Ostler v. Department of Public Safety

2022 UT App 6
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NEAL K. O STLER ,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF P UBLIC S AFETY , ET AL.,1
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20200395-CA
Filed January 21, 2022
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
No. 190905617
Aaron C. Garrett, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Joshua Davidson, Attorneys
for Appellees
JUDGE R YAN D. T ENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and R YAN M. HARRIS
concurred.
TENNEY, Judge:
¶1 	Neal K. Ostler sued a group of state actors for allegedly
violating the terms of a prior settlement agreement. After the
district court dismissed Ostler’s complaint, Ostler moved to
amend 	it. 	The 	court 	denied 	the 	motion 	to 	amend 	without
specifying its reasoning.
1. The parties on appeal are not limited to those listed, but also
include other parties whose names appear on the notice of
appeal or who have otherwise entered appearances in this court.

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¶2 	Ostler now appeals the denial of his motion to amend. In
response, the state actors argue that the denial was appropriate
because the amended complaint would have been dismissed as a
matter of law and was therefore futile. Because we conclude
otherwise, we reverse the court’s ruling.
BACKGROUND
The Release Agreement
¶3 	Ostler was employed by various public entities in Utah
for over two decades. After he was placed on a reduction in force
list in the early 1990s, Ostler sued, alleging, among others,
wrongful termination and breach of contract. Ostler included the
Utah 	Department 	of 	Commerce, 	the 	Utah 	Department 	of
Corrections, the Utah Department of Public Safety, and the then-
heads of those departments as defendants (the Defendants).2
¶4 	In 1996, Ostler and the Defendants entered into a release
agreement. 	In 	exchange 	for 	Ostler 	dismissing 	his 	suit, 	the
Defendants agreed to pay Ostler $50,000 and reinstate him “on
paper only” for a specified timeframe so that he could apply for
retirement.
¶5 	The agreement also included a provision that set forth the
Defendants’ obligations if they were ever contacted by “potential
or prospective employers of Ostler” (the Contact Provision). In
this Contact Provision, the parties agreed that
2. Ostler’s original complaint and the 2019 complaint discussed
below both named the same State departments as defendants.
The complaints named different individuals, however, because
department leadership changed in the interim. For simplicity,
we refer to both groups collectively as “the Defendants,” even
though different individuals were named in the complaints.

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20200395-CA 	3 	2022 UT App 6
[i]f the Defendants and/or the State of Utah are
contacted 	by 	any 	potential 	or 	prospective
employers 	of 	Ostler, 	or 	any 	other 	third 	party
concerning prospective employment, the State of
Utah 	shall 	comply 	with 	all 	laws, 	rules 	and
regulations, 	concerning 	the 	disclosure 	of
information pertaining to Ostler, including DHRM
Human Resource management rules.
Ostler’s 2019 Complaint
¶6 	In 2019, Ostler filed a complaint against the Defendants.
In 	this 	complaint, 	Ostler 	alleged 	that 	the 	Defendants 	had
breached the release agreement and the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. According to Ostler, the Defendants had agreed
to not “interfere with Mr. Ostler’s ability to seek reemployment
(within the State system or otherwise).” He then alleged that
“the State [had] yet to fulfill its obligation to appoint Mr. Ostler
to a position for which he is qualified” and that it had also
“stifled or blocked his efforts, in violation of the 1996 [release]
agreement.” Ostler also alleged that he had tried to apply for
public positions but had “experienced such occurrences such as
suspiciously ‘lost’ applications, inexplicably ‘deleted’ profiles,
and the like.”
The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
¶7 	The Defendants moved to dismiss Ostler’s complaint,
arguing that the complaint did “not allege breach of actual
contract terms.”
¶8 	While Ostler had asserted that the release agreement
envisioned him seeking reemployment “within the State system
or otherwise,” the Defendants argued that the Contact Provision
applied only if Ostler sought “new employment from third
parties, not the State of Utah.” (Emphasis in original.) According
to the Defendants, even if state actors “did block an application

