JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission

2017 UT App 59
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JP’ S L ANDSCAPING AND A UTO O WNERS I NSURANCE,
Petitioners,
v.
LABOR C OMMISSION AND A LBERTO M ONDRAGON ,
Respondents.
Opinion
No. 20150898-CA
Filed March 30, 2017
Original Proceeding in this Court
Mark R. Sumsion and Cody G. Kesler, Attorneys
for Petitioners
Jaceson R. Maughan and William Barlow, Attorneys
for Respondent Labor Commission
JUDGE S TEPHEN L. R OTH authored this Opinion, in which J UDGES
J. F REDERIC VOROS JR . and DAVID N. M ORTENSEN concurred.
ROTH, Judge:
¶1 	JP’s 	Landscaping 	(JPL) 	requests 	review 	of 	the 	Labor
Commission’s award for workers’ compensation benefits arising
out of an industrial accident that occurred in May 2012 involving
one of JPL’s employees. We decline to disturb the Commission’s
decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	On May 22, 2012, the first day of his employment, JPL
employee Alberto Mondragon suffered an injury. The accident
occurred 	as 	Mondragon, 	“almost 	running,” 	pushed 	a
wheelbarrow full of gravel over uneven ground. Mondragon
slipped, 	and 	as 	he 	did, 	the 	wheelbarrow 	“tipped 	over.”

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	2 	2017 UT App 59
Mondragon 	claimed 	that, 	as 	the 	wheelbarrow 	tipped, 	its
“handles [took] hold of him in different directions,” which
caused “pressure on his [right] knee.” At that point, Mondragon
claims “he felt a sudden pop in the knee.” Although he did not
“fall to the ground” and was instead “able to catch himself,”
Mondragon reported that the inside area of his right knee—both
front and back—began to immediately swell.
¶3 	Mondragon reported the incident to his supervisor when
she arrived at the site, and, within three hours of the incident, he
reported to a WorkMed clinic. The physician who examined
him, Dr. Britt, noted Mondragon’s explanation that the injury
involved a wheelbarrow full of gravel that tilted and caused
pressure on Mondragon’s right knee and 	that there was a
“sudden pop” in that knee. Dr. Britt then noted that there was
“no visible bruising” but that there “may be slight swelling
above the joint line medially” and that Mondragon had “diffuse
tenderness . . . around the medial joint line area.” He also noted
that, although Mondragon was able to extend and flex the knee,
“[a]ny attempts at rotation and extension cause[d] [Mondragon]
to have marked pain.” Dr. Britt diagnosed Mondragon with a
right knee sprain and stated that the sprain was the “result of the
industrial 	injury/exposure 	described.” 	He 	prescribed 	a 	knee
support and pain medication. He also referred Mondragon to an
orthopedic specialist for further evaluation and released him to
light-duty work. Because JPL did not have light-duty work
available, it terminated Mondragon’s employment. Mondragon
was out of work until July 15, 2012, when he began working for
another employer.
¶4 	In August 2012, Mondragon requested a hearing before
an 	administrative 	law 	judge 	(the 	ALJ) 	to 	determine 	his
entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits related to the
accident. Mondragon represented himself at the hearing. When
asked to explain how the accident occurred, he explained that he
was “almost running” while pushing a wheelbarrow full of

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	3 	2017 UT App 59
gravel and that the wheelbarrow tipped to the side, catching his
knee between the two handles. He testified that he “felt [his]
knee popping and twisting to the side” or that “maybe only
nerves got twisted,” and that there was immediate swelling
around his right knee. He also testified that Dr. Britt later
informed him that he had suffered a “severe sprain.” On cross-
examination, however, JPL demonstrated that the mechanism of
injury Mondragon had described—that his right knee became
caught 	between 	the 	two 	handles 	of 	the 	wheelbarrow—was
physically 	impossible. 	Specifically, 	counsel 	for 	JPL 	asked
Mondragon to demonstrate how his accident had occurred using
a comparable wheelbarrow that JPL produced at the hearing. It
became obvious that Mondragon’s knee could not have been
caught between the two handles, because as the wheelbarrow
tipped, the left handle would have been significantly higher than
his right knee and could not have caught his right knee or struck
it. Mondragon stated, however, that even if he did not know
“how [the wheelbarrow] caught [his knee],” his right knee still
“got caught . . . and the wheelbarrow tipped over to the side”
and that the right handle “was the one that hit [him],” which
was when he felt his “[right] knee kind of popping towards the
outside.”
¶5 	In her interim findings of fact and conclusions of law
issued after the hearing, the ALJ concluded that although “[t]he
exact 	mechanism 	of 	injury 	is 	unclear” 	and 	Mondragon
mistakenly “believed 	that one of the handles of the wheel
barrow 	hit 	his 	right 	knee,” 	Mondragon 	had 	nevertheless
suffered an injury that “arose out of an industrial accident.” The
ALJ 	also 	concluded 	that 	there 	were 	conflicting 	opinions
regarding the medical cause of Mondragon’s continuing knee
problems, with Mondragon’s treating physicians stating that the
accident caused Mondragon’s injury and the need for further
treatment, while an independent medical examiner that JPL
hired had concluded that, at most, the accident aggravated
preexisting knee conditions. The ALJ therefore referred the case

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	4 	2017 UT App 59
to a medical panel to consider the question of medical causation.
In the charging letter, the ALJ asked the panel to answer whether
there was “a medically demonstrable causal connection between
[Mondragon’s] medical problem and the industrial accident as
described in [the] Interim Order”; to “identify the medical care
necessary 	to 	treat 	[Mondragon’s] 	problems 	caused 	by 	the
industrial accident”; and to “identify any and all future medical
care . . . that 	will 	be 	necessary 	in 	treating 	[Mondragon’s]
problems caused by the industrial accident.”
¶6 	The ALJ found in her interim order that Mondragon
could not have been injured by “one of the handles of the wheel
barrow hit[ting] his right knee” and advised the medical panel in
her charging letter that the panel was “bound by” the findings
and conclusions in the interim order. In its report, the medical
panel characterized Mondragon’s injury as a “twisting type
injury” 	and 	described 	the 	accident 	as 	occurring 	when 	the
wheelbarrow’s “handle caught [Mondragon’s] right leg” as it
tipped over and Mondragon “twisted to free himself from the
flipped 	wheel 	barrow.” 	On 	this 	basis, 	the 	medical 	panel
concluded that there was a “causal connection between the
injury suffered in 2012 and the ongoing knee problem.” The
panel had examined 	Mondragon and reviewed his medical
history and determined that the type of pain he experienced—
“mostly medial side pain” along with “recurrent swelling” in the
joint—was consistent with meniscal knee injuries. It also noted
that, 	although 	Mondragon 	had 	suffered 	a 	number 	of 	knee
injuries in the past, “all previous injuries to the right knee were
diagnosed contusions” that “improved in less than four months”
with “no residual symptoms.” Further, although arthritis could
have been a cause of similar symptoms, the panel noted that
radiographic images of the knee “show[ed] healthy joint weight
bearing surfaces, with minimal arthritic changes consistent with
age and heavy use” and opined that “the excellent joint space
seen on [Mondragon’s] radiographs” would weigh against a
conclusion 	that 	arthritis 	was 	the 	cause. 	The 	medical 	panel

