State v. Connelley

2026 UT App 129
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
C HAD D. C ONNELLEY ,
Appellant.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20241110-CA
Filed August 20, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Coral Sanchez
No. 211910246
Peter Daines, Emily Adams, and Brittany Urness,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jeffrey G. Thomson Jr.,
Attorneys for Appellee
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME, DAVID N. M ORTENSEN , and
R YAN D. TENNEY .
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	Chad 	D. 	Connelley 	was 	convicted 	of 	two 	counts 	of
aggravated sexual assault, one count of aggravated assault, one
count of aggravated robbery, and three counts of unlawful
acquisition of a credit card, all as a result of a violent encounter
with a woman, Jessica.1 On appeal, we are asked to determine
whether the district court erred by not merging the unlawful
acquisition charges into the aggravated robbery charge, whether
the district court adequately resolved Connelley’s objections to
the presentence investigation report (PSI), and whether the court
1. A pseudonym.

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20241110-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 129
abused its discretion by ordering that Connelley’s sentences run
consecutively. Because we agree that the charges should have
merged, we vacate the three unlawful acquisition convictions.
Additionally, because we agree that the district court did not
adequately resolve the objections to the PSI, we remand this
matter for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to
resolve the objections on the record. However, we conclude that
the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI did not impact the court’s
sentencing decision and that the district court did not abuse its
discretion 	by 	imposing 	consecutive 	sentences 	under 	the
circumstances presented here, so we therefore affirm Connelley’s
sentences on the aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault,
and aggravated robbery convictions.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Jessica encountered Connelley, who was a stranger to her,
while she was walking home late at night through a construction
site. Connelley grabbed her by the neck and strangled her. When
Jessica tried to fight back, Connelley pulled out a pocketknife and
threatened her. He then forced her to perform oral sex on him and
anally sodomized her. After he was done, Connelley threatened
to take Jessica’s phone and wallet. She begged him not to take her
wallet and offered him her credit cards instead. He also forced
Jessica to give him her car keys.
¶3 	At trial, Connelley claimed that when he asked Jessica
what time it was, she laughed at him like he was “beneath her.”
He followed her and told her she was a “fuckin’ bitch” and that
maybe he should “kick her ass.” Connelley claimed that Jessica
then suggested that he have sex with her instead. Connelley said
she then voluntarily performed oral sex on him and allowed him
to have anal sex with her. Connelley testified that after a brief
conversation following the anal sex, Jessica allowed him to use
her phone. The phone case had a pocket for credit cards, and

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 129
Connelley took one, intending to steal it. But he testified that
Jessica told him that credit card did not work and voluntarily gave
him two additional cards.
¶4 	Connelley was charged with two counts of aggravated
sexual assault, one count of aggravated assault, one count of
aggravated robbery (for the car keys), and three counts of
unlawful acquisition of a credit card (one for each credit card).
Connelley argued that the three counts of unlawful acquisition of
credit cards should merge into the aggravated robbery charge.
The district court disagreed, and the jury convicted Connelley of
all charges.
¶5 	At Connelley’s sentencing hearing, the court asked defense
counsel whether any corrections or additions were needed on the
PSI. Defense counsel responded that there were errors in several
statements in the PSI: (1) that Connelley’s two “prosocial” friends
have criminal backgrounds; (2) that he “doesn’t have regular
communication with any family members, except his mother”
and that “many in his family are substance abusers or criminals”;
and (3) that he had “[a]t least six violations during [his] current
incarceration.” After defense counsel identified these concerns,
the court responded, “Okay. Anything else?” Counsel responded,
“No, Your Honor, that’s it.” The court did not make any findings
regarding 	the 	alleged 	inaccuracies 	but 	proceeded 	with 	the
sentencing hearing.
¶6 	The State emphasized Connelley’s history of “victimizing
people” over many decades. It opined that Connelley had “taken
no accountability” and that he was someone who had “done
nothing but caused problems to society” and “victimized people
to all sorts of extremes, just constantly.” The State asked the court
to impose the maximum sentences on all charges and to run the
sentences consecutively. Jessica then testified about the impact
Connelley’s actions had on her. She said she believed she was
going to die when he attacked her and that she is now “afraid to

