In re L.M.

2019 UT App 174
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
A.M.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20190657-CA
Filed October 31, 2019
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Susan Eisenman
No. 1150593
Julie George, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME, and M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN
F ORSTER , and R YAN M. HARRIS.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	A.M. 	(Mother) 	appeals 	the 	juvenile 	court’s 	order
terminating her parental rights in her child, 	L.M. Mother’s
petition on appeal is unfocused and fails to actually state an
issue for review, although it is clear that Mother disagrees with
the juvenile court’s order. Generously read, Mother challenges
the finding that the Division of Child and Family Services
(DCFS) 	provided 	reasonable 	reunification 	services 	and 	the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting grounds for termination.

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¶2 	“Trial courts are in the best position to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, the parent’s level of participation in
reunification services, and whether services were appropriately
tailored to remedy the problems that led to the child’s removal.”
In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 52, 201 P.3d 985. Accordingly, “juvenile
courts have broad discretion in determining whether reasonable
reunification efforts were made.” Id.
¶3 	Here, 	reunification 	services 	began 	with 	a 	domestic
violence assessment. The assessment concluded that Mother was
in 	“extreme 	danger” 	from 	Father 	“and 	recommended 	ten
sessions of domestic violence victim treatment.” DCFS referred
Mother for this treatment, as recommended by the assessment,
but it took Mother five months to complete the classes because
she “frequently” missed them. DCFS also brought in its domestic
violence specialist to consult on the case. The specialist was
involved throughout the case, “participated in team meetings
and provided additional support and resources for [Mother] as a
victim 	of 	domestic 	violence.” 	After 	Mother 	completed 	the
domestic violence treatment program, DCFS referred her to
individual therapy.
¶4 	Based upon the record before us, we cannot say that the
juvenile 	court 	abused 	its 	discretion 	in 	finding 	that 	DCFS
provided 	reasonable 	reunification 	services 	to 	Mother. 	The
services were tailored to remedy the issues that led to Child’s
removal 	and 	give 	Mother 	the 	opportunity 	to 	address 	the
domestic violence issues in this case. First, to the extent that
“more intensive services” may have been helpful to Mother,
Mother’s own dishonesty regarding her ongoing involvement
with Father prevented DCFS from recognizing any arguable
need for additional services during the reunification period. In
any event, the domestic violence services provided to Mother
were extensive and included a domestic violence assessment, a
domestic violence course, individual therapy, and the ongoing
services of a domestic violence specialist. These services were “at

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the level suggested by the experts” who conducted Mother’s
domestic 	violence 	assessment 	and 	were 	clearly 	aimed 	at
alleviating 	“the 	myriad 	psychological, 	social, 	and 	economic
constraints that undermine abused women’s efforts to leave their
abusers and protect their children from exposure to domestic
violence.” See In re C.C., 2017 UT App 134, ¶ 47, 402 P.3d 17
(Christiansen, J., concurring). That Mother did not succeed in
breaking free from an abusive relationship is unfortunate, but
cannot reasonably be attributed to a lack of appropriate services.
¶5 	Mother next asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
establish grounds for termination. Whether a parent’s rights
should be terminated is a mixed question of law and fact. In re
B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435. The ultimate conclusion that
a parent is unfit or that other grounds for termination have been
established is a legal question, “but such decisions rely heavily
on the juvenile court’s assessment and weighing of the facts in
any given case.” Id. Because of the factually intense nature of
parental termination proceedings, “the juvenile court’s decision
should be afforded a high degree of deference.” Id. Accordingly,
to overturn a juvenile court’s decision, the decision must be
“against 	the 	clear 	weight 	of 	the 	evidence.” 	Id. 	“When 	a
foundation 	for 	the 	[juvenile] 	court’s 	decision 	exists 	in 	the
evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of
the evidence.” Id.
¶6 	The 	juvenile 	court 	found 	multiple 	grounds 	for
termination of Mother’s parental rights. See Utah Code § 78A-6-
507(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (listing grounds for termination of
parental rights). A finding of any single ground is sufficient to
support termination of parental rights. Id. Among the grounds
found by the juvenile court was that Mother had failed to
remedy the circumstances leading to the removal of Child. Id.
§ 78A-6-507(1)(d). The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s
rights if it finds