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	5 	2017 UT App 59
concluded that “the twisting type injury with medial pain, the
prolonged nature of the medial joint line pain and swelling, the
findings on physical examination of medial pain, . . . all suggest
an injury to the meniscus” from the accident, which “seldom
heal[s] with time.” As a consequence, the panel opined that
Mondragon required further medical care to treat his knee
injury, including an operation to repair the meniscal tear, follow-
up 	physical 	therapy 	and 	medication, 	and 	other 	associated
medical care.
¶7 	JPL objected to the medical panel report, arguing that the
case should have been dismissed before referral to the panel
because Mondragon “did not meet his burden of proving that an
accident occurred.” JPL also argued that the panel’s report
should not be admitted in any event, because the medical panel
“relied upon a mechanism of injury which did not occur” when
it 	described 	the 	accident 	as 	involving 	the 	wheelbarrow’s
“handle” catching Mondragon’s right leg as the wheelbarrow
tipped over. The ALJ responded to JPL’s contentions in her
findings of fact and conclusions of law, reiterating and further
explaining 	her 	conclusion 	that 	Mondragon 	had 	suffered 	an
industrial accident on the day in question. In particular, the ALJ
stated that she found Mondragon’s “testimony regarding his
work day to be believable and truthful.” Although Mondragon’s
“description [of the accident] is flawed in the details,” she said,
what “remained quite clear was that [Mondragon] did use his
legs and body to try and keep control of the wheel barrow” and
that “when the heavy load tipped” Mondragon was “jerked and
tousled.” She further explained that even though Mondragon
might have had a “flawed recollection of the details . . . the case
can be made that an accident took place from the facts known
before and after the moment of injury,” which included “the
nature of the heavy work being done, the pace of the work, the
loss of control over the wheel barrow[,] and the resultant pain
and injury.” The ALJ concluded that that evidence “proved that
an industrial accident of substantial exertion took place.” In

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	6 	2017 UT App 59
addition, the ALJ rejected JPL’s contention that the medical
panel 	had 	relied 	on 	facts 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	“in 	court
demonstration done with the wheel barrow,” in other words,
that the panel had relied on Mondragon’s discredited original
description of the mechanism of injury. She therefore declined to
hold a hearing on JPL’s objection to the medical panel report and
admitted it. The ALJ then ordered JPL to pay Mondragon’s “past
and 	future 	medical 	bills 	related 	to 	the 	necessary 	care
of . . . Mondragon’s right knee injury consistent with the medical
panel’s opinion.”
¶8 	JPL 	sought 	review 	of 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	with 	the
Commission. The Commission concluded, as had the ALJ, that
Mondragon had suffered a right knee injury as a result of the
work-site 	accident 	with 	the 	wheelbarrow. 	The 	Commission
explained 	that, 	while 	the 	“exact 	mechanism 	of 	injury 	is
somewhat 	unclear, . . . that 	uncertainty 	is 	not 	fatal” 	to
Mondragon’s 	claim, 	particularly 	where 	it 	was 	clear 	that
Mondragon’s “knee was subject to stress while the fully loaded
wheelbarrow tipped over.” Nonetheless, the Commission agreed
with JPL that the medical panel’s opinion was, at least in part,
based “on a mechanism involving the wheelbarrow handles that
is inaccurate.” The Commission concluded that the panel needed
to “reassess [Mondragon’s] right knee injury in light of the
Commission’s and [the ALJ’s] findings regarding the accident
rather than [Mondragon’s] inaccurate description” and then
readdress whether the accident was a medical cause of the
injury.
¶9 	In her second charging letter, the ALJ advised the panel
that the matter was being remanded “for further review by the
medical panel” because the Commission had determined that
the report “may have been based on facts which were not
consistent with the [interim order] issued after the hearing.”
Specifically, the ALJ explained that the panel had described the
accident as occurring when the tipping wheelbarrow’s handle

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	7 	2017 UT App 59
“caught [Mondragon’s] right leg, and [Mondragon] twisted to
free 	himself,” 	but 	that 	“[t]here 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	Mr.
Mondragon was caught in the wheelbarrow or that he twisted to
free himself.” Again advising the panel that it was bound by the
findings of fact and conclusions of law in her order, the ALJ
requested that the panel answer four questions, including the
following question most pertinent to the issues in this review:
Assuming that the exact mechanism of injury is not
clear but that Mr. Mondragon’s right knee was
subject to stress while a fully loaded wheelbarrow
tipped over[,] please determine if Mr. Mondragon’s
right knee problems were medically caused by the
work accident or whether his current right knee
problems are a continuation of his pre-existing
condition 	and 	the 	transient 	pain 	he 	has
experienced in the past?
¶10 	The medical panel reconsidered the matter accordingly,
and, 	in 	better 	alignment 	with 	the 	ALJ’s 	interim 	findings,
disclaimed its previous description of the accident, i.e., that
Mondragon’s knee had “been caught in the wheelbarrow or that
he 	twisted 	to 	free 	himself.” 	Instead, 	the 	panel 	now
acknowledged that the “exact mechanism of injury was unclear”
and that it had not been aware in the first evaluation that there
was a controversy surrounding the “exact mechanism of injury.”
The panel further noted that “the interpretation of a twisting
type injury” was the panel’s conclusion, not Mondragon’s. The
medical panel again determined, however, that the industrial
accident medically caused Mondragon’s knee injury, that his
condition 	had 	not 	yet 	stabilized, 	and 	that 	he 	would 	need
additional treatment. With regard to the relationship between
the known facts of the accident and injury, the panel explained
that, 	due 	to 	the 	anatomical 	configuration 	of 	the 	meniscus,
persons who suffer a meniscus tear often report “a sudden pop
within the joint” and “often feel[] that [they have] been struck by

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	8 	2017 UT App 59
something,” 	consistent 	with 	Mondragon’s 	description. 	The
person generally suffers “immediate pain on the side of the
meniscus and swelling within the joint,” and it is “often difficult
to extend the knee or place pressure on it,” just as Mondragon
had reported right after the event. The panel further concluded
that while Mondragon had suffered previous knee injuries, those
injuries did not involve the same symptoms he exhibited after
the May 2012 accident. The medical panel therefore rejected the
suggestion that Mondragon’s injury was caused by a preexisting
knee condition. And the panel concluded, as it had before, that
Mondragon’s injury was consistent with a meniscal tear. After
reviewing the medical panel’s second report, the ALJ reaffirmed
her previous order awarding benefits to Mondragon stemming
from the May 2012 accident.
¶11 	JPL sought review by the Commission’s Appeals Board.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and denied JPL’s request
for reconsideration. JPL asks that we set aside the Board’s
decision and the award of benefits in Mondragon’s favor.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶12 	JPL 	argues 	that 	the 	Commission 	erred 	in 	awarding
benefits to Mondragon. The Commission’s decision to award
benefits is a mixed question of fact and law. Danny’s Drywall v.
Labor Comm’n, 2014 UT App 277, ¶ 9, 339 P.3d 624. “The
standard of review we apply when reviewing a mixed question
can be either deferential or non-deferential” depending upon
whether the question is more fact-like or law-like. Jex v. Labor
Comm’n, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, “[d]ue to the fact-intensive
inquiry involved at the agency level” in determining whether it
is 	appropriate 	to 	award 	benefits, 	including 	credibility
determinations that an appellate court is “in an inferior position
to review,” “this case does not lend itself to consistent resolution
by a uniform body of appellate precedent.” See Carbon County v.

