part, that Utah law—not California law—should be applied to the
elder abuse allegations. In their opposition to Plaintiffs’ summary
judgment motion, Defendants stated they did “not dispute that
the substantive law of Utah should apply to the determination of
Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim as they have framed it in the
pleadings and subsequently confirmed in discovery.”4 Later, in

3. This statute has since been renumbered as Utah Code section
26B-6-213.

4. Defendants did, however, maintain that California law should
govern the allegations of elder abuse at issue in the California
(continued…)

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their trial brief, Plaintiffs also argued that “the Court should apply
Utah law and enter” a declaration “that Thomas and Jennifer
never abused Ruth in Utah.”

¶11 As part of their summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs also
argued that the claims of elder abuse at issue in the case were
limited to the alleged financial exploitation of Ruth because that
was the only relevant claim for which Utah law provided a private
right of action. 5 The parties also argued the issue of which side
bore the burden of proof regarding the elder abuse claims.

¶12 In an oral ruling, the court denied the cross-motions for
summary judgment, concluding that disputed issues of material
fact precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of either
party. Also pretrial, the court ruled that Plaintiffs bore the burden
of establishing the existence of a justiciable controversy, while
Defendants bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that Plaintiffs committed elder abuse against Ruth. The
court further clarified that “[t]he scope of this case is related to
solely acts committed after Ruth was brought to the state of Utah,
acts committed wholly within the state of Utah, and under Utah
law.” Thus, the court limited the presentation of evidence to the
timeframe of Ruth’s relocation to Utah in March 2016 until her
death in November 2016, and it expressly excluded any evidence
related to Ruth’s estate planning or the validity of any of Ruth’s
estate planning documents in part because that was already at
issue in the Probate Action. The court also agreed with
Defendants that the scope of the declaratory judgment action

Action and that any declaratory judgment obtained in the current
action cannot be used to “estop” the California Action.

5. Plaintiffs also argued that in the event California law applied,
which provides broader private rights of action for elder abuse
than Utah law, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15610.07, 15657, there
was no evidence to support claims of elder abuse.

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went “beyond” “conduct that gives rise to a private cause of
action” under Utah’s elder abuse statute and should include “a
real broad cross section of physical, financial elder abuse and
exploitation.”

Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

¶13 In November 2021, the case proceeded to a three-day bench
trial, during which the trial court considered whether Plaintiffs
committed elder abuse under Utah statute against Ruth by
(1) knowingly inflicting harm, (2) isolating her, (3) emotionally or
psychologically abusing her, (4) neglecting her, or (5) financially
exploiting her. See Utah Code Ann. § 26B-6-201(2)(a)–(c), (11), (15),
(16), (20), (22) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023); id. § 76-5-111.4. The court
found Defendants and many of their witnesses “to be extremely
credible” but found Plaintiffs not “credible at all.” Among other
things, the court pointed to an email Thomas sent prior to Ruth’s
move to Utah that contradicted his trial testimony, 6 and the court
also stated that portions of Jennifer’s testimony “strain[ed]
credulity” and contradicted others’ testimony. The following is a
summary of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

¶14 The court found that Plaintiffs and Ruth’s daughter, Sue,
conspired “to move Ruth to Utah as part of a scheme to physically
separate her from the rest of the family and gain control of who
Ruth saw and talked to, when she talked to or saw them and
under what circumstances any such contact would occur” in
order to “exert some level of influence over her related to her
estate planning.” The court found they did so without informing

6. At trial, Thomas testified that the initial plan was for Ruth to
visit Utah only for a few days and that she decided to stay in Utah
shortly after her arrival. But the email Thomas sent to Ruth’s
estate planning attorney almost a week prior to the trip indicated
that Ruth would be moving to Utah and living in an assisted
living center near him.

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Ruth that she was essentially leaving California for good. The
court further found that keeping Ruth “isolated to a significant
degree from Defendants and other family and friends” was an
integral part of their plan.

¶15 Prior to the move, Ruth loved living in Palos Verdes
Estates, had an active social life, and frequently participated in
church activities. Family members, including her sister and many
of her children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren,
frequently visited her. The trial court found that “Ruth was an
integral part of her community in California, she was loved in that
community and she loved that community.” In California, Ruth
was largely self-sufficient, needing only occasional help. She was
also looking forward to attending a large Easter get-together
planned for the end of March 2016.