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
20200395-CA 	4 	2022 UT App 6
for state employment from Ostler, it would not breach the”
release agreement or any implied covenant. The Defendants also
argued that, even if Ostler’s interpretation was correct, he had
not alleged that the Defendants disclosed information to any of
his “potential or prospective employers.”
¶9 	In response, Ostler argued that the Contact Provision’s
“prohibition on interference” applied “to the State of Utah, its
subdivisions, and to other third party employers.” Alternatively,
Ostler contended that his claims could not be dismissed because
the Contact Provision “contains a certain level of ambiguity.”
The District Court Dismisses Ostler’s Complaint
¶10 	The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss.
At the hearing, the court asked Ostler’s counsel about Ostler’s
attempts to find employment. In response, counsel admitted that
Ostler had not “applied to positions outside of the state system.”
¶11 	In a subsequent written decision, the court dismissed
Ostler’s claims with prejudice. On the breach of contract claim,
the 	court 	concluded 	that 	the 	Contact 	Provision 	was 	“not
implicated” by Ostler’s claims because Ostler did not allege “that
one of [Ostler’s] prospective employers or another third party
contacted Defendants.”
¶12 	On Ostler’s allegation that the Defendants breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair 	dealing, the court
concluded that the release agreement does not “contemplate the
obligations alleged in the Complaint” and “does not impose an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing concerning
[Ostler’s] applications for State employment.” The court also
concluded that the release agreement was “not ambiguous.”
Ostler’s Amended Complaint
¶13 	After the court’s dismissal, Ostler moved for leave to file
an amended complaint. In his proposed amended complaint,

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
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Ostler 	alleged that 	he 	had 	applied 	for 	jobs with 	the 	Utah
Department 	of 	Transportation, 	the 	Utah 	Department 	of
Corrections, and Salt Lake Community College. Ostler alleged
that 	each 	of 	these 	“potential 	employers” 	had 	“contacted
Defendants to inquire about Mr. Ostler’s prior employment” and
that 	the 	Defendants 	had 	“disclosed 	and 	released 	false,
fraudulent, 	defamatory, 	or 	otherwise 	incorrect 	information
about Mr. Ostler’s prior work history with the State of Utah . . .
contrary to DHRM Human Resource management rules.” In his
motion to amend, Ostler then asserted that these new allegations
“cure[d] 	the 	pleading 	deficiencies” 	in 	his 	2019 	Complaint
because they asserted that (i) potential State employers had
contacted the Defendants and (ii) the Defendants had disclosed
information to those potential employers in violation of the
Contact Provision.
¶14 	The Defendants opposed Ostler’s motion to amend for
three reasons.
¶15 	First, the Defendants argued that Ostler could not file an
amended complaint because the court had dismissed his claims
with prejudice. The Defendants reasoned that before Ostler
could 	“seek 	leave 	to 	amend,” 	he 	needed 	to 	“seek
reconsideration” 	under 	rule 	60 	of 	the 	Utah 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure. 	Because 	Ostler 	did 	not 	present 	grounds 	for
reconsideration under rule 60, the Defendants argued that he
was not entitled to his requested relief.
¶16 	Second, the Defendants contended that leave to amend
should be denied even “by the comparatively liberal standards
of Rule 15.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 15; see also ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf
Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT 24, ¶ 26, 309 P.3d 201 (explaining
what factors a court must weigh when ruling on a motion to
amend). Applying the traditional rule 15 factors, the Defendants
asked the court to conclude that the request to amend was
untimely, that Ostler was not justified in the delay, and that any
amendment would be prejudicial to the Defendants.

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
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¶17 	Third, the Defendants asserted that Ostler’s proposed
amendment was “futile.” The Defendants again argued that the
Contact Provision did not apply if “the State of Utah or its
agencies” contacted the Defendants. Because Ostler’s amended
complaint only alleged that he applied for jobs with the State of
Utah, the Defendants argued that he had “not alleged a viable
claim.”
¶18 	The court denied Ostler’s motion to amend. The court’s
reasoning was contained in just one sentence: “For reasons set
out in Defendants’ Opposition, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
File 	Amended 	Complaint 	is 	denied.” 	The 	court 	did 	not
otherwise clarify which of the reasons given by the Defendants it
was relying on.
¶19 	Ostler timely appealed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶20 	The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred when
it denied Ostler’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
We ordinarily review the “denial of motions for leave to amend
under an abuse of discretion standard.” Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39,
¶ 11, 427 P.3d 1155. But when “the purported futility of the
amendment justifies the denial of a motion to amend, we review
for correctness.” Id. ¶ 16.3
3. Ostler’s notice of appeal included the district court’s ruling
granting 	the 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	Ostler’s 	2019
Complaint. In his brief, Ostler likewise argued that the court
erred 	when 	it 	granted 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	But 	at 	oral
argument, Ostler clarified that he was only appealing the court’s
denial of his motion to amend. We therefore do not review the
court’s decision to grant the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
(continued…)

