In re A.C. (M.R. v. State)

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 157
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF A.C., A PERSON UNDER
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
M.R.
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20140194-CA
Filed July 3, 2014
Second District Juvenile Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Michelle E. Heward
No. 1083181
Andrew J. Heyward, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Carol L.C. Verdoia, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN,
AND PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 M.R. (Mother) appeals the order terminating her parental
rights to A.C. We affirm.

In re A.C.
20140194-CA 2 2014 UT App 157
¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision, the
result must be against the clear weight of the evidence or leave the
appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). We “review the juvenile
court’s factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous standard.”
In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous when, in light of the evidence supporting the
finding, it is against the clear weight of the evidence. See id.
Therefore, “[w]hen a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the
evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the
evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
¶3 The juvenile court concluded that several grounds supported
termination of Mother’s parental rights. Pursuant to Utah Code
section 78A-6-507, the finding of a single enumerated ground will
support the termination of parental rights. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012). Therefore, it is sufficient if the
evidence supports any of the grounds for termination found by the
juvenile court. The court found that A.C. was neglected by Mother,
see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(b), and that Mother was an unfit or
incompetent parent, see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(c). The court further
found that A.C. had been in an out-of-home placement under the
supervision of the juvenile court and the Division of Child and
Family Services (DCFS), see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(i), that Mother had
“substantially neglected, willfully refused, or has been unable or
unwilling to remedy the circumstances that caused the children to
be in an out-of-home placement,” see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(ii); and
that “there is a substantial likelihood that [Mother] will not be
capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the near
future,” see id. § 78A-6-507(1)(d)(iii). The court also found that
Mother failed in her parental adjustment. See id. § 78A-6-507(1)(e).
Finally, the court found that it was in A.C.’s best interest that
parental rights be terminated.
¶4 Mother‘s petition on appeal purports to challenge only the
best interest finding, claiming that the juvenile court failed to give
adequate weight to her efforts to become a fit parent for her child.

In re A.C.
2. After a hearing regarding reunification services, the juvenile
court concluded that Mother was unable to overcome the statutory
presumption against awarding services. Utah Code section
78A-6-312(20)(g) provides that “[t]here is a presumption that
reunification services should not be provided to a parent if the
court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the
following circumstances exist: . . . (g) the parent’s rights are
terminated with regard to any other minor.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-6-312(20)(g) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
20140194-CA 3 2014 UT App 157
Mother claims that the juvenile court failed to recognize the
education and insight she gained during the case as a result of the
services she completed. However, the juvenile court’s detailed2
findings demonstrate the court’s careful consideration of Mother’s
voluntary participation in a parenting course and her present
parenting ability. After considering all of the evidence, the juvenile
court did not agree that Mother had made the significant changes
in her life and living situation that she claims to have made. The
juvenile court’s findings acknowledged that Mother had completed
a parenting course at her own expense, visited A.C., and prepared
her home for her. To the extent that Mother challenges the weight
that the juvenile court placed on her efforts during this case relative
to the other evidence before the juvenile court, we do not reweigh
the evidence where there is a basis for the juvenile court’s decision.
¶5 Mother claims that there was no evidence that she abused or
neglected A.C. because A.C. was never in her custody. Mother also
claims that the initial referral received by DCFS based upon
suspected fetal withdrawal symptoms was not corroborated by
medical tests, and therefore, there was never a basis for A.C.’s
removal. However, Mother does not challenge the basis for juvenile
court jurisdiction over A.C. as a sibling at risk of being neglected
because at least four of her siblings had been the subject of child
welfare proceedings that culminated with Mother’s relinquishment
of parental rights. See id. § 78A-6-105(27)(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2012)
(defining a neglected child to include one “at risk of being neglected
or abused because another child in the same home is neglected or

In re A.C.
20140194-CA 4 2014 UT App 157
abused”). Furthermore, Mother did not appeal the adjudication
order determining that A.C. was within juvenile court jurisdiction
as a neglected child.
¶6 The juvenile court’s findings amply support termination
under section 78A-6-507(1)(d) by demonstrating that Mother had
been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused A.C. to be in
an out-of-home placement and that there was a substantial
likelihood Mother would not be capable of exercising proper and
effective parental care in the near future. The court found that
Mother had continued her relationship with A.C.’s father, who is a
registered sex offender, and found that her statements that she
would divorce or distance herself from him were not credible. The
court found that there were concerns about Mother’s ability to
parent A.C. due to her volatile moods, her high level of anger, her
impaired reasoning and judgment, her past history of relationships
with men who are violent or have alcohol problems, and her lack of
insight into the relationship between her mental health issues and
her parenting ability. Mother’s failure to address the mental health
and domestic violence issues that led to her inability to properly
parent at least four of her five other children left the court with no
confidence in the likelihood that she will be capable of exercising
proper and effective parental care for A.C. in the near future. A.C.
is in a prospective adoptive home where her needs are being met,
she is integrated into that family, and the family loves A.C. and is
able and willing to adopt her. The evidence amply supports both
the grounds for termination and the best interests determination.
¶7 Because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the
evidence,” we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating
Mother’s parental rights. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d
435.