Coombs v. NWR LTD

2026 UT App 145
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
K IRK WADE C OOMBS ; R OCHE R ANCHES , I NC .; WF GORING AND
S ONS , INC .; VICARS TRUCKING, I NC .; Y OUNG R ESOURCES LTD
PARTNERSHIP ; J6 R ANCHES , LLC; BURKE N. U DY ; C ORINNE H. U DY ;
AND N.W.R. LTD P ARTNERSHIP ,
Appellees,
v.
NATURAL C HOICE, LLC,
Appellant.
K IRK WADE C OOMBS ; R OCHE R ANCHES , I NC .; WF GORING AND
S ONS , INC .; VICARS TRUCKING, I NC .; Y OUNG R ESOURCES LTD
PARTNERSHIP ; J6 R ANCHES , LLC; BURKE N. U DY ; C ORINNE H. U DY ;
AND NATURAL C HOICE, LLC,
Appellees,
v.
N.W.R. LTD PARTNERSHIP ,
Appellant.
Opinion
Nos. 20240072-CA, 20240682-CA
Filed September 24, 2026
First District Court, Brigham City Department
The Honorable Brandon J. Maynard
No. 160100162
Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Rachel Phillips
Ainscough, Hannah Leavitt-Howell, Mikayla Irvin,
and Laura J. Fuller, Attorneys for Appellant and
Appellee Natural Choice, LLC
Troy L. Booher, Taylor P. Webb, Olivia C.
Shaughnessy, David E. Kingston, Todd Weiler, and
Kristen Kiburtz, Attorneys for Appellant and
Appellee N.W.R. LTD Partnership

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Jonathan R. Grover, Attorney for all other Appellees
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN D. TENNEY and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	In 	the 	underlying 	case, 	Kirk 	Wade 	Coombs; 	Roche
Ranches, Inc.; WF Goring and Sons, Inc.; Vicars Trucking, Inc.;
Young Resources LTD Partnership; J6 Ranches, LLC; Burke N.
Udy; and Corinne H. Udy (collectively, Landowners) brought
claims against N.W.R. LTD Partnership (NWR) and Natural
Choice, LLC (Natural Choice), alleging that the negligence of
NWR and Natural Choice caused a wildfire that spread to and
damaged their properties. At the close of trial, the jury found that
NWR and Natural Choice were both negligent and both caused
damages, but it attributed one hundred percent of the fault to
NWR. 	Having 	done 	so, 	it 	assessed 	compensatory 	damages
against NWR (but not against Natural Choice), after which it
awarded punitive damages against both NWR and Natural
Choice.
¶2 	NWR and Natural Choice separately appealed, and we
address both appeals in this opinion. NWR argues in its appeal
that 	the 	special 	verdict 	form 	completed 	by 	the 	jury 	was
inconsistent and requires a new trial and that the trial court erred
in determining otherwise. Natural Choice argues in its appeal that
the trial court erred in allowing Landowners to proceed on a
vicarious liability claim that it asserts Landowners never pleaded.
We agree that the jury verdict was inconsistent and requires a new
trial, so we vacate the verdict and remand this case for further
proceedings. We also exercise our discretion to provide guidance
upon remand related to Natural Choice’s vicarious liability
argument, 	determining 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	did 	not 	err 	in

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considering the vicarious liability claim to have been sufficiently
pleaded.1
BACKGROUND
¶3 	NWR owns land in a canyon in Box Elder County that
borders properties owned by Landowners. Natural Choice leased
this land from NWR via a lease agreement signed on July 1, 2014.
Natural Choice is owned by Jeremiah Kingston, who is related to
certain partners and shareholders of NWR.
The Fire
¶4 	In the summer of 2016, Luke Nelson, who is also related to
Jeremiah,2 was working for NWR. According to Luke, Box Elder
County warned him that the thistle on NWR’s property was
becoming a problem and needed to be taken care of. Luke said he
then informed Jeremiah about the notice to remove the thistle.
¶5 	However, another relative, Samuel Kingston, who was the
one who attempted to remove the thistle, would later testify that
he was not aware of any direction from the county to cut down
thistle. Instead, he understood that he was going to knock down
weeds on the property to clear out the area so he could make
improvements to the water pumping system—a job that he said
he was hired to perform as an independent contractor.
1. Each appellant raises additional issues in its appeal. However,
because we determine that a new trial is necessary based on the
inconsistent verdict, we need not reach these additional issues.
2. Because multiple individuals involved in this case share a last
name, we refer to the involved individuals by their given names,
with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.