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	9 	2017 UT App 59
Workforce Appeals Board, 2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). This decision is therefore
more fact-like, and deference to the Commission’s decision is
warranted. See id.
¶13 	The Commission is the ultimate fact finder in workers’
compensation claims. See e.g., Danny’s Drywall, 2014 UT App 277,
¶ 14 (“[T]he ALJ/Commission is always the ultimate fact finder.”
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). We will uphold the Commission’s “factual findings if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence based upon
the record as a whole.” Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2016
UT App 48, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 462 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Substantial evidence exists when the findings
are supported by “more than a mere scintilla of evidence,” and
“[a]n administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence
test when a reasonable mind might accept as adequate the
evidence supporting the decision.” Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 35, 164 P.3d 384 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶14 	“In order to determine whether a decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing court must consider the
whole record before the lower court,” which includes “evidence
in support of the administrative finding, as well as evidence that
detracts from the finding.” Id. ¶ 36. However, “[i]t is not this
court’s 	place 	to 	substitute 	its 	judgment 	as 	between 	two
reasonably conflicting views.” EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of
Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 43, ¶ 16, 157 P.3d 334 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it is the “province of
the [Commission], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from
the same evidence, it is for the [Commission] to draw the
inferences.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	10 	2017 UT App 59
¶15 	JPL 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	Commission 	improperly
denied its request to conduct discovery into the claims history of
Mondragon’s wife and adult son. “[T]he Commission is afforded
broad discretion in determining how best to conduct its inquiry
into each case,” and we will not disturb the Commission’s
discovery 	decision 	unless 	it 	“exceed[s] 	the 	bounds 	of 	the
Commission’s discretion.” See Ernest Health, 2016 UT App 48,
¶¶ 6–7; see also Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i) (LexisNexis
2014) (explaining that an appellate court “shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency’s record, it determines that a person
seeking 	judicial 	review 	has 	been 	substantially 	prejudiced
by . . . an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute”); id. § 34A-2-802(1) (2015) (explaining that an ALJ and
the Commission “may make its investigation in such manner as
in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit” of the
Workers’ Compensation Act).
ANALYSIS
¶16 	JPL on appeal essentially contends that, once it disproved
the precise mechanism of injury that Mondragon described,
Mondragon’s credibility was destroyed, but that the Commission
then created an alternative theory of the accident on its own that
has no basis in the evidence to support its award of benefits. As
a consequence, JPL claims that it was deprived of fair notice and
an opportunity to defend against Mondragon’s claims. JPL also
contends that it was foreclosed from pursuing its theory that
Mondragon’s claim was fraudulent when the ALJ, and later the
Commission, denied its requests to conduct discovery on the
claims history of Mondragon’s wife and adult son.
I. The Award of Benefits
¶17 	To recover workers’ compensation, an employee must
demonstrate that he or she has been “injured . . . by accident

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	11 	2017 UT App 59
arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment.”
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1) (LexisNexis 2015). “This section
sets forth two prerequisites to recovery.” Smith’s Food & Drug,
Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2011 UT App 67, ¶ 7, 250 P.3d 1008 (citing
Allen v. Industrial Comm’n, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986)). First, the
employee 	must 	show 	that 	the 	claimed 	injury 	occurred 	by
accident. Id. Second, the employee must show that there is “‘a
causal connection between the injury and the employment.’” Id.
(quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 18). In other words, the “by accident”
element is distinct from the “causal connection” element. See id.
¶18 	JPL argues that the award of benefits was based upon
factual 	findings 	that 	do 	not 	have 	support 	in 	the 	evidence
submitted 	by 	Mondragon—both 	as 	to 	the 	injury 	itself 	and
causation. Instead, according to JPL, the Commission improperly
determined that Mondragon had been injured in an industrial
accident by inferring that he was merely mistaken about the
mechanism 	of 	injury, 	which 	it 	claims 	has 	no 	basis 	in 	the
evidence. 	And 	JPL 	contends 	that 	the 	Commission 	then
improperly advocated for Mondragon by creating an alternative
theory of injury—the significant stress theory—that also had no
support in the evidence, and then relied on the subsequent
reports from the medical panel to justify awarding benefits on
that basis. In JPL’s view, the physical mechanism described by
Mondragon constituted the theory of injury under which he
submitted 	his 	claim. 	Once 	JPL 	disproved 	the 	theory 	of
mechanism at the hearing, the case should have been dismissed
because Mondragon had failed to establish that an industrial
accident had even occurred. JPL also contends that because it
disproved Mondragon’s description of the mechanism of injury,
the doctors’ reports submitted by Mondragon were necessarily
rendered “foundationless,” because the doctors had relied upon
that mechanism in making their professional assessments. As a
result, the doctors’ reports could not have provided evidence
that there was a dispute about medical causation sufficient to

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	12 	2017 UT App 59
refer the case to the medical panel. Thus, according to JPL,
Mondragon did not establish medical causation.
¶19 	In this section, we first address whether the evidence
supported 	the 	Commission’s 	determination 	that 	Mondragon
suffered an industrial accident. Next, we address whether the
Commission improperly created a theory of injury to support its
award of benefits, thereby advocating on behalf of Mondragon.
Finally, we address whether the medical panel referrals were
proper.
A. 	The Industrial Accident
¶20 	JPL attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
Commission’s determination that Mondragon suffered injury
from 	an 	industrial 	accident. 	JPL 	argues that 	by 	disproving
Mondragon’s description of the precise mechanism of injury, it
also disproved Mondragon’s claim that an accident occurred at
all. Therefore, JPL reasons, the Commission had no basis to
conclude that Mondragon was confused about the mechanism of
injury. Rather, according to JPL, the Commission sua sponte
created an alternate theory of injury—what JPL characterizes as
“the 	significant 	stress 	theory”—which 	had 	no 	basis 	in 	the
evidence. 	In 	essence, 	JPL 	contends 	that 	the 	evidence
demonstrated Mondragon was lying about the entire incident
and that the Commission had no basis for believing his story
about a workplace accident.
¶21 	The 	Commission 	recognized 	that, 	because 	of 	the
demonstration 	with 	the 	wheelbarrow 	at 	the 	hearing, 	the
industrial accident could not have occurred in exactly the way
Mondragon described. Nonetheless, the Commission found that
Mondragon 	was 	“believable 	and 	truthful” 	regarding 	the
occurrence of an accident and that although his description of
the mechanism of injury was “flawed in the details,” at the time
the 	“full 	wheelbarrow 	tilted” 	and 	fell 	over, 	Mondragon
experienced “significant stress on his right knee,” which resulted

