State v. Thompson

2025 UT App 185
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
R OWDY LEE THOMPSON ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240027-CA
Filed December 18, 2025
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Sean M. Petersen
No. 071403619
Randall W. Richards and Benjamin R. Richards,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Karen A. Klucznik,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. O RME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	Nearly 20 years ago, Rowdy Lee Thompson pled guilty to
sexually abusing a minor. After completing a jail sentence and
probation, he sought to take advantage of a new Utah statute
which allows an offender who was under 21 at the time, and
whose crime did not involve force or coercion, to be removed
from the sex offender registry after 10 years. Thompson filed a
motion to clarify his sentence, asking the district court to make a
specific finding that his offense did not involve force or coercion.
The court denied the motion, determining that, based on the
victim’s statement, it could not make such a finding.

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	2 	2025 UT App 185
¶2 	On appeal, Thompson takes issue with this determination.
He argues the court relied on irrelevant factors while ignoring
relevant 	ones. 	He 	also 	contends the 	court 	plainly 	erred 	in
accepting—or, in the alternative, that his trial counsel (Counsel)
was ineffective in failing to object to—a misstatement of the law
advanced by the prosecutor. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶3 	In 2007, 19-year-old Thompson and his roommates invited
a group of girls to their apartment. One of the girls—13-year-old
Anna1—later provided a written statement to police in which she
claimed that Thompson flirted with her as she sat on the couch in
the apartment. Anna stated that she and Thompson then went
into his bedroom where he kissed her and suggested that they
have sex. She also stated that when she told Thompson “no,” he
called her a “fucking bitch,” pushed her down onto the bed hard
enough to make her head hit the wall, got on top of her, and raped
her.
¶4 	Thompson 	was 	charged 	with 	rape 	of 	a 	child 	or,
alternatively, object rape of a child, both first-degree felonies. But
he later pled guilty to one charge of sexual abuse of a child, a
second-degree felony. The statement in support of the guilty plea
laid out the elements of the offense, stating,
[A]t the time and place alleged, the Defendant,
under circumstances not amounting to rape of a
child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or
an attempt to commit any of these offenses, touched
the genitalia of a female child with his hand with the
1. A pseudonym.

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	3 	2025 UT App 185
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the
Defendant.
¶5 	The plea agreement further indicated,
The Defendant has been allowed to plead the facts
as supported by Defendant’s statement to the police
when 	arrested, 	a 	psycho-sexual 	evaluation 	and
polygraph 	examination 	which 	comport 	with
Defendant’s version of the event. The Prosecution
and the Defense find that such an agreement is
appropriate in light of the discrepancies in the
victim’s 	statement 	and 	the 	results 	of 	the
aforementioned 	psycho-sexual 	evaluation 	and
polygraph.
Accordingly, the plea was based on Thompson’s version of
events, which was as follows:
[A]t the time and place alleged, the Defendant met
the victim at his college apartment. The Defendant
and the victim played video games and then went
to Defendant’s bedroom where Defendant touched
the victim’s genitals with his hand with the intent to
arouse or gratify his sexual desire.
¶6 	The court accepted the plea, and Thompson was sentenced
to a suspended prison term, 310 days in jail, and 36 months of
probation. 	In 	2011, 	Thompson’s 	probation 	was 	successfully
terminated. Due to the nature of his offense, he was placed on the
sex offender registry.
¶7 	In March 2022, Thompson moved for a two-step reduction
of 	his 	sentence 	from 	a 	second-degree 	felony 	to 	a 	class 	A
misdemeanor. But the parties eventually concluded that the
reduction was “prohibited.” So in April 2023, Thompson filed a
motion 	to 	clarify 	his 	sentence. 	At 	that 	time, 	section