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 129
leave [her] house or 	to go anywhere, especially alone and
especially at night.” She said she has experienced insomnia,
nightmares, flashbacks, and panic attacks and that she also
suffered a lot of physical pain after the assault.
¶7 	Defense Counsel asked the court to show leniency based
on Connelley’s age and pointed out that because Connelley is
fifty-two years old, even concurrent sentencing would likely
result in an effective “life sentence without possibility of parole.”
¶8 	The court observed that Connelley had “a criminal history
that goes back almost three decades” and that the attack in this
case “was especially brutal” and caused serious harm to Jessica.
The court found that imposing any sentence less than fifteen years
to life on the aggravated sexual assault convictions would “not be
in the interests of justice.” The court also imposed sentences of
five years to life on the aggravated robbery conviction, zero to five
years on the aggravated assault conviction, and zero to five years
on each of the unlawful acquisition convictions.
¶9 	The court ordered that the sentences run consecutively to
each other and to the sentences imposed against Connelley in two
other criminal cases. The court indicated that it had “considered
the gravity and the circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, [and] the history, character, and rehabilitative needs” of
Connelley. 	The 	court 	again 	pointed 	to 	Connelley’s 	lengthy
criminal history in both the juvenile and adult criminal system.
The court noted that Connelley had already had many previous
opportunities to rehabilitate himself. The court characterized the
incident as “a violent and disturbing attack . . . on a complete
stranger” and stated that the violence Connelley inflicted on
Jessica was “horrendous.” It also observed that Connelley’s
version of events, which he had “doubled down” on, was “just
not credible,” and the court found it troubling that Connelley had
“created 	this 	narrative 	that 	defies 	credulity” 	and 	that 	he
“believe[d] that that’s what happened.” The court expressed its

State v. Connelley
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view that if Connelley were out of custody, he would “attack
someone else again.” The court stated that Connelley was a
danger to the public, that he had been for almost three decades,
and that he would continue to be. The court explained that
Connelley’s 	criminal 	history 	and 	attitude, 	the 	violence 	he
inflicted, 	and 	the 	court’s 	concerns 	about 	public 	safety
demonstrated that leniency for Connelley was not appropriate.
ANALYSIS
I. Merger
¶10 	Connelley first argues that the district court erred by not
merging the three charges for unlawful acquisition of a credit card
into the aggravated robbery charge. “Merger issues present
questions of law, which we review for correctness.” State v. Lopez,
2020 UT App 101, ¶ 7, 468 P.3d 604 (cleaned up). The State
concedes that the district court erred on this point, and we agree.
¶11 	Under the doctrine of merger, if a “greater offense cannot
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,
then the lesser offense merges into the greater crime.” State v.
Calvert, 2017 UT App 212, ¶ 25, 407 P.3d 1098 (cleaned up). An
offense is a lesser offense if it “is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of
the offense charged.” Id. ¶ 24 (cleaned up). Additionally, under
Utah’s 	single-criminal-episode 	statute, 	a 	defendant 	cannot
typically be convicted twice for separate items stolen in the course
of the same robbery. See Utah Code § 76-1-402; see also State v.
Irvin, 2007 UT App 319, ¶¶ 18–19, 169 P.3d 798. Connelley’s theft
of the car keys and the three credit cards was all part of the same
robbery. And while unlawful acquisition may be based on several
theories, the variant relied on by the State in this case—that
Connelley acquired a “financial transaction card from another
without the consent of the card holder”—was a lesser included