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	13 	2017 UT App 59
in “a sudden ‘pop’ and pain in his right knee.” The Commission
noted 	that, 	even 	if 	“the 	specific 	action 	that 	result[ed] 	in
[Mondragon’s] internal injury” was “unclear,” Mondragon had
“consistently described that he experienced a sudden onset of
pain” as the wheelbarrow tipped, a description corroborated by
Dr. Britt’s assessment three hours after the accident. Thus, on the
basis of both Mondragon’s testimony and Dr. Britt’s report, the
Commission concluded that Mondragon “did suffer a right-knee
injury” as a result of the industrial accident.
¶22 	We will uphold the ALJ’s and the Commission’s factual
findings 	that 	Mondragon 	suffered 	an 	injury 	through 	an
industrial accident if we determine that there is substantial
evidence to do so. See Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2016
UT App 48, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 462. And with regard to the credibility
determination here, “[i]t is not our role to judge the relative
credibility of witnesses.” Davis v. Department of Workforce Servs.,
2012 UT App 158, ¶ 6, 280 P.3d 442 (citation and internal
quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	Rather, 	“when 	the 	evidence 	is
disputed, as it was here, we defer to the Board’s assessment of
credibility and resolution of conflicting evidence.” Id. (brackets,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Carbon
County v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2013 UT 41, ¶ 6, 308 P.3d 477
(explaining that we give deference to the fact finder “because it
stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and weigh
the 	evidence 	and 	assess 	the 	credibility 	and 	accuracy 	of
witnesses’ recollections” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
¶23 	As the Commission noted, Mondragon testified at the
hearing that he was injured when he slipped while “almost
running” with a wheelbarrow full of gravel which tipped to the
side. He stated that as the wheelbarrow fell, his “knee was
caught between the two handles,” and that he “felt [his] knee
popping and twisting to the side,” or “maybe only nerves got
twisted.” He testified that, immediately after he felt the popping,

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	14 	2017 UT App 59
the inside of his right knee began to swell. Dr. Britt’s report
corroborated the core aspects of this account. He indicated that
Mondragon 	told 	him 	that 	“he 	was 	at 	work 	pushing 	a
wheelbarrow full of gravel” when he “slipped,” and that “as the
wheelbarrow tilted the handles [took] hold of him in different
directions,” 	which 	“caused 	pressure” 	on 	his 	right 	knee,
whereupon 	Mondragon 	“felt 	a 	sudden 	pop 	in 	the 	knee.”
Importantly, he also noted that “[t]here was no impact on the
knee,” as Mondragon “did not fall to the ground but was
[instead] able to catch himself when this occurred.” Dr. Britt’s
examination 	notes 	state 	that 	he 	observed 	a 	“diffuse
tenderness . . . around the medial joint line area,” that there was
possibly “slight swelling,” and that Mondragon was not able to
adequately perform a McMurray test1 because he experienced
“significant 	pain” 	with 	“[a]ny 	attempts 	at 	rotation 	and
extension” of the knee. Dr. Britt diagnosed a right knee sprain
and 	opined 	that 	the 	industrial 	accident 	that 	Mondragon
described caused the injury.
¶24 	This is “a quantum and quality of relevant evidence that
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support [the]
conclusion” that Mondragon experienced an industrial injury.
See Provo City v. Labor Comm’n, 2015 UT 32, ¶ 8, 345 P.3d 1242
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In particular,
Mondragon’s 	testimony 	and 	Dr. 	Britt’s 	report 	constituted
evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to
suggest that Mondragon was in fact injured during the work-
related accident he described. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 35, 164 P.3d 384 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
1. A McMurray test is “used to evaluate individuals for tears in
the 	meniscus 	of 	the 	knee.” 	McMurray 	Test, 	Wikipedia.org,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McMurray_test 	[https://perma.cc/
58TT-52PT].

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	15 	2017 UT App 59
¶25 	Moreover, 	this 	evidence 	supports 	the 	Commission’s
characterization of the incident as involving “significant stress”
on Mondragon’s knee. JPL appears to argue that Mondragon
was required to have described a precise mechanism of injury to
explain the occurrence of “significant stress” to his knee different
from the disproved rotating handles mechanism in order for the
Commission to have determined that such stress had actually
occurred, 	and 	that, 	because 	he 	did 	not, 	the 	Commission’s
conclusion amounted to an impermissible alternate theory of
injury. We do not agree. “In conducting a substantial evidence
review, we do not reweigh the evidence and independently
choose which inferences we find to be the most reasonable.
Instead, we defer to [the Commission’s] finding because when
reasonably 	conflicting 	views 	arise, 	it 	is 	the 	[fact-finder’s]
province to draw the inferences and resolve these conflicts.”
Danny’s Drywall v. Labor Comm’n, 2014 UT App 277, ¶ 11, 339
P.3d 624 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, because the evidence at the
hearing presented a conflict regarding the precise mechanism of
injury, it was within the Commission’s prerogative to weigh the
evidence as a whole and to draw the inferences it found to be the
most reasonable.
¶26 	While JPL is correct that Mondragon did not use the exact
words “significant stress” in his description of the event, the fact
that he felt his right knee pop and experienced immediate pain
as the wheelbarrow tipped over permits a reasonable inference
that the knee was subject to significant stress in those moments.
Further, 	Dr. 	Britt’s 	report 	supports 	the 	Commission’s
“significant stress” determination. In his notes, Dr. Britt related
that Mondragon had told him that his right knee was subjected
to “pressure” as he attempted to “catch himself” when “he
slipped and the wheelbarrow tilted,” which resulted in the
“sudden pop” Mondragon reported feeling in his right knee. Dr.

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	16 	2017 UT App 59
Britt also confirmed that there was indeed an injury.2 Thus,
Mondragon’s 	testimony 	and 	Dr. 	Britt’s 	report 	support 	an
inference that Mondragon’s right knee was subject to stress as
the wheelbarrow tipped, even if Mondragon was mistaken about
the physical dynamics that led to the injury. As a consequence,
the Commission did not, as JPL contends, sua sponte create an
alternate theory of injury. The “significant stress” theory of
injury was already present in the evidence submitted, and the
Commission’s characterization of the accident is more properly
viewed as arising from reasonable inferences drawn from the
potentially conflicting evidence surrounding how Mondragon’s
internal knee injury occurred as the wheelbarrow began to tip
over. See EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT
App 43, ¶ 16, 157 P.3d 334 (explaining that it is the “province of
the [Commission], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from
the same evidence, it is for the [Commission] to draw the
inferences” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶27 	Nonetheless, JPL essentially contends that the precise
mechanism of injury was the lynchpin to Mondragon’s entire
story and that, because JPL disproved that mechanism, the
Commission could not have found the surrounding details of
Mondragon’s testimony to be credible. But JPL has provided no
2. We note, too, that other than asserting that Mondragon
fabricated the entire incident, JPL has not pointed us toward any
medical report that denies that Mondragon was injured in some
way on the day in question. Indeed, even JPL’s independent
medical evaluator, Dr. Fotheringham, conceded that the accident
“could possibly have aggravated” what he characterized as
“preexisting degenerative changes” and that the treatment that
Mondragon received through Dr. Britt at the WorkMed clinic
“was appropriate” to resolve the injury he believed Mondragon
incurred.