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
20200395-CA 	7 	2022 UT App 6
ANALYSIS
¶21 	Ostler challenges the district court’s decision denying his
motion to amend his complaint. Before we can address the
merits of that ruling, however, we must first decide what the
basis for that ruling actually was.
¶22 	The Defendants asked the district court to deny Ostler’s
motion to amend for three reasons. But when the court later
denied the motion, it did so “[f]or reasons set out in Defendants’
Opposition.” The court did not clarify whether it was relying on
all or just some of the reasons given by the Defendants.
¶23 	When there are multiple possible bases for a ruling, a
district court should explain which of those bases it is (or is not)
relying on. Such specificity is important in any case to facilitate
meaningful appellate review. See, e.g., Veracity Networks LLC v.
MCG S. LLC, 2019 UT App 53, ¶ 37, 440 P.3d 906 (“Because we
lack insight into the district court’s rationale for its decision, we
cannot effectively review it.”). And this is particularly important
where “our ability to meaningfully review” an issue is in any
way “dependent upon the trial court’s reasons for its ruling.”
State v. De La Rosa, 2019 UT App 110, ¶ 11 n.6, 445 P.3d 955. This
would be the case, for example, when the different possible
rationales for the decision are subject to different standards of
review on appeal. Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 11 n.6.
(…continued)
Ostler also claims that “the trial court erroneously denied
the 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	file 	an 	amended 	complaint 	by
considering an untimely opposition and not letting Mr. Ostler
reply.” (Quotation simplified.) Because we reverse, we need not
consider this alternative argument. See McNair v. State, 2014 UT
App 127, ¶ 6 n.5, 328 P.3d 874.

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
20200395-CA 	8 	2022 UT App 6
¶24 	This is so here. When a district court denies a motion to
amend, we ordinarily review that denial under an abuse of
discretion standard, but if the denial is based on “the purported
futility of the amendment,” we instead review for correctness.
Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶¶ 11, 16, 427 P.3d 1155. As noted, the
Defendants here gave the district court three rationales for
denying the motion to amend. One of them was futility, which
would be subject to a different standard of review on appeal
than the others.
¶25 	Nevertheless, it is settled that we “treat a district court’s
order as an abuse of discretion when the district court fails to
articulate its reasoning for denying leave to amend, unless the
court’s reasoning 	is 	apparent 	from 	the 	record.” 	Hudgens 	v.
Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, ¶ 19, 243 P.3d 1275. In the ordinary
case, 	the 	district 	court’s 	silence 	would 	thus 	require 	us 	to
determine whether we can ascertain the basis for its decision
from the record.
¶26 	We 	need 	not 	make 	that 	determination 	in 	this 	case,
however, 	because 	the 	Defendants 	have 	advanced 	only 	one
rationale for the district court’s ruling in their appellate brief:
futility. As noted, the Defendants did offer two other rationales
to the district court below, but they did not mention those in
their brief. Instead, their sole argument to us was that “Ostler’s
proposed 	amendment 	was 	futile 	and 	would 	not 	survive 	a
motion to dismiss.”
¶27 	At oral argument, the Defendants nevertheless suggested
that we could still affirm based on the other two rationales. But
our briefing rules require a party to “explain, with reasoned
analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record,
why [it] should prevail on appeal.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8),
(b)(3). We accordingly retain “discretion to not address” an
argument that is inadequately briefed. Broderick v. Apartment
Mgmt. 	Consultants, 	L.L.C., 	2012 	UT 	17, 	¶ 	11, 	279 	P.3d 	391
(quotation simplified).