¶16 In mid-March 2016, Ruth’s daughter, Laura, took Ruth to
Ruth’s California bank in an unsuccessful attempt to add herself
to Ruth’s personal account and possibly to remove Thomas from
that account. The next day, Sue drove Ruth to Utah with only “the
equivalent of an overnight bag.” Ruth believed that her Utah visit
would last only a few days. After the fact, Sue told one of Ruth’s
granddaughters, Katie, that she was concerned Ruth had suffered
a stroke and she had taken Ruth to see a neurologist in Utah. Katie
called Ruth, who told her that Sue had traveled to Utah to
accompany her son to a doctor’s appointment and Ruth had taken
the opportunity to travel with her to visit Ruth’s Park City home.
There was no evidence that Ruth said goodbye to her friends or
church community before leaving or that she told anyone that she
was moving to Utah.7 The court found that Plaintiffs and Sue

7. In April 2016, Sue brought Ruth back to California for a short
visit with Ruth’s sister. None of the other family members were
informed that Ruth was back in California, although she did see
Laura and Katie because they also happened to pay Ruth’s sister
a visit at that time.

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fabricated the story in order to get Ruth to agree to leave
California and that they did not tell Ruth that they intended to
move her to Utah permanently.

¶17 In Utah, Ruth was initially placed in an assisted living
facility for a short while but was later moved into Plaintiffs’ home.
There, Ruth stayed in Jennifer’s former yoga studio. The entrance
to the room had no door, and Ruth slept on a narrow bed that had
previously been used for yoga-based healing. Plaintiffs made it a
point to be physically present with Ruth as much as possible in
order to closely monitor and limit Ruth’s contact with her other
family, particularly Defendants and Katie. Phone calls, although
not altogether prohibited, were rare, short, and of limited subject
matter.

¶18 Katie was able to visit Ruth in or around May. Although
Ruth seemed to be doing well physically, she told Katie that “she
had never been so homesick” and she wanted to return with Katie
to California. Ruth’s sister passed away shortly after Katie’s visit.
Ruth did not attend the funeral even though Ruth was
“extraordinarily close” with her sister, she “desired very much to
attend [the] funeral,” and there was no medical or logistical
reason that prevented her from doing so.

¶19 In June, Anne and two of her sons visited Ruth, but
Thomas refused to allow Ruth to leave his home, claiming to have
guardianship over her. This resulted in an argument and the
police being called. The trial court found that Anne credibly
testified that Ruth appeared “terrified” during the confrontation
and that Plaintiffs “were screaming and yelling and Ruth was in
a panic” and “looked like a caged animal.” Ruth told Anne that
she felt lonely and isolated and that she missed her friends and
her home. Anne subsequently reported to Adult Protective
Services that Ruth was not residing with Plaintiffs willingly.

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¶20 In late June or early July, Anne, Dave, and Katie visited
Utah, but Plaintiffs would not allow Ruth to spend time with them
in the Park City home. Katie was able to visit Ruth twice during
the trip but had to schedule the visits in advance with Plaintiffs.
Following that trip, Katie tried to schedule phone calls with Ruth,
frequently to no avail.

¶21 In October, Anne and Dave again visited Ruth at Plaintiffs’
home after hearing from Katie that Ruth was not doing well.
Jennifer, who was the only one home with Ruth at the time, again
refused to allow Anne and Dave to take Ruth to the Park City
home. Another argument ensued, and the police were again
called.

¶22 In November, concerned that Ruth would soon die, Katie
returned to Utah. She and her children were forced to wait outside
of Plaintiffs’ home for hours, and they were ultimately unable to
see Ruth. Katie found out the following day that Ruth had passed
away.

¶23 Based on these findings of fact, the trial court entered
conclusions of law. The court first ruled that it had jurisdiction to
adjudicate the declaratory judgment action and specifically
determined that Plaintiffs had a legally protectible interest in the
matter. In so concluding, the court distinguished Miller v. Weaver,
2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592, stating that in Miller “the statute relied
upon by plaintiffs did not give rise to an express or implied cause
of action,” whereas in the current action, “while Plaintiffs have
not pointed to any statute or concrete theory under which they
have a legally protectible interest, they have been accused by
Defendants of elder abuse in two separate courts.” The court
stated that it therefore followed that “in consideration of the fact
that the declaratory relief statute is to be liberally interpreted and
administered, Plaintiffs do have a legally protectible interest in a
declaration that they have not committed elder abuse.”