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 129
offense of the aggravated robbery charge. See Utah Code § 76-6-
506.3(2)(a). Thus, the three unlawful acquisition charges should
have merged into the aggravated robbery charge, and we must
vacate Connelley’s convictions on those charges.
II. Objection to the PSI
¶12 	Next, Connelley argues that the district court erred by not
resolving several alleged inaccuracies in his PSI. “Whether the
trial court properly complied with a legal duty to resolve on the
record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports
is a question of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Perez,
2026 UT App 92, ¶ 19 (cleaned up).
¶13 	The statute governing a district court’s duty to resolve
objections to the accuracy of a PSI was previously found at Utah
Code section 77-18-1. In relevant part, that statute read,
Any 	alleged 	inaccuracies 	in 	the 	presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved
by 	the 	parties 	and 	the 	department 	prior 	to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the
sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional 10 working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If
after 10 working days the inaccuracies cannot be
resolved, the court shall make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record.
Utah Code § 77-18-1(6)(a) (2020). In interpreting that version of
the statute, this court has held that to adequately resolve a
defendant’s objections to a PSI, “the district court must do three
things: first, consider the objection raised; second, make findings
on the record regarding the accuracy of the information at issue;
and 	third, 	determine 	on 	the 	record 	the 	relevance 	of 	that

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 129
information as it relates to sentencing.” State v. Monroe, 2015 UT
App 48, ¶ 6, 345 P.3d 755.
¶14 	The statute was replaced with a new statute in 2021,
however, and that version has since been amended several times.
The current version of the controlling statute reads as follows:
(i) 	If 	there 	is 	an 	alleged 	inaccuracy 	in 	the
presentence investigation report that is not resolved
by 	the 	parties 	and 	the 	department 	or 	law
enforcement agency before sentencing:
(A) the alleged inaccuracy shall be brought to
the attention of the court at sentencing; and
(B) the court may grant an additional 10
working days after the day on which the alleged
inaccuracy is brought to the court's attention to
allow the parties and the department to resolve the
alleged inaccuracy in the presentence investigation
report.
(ii) If the court does not grant additional time under
Subsection (5)(a)(i)(B), or the alleged inaccuracy
cannot be resolved after 10 working days, and if the
court finds that there is an inaccuracy in the presentence
investigation report, the court shall:
(A) enter a written finding as to the relevance
and 	accuracy 	of 	the 	challenged 	portion 	of 	the
presentence investigation report; and
(B) 	provide 	the 	written 	finding 	to 	the
department or the law enforcement agency.
Utah 	Code 	§ 	77-18-103(5)(a) 	(2025) 	(emphasis 	added). 	The
amended version of the statute makes a significant change by

State v. Connelley
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adding the condition “if the court finds that there is an inaccuracy
in the presentence investigation report” as a prerequisite to the
requirement that the court enter written findings regarding
relevance and accuracy. See id. Thus, “without first finding that [a
challenged] statement in the PSI [is] inaccurate, the court [is] not
required to make further written findings.” Perez, 2026 UT App
92, ¶ 35.
¶15 	However, the amendment does nothing to change the first
duty of the district court in addressing an objection to a PSI: the
court still “must . . . consider the objection raised.”2 Monroe, 2015
2. The State argues that the statute requires a defendant to satisfy
certain “prerequisites to trigger a sentencing court’s duty to
determine if the [PSI] had an inaccuracy” and to preserve a
challenge to the PSI. Specifically, the State reads the statute as
requiring the following: (1) the defendant must “make a good
faith effort to confer and resolve” the alleged inaccuracy with the
opposing party and Adult Probation & Parole (AP&P) before
sentencing; (2) at sentencing, the defendant must “explain the
efforts made to resolve the allegation and seek additional time to
confer and attempt to resolve the allegation”; and (3) if the court
does not grant additional time, the defendant must “introduce
some supporting evidence” regarding the alleged inaccuracy.
We do not agree with the State that these steps are
necessary to trigger the court’s duty to consider or rule on
objections to a PSI. The statute does not impose any affirmative
duty on the defendant to confer and resolve an objection prior to
sentencing, and there is no difference between the previous
version of the statute and the current version on that point. Both
versions of the statute imply that efforts may be made to resolve
the objection before sentencing, and the relevant language has not
substantively changed. Compare Utah Code § 77-18-1(6)(a) (2020)
(requiring that AP&P provide the defendant’s attorney, the
prosecutor, and the court with a copy of the PSI “three working
(continued…)