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¶6 	Either way, on August 3, 2016, Natural Choice sent Samuel
to clear the thistle with a backhoe. Samuel drove the backhoe up
the canyon to the property and began using the bucket on the
backhoe to flatten the thistle. At some point, “a fire started where
the weeds had just been knocked down by the backhoe.” Samuel
first responded by using the backhoe to push the burning thistle
into areas of dirt in an attempt to stop the fire. While Samuel was
trying to stop the fire, he also took out his cell phone and
attempted to call 911 and Jeremiah, but he had no service. When
it became clear that the fire was beyond his control, Samuel began
driving the backhoe down the canyon for help. Somewhere along
the way, his cell phone gained service and a call to Jeremiah
successfully went through.
¶7 	Firefighters soon arrived at the scene and, after fighting the
fire for some time, were finally able to extinguish it. By that point,
the fire had burned over 20,000 acres, including portions of
Landowners’ properties.
The Lawsuit Filings and Discovery
¶8 	In October 2016, Landowners sued NWR, seeking damages
caused by the fire. Landowners asserted claims of negligence and
nuisance, among other claims. NWR then filed a third-party
complaint against Natural Choice, alleging negligence, breach of
contract, and indemnification. Landowners thereafter amended
their complaint to include Natural Choice 	as an additional
defendant.
¶9 	Landowners later amended their complaint again, this
time adding claims of vicarious liability and alter ego against
NWR. Landowners asserted that under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, NWR was “responsible for the negligence and any
breach of duties . . . by Natural Choice which ha[d] caused
damages 	to 	[Landowners].” 	Landowners 	also 	argued 	that

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because there was “such a unity of interest, ownership[,] and
control 	by 	[NWR] 	and 	Natural 	Choice 	that 	they 	[were]
inseparable one from another,” the two entities were alter egos of
each other and, thus, “each [was] personally liable for the actions
of the other, and judgment must therefore be entered against
[NWR] and Natural Choice, jointly and severally.”
¶10 	Landowners’ amended complaint contained essentially the
same allegations of negligence as found in their first complaint.
Specifically, Landowners alleged, “On or about August 3, 2016,
[NWR and Natural Choice], their agents or employs, started or
ignited a fire while scraping and cleaning a thistle patch with a
backhoe.” Landowners then argued that NWR and Natural
Choice “owed a duty of care concerning the safety of the manner
or method of performance implemented by any person operating
equipment or starting a fire” and that NWR and Natural Choice
“owed a duty to [Landowners] to act in a reasonable manner
when using their backhoe to prohibit causing destruction to
[Landowners’] property.” Landowners also argued that NWR
and Natural Choice had breached these duties “by wrongfully
igniting a wildfire which consumed [Landowners’] properties.”
However, despite the fact that the amended complaint clearly
treated the operation of the backhoe on the day of the fire as
central to Landowners’ claims, and despite the fact that the
amended complaint had mentioned the actions of “agents or
employs,” Samuel was not mentioned by name anywhere in the
amended complaint.
¶11 	Nonetheless, early filings in the case by Natural Choice
seemed to reflect its understanding that Samuel was acting on its
behalf, with Natural Choice characterizing itself as the party that
“was using a backhoe” on the day of the fire and the “only party
present at the time the fire was started.” And when Natural
Choice 	provided 	initial 	disclosures 	in 	August 	2017, 	those
disclosures identified Samuel as an “individual likely to have