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
20200395-CA 	9 	2022 UT App 6
¶28 	Moreover, 	the 	two 	non-briefed 	rationales 	would 	be
subject to different standards of review if we addressed them.
And they also implicate distinct legal rules and lines of authority
that the Defendants have not provided us in their brief. Given all
this, and given the Defendants’ decision to focus on just one of
those rationales in their brief, we limit our review accordingly.
¶29 	The sole question before us, then, is whether Ostler’s
motion to amend would have been futile.
¶30 	“It is well settled that a court may deny a motion to
amend 	as 	futile 	if 	the 	proposed 	amendment 	would 	not
withstand a motion to dismiss.” Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003
UT 	51, 	¶ 	139, 	82 	P.3d 	1076 	(quotation 	simplified). 	And 	a
proposed amendment will not withstand a motion to dismiss if it
fails to “allege facts sufficient to satisfy each element of a claim.”
Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 2017 UT 75,
¶ 60, 416 P.3d 401; see also First Interstate Fin. LLC v. Savage, 2020
UT App 1, ¶ 10, 458 P.3d 1161.
¶31 	When a case turns on the interpretation of a contract, an
amended complaint will withstand a motion to dismiss if the
operative 	contract 	language 	is 	ambiguous. 	See 	Haynes 	v.
Department of Public Safety, 2020 UT App 19, ¶ 11, 460 P.3d 565.
The reason for this is that, when “an ambiguity exists, the intent
of the parties becomes a question of fact upon which parol
evidence of the parties’ intentions should be admitted.” E & H
Land, Ltd. v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ¶ 21, 336 P.3d
1077 (quotation simplified).
¶32 	“Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of
law.” Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 1999 UT 89, ¶ 14, 987 P.2d 48. And
a contract “is facially ambiguous if its terms are capable of more
than 	one 	reasonable 	interpretation 	because 	of 	uncertain
meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.”
Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6,
¶ 24, 367 P.3d 994 (quotation simplified). Thus, a court cannot

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
20200395-CA 	10 	2022 UT App 6
conclude that a motion to amend would be futile based on a
contract’s language if that language is susceptible to multiple
reasonable interpretations. See Jensen, 2003 UT 51, ¶¶ 139–42;
Haynes, 2020 UT App 19, ¶ 11.
¶33 	Again, the language at issue here is the Contact Provision,
which applied if “the Defendants and/or the State of Utah are
contacted by any potential or prospective employers of Ostler, or
any other third party concerning prospective employment.” So
the question before us is whether that provision is susceptible to
multiple 	reasonable 	interpretations 	as 	to 	its 	application 	to
prospective State employers. If it is, then Ostler’s motion to
amend was not futile.
¶34 	The 	parties 	obviously 	have 	different 	answers 	to 	that
question.
¶35 	From Ostler’s perspective, if the Contact Provision only
applied to non-State employers, then the phrase “any potential
or 	prospective 	employers” 	would 	be 	rendered 	meaningless.
(Emphasis added.) After all, the word “any” commonly means
“one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind,” so in his view,
the 	Contact 	Provision 	broadly 	applies 	to 	“potential 	or
prospective employers” “indiscriminately of whatever kind.” See
Any, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dicti
onary/any [https://perma.cc/H4ZB-XYZU](definition 1).
¶36 	Moreover, 	the 	phrase 	“any 	potential 	or 	prospective
employers” is separated from the phrase “any other third party”
by the disjunctive “or.” Because “or” is commonly “used as a
function word to indicate an alternative,” Ostler suggests that
“any other third party” could plausibly refer to other non-
employer 	entities 	like 	investigators 	and 	headhunters, 	for
example, who might contact the Defendants. See Or, Merriam-
Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/or [https
://perma.cc/6T36-M9QV] (definition 1).

