In re C.L.V. (S.H. v. A.S. and M.S.)

2014 UT App 39
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE INTEREST OF C.L.V., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN
YEARS OF AGE.
S.H.,
Appellant,
v.
A.S. and M.S,
Appellees.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20131037-CA
Filed February 21, 2014
Eighth District Juvenile Court, Vernal Department
The Honorable Larry A. Steele
No. 1075774
Marea A. Doherty, Attorney for Appellant
Jordan R. Van Oostendorp, Attorney for Appellees
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., AND
JOHN A. PEARCE.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 S.H. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating
his parental rights in his son, C.L.V. (Son). We affirm.
¶2 A juvenile court’s findings of fact will not be overturned
unless they are clearly erroneous. In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11,
21 P.3d 680. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in
light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against the clear
weight of the evidence. Id. In reviewing a juvenile court’s order,

In re C.L.V.
20131037-CA 2 2014 UT App 39
this court “will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings and
conclusions unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings as made or the court has abused its discretion.” In re R.A.J.,
1999 UT App 329, ¶ 6, 991 P.2d 1118. “When a foundation for the
[juvenile] court’s decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court
may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007
UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435.
¶3 Father asserts that he was not properly served with
documents during the course of the case against him. The juvenile
court permitted the use of alternate service because of difficulties
in locating Father. Although Father now disputes whether the
court’s order was appropriate, he has waived that issue. The record
shows that Father appeared by telephone at a hearing in April 2013
and accepted alternate service through his mother’s address. He
told the court, “[A]ny mail sent to my mother’s house, for me, I’ll
understand as being served.” Accordingly, any issue regarding the
form of service has been waived.
¶4 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred in finding
that he abandoned Son. It is prima facie evidence of abandonment
that a parent fails to communicate with the child for more than six
months or fails to show the normal interest of a natural parent.
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-508(1)(b)(c) (LexisNexis 2012). The
testimony at trial showed that Father had not paid any child
support over the course of Son’s life and had not sent cards or gifts.
Father had seen Son, at most, for a couple of hours during the one
trip he had made to visit him. Father had not otherwise
communicated with Son and had not inquired about his well-being
on the few occasions that Father called Son’s mother or
grandparents. The evidence established that Father failed to show
normal parental interest in his son for more than three years and
had not formed any relationship with him. Accordingly, the
juvenile court’s finding that Father had abandoned Son was
supported by the evidence.

In re C.L.V.
1. Ultimately, counsel did not file such a document because Father
appeared by telephone at another hearing to set the trial date and
agreed to the new date. He also committed to appearing personally
and was notified that the trial would move forward even if he
failed to appear.
20131037-CA 3 2014 UT App 39
¶5 Father additionally asserts that the juvenile court erred in
requiring a notarized statement from him confirming that he would
attend the termination trial if it were continued to a later date. This
issue was not raised in the juvenile court and is therefore not
appropriately before this court on appeal. To preserve an issue for
appeal, the issue must be raised in the juvenile court in such a way
as to enable the juvenile court to address the issue. See 438 Main St.
v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801. In this instance, trial
counsel did not object to the requirement of the notarized
statement from Father and instead readily agreed to obtain the
notice to assuage the juvenile court’s concern that Father would be
difficult to notify of any date change.1
¶6 Finally, Father argues that the juvenile court discriminated
against him based on his indigence. Father asserts that traveling to
Utah was a hardship and that his failure to visit should not have
been held against him because he could not afford to visit. Indeed,
Father visited only once. However, it was not only financial
resources that kept him from visiting but also two lengthy periods
of incarceration. Furthermore, Father failed to establish any
relationship with Son through cards, letters, or telephone calls. In
sum, the evidence of Father’s lack of interest in Son, leading to the
finding of abandonment, does not rest on Father’s financial status.
¶7 Affirmed.