In re K.C. (M.C. v. State)

2014 UT App 8
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF K.C., L.C., AND Y.C.,
PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
M.C.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20130608-CA
Filed January 9, 2014
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Janice L. Frost
No. 515901
Jennifer A. Clark, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, AND
STEPHEN L. ROTH.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 M.C. (Mother) appeals the June 24, 2013 order terminating
her parental rights. We affirm.
¶2 Mother first asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s determination that she is an unfit
parent. Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred in
determining that she was an unfit parent given that she was not

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offered reunification services. In order to overturn the juvenile
court’s decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he result
must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the
appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435. The
juvenile court is in the best position to weigh conflicting testimony,
to assess credibility, and from such determinations, render findings
of fact. See In re L.M., 2001 UT App 314, ¶¶ 10-12, 37 P.3d 1188. We
“review the juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the clearly
erroneous standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680.
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in light of the
evidence supporting the finding, it is against the clear weight of the
evidence. See id. Furthermore, we give the juvenile court a “‘wide
latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived at’ based upon
not only the court’s opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but
also based on the juvenile court judges’ ‘special training, experience
and interest in this field.’” Id. Finally, “[w]hen a foundation for the
court’s decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not
engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82,
¶ 12.
¶3 The juvenile court determined that there were multiple
grounds supporting the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-6-507, the finding of a single
ground enumerated in section 78A-6-507 is sufficient to warrant the
termination of parental rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-507(1)
(LexisNexis 2012). As a result, if there is sufficient evidence to
support any one of the grounds for termination found by the
juvenile court, the termination of parental rights is appropriate if
the juvenile court also determines that doing so is in the children’s
best interest. See In re R.A.J., 1999 UT App 329, ¶ 7, 991 P.2d 1118.
¶4 There is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
determination that Mother is an unfit parent. Utah Code section
78A-6-508(2)(f) provides that in determining whether a parent is
unfit, the juvenile court shall consider a parent’s history of violent
behavior. See id. § 78A-6-508(2)(f). The record demonstrates that

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Mother has an extensive history of violent behavior. Mother
continues to engage in domestic violence in the presence of the
children, despite having previously participated in domestic
violence therapy and anger management. Although Mother asserts
that she should have been offered reunification services in this case,
“[r]eunification services are a gratuity provided to parents by the
Legislature, and [parties] thus have no constitutional right to
receive these services.” In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955-56 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998). Furthermore, there is a statutory presumption that
Mother was not entitled to reunification services given that her
parental rights to her other children were terminated. See Utah
Code Ann. 78A-6-312(21)(g). Mother fails to demonstrate that the
juvenile court erred by determining that she was an unfit parent,
or that she was entitled to reunification services.
¶5 Mother next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s determination that it was in the
children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. If the
juvenile court determines that there are sufficient grounds to
terminate parental rights, in order to actually do so, the court must
next find that the best interests and welfare of the child are served
by terminating the parent’s parental rights. See In re R.A.J., 1999 UT
App 329, ¶ 7, 991 P.2d 1118. Furthermore, “when a foundation for
the [juvenile] court’s decision exists in the evidence, an appellate
court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R.,
2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
¶6 In conducting the best interest analysis, the juvenile court
determined that Mother was an unfit parent based upon her
volatile temper and her pattern of domestic violence. The juvenile
court went on to find that Mother abused and neglected the
children in prior cases, and that she has been unable to correct the
problems, which resulted in the children’s removal. Mother
exposed the children to domestic violence, and violence has been
a routine part of the children’s lives with Mother. The juvenile
court also noted that, while living with Mother, K.C. and L.C.
struggled at school. L.C. developed behavioral problems at school

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and she became physically aggressive towards other children after
spending time with Mother. Conversely, since K.C. and L.C. have
been in their foster placement, they are thriving in school and L.C.’s
behavioral problems and academics have improved. Additionally,
as a result of Mother’s issues, Y.C. has been forced to live with
foster parents for more than half of her life. She is bonded to her
foster parents and she considers the foster mother to be her mother.
The children are in need of a stable home where they may obtain
a sense of permanency so that they move on with their lives. The
children also need a home where they are free from Mother’s
violence. According to the juvenile court, the children are now in
a home where their needs are being met, they are loved, and their
foster parents wish to adopt them. Mother fails to demonstrate that
the juvenile court’s determination that it is in the children’s best
interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights is against the clear
weight of the evidence.
¶7 Accordingly, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.