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¶37 	We conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of this
provision—i.e., that, on its face, “any potential or prospective
employers” 	could 	mean 	“any 	potential 	or 	prospective
employers,” including State employers. And the phrase “or any
other third party” could be separately referring to those who are
not “potential or prospective employers” but nonetheless might
still contact the Defendants about Ostler.
¶38 	Because Ostler’s interpretation is reasonable, we must
decide 	if 	the 	Defendants’ 	interpretation 	forecloses 	Ostler’s
interpretation.
¶39 	According to the Defendants, the phrase “potential or
prospective employers” is “illustrative of, and limited by, the
catchall phrase” “any other third party.” So according to the
Defendants, State employers do not qualify as “potential or
prospective employers” because they are not third parties.
¶40 	To support this interpretation, the Defendants rely on
“reverse ejusdem generis.” Reverse ejusdem generis is a method
of interpretation that some courts have recognized as a canon of
construction. See, e.g., United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490,
508–09 (D.C. Cir. 1996); SMI Realty Mgmt. Corp. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, London, 179 S.W.3d 619, 624–25 (Tex. App. 2005); see
generally Jay Wexler, Fun with Reverse Ejusdem Generis, 105 Minn.
L. Rev. 1 (2020). With reverse ejusdem generis, a “general term
reflects back on the more specific” term. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d
at 509. For example, “the phrase ‘A, B, or any other C’ indicates
that A is a subset of C.” Id. If applied to the Contact Provision,
reverse 	ejusdem 	generis 	would 	therefore 	mean 	that 	“any
potential or prospective employers” is a subset of “any other
third party”—i.e., the Contact Provision applies only if Ostler’s
“potential or prospective” employer is also a “third party.”
¶41 	We conclude that this is also a reasonable interpretation
of the Contact Provision. The word “other” in “any other third
party” 	could 	indeed 	limit 	“any 	potential 	or 	prospective

Ostler v. Dept. of Public Safety
20200395-CA 	12 	2022 UT App 6
employers” to third parties who are not State employers. See
Other, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/other 	[https://perma.cc/9XNH-FB28] 	(definition 	1a)
(defining 	“other” 	as 	“being 	the 	one 	(as 	of 	two 	or 	more)
remaining or not included”).
¶42 	But 	the 	problem 	for 	the 	Defendants 	is 	that 	their
reasonable interpretation does not foreclose Ostler’s reasonable
interpretation. 	Because 	no 	Utah 	appellate 	decision 	has 	yet
recognized reverse ejusdem generis as a canon of construction,
we question the fairness of allowing it to dictate, as a matter of
law, the outcome of this contract dispute. Cf. Olsen v. Eagle
Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 19, 248 P.3d 465 (“Canons of
construction . . . are not formulaic, dispositive indicators of
statutory 	meaning. 	They 	are 	merely 	tools 	that 	guide 	our
construction of statutes in accordance with common, ordinary
usage and understanding of language . . . . Such tools must be
understood as one of several contextual indicators of statutory
meaning.”).
¶43 	Moreover, one 	of the 	justifications for 	the 	canons of
construction is that they are so entrenched in our legal system
that we can expect lawyers to have them in mind while drafting.
See 	Antonin 	Scalia 	& 	Bryan 	A. 	Garner, 	Reading 	Law: 	The
Interpretation 	of 	Legal 	Texts 	51 	(2012) 	(“When 	it 	is 	widely
understood in the legal community that, for example, a word
used repeatedly in a document will be taken to have the same
meaning throughout, . . . you can expect those who prepare legal
documents competently to draft them accordingly.”).
¶44 	But the term “reverse ejusdem generis” was not even
coined until 1996. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 509. That is the
same year that the parties entered into the release agreement, so
we 	cannot 	necessarily 	expect 	that 	they 	drafted 	the 	release
agreement with this particular canon in mind. We also note that
canons 	of 	construction 	are 	most 	typically 	used 	to 	resolve
ambiguity, not to suggest that it never existed at all. See Thayer v.