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	17 	2017 UT App 59
authority for the proposition it asserts—that once the precise
mechanism of internal injury is shown to be impossible, the
claimant’s recounting of events is necessarily unworthy of belief
as a matter of law. Instead, JPL supports its argument by arguing
its own assessment of the evidence and claiming that, in its view,
the evidence was at least as likely that Mondragon fabricated the
entire incident. It also suggests that Dr. Britt’s report could fairly
be 	read 	as 	evidence 	that 	Mondragon’s 	injury 	was 	actually
preexisting. But JPL cannot persuade us that the Commission
erred 	in 	its 	assessment 	of 	the 	evidence 	or 	its 	credibility
determination by rearguing on appeal “the facts that [it claims]
support 	its 	version 	of 	the 	events,” 	see 	Carbon 	County 	v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2012 UT App 4, ¶ 5, 269 P.3d 969,
or by attempting to persuade us to reweigh the evidence, see
Provo 	City, 	2015 	UT 	32, 	¶ 	8 	(“In 	conducting 	a 	substantial
evidence 	review, 	we 	do 	not 	reweigh 	the 	evidence 	and
independently choose which inferences we find to be the most
reasonable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶28 	More 	importantly, 	while 	JPL 	demonstrated 	that 	the
precise 	mechanism 	Mondragon 	described 	was 	physically
impossible, JPL has not shown on appeal that the accident as a
whole 	was 	physically 	impossible 	or 	that 	the 	surrounding
circumstances could not have led to the injury Mondragon
described. See Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2016 UT App
48, 	¶ 	10, 	369 	P.3d 	462 	(explaining 	that 	we 	assess 	the
Commission’s findings based upon the record “as a whole”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Certainly, it is
not 	beyond 	reason 	that 	a 	person 	who 	loses 	control 	of 	a
wheelbarrow full of gravel while running with it can injure a
knee while trying to “catch himself” from falling as the loaded
wheelbarrow goes over—or that afterward he might inaccurately
describe the precise mechanism of injury.
¶29 	Nor has JPL shown that Mondragon’s testimony about
the 	incident 	as 	a 	whole 	was 	necessarily 	incredible. 	Even

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	18 	2017 UT App 59
assuming that Mondragon’s recounting of the mechanism of
injury constitutes a type of inconsistency in his testimony, the
precise mechanism of internal injury is merely one element in
the series of events comprising the industrial incident. See id.
And apart from the mechanism of injury, Mondragon recounted
the other material aspects of the event consistently. He reported
at 	the 	hearing 	and 	to 	Dr. 	Britt 	that 	he 	was 	pushing 	the
wheelbarrow, that he lost control of it, that as it tipped over he
felt 	his knee 	pop, 	and 	that 	he 	suffered 	swelling 	and 	pain
immediately afterward. And the Commission did not need to
merely rely on Mondragon’s testimony given at the hearing; as
explained, the objective components of Dr. Britt’s report support
a conclusion that Mondragon had suffered a knee injury.
¶30 	Thus, even assuming that Mondragon’s testimony and the
circumstances surrounding the accident might have permitted
the Commission to infer that Mondragon had fabricated the
incident, it is “the province of the [Commission], not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent
inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the
[Commission] to draw the inferences.” EAGALA, 2007 UT App
43, ¶ 16 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Carbon 	County, 	2013 	UT 	41, 	¶ 	6. 	The 	ALJ 	found, 	and 	the
Commission affirmed, that Mondragon was credible, and we
will not disturb that determination. See Prosper Team, Inc. v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2011 UT App 246, ¶ 4 n.2, 262 P.3d
462 	(“[W]e 	never 	enter 	into 	the 	realm 	of 	credibility; 	the
[Commission] is simply in a much better position to judge the
credibility of a witness than this court.”).
¶31 	Finally, although JPL contends that the Commission did
not have sufficient evidence to determine that Mondragon was
merely confused about the mechanism of injury as opposed to
fabricating the incident, the Commission’s determination that
Mondragon was mistaken about the exact mechanism is more
properly characterized as an inference, one that is also inherently

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	19 	2017 UT App 59
bound up in its credibility determination. Provo City, 2015 UT 32,
¶ 8 (“Instead, we defer to an administrative agency’s findings
because 	when 	reasonably 	conflicting 	views 	arise, 	it 	is 	the
agency’s 	province 	to 	draw 	inferences 	and 	resolve 	those
conflicts.” 	(brackets, 	citation, 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks
omitted)). When JPL disproved the mechanism of injury at the
hearing, 	the 	Commission 	was 	required 	to 	decide 	whether
Mondragon 	was 	nonetheless 	credible—that 	is, 	whether 	the
evidence as a whole suggested that he was lying or was merely
mistaken about the exact mechanism about the whole incident.
While 	the 	Commission 	acknowledged 	that 	Mondragon’s
description of the precise mechanism of injury was not possible,
it determined that Mondragon was generally credible as to the
events of the day—i.e., that he was not lying. See EAGALA, 2007
UT App 43, ¶ 16. As a result, our conclusion that there was
substantial evidence to support the Commission’s credibility
determination necessarily resolves the question of whether there
was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s inference
that Mondragon was mistaken about the events of the accident
rather than dishonest. See Provo City, 2015 UT 32, ¶ 8.
¶32 	In 	sum, 	where 	“the 	underlying 	and 	dispositive
circumstances of the accident were established in the record
even though the precise mechanism of injury was not,” we
conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s 	determination 	that 	Mondragon 	was 	injured
through an industrial accident. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster
Plus, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 35, 164 P.3d 384.
B. 	The Commission as an Advocate
¶33 	Relying on Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67, 44
P.3d 	819, 	JPL 	contends 	that 	the 	ALJ 	and 	the 	Commission
improperly advocated on Mondragon’s behalf by creating a
“new theory of accident” to support the award of benefits—
namely, the “significant stress” theory. It argues that, in doing

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	20 	2017 UT App 59
so, 	the 	Commission 	“improperly 	awarded 	benefits 	on 	a
theory . . . against which JPL had no opportunity to defend.” For
reasons similar to those already discussed above, we conclude
that our decision in Acosta does not require a different result.
¶34 	In Acosta, we upheld the Commission’s determination
that the ALJ had improperly awarded benefits based on a theory
of legal causation not presented by the claimant. Id. ¶¶ 31–33.
The claimant, a licensed nurse, asserted that, while working in
the maternity unit of a medical center, “she felt pain in her back”
when she lifted an eight-pound infant from a crib-like structure
and “turned to hand the child to its mother.” Id. ¶ 2. The pain
grew 	worse. 	She 	based 	her 	claim 	for 	temporary 	workers’
compensation 	benefits 	on 	this 	discrete 	incident, 	and 	the
employer countered that her accident did not amount to the sort
of “unusual or extraordinary exertion” required to justify an
award of compensation in the face of her preexisting back
condition under Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986). See Acosta, 2002 UT App 67, ¶ 32. In concluding that the
claimant satisfied the legal causation requirement, however, the
ALJ “relied on a cumulative trauma theory that he raised sua
sponte” rather than on the discrete trauma identified by the
claimant as the basis for her claim. Id. ¶ 4. In particular, the ALJ
determined 	that, 	while 	a 	“single 	lift 	of 	an 	eight 	pound
baby, . . . considered alone” would not satisfy the extraordinary
exertion test, nonetheless the “totality of the circumstances in
Acosta’s case include much more than this single event, for she
had five babies and their respective mothers to care for.” Id. ¶ 31
(citation 	and 	internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	The 	ALJ
concluded that “Acosta has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that her aggregated workplace duties caused her injury
and exceeded the Allen test.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The Commission reversed, concluding in part
that “it was improper for the ALJ to raise the cumulative trauma
theory on his own because doing so denied [the respondents] the
opportunity to present evidence and challenge [a cumulative