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	9 	2026 UT App 129
UT App 48, ¶ 6. This requires, at a minimum, that the court make
a finding as to whether the PSI is inaccurate.3 Because the statute
does not require written findings in the absence of a finding of
inaccuracy, the court’s finding regarding accuracy need not be
explicit. 	See 	Perez, 	2026 	UT 	App 	92, 	¶ 	35. 	However, 	the
circumstances must make it “reasonable to assume that the court
actually made” the finding. See State v. Samul, 2018 UT App 117,
¶ 21, 436 P.3d 298, quoted in Perez, 2026 UT App 92, ¶ 35.
¶16 	Recently, 	this 	court 	held 	that 	the 	district 	court 	had
adequately resolved a defendant’s objection to a PSI, even though
it did not make an explicit finding as to accuracy, because it could
be inferred from the circumstances that the court had found the
challenged statement not to be inaccurate. See Perez, 2026 UT App
92, ¶ 35. In that case, the court had “discussed the allegedly
inaccurate statement at some length at the sentencing hearing”
before 	ultimately 	denying 	the 	defendant’s 	request 	for 	a
days prior to sentencing” and permitting a defendant to bring
“[a]ny 	alleged 	inaccuracies 	in 	the 	presentence 	investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the
department prior to sentencing” to the court’s attention), with id.
§ 77-18-103(4), (5)(a) (2025) (requiring that AP&P provide the
defendant’s attorney, the prosecutor, and the court with a copy of
the PSI “three working days before the day on which the
defendant is sentenced” and permitting a defendant to bring “an
alleged inaccuracy in the [PSI] that is not resolved by the parties
and 	the 	department 	or 	law 	enforcement 	agency 	before
sentencing” to the attention of the court).
3. To hold otherwise would lead to an absurd result. If the court
is not required to make written findings in the absence of a finding
that the PSI is inaccurate, but the court also has no duty to make
any finding as to accuracy, courts would be free to simply ignore
a defendant’s objections altogether.

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 129
continuance to resolve the objection. Id. But the circumstances
here 	are 	different: 	the 	court 	did 	not 	discuss 	Connelley’s
objections, and there is no indication from the record that the
court considered them. Rather, after Connelley identified three
alleged inaccuracies in the PSI, the court responded simply,
“Okay. Anything else?”4 and then continued with the sentencing
hearing.
¶17 	“Because the statements in a defendant’s PSI may be
utilized in future settings, such as parole hearings, it is necessary
that a defendant’s objections be resolved on the record.” Monroe,
2015 UT App 48, ¶ 7 (cleaned up); accord State v. Samulski, 2016 UT
App 226, ¶ 18, 387 P.3d 595. Although the current version of the
statute no longer requires a court to make written findings unless
it first finds that there is an inaccuracy in the PSI, it is still
important that the court resolve the defendant’s objections on the
record. The court in Perez did that by discussing the alleged
inaccuracies, 	implicitly 	rejecting 	them, 	and 	denying 	a
continuance. See Perez, 2026 UT App 92, ¶ 35. When a court does
not address the objection at all, however, we cannot say that it
adequately 	considered 	or 	resolved 	the 	objection 	raised. 	Cf.
Monroe, 2015 UT App 48, ¶¶ 6–7. Thus, we must remand this
matter 	“for 	the 	limited 	purpose 	of 	resolving 	[Connelley’s]
objections to the PSI that were not adequately addressed on the
4. To be sure, this was the point when defense counsel would have
been well-advised to either request a continuance or attempt to
put on some evidence to support the challenge to the PSI. But
ultimately, the court has a statutory duty to consider and resolve
an objection to the accuracy of the PSI, and it did not do so here.
Cf. State v. Samulski, 2016 UT App 226, ¶¶ 18, 23, 387 P.3d 595
(recognizing that counsel “should have . . . asked the district court
to make specific findings on the record” regarding the accuracy of
the PSI but resting reversal on the fact that the court failed to fulfill
its statutory duty by not making sufficient findings).

