State v. Davis

2014 UT App 77
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DEXTER DAVIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Memorandum Decision
No. 20130006-CA
Filed April 10, 2014
Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck
No. 121400308
Matthew A. Barraza and Peter A. Daines,
Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Daniel W. Boyer, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Memorandum
Decision, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L.
ROTH concurred.
VOROS, Judge:
¶1 While an inmate at the Utah State Prison, Dexter Davis got
into a scuffle with a corrections officer, Sgt. Benjamin Vanzant.
Davis was charged with assault by a prisoner, a third-degree
felony. At trial, the jury heard two versions of the event—two
corrections officers testified in effect that Davis was the aggressor,
while Davis testified that Sergeant Vanzant was the aggressor. The
jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, Davis challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

State v. Davis
20130006-CA 2 2014 UT App 77
¶2 “Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.” Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (LexisNexis 2008). Assault includes any “attempt,
with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another,”
and any “act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another.” Id. § 76-5-102(a), (c).
¶3 Davis tacitly concedes that, if believed, the testimony of the
two corrections officers would support the elements of the charged
offense. But Davis contends that the officers’ testimony was “so
inconsistent and substantially unreliable” that no reasonable jury
could have believed it.
¶4 In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict, we do not “sit as a second trier of fact.”
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ¶ 16, 25 P.3d 985. “It is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.” Id.
¶5 Because we defer to the fact-finding of the jury, this court
may “exercise its discretion to disregard inconsistent witness
testimony only when the court is convinced that the credibility of
the witness is so weak that no reasonable jury could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Robbins, 2009
UT 23, ¶ 18, 210 P.3d 288. Accordingly, when the complaining
“witness’s testimony is inherently improbable, the court may
choose to disregard it.” Id. ¶ 16 (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d
981, 984 (Utah 1993)). “[W]itness testimony is inherently
improbable . . . if it is (1) physically impossible or (2) apparently
false.” Id. “[T]estimony is apparently false if its falsity is ‘apparent,
without any resort to inferences or deductions.’” Id. ¶ 17 (quoting
Workman, 852 P.2d at 984). “Substantial inconsistencies in a sole

State v. Davis
1. Or at least a bruise: Davis notes that the State offered no evidence
“matching the bruises on Sergeant Vanzant’s arm with Davis’s
knuckle pattern.”
20130006-CA 3 2014 UT App 77
witness’s testimony, though not directed at the core offense, can
create a situation where the prosecution cannot be said to have
proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
particularly . . . where other significant factors in the case suggest
a lack of credibility.” Id. Accordingly, a jury’s verdict of guilt may
be overturned “in cases where a sole witness presents inherently
contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion,
and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt.” Id.
¶ 18 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶6 This is not such a case. Davis was not convicted on the
contradictory testimony of a sole uncorroborated witness. Two
adult eyewitnesses testified to the incident. Sergeant Vanzant
testified that Davis threw a “closed-fist overhand right” punch that
landed on his arm, leaving a “good-sized bruise.” The jury saw a
photo of the bruise. A second corrections officer witnessed the1
encounter. She reported that Davis “started physically fighting”
with Sergeant Vanzant, that Davis was “pushing and swinging” at
Sergeant Vanzant, and that Davis “threw several over head
punches,” although she could not tell if any of them landed.
¶7 Davis makes a plausible case on appeal that the jury should
have discredited this testimony. He argues that the officers’
accounts suffered from various flaws: Sergeant Vanzant could not
remember which arm Davis hit; the officers may have shaped and
coordinated their stories for trial; Sergeant Vanzant had a motive
to fabricate; and the other officer, as his subordinate, had a motive
to back him up. But these are jury questions. On appeal “[w]e do
not re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses or second-guess the
jury’s conclusion.” State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ¶ 44, 57 P.3d 977. In a
case of this sort, our role is limited to determining whether the
testimony supporting the guilty verdict was inherently improbable.

State v. Davis
20130006-CA 4 2014 UT App 77
See Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 16. Here we readily conclude that it was
not.
¶8 Affirmed.