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	21 	2017 UT App 59
trauma theory] type of claim.” Id. ¶ 33 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Commission reversed the award
of benefits, concluding that the “single lift of one eight pound
infant is not enough to satisfy the Allen test,” which we affirmed.
Id. ¶¶ 33–35.
¶35 	The circumstances here are different. In Acosta, the ALJ
sua sponte raised a completely new theory of causation to meet
that necessary element of Acosta’s claim—he decided that, while
a single discrete instance of lifting one child could not meet the
legal causation requirement, the “totality of the circumstances”
in the claimant’s case would. Thus, he crafted a new theory of
legal causation to substitute for the theory the claimant had
advanced. And, in doing so, the ALJ made it impossible for the
respondents to prepare an effective defense. In contrast, here, the
Commission did not need to create a new theory of accident for
Mondragon; 	even 	if 	the 	precise 	mechanism 	of 	injury 	was
unclear, the circumstances of the incident as a whole, as well as
the medical evidence that Mondragon provided, supported an
inference that Mondragon’s right knee was injured when the
wheelbarrow tipped over. Indeed, the ALJ and the Commission
determined 	that, 	even 	though 	the 	mechanism 	of 	injury
Mondragon described—the handles hitting and catching his
leg—could not have occurred, he was nevertheless injured by
the accident. Thus, unlike Acosta, the ALJ and the Commission
did not have to look beyond the claim and the supporting
evidence that Mondragon actually presented to determine that
he had suffered an injury through an industrial accident. This
case would resemble Acosta if the Commission had rested its
decision not on the wheelbarrow incident alone, but also on
other events that Mondragon did not claim caused his injury.
But the Commission did not.
¶36 	As 	a 	result, 	we 	reject 	JPL’s 	contention 	that 	the
Commission impermissibly advocated on Mondragon’s behalf.
The 	Commission 	does 	not 	act 	as 	an 	advocate 	by 	making

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	22 	2017 UT App 59
inferences supported by substantial evidence and judgments
about the credibility of a claimant in fulfillment of its fact finding
responsibility. Because the evidence permitted a fair inference
that Mondragon’s knee was subject to stress as the wheelbarrow
tipped 	over 	and 	that 	Mondragon 	was 	credible 	despite 	his
mistake 	about 	the 	precise 	mechanism 	of 	injury, 	the
Commission’s determination that Mondragon had been injured
in the incident as a result of “significant stress” resulting from
the established events did not amount to advocacy.
¶37 	For the same reasons, we are not persuaded that JPL was
deprived 	of 	fair 	notice 	to 	defend 	against 	Mondragon’s
allegations. From the beginning, Mondragon alleged that his
right knee injury occurred when he lost control of the tipping
wheelbarrow. And, indeed, JPL defended against Mondragon’s
claim by asserting that his claim was fraudulent and could not
have occurred. In addition, JPL contended, with the support of
an independent medical examination, that Mondragon’s knee
problems were the result of a preexisting condition, not an injury
at work. Thus, JPL has not persuaded us that it was unfairly
impeded in its defense in this case.
C. 	Medical Support and the Medical Panel Referrals
¶38 	In addition to arguing that the evidence did not support
the 	Commission’s 	determination 	that 	Mondragon 	had 	been
injured through the industrial accident he described, JPL argues
that 	medical 	causation 	was 	not 	established 	where 	the
Commission improperly referred the case to a medical panel. It
contends that the Commission sent the case to the medical panel
on the basis of the “significant stress” theory, but asserts that,
because the medical reports Mondragon submitted relied upon a
“rotation-type 	injury” 	rather 	than 	a 	stress 	theory 	and 	the
rotation-type injury he described was shown to be impossible,
those medical reports were “rendered foundationless and cannot
be relied upon” to support the Commission’s determination that

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	23 	2017 UT App 59
there was a dispute in the medical evidence regarding medical
causation sufficient to refer the case to the panel. JPL claims that,
“[b]ecause 	[the 	rotation-type 	injury] 	theory 	was 	disproved,
Mondragon’s medical support for that theory was invalidated”
and that, apart from the medical panel’s ultimate conclusions,
“[Mondragon] lacked medical support for any other theory of
accident.” On that basis, JPL claims that those reports therefore
could not have supported the Commission’s determination that
there was a dispute in the medical evidence sufficient to justify
referral to a medical panel or that medical causation had been
established.
¶39 	An ALJ is authorized to “refer the medical aspects of a
case . . . to a medical panel.” Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(1)(a)
(LexisNexis 2015). The regulations regarding use of medical
panels provide that “[a medical] panel will be utilized by the
Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	where 	one 	or 	more 	significant
medical issues may be involved,” which include “[c]onflicting
medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease.”
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2(A)(1). At issue here is whether there
was 	a 	dispute 	in 	the 	medical 	evidence 	regarding 	medical
causation. “Whether there are conflicting medical reports is a
question of fact. We must uphold the Commission’s factual
findings if such findings are supported by substantial evidence
based upon the record as a whole.” Resort Retainers v. Labor
Comm’n, 2010 UT App 229, ¶ 24, 238 P.3d 1081 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
¶40 	As discussed above, this case was twice referred to a
medical panel. After initially determining that Mondragon had
suffered an industrial injury, the ALJ referred the case to a
medical panel based upon a determination that there was a
conflict in the medical evidence about whether the injury was
“the direct result of the accident” and whether further treatment
was necessary. 	The 	ALJ 	noted 	that, while 	the 	independent
medical examiner that JPL retained believed that Mondragon’s

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	24 	2017 UT App 59
current 	symptoms 	resulted 	from 	“preexisting 	degenerative
changes” and were not “the direct result of the accident at
issue,” Mondragon’s treating physicians “are recommending
treatment and indicate the accident is industrial.” On that basis,
the ALJ determined that “there are conflicting medical opinions
regarding 	medical 	causation” 	and 	referred 	the 	case 	to 	the
medical 	panel. 	After 	extensively 	reviewing 	Mondragon’s
medical history and examining him, the initial panel report
opined that “all [the evidence it reviewed] suggest[ed] an injury
to 	the 	meniscus.” 	It 	concluded 	that 	“[t]here 	is 	a 	causal
connection between the injury suffered in 2012 and the ongoing
knee problem” and that Mondragon needed further treatment,
including a “right knee arthroscopy.”
¶41 	The Commission determined on review that “the panel’s
reasoning [was] based in part” “on a mechanism of injury
involving wheelbarrow handles that is inaccurate”—i.e., that the
wheelbarrow 	handles 	somehow 	twisted 	Mondragon’s 	knee.
Noting that the record established that “Mr. Mondragon’s right
knee was subject to stress while the fully loaded wheelbarrow
tipped over,” the Commission referred the case back to the
medical 	panel 	to 	“reconsider 	the 	medical 	aspects 	of 	Mr.
Mondragon’s claim in light of the fact that his right knee was not
caught and twisted between the wheelbarrow handles.” The
medical 	panel’s 	second 	report 	again 	concluded 	that 	“Mr.
Mondragon’s right knee problems suffered since May 2012 were
caused by the described industrial accident” and explained that
“[t]he nature of the injury is consistent with those causing
meniscal injury.” In particular, the panel noted that Mondragon
reported that he “felt that he had been hit in the knee,” that he
“felt a pop inside of the medial knee,” and that he experienced
“medial 	tenderness, 	swelling, 	and 	medial 	pain” 	after 	the
accident. The panel explained that, as a general matter, “[t]he
unfortunate 	individual 	suffering 	[a 	meniscal] 	tear 	reports a
sudden pop within the joint, often feeling that he has been struck
by something” along with “immediate pain on the side of the