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 129
record by the district court.” See Samulski, 2016 UT App 226, ¶ 19
(cleaned up).5
III. Consecutive Sentencing
¶18 	Finally, Connelley asserts that the district court abused its
discretion 	by 	imposing 	consecutive 	sentences 	for 	all 	of 	his
convictions. “In determining whether state offenses are to run
concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity
and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”
Utah Code § 76-3-401(2). “An abuse of discretion results when the
judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence
imposed is clearly excessive.” State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App
432, ¶ 14, 82 P.3d 1167 (cleaned up). “An appellate court may only
find abuse if it can be said that no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the trial court.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶19 	Connelley 	asserts 	that 	the 	court 	did 	not 	adequately
consider that the interaction between Connelley and Jessica was
brief, that there was only one victim, that most of Connelley’s
criminal history involved drugs and theft, and that he had never
been charged with a sex crime before.6
5. Although Connelley challenges the court’s decision to impose
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, see infra section III,
he raises other arguments in support of that challenge and does
not assert that any of the alleged inaccuracies in the PSI impacted
the sentence.
6. Connelley also asserts that the unlawful acquisition charges, in
particular, should run concurrently. He argues that those crimes
were not violent because Jessica “gave” him the credit cards in
exchange for him returning her wallet to her. He asserts that those
(continued…)

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	12 	2026 UT App 129
¶20 	When reviewing a district court’s sentencing decision, “we
generally presume that the district court appropriately considered
all the relevant evidence and statutory factors.” State v. Valdez,
2017 UT App 185, ¶ 9, 405 P.3d 952 (cleaned up). While the failure
to “consider all legally relevant sentencing factors is an abuse of
discretion, a sentencing court is not required to weigh all the
factors equally. The fact that the district court assessed the
relevant factors differently than a defendant would have liked
does not indicate that it exceeded its discretion.” State v. Wood,
2018 UT App 98, ¶ 12, 427 P.3d 452 (cleaned up).
¶21 	Here, 	the 	court 	was 	clearly 	aware 	of 	all 	the 	factors
identified by Connelley, and there is no indication that the court
did not consider them. Rather, the court weighed the factors
differently 	than 	Connelley 	would 	have 	liked. 	Although
Connelley’s encounter with a single victim was not protracted,
that encounter was extremely violent and had significant negative
consequences for Jessica. Furthermore, although Connelley did
not have previous convictions for sex offenses, his criminal
history 	includes 	past 	convictions 	for 	assault 	and 	domestic
violence. Moreover, his criminal history is extensive, with over
fifty charges and convictions on his adult record alone. Under
these circumstances, we are not convinced that the court failed to
consider all the legally relevant factors or that no reasonable
person would have imposed consecutive sentences.
CONCLUSION
¶22 	Connelley’s three convictions for unlawful acquisition of a
credit card are vacated, Connelley’s sentences for the remaining
offenses were not as “grave” and therefore should not have been
treated the same as the other offenses with respect to consecutive
sentencing. Because we have vacated the unlawful acquisition
convictions, we need not address this argument.

State v. Connelley
20241110-CA 	13 	2026 UT App 129
convictions are affirmed, and this matter is remanded for the
limited purpose of having the district court consider and resolve
Connelley’s objections to the PSI on the record.