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	4 	2025 UT App 185
77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A) 	of 	the 	Utah 	Code 	provided 	that 	“an
offender who commits the offense when the offender is under 21
years of age” and whose offense “does not involve force or
coercion” may, pursuant to section 77-41-105(3)(a), be removed
from the sex offender registry “10 years after termination of
sentence.” See Utah Code Ann. § 77-41-105(3)(iii)(A) (LexisNexis
2023).2 Thompson, who was under 21 at the time of the offense
and who had been registered for over 10 years by the time he filed
his motion to clarify, asked the district court to find that his
offense did not involve force or coercion so he could be removed
from the registry.
¶8 	At a hearing on the motion to clarify, Thompson focused
on the fact that force and coercion were not elements of the offense
of sexual abuse of a child. He argued that his guilty plea to that
offense was based on his own version of events, which did not
include any force or coercion. And he pointed out that the results
of 	his 	psychosexual 	evaluation 	and 	polygraph 	examination
comported with this version of events. He also urged the court not
to rely on Anna’s written statement in determining whether the
offense involved force or coercion.
¶9 	The prosecutor argued that a finding regarding force or
coercion should not rely on the statutory elements of the charged
offense, stating, “[I]f I’m not mistaken, I don’t believe that the
word ‘force’ appears in any of the elements of any child sex abuse
statute: Rape of a child, object rape of a child, sex abuse of a child,
aggravated sex abuse of a child. And I’m almost certain that that
word ‘force’ is not included.” The State also argued that, based on
Anna’s written statement to the police, the court could not find
that Thompson’s abuse of Anna did not involve force or coercion.
2. The relevant provisions have since been repealed and re-
codified. Throughout this opinion we cite the provisions in effect
at the time the court ruled on Thompson’s motion.

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	5 	2025 UT App 185
¶10 	In an oral ruling, the court3 concluded,
The Court is in receipt of the victim’s written
statement. The statement does indicate and alleges
that the defendant used force and/or coercion. As it
relates to this matter, the facts described by the
victim 	preclude 	the 	defendant 	from 	receiving
modification 	of 	his 	current 	lifetime 	registration
requirement under Subsection (3)(c)(iii) as the Court
cannot make a finding based upon its review that
the offense does not involve force or coercion.
Thus, 	the 	court 	denied 	Thompson’s 	motion 	to 	clarify—the
decision from which he now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶11 	Thompson argues the district court ignored certain factors
and 	improperly 	considered 	others—namely, 	Anna’s 	written
statement—in reaching its conclusion regarding force or coercion.
The parties disagree about the applicable standard of review.
Thompson argues this is an issue reviewed for abuse of discretion,
consistent with other sentencing decisions. The State counters that
because the issue being appealed is the denial of the motion to
clarify—not 	specifically 	a 	sentencing 	decision—we 	should
instead review the denial for correctness. Because the district
court’s conclusion was based on its review of the written record,
which we are in the same position to assess, we agree with the
State and review the court’s denial of the motion to clarify for
correctness. See State v. Jiminez-Wiss, 2015 UT App 36, ¶ 15, 345
P.3d 743.
3. Judge Sean M. Petersen, who ruled on Thompson’s motion to
clarify, did not preside over the initial criminal proceedings.

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	6 	2025 UT App 185
¶12 	Thompson also argues the district court plainly erred in
accepting, and Counsel was ineffective in failing to object to, the
prosecutor’s alleged misstatement of the law regarding force or
coercion in sex offenses. Claims of plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel present questions of law that we also review
for correctness. See State v. Samora, 2022 UT App 7, ¶ 16, 504 P.3d
195, cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1254 (Utah 2022).
ANALYSIS
¶13 	Thompson filed a motion to clarify his sentence because he
was required to register as a sex offender for life. See Utah Code
Ann. 	§ 	77-41-105(3)(c)(ii) 	(LexisNexis 	2023). 	But 	Utah 	Code
section 	77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A)—enacted 	after 	Thompson 	was
sentenced—provided an exception to lifetime registration, stating
that 	“[i]f 	the 	sentencing 	court 	at 	any time 	after 	conviction
determines that the offense does not involve force or coercion,
lifetime registration . . . does not apply to an offender who
commits the offense when the offender is under 21 years old.” If
this exception applies, “the offender need only register for the
duration of his or her sentence plus ten years.” State v. Lightel, 2025
UT App 40, ¶ 10, 567 P.3d 610, cert. denied, 574 P.3d 523 (Utah
2025). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-41-105(3)(a), (3)(c)(iii)(A). Having
completed his sentence and been registered as a sex offender for
10 years thereafter, Thompson sought to be removed from the
registry. But the district court concluded that it could not make
the necessary finding that Thompson’s abuse of Anna did not
involve force or coercion. Thompson raises two challenges to this
conclusion. As hereafter explained, we are not persuaded by
Thompson’s arguments.
I. Consideration of Improper Factors
¶14 	Thompson first argues that the district court failed to
consider certain relevant factors, including his version of events