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20190657-CA 	4 	2019 UT App 174
that the child is being cared for in an out-of-
home placement under the supervision of the court
or the [DCFS]; that the parent has substantially
neglected, willfully refused, or has been unable or
unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause
the 	child 	to 	be 	in 	an 	out-of-home 	placement;
and 	that 	there 	is 	a 	substantial 	likelihood 	that
the 	parent 	will 	not 	be 	capable 	of 	exercising
proper 	and 	effective 	parental 	care 	in 	the 	near
future. Id.
¶7 	Here, the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s determination that Mother had failed to remedy the
circumstances leading to Child’s removal. Mother lost custody of
Child primarily due to domestic violence concerns and Child
was 	in 	a 	DCFS 	supervised 	placement. 	Although 	Mother
completed a domestic violence class of ten sessions over several
months and had access to a domestic violence specialist as a
further resource, Mother did not successfully address the pattern
of domestic violence with Father.
¶8 	A 	parent 	who 	maintains 	a 	relationship 	with 	an
abusive partner jeopardizes a child’s safety. See In re C.C.W.,
2019 UT App 34, ¶ 20, 440 P.3d 749 (“[A] parent’s acts of
domestic violence [towards another parent] can have adverse
impacts on a child, even if that child is not the direct object
of 	such 	violence, 	and 	even 	if 	the 	child 	does 	not 	directly
witness 	the 	violence.”). 	As 	such, 	the 	continuation 	of 	an
abusive 	relationship 	can 	therefore 	be 	a 	factor 	supporting
termination of parental rights. In re T.M., 2006 UT App 435, ¶ 20,
147 	P.3d 	529. 	While 	extricating 	oneself 	from 	an 	abusive
relationship can pose an extremely difficult hurdle for victims
of 	domestic 	abuse, 	if 	a 	parent 	does 	not 	successfully 	leave
the relationship, the juvenile court may find that the parent
has failed to remedy the circumstances that led to a child’s
removal.

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¶9 	It 	has 	been 	observed 	that 	Utah 	law 	has 	not 	always
accounted for the difficulty faced by domestic violence victims in
these circumstances, often blaming victims for the abuse they
have suffered without acknowledging that adequate resources
may not have been offered to a victim to enable that victim to
address the problem. In re C.C., 2017 UT App 134, ¶¶ 46–48, 402
P.3d 17 (Christiansen, J., concurring). However, that is not the
case here. As discussed above, DCFS provided extensive services
to Mother specifically aimed at helping her to break out of the
cycle of domestic violence. But, despite these services, Mother
was unable to remedy the circumstances that led to Child’s
removal.
¶10 	Over the course of more than one year of reunification
services, 	Mother 	deceived 	DCFS 	regarding 	her 	contact 	and
status with Father, even as she was participating in the domestic
violence classes. At times, Mother reported that Father was
abusive, and asserted that he kidnapped her at one point during
the case. She denied having contact with Father and said she was
done 	with 	him. 	On 	the 	other 	hand, 	Mother 	told 	her
psychological evaluator that Father had not hurt her and denied
ever reporting that he did.
¶11 	At 	other 	times, 	Mother 	acknowledged 	that 	the
relationship was ongoing and at one point requested couples
therapy. She said that she and Father had not actually separated
and intended to stay together. Mother even brought Father to
visits with Child although Father did not have visitation rights.
When 	Mother 	was 	close 	to 	having 	Child 	for 	an 	extended
unsupervised visit, she brought Father with her and lied about
his identity to her caseworker, knowing that contact with Father
was not allowed. Based on Mother’s continued contact with
Father and her deception, the juvenile court concluded that
Mother had not internalized the lessons from the domestic
violence therapy and still presented a risk to Child because she

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could not protect Child from the abusive situation posed by
Father.
¶12 	Additionally, the same evidence supports that there was a
substantial likelihood that Mother would not be able to exercise
proper and effective parental care in the near future. After a year
of services, Mother had not progressed in her ability to protect
Child from harm. And Mother’s lack of credibility resulted in
little weight being given to her assertions at trial that she had
severed her ties with Father. The concerns for Child’s safety
remained the same and Mother would require substantially
more time to demonstrate that she would be able to protect
Child. 	In 	sum, 	the 	evidence 	supported 	the 	juvenile 	court’s
finding of grounds for termination pursuant to Utah Code
section 78A-6-507(1)(d).
¶13 	Affirmed.