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¶24 Turning next to the merits of the action, the court ruled that
Plaintiffs committed elder abuse by knowingly harming Ruth,
which they did by moving her to Utah and effectively cutting off
contact between her and the rest of her family, resulting in
emotional distress, mental anguish, hurt, and suffering. See Utah
Code Ann. § 26B-6-201(2)(a), (17) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). But the
court further concluded that Plaintiffs did not commit elder abuse
by isolating Ruth because their actions did not satisfy the strict
statutory definition of that term, see id. § 26B-6-201(2)(b), (20), nor
did they commit elder abuse by emotionally or psychologically
abusing Ruth, see id. § 26B-6-201(2)(c), nor by neglecting her, see
id. § 26B-6-201(11), (22). Lastly, the court concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that Plaintiffs
financially exploited Ruth, see id. § 26B-6-201(16); id. § 76-5-111.4,
but the court “expressly except[ed] from its determination at trial
any issues pertaining to Ruth’s estate planning.”

Attorney Fees

¶25 Following the trial court’s decision, Defendants filed a
motion seeking attorney fees and costs. The court granted the
motion, ruling that this case satisfied the elements of Utah’s bad
faith statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(1) (LexisNexis 2022).
First, the court found that Defendants were the prevailing parties
because Plaintiffs did not obtain the declaratory judgment they
sought. Second, the court concluded that the action was without
merit because some of Plaintiffs’ testimony, specifically regarding
the circumstances of Ruth’s move to Utah and extended stay,
“was not just incredible, but was actual perjured testimony.” See
supra ¶ 13 & note 6. Third, the court found that Plaintiffs brought
the action in bad faith. The court again pointed to the perjured
testimony, and it also found that “Plaintiffs did not bring this
action to clear their names” but rather as “part of a strategy of
piecemeal litigation, the purpose of which was to hinder, delay,
and defraud Defendants, and which was premised in part on the
provision of false testimony.” Accordingly, the court ordered

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Plaintiffs to pay $876,295.55 in attorney fees and costs to
Defendants.

¶26 Plaintiffs appeal.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶27 Plaintiffs raise two issues that we consider in this appeal.
First, they argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
declaratory judgment on any statutory ground for elder abuse
other than that of financial exploitation. “Whether a district court
has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law” that we review
for correctness. 8 Summerhaze Co. v. FDIC, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 8, 332 P.3d
908 (quotation simplified).

¶28 Second, Plaintiffs challenge the court’s award of attorney
fees and costs to Defendants under the bad faith statute. “A
[prevailing] party is entitled to attorney fees under the bad faith
statute when an action or defense is both (1) without merit, and
(2) not brought or asserted in good faith.” Kelly v. Timber Lakes
Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 24, 507 P.3d 357 (quotation
simplified). The trial court’s “without merit determination is a
question of law” that we review for correctness. Id. (quotation
simplified). But we review the court’s factual finding that the
action was not brought in good faith for clear error. Id.
“Furthermore, because the good faith element implicates
fact-intensive questions about the losing party’s subjective intent,

8. Plaintiffs also directly challenge the trial court’s ruling that they
committed elder abuse under Utah Code section 26B-6-201(2)(a)
by knowingly harming Ruth. Because our resolution of the
jurisdictional issue is dispositive, we do not reach this additional
argument.