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discoverable information” because he had been “working for
[Natural Choice] on the day of the fire” and was “likely to have
information about the use of the backhoe by Natural Choice.”
Additionally, during their depositions, both Jeremiah and Samuel
testified that Samuel was an employee of Natural Choice, and for
the deposition of the company, Samuel was designated as a rule
30(b)(6) 	representative 	to 	answer 	certain 	questions 	as 	“a
representative” and “an agent” of Natural Choice, see Utah R. Civ.
P. 30(b)(6) (“A party may name as the witness a corporation, a
partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, describe
with reasonable particularity the matters on which questioning is
requested, and direct the organization to designate one or more
officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons to testify on
its behalf.”).
¶12 	Shortly before trial, in September 2023, the court held a
hearing to discuss proposed jury instructions and objections that
had been recently raised in response to them. Landowners had
proposed an instruction telling the jury that Landowners were
asserting that Samuel was an agent of Natural Choice “acting
within the scope of [his] employment when the fire started,” and
then instructing the jury that if the jury agreed with that assertion,
it must find Natural Choice liable for Samuel’s actions. At the
hearing, Natural Choice opposed the instruction, arguing that in
Landowners’ amended complaint “they never allege[d] that
Natural Choice [was] vicariously liable for the acts of another
person” 	and, 	thus, 	that 	Landowners 	were 	“trying 	to 	give
instructions regarding a cause of action that they did not bring.”
¶13 	Landowners responded, pointing out that “all of the causes
of action against Natural Choice . . . [were] for conduct which
Natural Choice as an entity could not itself engage in” and that
“Natural Choice could only be held liable for starting a fire
vicariously.” They then asserted that “because [Samuel] was an
employee or agent of Natural Choice, Natural Choice [was] liable

Coombs v. Natural Choice
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for his actions in starting the fire, regardless of whether the words
‘respondeat superior’ appeared in the complaint or not.”
¶14 	The court agreed with Landowners, determining that the
claim had “been pled sufficiently to be able to move forward.”
The court recognized the dispute regarding whether Samuel had
ever been employed by Natural Choice, but the court stated that
this was “a factual issue that would be determined by the jury”
and that it did not have a bearing on whether the claim was
sufficiently pleaded.
The Trial and the Special Verdict Forms
¶15 	A jury trial was held in October and November 2023. One
of the many issues addressed at trial was the relationship between
Natural Choice and Samuel. Samuel and Jeremiah, on the one
hand, testified that Samuel was working as an independent
contractor on the day of the fire. Landowners, on the other hand,
presented evidence that Samuel was an employee of Natural
Choice, questioning Jeremiah and Samuel about their previous
deposition testimony where they had agreed that Samuel was an
employee and about the fact that Samuel had been designated as
a rule 30(b)(6) representative to answer questions on behalf of
Natural Choice in its deposition.
¶16 	After 	nine 	days 	of 	testimony, 	the 	jury 	began 	its
deliberations, guided by a special verdict form to which the
parties had stipulated. The first four questions on the special
verdict form asked (1) whether NWR was negligent in causing the
fire, (2) whether Natural Choice was negligent in causing the fire,
(3) whether NWR’s negligence was “a substantial factor in
causing” 	Landowners’ 	damages, 	and 	(4) 	whether 	Natural
Choice’s 	negligence 	was 	“a 	substantial 	factor 	in 	causing”
Landowners’ damages. Several questions later, question 10 asked,
“Was Natural Choice an ‘alter ego’ of NWR?” And question 12