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	7 	2025 UT App 185
as set forth in the plea agreement and the results of both the
psychosexual evaluation and the polygraph examination he took
shortly after the abuse. And he argues the court improperly relied
on Anna’s written statement to the police. But we see no error
here.
¶15 	First, Thompson provides no indication that the court
did not consider the factors he urges it should have. The court
had before it the record of the case. Although incomplete due to
its vintage, the record included the plea agreement and the
results of 	both 	the 	psychosexual 	evaluation 	and 	the
polygraph examination. From this record, the court concluded it
could not make a finding that Thompson’s abuse of Anna did
not involve 	force 	or 	coercion. 	True, 	the 	court 	specifically
recognized 	Anna’s 	statement, 	noting 	that 	the 	statement
“does indicate and alleges that [Thompson] used force and/or
coercion,” 	and 	concluded 	that 	the 	facts 	therefore
“preclude [Thompson] from receiving modification of his current
lifetime registration requirement . . . as the Court cannot make a
finding based upon its review that the offense does not involve
force or coercion.” But this shows that the court was swayed by
Anna’s statement—not that it “solely” relied on it, as Thompson
argues.
¶16 	Thompson further argues that because the plea agreement
noted 	that 	Anna’s 	statement 	contained 	“discrepancies,” 	the
statement 	was 	“irrelevant” 	and 	the 	court 	should 	not
have considered it at all. But the plea agreement contained
concessions made by both the State and Thompson. One of
those was that the plea would be based on Thompson’s version of
events. See State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(noting 	that 	“in 	plea 	agreement 	cases, 	the 	‘facts’ 	listed 	in
final, often 	amended, 	charging 	documents 	follow 	from 	an
agreed upon 	penalty” 	and 	that 	pleas 	“are 	entered 	based
upon imaginary or fictional sets of facts”) (quotation simplified).
These 	facts 	were 	relevant 	for 	sentencing. 	But 	the 	plea

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	8 	2025 UT App 185
agreement and the facts contained therein did not limit the
court’s consideration of other facts in the record or otherwise
constrain 	the 	determination 	that 	the 	court 	was 	required 	to
make here.4 This is so because both the plea agreement and
Thompson’s 	version 	of 	events 	were 	silent 	as 	to 	whether
Thompson used force or coercion in “touch[ing] the victim’s
genitals with his hand.”
¶17 	Section 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A) required the district court to
make a finding on whether Thompson’s abuse involved force or
coercion. Given the silence of the plea agreement concerning force
or coercion, we conclude that the court correctly considered the
other 	materials 	in 	the 	record 	before 	it, 	including 	Anna’s
statement.
4. Relatedly, Thompson argues that the court’s consideration of
Anna’s statement was a breach of the plea agreement—which, in
his view, required the court to consider only his version of events.
Thompson relies on this court’s opinion in State v. Yates, 918 P.2d
136 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), wherein we stated that because a
defendant pled guilty to theft, the court “should not have
considered evidence or argument at sentencing about the actual
value 	of 	the 	stolen 	property” 	because 	the 	“actual 	value 	is
irrelevant after the State and the defendant have entered into a
plea agreement.” Id. at 139. But Yates is readily distinguishable, as
it concerned the evidence the court considered at sentencing. And
there, we held that the district court improperly considered
evidence that explicitly contradicted the agreed-upon value set
forth in the plea agreement. Here, in this unique post-sentencing
posture, 	the 	court 	was 	required 	to 	determine 	whether
Thompson’s offense involved force or coercion. And the plea
agreement was silent as to those factors. Thus, Thompson has not
persuaded us that the district court breached the plea agreement
by considering Anna’s statement.