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a lower court’s finding on this element typically will be afforded
a substantial measure of discretion.” Id. (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

¶29 Utah’s Declaratory Judgment Act grants district courts
“the power to issue declaratory judgments determining rights,
status, and other legal relations within its respective jurisdiction”
and provides that “[a]n action or proceeding may not be open to
objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is
prayed for.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-401(1) (LexisNexis 2022). See
Bleazard v. City of Erda, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 39 (“The Declaratory
Judgment Act grants a district court jurisdiction to determine any
question of construction or validity of a statute that affects the
rights, status, or other legal relations of any person and to declare
that person’s rights, status, or legal relations under the statute.”)
(quotation simplified). Nevertheless, “the courts are not a forum
for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions,
and therefore all actions must meet the requisite justiciable and
jurisdictional requirements of any action.” Williamson I, 2019 UT
App 123, ¶ 11, 447 P.3d 131 (quotation simplified). See Summit
County v. Town of Hideout, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 32 (“The statutory
creation of relief in the form of a declaratory judgment does not
create a cause of action or grant jurisdiction to the court where it
would not otherwise exist.”) (quotation simplified). That is, before
an action seeking declaratory judgment may proceed, “(1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties
must be adverse; (3) the parties seeking relief must have a legally
protectible interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between
the parties must be ripe for judicial determination.” Bleazard, 2024
UT 17, ¶ 40 (quotation simplified). All four requirements must be
satisfied before an action for declaratory judgment may move
forward. See Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 15, 66 P.3d 592.

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¶30 Only the third requirement concerning the parties’ legally
protectible interests, which goes toward standing, is at issue in
this appeal. See Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)
(stating that the second and third requirements a plaintiff must
satisfy before obtaining declaratory judgment “represent the
traditional test for standing”). “Standing is a jurisdictional
requirement that must be satisfied before a court may entertain a
controversy between two parties.” Kemp v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2013
UT App 88, ¶ 4, 301 P.3d 23 (quotation simplified). And
“generally speaking, a party has an interest that is legally
protectible for purposes of standing if it has a claim for relief that
emanates from the common law, a statute, or the constitution.”
Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 34 (quotation simplified). Here, by
the time of trial, the sole basis for the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction was Utah’s elder abuse statute—the court did not
address any common law or constitutional considerations.

¶31 “[W]hen a party’s declaratory judgment claim is rooted in
statute, not the constitution or common law, a legally protectible
interest comes from an express or implied statutory right of
action.” Id. ¶ 35. “A private statutory right of action exists when a
private party can bring a lawsuit for relief from injuries caused by
another’s violation of a statute.” Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 45
(quotation simplified). Whether a private statutory right of action
exists presents “a question of statutory interpretation,” for which
“we look first to the plain language of the statute for an express
indication that a private right of action was intended.” Id. ¶ 46
(quotation simplified). “Such an indication is made clear by
explicit language that does not require anyone to add language or
make inferences to impart the full meaning of the statute.” Id.
(quotation simplified).

¶32 Furthermore, absent express statutory language granting a
private right of action, Utah courts “are reluctant to imply a
private right of action based on state law.” Id. ¶ 47 (quotation
simplified). Indeed, “Utah courts have rarely, if ever, found a

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Utah statute to grant an implied private right of action.” Id.
(quotation simplified). This reluctance is elevated when an
implied private right of action would require courts “to infer
language and meaning that does not appear on the face of the
statute or when doing so would be inconsistent with the
Legislature’s statutory scheme,” id. (quotation simplified), or
“when the Legislature has already designated a method of
resolution through an administrative agency specifically
empowered to handle issues,” Miller, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 20.

¶33 Utah Code section 26B-6-201 generally defines elder abuse
as “abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an elder adult,” Utah Code
Ann. § 26B-6-201(11) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023), and further divides
each of these three categories of elder abuse into subcategories, id.
§ 26B-6-201(2), (16), (22). As relevant here, the “abuse” category
includes a subcategory of “knowingly or intentionally” “causing
harm.” Id. § 26B-6-201(2)(a)(ii). Harm, in turn, is defined as “pain,
mental anguish, emotional distress, hurt, physical or
psychological damage, physical injury, serious physical injury,
suffering, or distress inflicted knowingly or intentionally.” Id.
§ 26B-6-201(17). Additionally, the “exploitation” category of elder
abuse includes three subcategories. Id. § 26B-6-201(16). These are
personal dignity exploitation of a vulnerable adult, see id.
§ 76-5-111.3, financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, see id.
§ 76-5-111.4, and sexual exploitation of a vulnerable adult, see id.
§ 76-5b-202. See also id. § 26B-6-201(12), (30) (defining
“[v]ulnerable adult” as, among other things, an “elder adult,”
which, in turn, is defined as “an individual 65 years or older”).