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asked the jury to allocate “[w]hat percentage of the fault [was]
attributable” to each of several entities, including NWR and
Natural Choice.
¶17 	During deliberations, the jury asked the court, “We need
some clarification on question 12 of the special verdict form?” The
court responded, “Please be more specific in your request.” The
jury then clarified, “We want to know if the percentage of fault to
each choice correlates to the [amount] of damages that each
defendant would have to pay.” The court discussed the request
with the parties, and they agreed on the following response: “It
depends on how other questions in the special verdict form are
answered.”
¶18 	The jury thereafter returned a verdict. The jury answered
each of the first four questions in the affirmative, finding that both
NWR and Natural Choice were negligent in starting the fire and
that the negligence of each was “a substantial factor in causing”
Landowners’ damages. The jury also answered question 10
affirmatively, finding that Natural Choice was an alter ego of
NWR. But then, in response to question 12, the jury indicated that
“100%” of the fault was attributable to NWR and that “0%” of the
fault was attributable to each of the other entities, including
Natural 	Choice. 	The 	jury 	also 	determined 	the 	amounts 	of
damages sustained by the individual landowners.
¶19 	The jury remained empaneled, as an additional trial day
was needed to address the issue of punitive damages. While the
jury was still empaneled, NWR filed a motion pursuant to rule 49
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the jury’s
verdict was inconsistent and requesting that the court “either
return the jury for further consideration, or order a new trial.”
NWR argued that the jury’s allocation of all the fault to NWR and
none of the fault to Natural Choice “contradict[ed] the jury’s
finding that Natural Choice was negligent, and that its negligence

Coombs v. Natural Choice
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caused some of [Landowners’] damages.” The trial court denied
the motion, explaining its view that the verdict was consistent
because the jury found that Natural Choice was an alter ego of
NWR and, therefore, “in the jury’s mind, [NWR] would have been
100 percent liable because of that.”
¶20 	The parties then tried the punitive damages issue. In his
statements to the jury, Natural Choice’s attorney argued, “You
put 100 percent of the fault on NWR. And so I would suggest to
you that the amount of punitive damages to Natural Choice
should also be zero.” Nonetheless, the jury ultimately returned a
second special verdict determining that NWR and Natural Choice
should each be required to pay $1,185,000 in punitive damages.
The Posttrial Motion
¶21 	After the jury was discharged, NWR filed a motion for a
new trial. Among other issues it raised, NWR argued for a second
time that a new trial was warranted based on the inconsistent
verdict, incorporating the same arguments from its earlier rule 49
motion. At the hearing on the motion, NWR explained that it “still
believe[d] 	that 	the 	verdict 	was 	inherently 	and 	internally
inconsistent” 	and 	wanted 	to 	“preserv[e] 	that 	argument 	for
appeal.” The trial court again denied NWR’s request. NWR and
Natural Choice then separately appealed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶22 	In its appeal, NWR argues that the trial court erred in
ruling that the jury verdict was not inconsistent. “We review for
correctness a trial court’s determination of whether a special
verdict is inconsistent.” Tooele Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Tooele City,
2012 UT App 214, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d 709.

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¶23 	In its appeal, Natural Choice argues that the trial court
erred in allowing Landowners to proceed on a claim of vicarious
liability that it believes Landowners had not sufficiently pleaded.
Although this issue arose in the context of objections to jury
instructions, 	the 	underlying 	issue 	is 	whether 	Landowners
sufficiently raised the issue of Natural Choice’s vicarious liability
in their pleadings. Thus, we review the trial court’s decision on
this matter for correctness. See State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 43, 582
P.3d 772 (“[T]he applicable standard of review for jury instruction
issues should be determined as it is for any other issue on appeal.
In general, the standard of review is based on the nature of the
issue on appeal.”); Aguila v. Planned Parenthood of Utah, 2023 UT
App 49, ¶ 11, 530 P.3d 959 (reviewing “under a correctness
standard” the district court’s ruling regarding whether a party’s
pleading was sufficient (quotation simplified)).
ANALYSIS
I. The Inconsistent Verdict
¶24 	When, as happened here, a potential inconsistency in the
jury verdict is brought to the trial court’s attention while the jury
is still empaneled, “a powerful option exists that does not exist
later: the court can simply ask the jury what it meant.” KTM Health
Care Inc. v. SG Nursing Home LLC, 2018 UT App 152, ¶ 36, 436 P.3d
151. Indeed, “it seems terribly inefficient not to obtain clarification
from a still-empaneled jury of the meaning of its answers and
verdict, especially when we consider that unclarified inconsistent
answers often necessitate a retrial of the entire case.” Id. ¶ 43
(quotation simplified). Accordingly, “trial courts must be given a
measure of discretion in determining whether inconsistencies are
present” and “should be encouraged to seek the jury’s input while
they still can, without having to worry about being reversed on
appeal because, technically speaking and after comprehensive