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	25 	2017 UT App 59
meniscus and swelling within the joint.” It also noted that a torn
meniscus “seldom heals” on its own and “either has to be
removed or repaired.” And the panel opined that the kind of
accident Mondragon suffered—involving “abnormal,” shearing
stress 	placed 	upon 	the 	knee 	while 	trying 	to 	keep 	a 	full
wheelbarrow from falling over—is the kind of “mechanism that
causes 	a 	meniscus 	to 	tear.” 	It 	concluded 	that 	the 	“violent
stressful motion type injury,” “the prolonged nature” of the
pain, 	and 	“the 	findings 	[and 	test 	results] 	on 	physical
examination” “all suggest [that Mondragon suffered] an injury
to the meniscus.” As it did in the first report, the panel also
stated 	that 	further 	treatment 	was 	needed, 	including 	an
“[a]rthroscopic evaluation.”
¶42 	To begin with, we are not persuaded that the medical
reports Mondragon submitted were rendered foundationless or
invalidated simply because, as JPL claims, he reported a precise
mechanism of injury to his doctors that was later proven to be
impossible. JPL asserts that the dispute in the medical records as
to 	medical 	causation 	“was 	premised 	wholly 	upon 	the
presumption of Mondragon’s physicians that the mechanism he
reported had actually occurred.” But JPL provides no support
for this assertion; it simply characterizes the alleged mechanism
as somehow forming the entire backbone of each medical report,
without explaining why. JPL also cites no authority for its
proposition that, because one portion of a medical report is
drawn into question, the entire report is necessarily “rendered
foundationless.” And JPL has not even identified in what sense
the medical records were rendered foundationless other than
simply 	making 	the 	loose 	assertion 	that 	they 	were 	because
Mondragon had apparently described the mechanism of injury
in a way later found to be mistaken. Indeed, the second medical
panel report noted that, even if the wheelbarrow handles were
not the cause, an injury like Mondragon’s was consistent with
the sort of strain that could result from the event he described—
suggesting 	that 	aspects 	of 	Mondragon’s 	description 	of 	the

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	26 	2017 UT App 59
injury’s mechanism were perhaps not, in fact, wholly mistaken.
As a result, JPL has failed to persuade us that the foundation of
the medical reports dissolved once Mondragon’s wheelbarrow-
handles description of the injury was proved mistaken. See Red
Bridge Capital, LLC v. JAR Family Inv. Co., 2014 UT App 21, ¶ 8,
319 	P.3d 	754 	(explaining 	that 	the 	Utah Rules 	of 	Appellate
Procedure 	require 	“citation 	to 	authority 	[as 	well 	as]
development of that authority and reasonable analysis based on
that authority” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶43 	In any event, as we have discussed at length, this question
is the kind 	that the Commission 	is uniquely positioned 	to
resolve. See EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2007
UT App 43, ¶ 16, 157 P.3d 334. Like Mondragon’s testimony, the
medical records are pieces of evidence that the Commission may
choose to weigh as it deems appropriate. See Hutchings v. Labor
Comm’n, 2016 UT App 160, ¶ 29, 378 P.3d 1273 (explaining that it
is the Commission’s responsibility to assess the medical evidence
to make its medical causation determination). And, at best,
Mondragon’s 	mistaken 	description 	of 	the 	precise 	injury
mechanism created a question regarding the extent to which
Mondragon’s medical records could be relied upon. Certainly,
the Commission could have decided that Mondragon’s error
undermined the value of the medical opinions, but JPL has not
demonstrated that such a determination involved more than the
sort of weighing of evidence that is the Commission’s particular
province.
¶44 	In this regard, as we have explained above, there was
substantial 	evidence—apart 	from 	the 	medical 	panel 	report
itself—to suggest that the accident actually occurred and that an
injury occurred due to stress being placed on Mondragon’s right
knee as the full wheelbarrow tilted over, even if Mondragon was
mistaken regarding exactly how it happened. As a result, we
also necessarily reject JPL’s contention that the medical panel
report provided the only medical support for the Commission’s

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	27 	2017 UT App 59
medical causation finding. While Mondragon’s impression of
how 	the 	injury 	occurred 	was 	mistaken 	in 	the 	details 	he
described, 	both 	treating 	physicians 	nonetheless 	treated 	him
based upon the overarching theory that his right knee was
injured when the full wheelbarrow he was pushing tipped over,
which was consistently reported to his physicians. Dr. Britt’s
report went further, stating that Mondragon reported that he
was injured as the wheelbarrow tipped over and put “pressure”
on his right knee. Further, neither physician simply relied upon
Mondragon’s description of the mechanism of injury in making
their assessments or conclusions as to causation or whether
further treatment was required. For example, Dr. Britt conducted
objective tests, such as the McMurray test, and examined the
knee for swelling, bruising, or other signs of injury, which he
found. 	Likewise, 	another 	treating 	physician, 	Dr. 	Andruss
performed 	an 	examination 	of 	Mondragon’s 	knee 	and 	also
reviewed 	x-rays 	and 	Mondragon’s 	medical 	history 	before
making 	his 	assessment. 	In 	other 	words, 	neither 	physician’s
report 	was 	premised 	entirely 	upon 	Mondragon’s 	own
description of the mechanism of injury he described. Rather,
both physicians formulated their assessment based upon the
entire picture presented to them. Cf. Ernest Health, Inc. v. Labor
Comm’n, 2016 UT App 48, ¶ 10, 369 P.3d 462 (explaining that the
evidence should be reviewed based upon the record “as a
whole” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). And to
the 	extent 	that 	the 	medical 	records 	repeated 	Mondragon’s
mistaken mechanism of injury, as we have explained, whatever
question that may have raised about their reliability was for the
Commission to resolve. See EAGALA, 2007 UT App 43, ¶ 16.
¶45 	In sum, we conclude that there was substantial evidence
supporting the Commission’s determination that Mondragon
was 	injured 	in 	the 	industrial 	accident 	he 	described, 	and,
notwithstanding the lack of clarity about the precise mechanism
of injury, we decline to disturb the Commission’s determination
that 	Mondragon 	was 	credible. 	We 	also 	conclude 	that 	the

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	28 	2017 UT App 59
Commission did not sua sponte create its own theory of accident
and that it did not improperly advocate on behalf of Mondragon.
Finally, we conclude that the ALJ’s referral of the case to the
medical panel was not improper and that the medical panel’s
report did not form the sole support for the Commission’s
medical causation finding.
¶46 	We now proceed to address JPL’s remaining argument
that the Commission improperly denied its discovery requests
into the claims history of Mondragon’s wife and adult son.
II. Discovery
¶47 	JPL 	finally 	contends 	that 	the 	Commission 	abused 	its
discretion when it refused to allow JPL additional discovery into
the claims history of Mondragon’s wife and adult son. JPL
contends that the Commission denied the discovery because JPL
“had not submitted the very evidence on fraud and credibility
that [it] sought to obtain through the requested discovery.” JPL
seems to suggest that its “speculation of fraud, based upon the
circumstantial evidence,” which included the claims history as
well 	as 	the 	circumstances 	of 	the 	accident 	itself, 	should 	be
sufficient 	to 	“cast[] . . . doubt 	upon 	the 	Commission’s
assumption of Mondragon’s confusion.” And JPL contends that
the 	Commission’s 	decision 	“deprived 	[JPL] 	of 	its 	rights 	to
conduct discovery into this centrally relevant matter.”
¶48 	The 	Commission 	“is 	afforded 	broad 	discretion 	in
determining how best to conduct its inquiry into each case.”
Ernest 	Health, 	2016 	UT 	App 	48, 	¶ 	6. 	In 	this 	regard, 	the
Commission “may make its investigation in such manner as in
its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights
of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the [Workers’
Compensation 	Act].” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	34A-2-802(1)
(LexisNexis 2015). It may also “receive as evidence and use as
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence considered material and
relevant.” 	Id. 	§ 	34A-2-802(2). 	The 	Commission’s 	discovery