¶34 Utah Code section 26B-6-213 provides that “[a] vulnerable
adult who suffers harm or financial loss as a result of exploitation has
a private right of action against the perpetrator,” and in the event
of the vulnerable adult’s death, “any cause of action under this
section shall constitute an asset of the estate of the vulnerable
adult.” Id. § 26B-6-213(1)–(2) (emphasis added). At issue here is
whether the modifier “as a result of exploitation” applies to both

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“harm” and “financial loss”—or merely to “financial loss.” If the
former, then an express private right of action exists only as to
elder abuse arising from exploitation that results in harm or
financial loss. If the latter, then a private right of action also exists
when the victim of elder abuse suffers harm more generally and
is not then limited to the exploitation category of elder abuse.

¶35 “Our primary task when interpreting these provisions is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature,” Downs v. Thompson,
2019 UT 63, ¶ 17, 452 P.3d 1101, the “best indication” of which “is
the statute’s plain language,” Flowell Elec. Ass’n v. Rhodes Pump,
LLC, 2015 UT 87, ¶ 34, 361 P.3d 91. “When looking at the plain
language, we presume that the Legislature used each word
advisedly, and deem all omissions to be purposeful.” Zilleruelo v.
Commodity Transporters, Inc., 2022 UT 1, ¶ 19, 506 P.3d 509
(quotation simplified). We also “consider the entire [statutory]
text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation
of its many parts.” Salt Lake City Corp. v. Haik, 2020 UT 29, ¶ 15,
466 P.3d 178 (quotation simplified).

¶36 Given the context of the statute at issue, the series-qualifier
canon of statutory interpretation is most helpful in resolving this
dispute. 9 See Downs, 2019 UT 63, ¶¶ 18, 21. It provides that

9. The series-qualifier canon is often in competition with the
last-antecedent canon. Downs v. Thompson, 2019 UT 63, ¶ 18, 452
P.3d 1101. Under the last antecedent canon, “a limiting clause or
phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or
phrase that it immediately follows.” Id. ¶ 19 (quotation
simplified). See LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15, 215 P.3d
135 (“Under the rule of the last antecedent, qualifying words and
phrases are generally regarded as applying to the immediately
preceding words, rather than to more remote ones.”) (quotation
simplified). But “this rule does not prevent us from deciding that
qualifying words and phrases apply to several preceding terms of
(continued…)

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“[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that
involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or
postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.” Id.
¶ 20 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147 (2012)). The “classic
example” of this canon is the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which protects “against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” Downs, 2019 UT 63, ¶ 20 (quotation
simplified). “Applying the series-qualifier canon, we and others
read this text as barring both unreasonable searches and
unreasonable seizures,” that is to say, “both nouns in the series
are qualified by the preceding adjective ‘unreasonable.’” Id. The
same principle can apply when the modifier comes after the
series. Id. When applied to section 26B-6-213(1), the modifier “as
a result of exploitation” would thus modify both “harm” and
“financial loss,” meaning that the private right of action granted
under the statute is limited to the exploitation category of elder
abuse, more specifically to when the victim suffers harm or
financial loss as a result.

¶37 The series-qualifier canon is properly applied to section
26B-6-213(1) because if the modifier “as a result of exploitation”
was limited to “financial loss,” the modifier would be rendered
wholly superfluous, an outcome typically avoided. See Turner v.

the same character.” LPI Services, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15 (quotation
simplified). Rather, “context guides which canons we apply.”
Downs, 2019 UT 63, ¶ 18. See LPI Services, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15 (“Rules
of statutory construction, such as the rule of the last antecedent,
are useful guides, but poor masters, and they should not be
regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the force of law,
or distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent.”) (quotation
simplified). For reasons discussed in greater detail below, the
series-qualifier canon is more appropriately applied to the statute
at issue in this appeal.