Coombs v. Natural Choice
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research and briefing, the original verdict turned out to be
reconcilable after all.” Id. ¶ 37. We therefore grant trial courts in
this 	situation 	the 	discretion 	both 	to 	determine 	whether 	an
inconsistency is present and to choose to send the case back to the
jury for clarification. See id. ¶¶ 37, 43.
¶25 	However, “if the court elects not to seek clarification from
the jury or the inconsistency is not noticed until after the jury has
been dismissed, the court must then attempt to harmonize the
answers, or order a new trial.” Clyma v. Sunoco, Inc., No. 03-CV-
809, 2008 WL 3394616, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2008), quoted in
KTM Health Care Inc., 2018 UT App 152, ¶ 35. Because at that point
it is no longer possible to seek clarification from the jury as to any
potential inconsistencies, and because of the time and expense
inherent in a new trial, courts should then “make every effort to
view the special verdict form in a way that permits each of the
answers to be reconciled with the others.” KTM Health Care Inc.,
2018 UT App 152, ¶ 32. In other words, we will “resolve any
inconsistency in favor of giving effect to a jury verdict,” Neff v.
Neff, 2011 UT 6, ¶ 49, 247 P.3d 380, and we will sustain the verdict
“if the judgment can be read harmoniously,” id. ¶ 76 (quotation
simplified). But if the inconsistency cannot ultimately be resolved,
a new trial is warranted. See Olé Mexican Foods Inc. v. J & W Distrib.
LLC, 2024 UT App 67, ¶ 29, 549 P.3d 663; KTM Health Care Inc.,
2018 UT App 152, ¶ 34.
¶26 	NWR asserts that there were inconsistencies in the first
special verdict that cannot be reconciled and require reversal and
the grant of a new trial. Specifically, NWR points to the jury’s
findings, on the one hand, that Natural Choice was negligent in
causing the fire and that this negligence was a “substantial factor”
in causing damages to Landowners and, on the other hand, that
Natural Choice was zero percent at fault. NWR asserts that “[a]
party cannot have acted negligently and caused damages yet bear
no fault.” We agree.

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¶27 	Under Utah’s comparative fault scheme, fault allocation is
the mechanism by which responsibility for damages is assigned.
See Utah Code § 78B-5-818(3) (“No defendant is liable to any
person 	seeking 	recovery 	for 	any 	amount 	in 	excess 	of 	the
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant . . . .”). And the
statutory scheme defines “fault” as “any actionable breach of legal
duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery,
including negligence in all its degrees.” Id. § 78B-5-817(2). Thus,
fault exists when a party’s negligence proximately caused or
contributed to the sustained damages.
¶28 	The jury instructions here were largely consistent with this
statutory scheme. The instructions stated that “[f]ault means any
wrongful act or failure to act” and that “[t]he wrongful act or
failure to act alleged in this case is negligence.” The instructions
then told the jury it “must also determine whether a person’s fault
caused [Landowners’] harm” and further stated, “If you decide
that more than one person or entity is at fault, you must decide
each person’s percentage of fault that caused the harm.” The jury
was 	therefore 	instructed 	that 	it 	needed 	to 	allocate 	what
“percentage of fault that caused the harm” was attributable to
each of the parties involved.
¶29 	Thus, it was inconsistent for the jury to determine that
Natural Choice was “negligent in causing the fire” and that its
negligence was “a substantial factor in causing some or all of the
damages sustained by [Landowners]” and yet also determine that
zero percent of the fault was attributable to Natural Choice (that
is, that Natural Choice was responsible for none of the fault that
caused the harm). These findings cannot be reconciled under any
reasonable interpretation of the verdict.
¶30 	Natural Choice and Landowners disagree, arguing that the
trial court correctly reconciled the special verdict by reliance on