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	29 	2017 UT App 59
decisions fit within this broad grant of discretion. See id. (listing
the various types of evidence the Commission may choose to
receive). Accordingly, we will not disturb the Commission’s
decision not to permit further discovery unless its decision
“exceeded the bounds of [its] discretion.” Ernest Health, 2016 UT
App 48, ¶ 7.
¶49 	During 	the 	proceedings, 	JPL 	repeatedly 	asserted 	that
Mondragon fabricated his claim of injury. It based this assertion
upon its characterization of the circumstances surrounding the
accident and upon a claims history report it had generated. JPL
generated the claims report from, as it states, “a broad search”
that included claims filed under “similar names,” from the same
address, and of the same loss type. It also included claims filed
under 	other types of policies, 	such 	as personal 	automobile
policies. And it included only basic information on any matching
claim, such as the identification information of the insuring
company implicated; the date of loss; the claimant’s identifying
information; 	the 	applicable 	policy 	type, 	such 	as 	“personal
automobile” or “workers compensation”; the coverage and loss
type; 	the 	injury 	type 	(such 	as, 	“inflammation 	knee” 	or
“contusion to right index finger”); and any other involved party,
such as an insured business. It did not include any information
about how much was paid out or how each claim had been
resolved or any details or notes describing the circumstances of
each matched claim. In fact, the report itself did not even
identify the potential familial relationships between Mondragon
and the other persons whose claims matched based upon the
selected criteria—that is, other than the dates of birth or the
matching 	addresses 	and 	last 	names, 	nothing 	in 	the 	report
identified any other persons as actually being Mondragon’s
adult son or wife. JPL argues that this report raised a sufficient
question regarding the veracity of Mondragon’s claim to justify
additional discovery into the claims history of Mondragon’s wife
and adult son. Indeed, it contends that the claims report showed
that Mondragon and his adult son “had demonstrated a pattern

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	30 	2017 UT App 59
of filing numerous workers’ compensation claims at the same
successive prior employers.”
¶50 	JPL therefore filed a motion early in the proceedings to
compel Mondragon to, among other things, provide signed
information releases from his adult son and wife. In its motion,
JPL did not explain why the releases for Mondragon’s wife and
son were necessary for resolution of the case. Instead, JPL simply
requested that the ALJ compel Mondragon to provide them,
along with other discovery responses, such as Mondragon’s own
release and the initial interrogatories and request for production
that 	JPL 	served. 	While 	the 	ALJ 	granted 	the 	motion 	as 	to
Mondragon’s release, she refused to compel Mondragon’s adult
son and wife to provide the information and records releases
requested, 	explaining 	that 	there 	had 	“been 	no 	showing 	of
relevancy,” 	and 	Mondragon’s 	adult 	son 	and 	wife 	“are 	not
subject to the jurisdiction of this court.” In seeking review of the
ALJ’s final order awarding Mondragon benefits, JPL attempted
to discredit Mondragon by asserting that the claims history
search it had conducted revealed that Mondragon and his “adult
son 	had 	demonstrated 	[a] 	pattern 	of 	filing 	workers’
compensation claims for multiple same prior employers.” JPL
stated that it desired “to conduct additional discovery into the
veracity 	of 	[Mondragon’s] 	claim” 	because, 	in 	its 	view, 	the
circumstances of the accident along with the “questionable claim
history” 	suggested 	that 	Mondragon 	had 	“fabricated” 	the
accident. The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s order, and JPL
then filed a motion for reconsideration in which it renewed its
request for discovery into the claims history of Mondragon’s
adult son and wife. JPL argued that its request for discovery
from Mondragon’s family members was “wholly relevant and
necessary” in light of the fact that, in its view, the ALJ awarded
benefits to Mondragon “on the basis of [the] faulty assumption
of [his] credibility.”

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	31 	2017 UT App 59
¶51 	In its order denying the request for reconsideration, the
Board stated that it had reviewed the claims history and the
related materials “and found there to be no actual evidence of
fraud on Mr. Mondragon’s part.” It concluded that Mondragon
had suffered an injury to his right knee based upon “the medical
evidence that Mr. Mondragon sustained a twisting-type injury to
his 	right 	knee 	consistent 	with 	the 	strain 	of 	carrying 	a
wheelbarrow on the date in question.” And it concluded that the
“assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be
committing fraud is no more than speculation.” It therefore
denied the request for reconsideration.
¶52 	We decline to disturb the Commission’s decision. JPL
essentially argues that the claims history report it submitted
combined with its characterization of the circumstances of the
accident—including the fact that Mondragon was “allegedly
injured within hours of beginning his employment with [JPL],”
that 	the 	accident 	was 	“unwitnessed,” 	and 	that 	Mondragon
returned to “similar employment” after his injury—cast enough
doubt on the veracity of Mondragon’s own claim to justify
discovery 	into 	the 	claims 	of 	his 	adult 	son 	and 	wife, 	both
nonparties to the claim. And, according to JPL, the Commission
abused its discretion by not allowing JPL to do so. But because
we 	have 	affirmed 	the 	Commission’s 	determination 	that
Mondragon was credible and that Mondragon was injured in the
accident, we do not address that aspect of this argument further.
As we explained, the Commission was entitled to view the
evidence about the accident as a whole and make its own
inferences and credibility determinations. The Commission also
determined that, even including the claims report, JPL had not
shown anything more than speculative evidence of fraud. JPL
has 	not 	demonstrated 	that 	this 	decision 	exceeded 	the
Commission’s 	discretion. 	Indeed, 	the 	claims 	report 	JPL
submitted is merely a bare list of claims, identifying only basic
information, with no notes describing details of the accidents or
the resolutions of the claims.

JP's Landscaping v. Labor Commission
20150898-CA 	32 	2017 UT App 59
¶53 	Thus, the Commission did not abuse its discretion by
concluding 	that 	JPL 	provided 	“no 	more 	than 	speculation
without evidence” that Mondragon “may be committing fraud.”
The Commission’s refusal to order discovery on nonparties
under such circumstances is well within its broad discretion. See
Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	34A-2-802(1) 	(LexisNexis 	2015) 	(“The
commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its
judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of
the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter.”).
Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Commission’s decision to
deny JPL’s request for additional discovery into the claims
history of Mondragon’s adult son and wife—two nonparties—on
the 	basis 	of 	thinly-supported 	speculation 	about 	a 	potential
pattern of fraudulent workers’ compensation claims.
CONCLUSION
¶54 	We 	conclude 	that 	there 	was 	substantial 	evidence 	to
support 	the 	Commission’s 	determination 	that 	Mondragon
suffered an industrial accident, that the Commission did not sua
sponte create its own theory of accident or improperly advocate
on behalf of Mondragon, and that the referral of the case to the
medical panel was not improper. We also conclude that the
Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied JPL’s
requests 	to 	conduct 	discovery 	into 	the 	claims 	history 	of
Mondragon’s adult son and wife. Accordingly, we decline to
disturb the Commission’s decision.