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Washington County School Dist., 2012 UT 31, ¶ 37, 285 P.3d 1142
(Lee, J., dissenting) (“Canons of construction are not universal
rules of grammar or syntax. They are rules of thumb that
provide 	potentially 	useful 	cues 	for 	resolving 	ambiguity 	in
written text.”); see also Brady v. Park, 2019 UT 16, ¶ 131, 445 P.3d
395 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that a “judicial determination of ambiguity opens the
door to extrinsic evidence” like “the possible application of a
canon of construction”); Graves v. North E. Services, Inc., 2015 UT
28, ¶ 55, 345 P.3d 619 (“But [ejusdem generis] comes into play
only in cases of ambiguity as to the general term.”).
¶45 	What’s more, some courts have rejected reasoning like the
Defendants’. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818), is illustrative. There,
the Supreme Court interpreted a statute that provided that any
person who committed “upon the high seas . . . murder or
robbery, or any other offence, which, if committed within the
body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be
punishable with death” could be convicted, in turn, of piracy
and thereby sentenced to death. Id. at 626. In the case at issue,
some mariners had committed robbery at sea and argued on
appeal 	that 	they 	could 	not 	be 	convicted of 	piracy 	because
robbery committed on land was not “punishable with death.” Id.
at 627. In other words, they argued that the phrase “any other
offence, which . . . would . . . be punishable with death” was a
catchall phrase that limited the meaning of “robbery,” meaning
that the mariners could only be convicted of piracy if robbery on
land was punishable by death. Id. at 626–27. In this sense, their
argument relied on the same interpretive principle that we
would now refer to as reverse ejusdem generis.
¶46 	The Supreme Court acknowledged that the mariners’
interpretation was “entitled to great respect on every account”
because it was the only way to give the word “other” any
meaning. Id. at 628. But the Court nevertheless concluded that
“robbery” was not limited by the phrase that followed. Id. at 629.

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Because Congress clearly specified “murder or robbery,” the
Court chose to not read the statute in such a way that would
exclude those crimes. Id. at 628–29.
¶47 	The analysis in Palmer thus suggests that, like the other
canons, reverse ejusdem generis can be a useful tool—but it is
not an inexorable command. See also Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001) (“Canons are not mandatory rules.
They 	are 	guides 	that 	need 	not 	be 	conclusive.” 	(quotation
simplified)). 	So 	here, 	while 	the 	Defendants’ 	application 	of
reverse ejusdem generis to the Contact Provision has some
persuasive force, it’s not enough to demonstrate that Ostler’s
contrary interpretation is not a reasonable one too. As a result,
we conclude that the motion to amend was not futile.4
4. In their brief, the Defendants also argue that Ostler’s amended
complaint was futile because it “fails to sufficiently allege how
the 	State 	of 	Utah—in 	contravention 	of 	the 	obligation 	in
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement—failed to comply with the laws,
rules, and regulations concerning the disclosure of information
pertaining to Ostler.” But “pleadings are ‘sufficient’ where they
give fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and
a general indication of the type of litigation involved.” Southern
Utah Wilderness All. v. San Juan County Comm’n, 2021 UT 6, ¶ 40,
484 P.3d 1160 (quotation simplified); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8.
This is a “liberal standard.” Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 2017 UT 75, ¶ 24, 416 P.3d 401 (quotation
simplified). The Defendants have not persuaded us that Ostler’s
amended complaint fails this liberal standard, because Ostler did
allege 	that 	the 	Defendants 	“disclosed 	and 	released 	false,
fraudulent, 	defamatory, 	or 	otherwise 	incorrect 	information
about Mr. Ostler’s prior history with the State of Utah to the
Utah 	Department 	of 	Transportation[, 	Adult 	Probation 	and
Parole, and Salt Lake Community College] contrary to DHRM
Human Resource management rules.”

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20200395-CA 	15 	2022 UT App 6
CONCLUSION
¶48 	Because 	both 	sides 	have 	put 	forth 	reasonable
interpretations 	of 	the 	Contact 	Provision, 	that 	provision 	is
ambiguous. See Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 1999 UT 89, ¶ 14, 987 P.2d
48. Because it’s ambiguous, Ostler’s amended complaint would
not be subject to dismissal as a matter of law and his motion to
amend therefore would not have been futile. See Haynes v.
Department of Public Safety, 2020 UT App 19, ¶ 11, 460 P.3d 565.
Because futility is the only justification for the district court’s
ruling advanced by the Defendants in their brief, and because
that ruling cannot stand, we reverse. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps.,
Inc., 2003 UT 51, ¶¶ 139–42, 82 P.3d 1076.