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the jury’s additional finding that Natural Choice is an alter ego of
NWR. Natural Choice asserts that because the jury was also
instructed that “under the alter ego doctrine a stockholder may be
liable for the obligations of the corporation,” the jury could have
reasonably understood “that it could hold NWR liable for Natural
Choice’s actions” and therefore could have chosen to apportion
one 	hundred 	percent 	of 	the 	fault 	and 	liability 	to 	NWR.
Landowners likewise argue that due to the alter ego finding, the
jury “attributed 100% of the fault to NWR because the actions of
Natural Choice became the actions of NWR.”
¶31 	Certainly the jury, at least initially, experienced some
confusion related to the allocation of fault question on the special
verdict form, prompting it to request further guidance on the
matter. But even assuming the court’s answer to the question did
not 	sufficiently 	clear 	up 	any 	such 	confusion 	and 	the 	jury
mistakenly understood that an alter ego determination would
require it to assign all of Natural Choice’s fault to NWR, that
nonetheless does not provide a way for us to interpret the special
verdict form in a way that is legally consistent.
¶32 	Under an alter ego theory, the alter ego is “liable only to
the same extent that the [underlying corporation] is liable.” Prows
v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 767 (Utah 1991). Furthermore, “a finding of
fact of alter ego, standing alone, creates no cause of action” but
“merely furnishes a means for a complainant to reach a second
corporation or individual upon a cause of action that otherwise
would have existed only against the first corporation.” 1 William
Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 41.10
(2026) (emphasis added). Thus, even where the jury determined
that alter ego provides a means to hold NWR liable for the fault
of Natural Choice, this does not eradicate Natural Choice’s
liability for that same fault. If Natural Choice were zero percent at
fault, there would be no fault to pass on to NWR through an alter
ego determination.

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¶33 	Moreover, the matter is further complicated here by the
fact that Landowners brought claims against NWR directly as
well as claims asserting that NWR could be indirectly liable under
the alter ego theory. So even assuming the jury decided it was
appropriate to pass along all of Natural Choice’s fault to NWR on
question 12, it does not follow that all of the fault the jury
ultimately attributed to NWR was based on the alter ego theory;
some portion of the fault could have been based on direct liability.
We are therefore left with no way to discern what percentage of
the allocated fault of one hundred percent was a result of NWR’s
direct liability and what percentage of the allocated fault was a
result of an alter ego finding (which would be fault for which
Natural Choice would also be responsible). Thus, the answers the
jury 	ultimately 	gave 	simply 	cannot 	be 	reconciled 	in 	an
unambiguous manner, and we must remand this case for a new
trial.
II. Guidance on Remand
¶34 	Our above determination that a new trial is required makes
it unnecessary to address many of the other issues raised on
appeal. However, we choose to provide guidance on the issue of
which liability theories are available for Landowners to pursue,
as that same issue is nearly certain to arise again on remand. See
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 61, 192 P.3d 867 (exercising discretion
to address additional issues raised on appeal “for purposes of
providing guidance on remand”).
¶35 	In its appeal, Natural Choice argues that the trial court
erred in allowing Landowners to proceed on a claim that they had
not sufficiently pleaded. Specifically, Natural Choice argues that
Landowners had not sufficiently pleaded that Natural Choice was
vicariously liable for the actions of Samuel. We disagree.