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	9 	2025 UT App 185
II. Incorrect Statement of the Law
¶18 	During oral argument on Thompson’s motion to clarify,
the prosecutor noted that Thompson was “charged with child sex
offenses” and stated, “[I]f I’m not mistaken, I don’t believe that
the word ‘force’ appears in any elements of any child sex abuse
statute: Rape of a child, object rape of a child, sex abuse of a child,
aggravated sex abuse of a child.” Thompson argues that the
district court plainly erred in relying on this misstatement of law
and, in the alternative, that Counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to it. We disagree.
¶19 	“Although plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel
are 	distinct 	concepts, 	they 	each 	require 	the 	defendant 	to
demonstrate that the alleged error or deficiency resulted in
prejudice,” meaning “that there is a reasonable probability that
but for the alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” State v. Haar, 2021 UT App 109, ¶¶ 53–54, 500 P.3d
102 (quotation simplified). Because both claims “share a common
standard of prejudice,” the lack of such a showing “will prove
fatal to each” claim. Id. ¶ 53 (quotation simplified).
¶20 	We agree with Thompson that the prosecutor’s statement
was legally incorrect because, at the time he made the statement,
“force, duress, violence, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat
of harm” were aggravating factors to a sexual abuse of a child
charge. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.3(2)(a)(i)(B) (LexisNexis
2023). But we are not convinced that, absent this misstatement, the
district 	court 	would 	have 	reached 	a 	different 	conclusion
regarding whether Thompson’s abuse of Anna involved force or
coercion.
¶21 	In 	determining 	whether 	an 	offense 	involves 	force 	or
coercion in this context, the court cannot simply evaluate the
statutory elements of the offense. See State v. Lightel, 2025 UT App
40, ¶ 20, 567 P.3d 610 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a

State v. Thompson
20240027-CA 	10 	2025 UT App 185
finding of force or coercion under section 77-41-105(3)(c)(iii)(A) is
premised solely on the statutory elements of the offense at issue,
as, in some cases, this would result in a defendant having to show
“only . . . that he or she was under age twenty-one at the time of
the crime,” which would be “contrary to the legislature’s plain
mandate that a two-factored factual inquiry be employed before
excepting an adult offender from otherwise-required lifetime
registration”) (emphases in original), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 523
(Utah 2025). Moreover, had the court looked to the statute here, it
would be evaluating the elements of sexual abuse, which do not
include force or coercion—not the elements of aggravated sexual
abuse, which do. So any misstatement of the law regarding other
sexual offenses did not affect the court’s analysis of whether
Thompson’s sexual abuse of Anna involved force or coercion.
¶22 	Thus, even without the prosecutor’s misstatement of the
law, there is no likelihood of the court reaching a different
conclusion. Because Thompson has not shown that he was
prejudiced, he “cannot succeed under the rubric of either plain
error or ineffective assistance” and both claims fail. Haar, 2021 UT
App 109, ¶ 54 (quotation simplified).
CONCLUSION
¶23 	In addressing Thompson’s motion to clarify, the district
court properly considered the entire record before it, including
Anna’s written statement to the police. And Thompson has not
shown that the court plainly erred insofar as it relied on the
prosecutor’s misstatement of the law regarding sexual offenses or
that Counsel was ineffective in failing to object to it.
¶24 	Affirmed.