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Staker & Parson Cos., 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 (“Wherever
possible, we give effect to every word of a statute, avoiding any
interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute
inoperative or superfluous.”) (quotation simplified). Of the three
categories of elder abuse, only that of exploitation contemplates
financial loss, see Utah Code Ann. § 26B-6-201(16); id. § 76-5-111.4,
thereby rendering the clarification that the financial loss must
result from exploitation entirely unnecessary. Conversely,
“harm”—which is the knowing or intentional infliction of “pain,
mental anguish, emotional distress, hurt, physical or
psychological damage, physical injury, serious physical injury,
suffering, or distress,” id. § 26B-6-201(17)—is not expressly limited
to any of the three categories of elder abuse, see id. It is also entirely
possible for an individual to knowingly or intentionally inflict
harm on a vulnerable adult by means of any of the three
subcategories of exploitation (personal dignity exploitation,
financial exploitation, or sexual exploitation). The modifier “as a
result of exploitation” thus serves a purpose only if it applies to
both “harm” and “financial loss” and is superfluous if applied
only to “financial loss.”

¶38 Additionally, the Utah Code provides alternative means to
address the other two categories of elder abuse. Adult Protective
Services, a unit of the Division of Aging and Adult Services, is
statutorily granted the power “to investigate abuse, neglect, and
exploitation of vulnerable adults and provide appropriate
protective services.” Id. § 26B-6-201(5). See id. §§ 26B-6-202, -205.
And it is the duty of the county or district attorney, and in some
situations of the attorney general, to assist Adult Protective
Services in “initiat[ing] legal proceedings to protect vulnerable
adults” and in “tak[ing] appropriate action to prosecute the
alleged offenders.” Id. § 26B-6-208. Accordingly, our
interpretation of section 26B-6-213(1) would not leave victims of
the abuse or neglect categories of elder abuse without means of

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relief—which would clearly be against our Legislature’s intent.10
For these reasons, we hold that the express statutory language of
section 26B-6-213(1) limits the private right of action to instances
of “harm or financial loss” that were caused “as a result of
exploitation.”

¶39 Here, following a bench trial, the trial court found that
Plaintiffs had committed one form of elder abuse as defined under
section 26B-6-201. Specifically, the court determined that
Plaintiffs’ actions satisfied subsection 201(2)(a) (harm—a
subcategory of abuse), but it also determined that their actions did
not constitute elder abuse under subsections 201(2)(b) (isolation—
also a subcategory of abuse), 201(2)(c) (emotional or psychological
abuse—also a subcategory of abuse), 201(22) (neglect), or 201(16)
(financial exploitation). As discussed above, of these five variants
of elder abuse the court considered, only that of financial
exploitation fell under the exploitation category of elder abuse,
and thus only that allegation carried with it a private right of
action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs had a legally protectible interest
only as to the determination of whether they financially exploited
Ruth between March and November 2016—and the court held
that Plaintiffs did not. The court thus exceeded its jurisdiction
when it adjudicated the remaining four allegations of elder abuse
for which there is no private right of action.

¶40 Defendants resist this conclusion, arguing that “even if
Plaintiffs’ arguments were to be indulged, it begs the question as
to the point of the bench trial.” 11 Defendants point to Plaintiffs’

10. For this same reason, there is no implied private right of action
for elder abuse committed by means of abuse or neglect. Cf. Miller
v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 20, 66 P.3d 592.

11. Defendants also argue that our holding in this appeal
contradicts our prior decision in Williamson I, 2019 UT App 123,
(continued…)

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complaint, in which Plaintiffs sought a broad declaratory
judgment that they “did not commit elder abuse against Ruth,”
that they “did not violate any statutory or common law duties
owed to Ruth,” and that Defendants “have no actionable claim
against [them] pertaining in any way to Ruth.” Defendants also
assert that if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider only the
issue of financial exploitation, given the court’s determination
that the question of whether Plaintiffs exerted undue influence in
Ruth’s estate planning should be reserved for the Probate Action,

447 P.3d 131. Specifically, they point to the statement that “the
requested declaratory judgment would indeed completely
resolve the controversy giving rise to the specific ‘proceeding’
pending before the court.” Id. ¶ 16. At issue in Williamson I was
whether the district court properly dismissed the action under
Utah Code section 78B-6-404 and under its common law
authority. Id. ¶ 13. And in Williamson I, we expressly presumed
for purposes of that appeal that all four of the threshold
requirements for declaratory judgments were met. See id. ¶ 12.
Defendants also point to the statement in Williamson I that the
“judicial power to issue declaratory judgments is broad, and is not
constitutionally restricted to cases and controversies.” Id. ¶ 10
(quotation simplified). However, this argument overlooks the
discussion that followed of the four threshold requirements that
must nevertheless be met before a court may proceed to
adjudicate an action for declaratory judgment. See id. ¶ 11. And
here, we hold that at least one of those requirements was not met
as to four of the five statutory grounds of elder abuse the court
considered at trial. Furthermore, as discussed in greater detail
below, at the time Williamson I was decided, the California elder
abuse statute, which provides broader private rights of action
than its Utah counterpart, was still potentially in play in the
underlying litigation.