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¶36 	“Utah has adopted the concept of notice pleading, which is
defined as a procedural system requiring that the pleader give
only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, and not a complete detailing of all the
facts.” Zubiate v. American Family Ins. Co., 2022 UT App 144, ¶ 11,
524 P.3d 148 (quotation simplified). This concept is reflected in the
requirements set forth by rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring that a pleading
“must contain a short and plain: (1) statement of the claim
showing that the party is entitled to relief; and (2) demand for
judgment for specified relief”). Rule 8 further requires that
pleadings “be construed to do substantial justice.” Id. R. 8(f).
“Taken together, these requirements lead to a context specific and
flexible approach in applying our rules to parties’ pleadings.”
Southern Utah Wilderness All. v. San Juan County Comm’n, 2021 UT
6, ¶ 39, 484 P.3d 1160 (quotation simplified). “Under this approach
we require only that the basis of the claim must be stated with
reasonable certainty and clarity, so the other party will have
notice of what he [or she] is obliged to meet.” Id. ¶ 40 (quotation
simplified). That is, “pleadings are sufficient where they give fair
notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general
indication of the type of litigation involved.” Id. (quotation
simplified).
¶37 	We 	determine 	that 	Landowners’ 	claim 	was 	sufficient
under this standard. In its initial allegations, which were later
incorporated into the negligence claim, the amended complaint
asserted, “On or about August 3, 2016, [NWR and Natural
Choice], their agents or employs, started or ignited a fire while
scraping and cleaning a thistle patch with a backhoe.” (Emphasis
added.) 	Then, 	in 	the 	negligence 	claim 	itself, 	the 	amended
complaint asserted that NWR and Natural Choice “owed a duty
of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of
performance implemented by any person operating equipment or
starting a fire” and that they “owed a duty to [Landowners] to act

Coombs v. Natural Choice
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in a reasonable manner when using their backhoe to prohibit
causing destruction to [Landowners’] property.” The negligence
claim further alleged that NWR and Natural Choice breached
these duties “by wrongfully igniting a wildfire which consumed
[Landowners’] properties.” These allegations provided notice to
NWR and Natural Choice that Landowners sought to hold them
responsible not only for their direct acts but also for the conduct
of those acting on their behalf when the fire was ignited with a
backhoe. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how Natural Choice
could have been negligent by igniting the wildfire while using the
backhoe without the involvement of an employee or some other
individual acting on Natural Choice’s behalf. And we do not see
that failing to specifically provide the name of the agent or
employee involved rendered Landowners’ claim unclear. Thus,
we agree with the trial court that the language of the amended
complaint 	fairly 	apprised 	Natural 	Choice 	of 	the 	nature 	of
Landowners’ claim.
¶38 	Further, it is clear from its litigation conduct that Natural
Choice had actual notice of the vicarious liability claim involving
Samuel and defended itself accordingly as the case progressed
and therefore was not prejudiced by any technical pleading
deficiency involved in the matter. Natural Choice’s own initial
disclosures recognized that Samuel was an “individual likely to
have discoverable information” because he had been “working
for [Natural Choice] on the day of the fire” and was “likely to have
information about the use of the backhoe by Natural Choice.”
And years later, Natural Choice designated Samuel as its rule
30(b)(6) representative to answer questions in that regard. Thus,
Natural Choice litigated the case for six years being fully aware
that Samuel’s conduct was central to Landowners’ claims and that
employer-based liability was at issue. Given this, Natural Choice
could not, shortly before trial, reasonably claim surprise that
Landowners were seeking to hold it responsible for its employee’s
actions. Likewise, because allowing Landowners to proceed on a

Coombs v. Natural Choice
20240072-CA,
20240682-CA 	17 	2026 UT App 145
vicarious liability theory at this stage did not inject an unforeseen
factual dispute into trial or deprive Natural Choice of meaningful
discovery, Natural Choice cannot show prejudice from the court’s
decision. See Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930
P.2d 268, 275–76 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (“[I]t is apparent from the
defenses raised by [the defendant] that it understood precisely
what claims were being made . . . . Under these circumstances,
there can be no doubt that [the defendant] had notice of [the
plaintiff’s] 	claim and 	that [the defendant] 	was not unfairly
prejudiced.”).
¶39 	Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that
Landowners 	adequately 	pleaded 	that 	Natural 	Choice 	was
vicariously liable for the actions of its agents and employees,
including Samuel, or in allowing jury instructions related to that
subject.
CONCLUSION
¶40 	Because the jury verdict was inconsistent and cannot be
reconciled, we vacate the verdict and remand the case for a new
trial. Additionally, we determine that the trial court was correct
in ruling that Landowners adequately pleaded a claim against
Natural Choice based on vicarious liability, and this conclusion
will remain in force during remand proceedings.