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“that would have left essentially nothing for the trial court [in the
current action] to adjudicate.”

¶41 Although Plaintiffs’ complaint sought a declaratory
judgment that they generally did not commit elder abuse in
various forms, by the time of trial those claims had been limited
to five statutory grounds of elder abuse under Utah law. Indeed,
at the time of the Williamson I decision, the potential of California
law being applied was still in play. California law, unlike its Utah
counterpart, expressly allows private actions against defendants
for abuse, neglect, or financial abuse of the elderly where the
defendant is also guilty of “recklessness, oppression, fraud, or
malice in the commission of [the] abuse.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 15657. Thus, a private right of action likely existed for certain
claims of elder abuse that might have been adjudicated under
California law. But post-remand, Plaintiffs argued in their motion
for summary judgment that Utah law—not California law—
should be applied in this case, and Defendants did “not dispute
that the substantive law of Utah should apply to the
determination of Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim as they have
framed it in the pleadings and subsequently confirmed in
discovery.” The trial court agreed, and by the time of trial, the
court had limited the current action to deciding five alleged
statutory grounds of elder abuse under Utah law, and it did not
consider whether Plaintiffs breached any duties they owed to
Ruth under Utah common law. Thus, as the action progressed to
trial, the allegations of elder abuse were specifically identified—
four of which the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate.

¶42 Furthermore, on summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that
because the financial exploitation allegation was the sole claim
that carried with it a private right of action, the court was limited
to considering only that claim at trial. But Defendants convinced
the court that the scope of the declaratory judgment action went
“beyond” “conduct that gives rise to a private cause of action”
under Utah’s elder abuse statute and should include “a real broad

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cross section of physical, financial elder abuse and exploitation.”
Thus, while Plaintiffs certainly bear their share of responsibility
for some of the inefficiencies in the way this lengthy litigation
proceeded, it is Defendants who ultimately prevailed upon the
trial court to try claims that we now hold were jurisdictionally
infirm.

¶43 In sum, because no private right of action exists for the
allegations that Plaintiffs committed elder abuse by harming,
neglecting, isolating, or emotionally or psychologically abusing
Ruth while she was in Utah, the court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it adjudicated those allegations. Accordingly, we vacate the
court’s rulings on those points. But because a private right of
action exists for the allegation that Plaintiffs financially exploited
Ruth, the court’s ruling that Plaintiffs did not commit that form of
elder abuse still stands because Defendants have not challenged
it in a cross-appeal.

II. Attorney Fees

¶44 Under the bad faith statute, “[i]n civil actions, the court
shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the
court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]” Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(1) (LexisNexis 2022). Thus, in addition to
determining whether the party requesting attorney fees under the
bad faith statute is the “prevailing party,” Utah Associated Mun.
Power Sys. v. 3 Dimensional Contractors Inc., 2024 UT App 35, ¶ 74,
547 P.3d 829, the trial court must also make findings regarding
whether the other party’s claim or defense was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith, id.; Pinder v. Duchesne
County Sheriff, 2020 UT 68, ¶ 100, 478 P.3d 610. “A claim [or
defense] is without merit if it is frivolous, is of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact, or clearly lacks a legal
basis for recovery.” Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon,
2002 UT 99, ¶ 30, 61 P.3d 1009 (quotation simplified). And a party

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does not bring a claim or defense in good faith if the party either
“(1) lacks an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in
question, (2) intends to take unconscionable advantage of others,
or (3) intends to or has knowledge of the fact that his actions will
hinder, delay, or defraud others.” Id. ¶ 29.

¶45 Here, the trial court ruled that Defendants were the
prevailing parties because Plaintiffs did not obtain the declaratory
judgment they sought. The court further ruled that the action was
without merit because some of Plaintiffs’ testimony was perjured
and that Plaintiffs brought the action in bad faith because they did
so as “part of a strategy of piecemeal litigation, the purpose of
which was to hinder, delay, and defraud Defendants, and which
was premised in part on the provision of false testimony.” But, as
discussed in Part I, of the five statutory grounds for elder abuse
that the trial court considered at trial, the court had jurisdiction to
adjudicate only whether Plaintiffs financially exploited Ruth,
which it addressed in a limited way. Specifically, it considered
evidence only from the time Ruth moved to Utah in March 2016
until her death in November 2016, and it “expressly except[ed]
from its determination at trial any issues pertaining to Ruth’s
estate planning.” Ultimately, the court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor on
that issue, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to find
that Plaintiffs financially exploited Ruth during that time. So, on
that issue at least, Plaintiffs were the prevailing party. And while
we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the
claims that did not give rise to a private right of action, the trial
court had determined on the record before it that Plaintiffs had
not committed three other variants of elder abuse.

¶46 Given our resolution of the jurisdiction issue in Part I, new
issues arise regarding the trial court’s award of attorney fees
under the bad faith statute. To name a few: whether Defendants
are still the prevailing party in the action considered as a whole;
whether, given that Plaintiffs prevailed on the only claim that the
court had jurisdiction to decide, Plaintiffs’ action lacked merit;

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and whether Plaintiffs’ false testimony, which does not seem to
relate to the financial exploitation claim but which did relate to
their defense against at least some of the four other claims, 12 can
still serve as a basis for the court’s findings regarding merit and
bad faith. 13 Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to consider
anew Defendants’ request for attorney fees under the bad faith
statute. 14

12. The trial court ruled that Defendants carried the burden of
proof at trial on all elder abuse claims, which ruling has not been
challenged by either party on appeal. Thus, although Plaintiffs
argued on summary judgment that a private right of action
existed only as to the financial exploitation claim, it is conceivable
that Plaintiffs’ defense at trial against the claims to which the false
testimony related may nonetheless have been meritless or in bad
faith.

13. We express no opinion on the resolution of these questions.
Indeed, questions relating to which side prevailed and good faith
are generally left to the discretion of the trial court. See Maxwell
Masonry Restoration & Cleaning LLC v. North Ridge Constr. Inc., 2022
UT App 109, ¶ 28, 518 P.3d 164 (“Whether a party is the prevailing
party in an action is a decision left to the sound discretion of the
trial court and reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”) (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1265 (Utah 2023); Kelly v. Timber
Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 24, 507 P.3d 357
(“Because the good faith element implicates fact-intensive
questions about the losing party’s subjective intent, a lower
court’s finding on this element typically will be afforded a
substantial measure of discretion.”) (quotation simplified).

14. Defendants also seek an award of attorney fees incurred on
appeal. “Generally, when a party who received attorney fees
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees
(continued…)

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CONCLUSION

¶47 Because, by the time of trial, the remaining allegations of
elder abuse were based solely on Utah statute, the trial court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate only the claims that carried a statutory
private right of action. And the only relevant claim with such a
private right of action was that of financial exploitation, which the
court determined Plaintiffs did not commit. We therefore vacate
the court’s judgment, except for its financial exploitation ruling in
Plaintiffs’ favor. We also vacate the court’s award of attorney fees
to Defendants under the bad faith statute and remand for the trial
court to reconsider Defendants’ request in light of our resolution
of this appeal.

reasonably incurred on appeal.” Fadel v. Deseret First Credit Union,
2017 UT App 165, ¶ 38, 405 P.3d 807 (quotation simplified), cert.
denied, 409 P.3d 1047 (Utah 2017). This principle likewise “applies
when the basis for attorney fees in the trial court is the bad faith
statute.” Id. (quotation simplified). But because we remand the
issue of attorney fees for the trial court to consider anew,
Defendants’ entitlement to attorney fees at the trial court level is
yet to be determined. “Thus, any appropriate award of attorney
fees on appeal is dependent upon that determination and should
be assessed by the district court on remand.” Crank v. Utah Jud.
Council, 2001 UT 8, ¶ 44 n.18, 20 P.3d 307.

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