Design Academy v. Albiston

2018 UT App 102
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DESIGN A CADEMY I NC .,
Appellant,
v.
NICOLE M. A LBISTON ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20170074-CA
Filed June 7, 2018
Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck
No. 130415822
Michael R. Lofgran and Scott A. Trujillo, Attorneys
for Appellant
Nicole M. Albiston, Appellee Pro Se
JUDGE GREGORY K. O RME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES K ATE A. TOOMEY and DAVID N. M ORTENSEN concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	Appellant 	Design 	Academy 	Inc. 	appeals 	the 	district
court’s denial of its motion to suspend Appellee Nicole M.
Albiston’s driver license and vehicle registration for her failure
to satisfy a judgment unrelated to owning or operating a motor
vehicle. We affirm.
¶2 	Albiston signed an agreement with Design Academy,
promising that she would pay tuition and related fees, and in
return, Design Academy would provide her with the 2,000
educational hours then required by the State of Utah to become a
licensed cosmetologist. Less than six months later, Albiston
withdrew from 	Design 	Academy. 	Shortly thereafter, 	Design
Academy sent her a statement indicating what she owed under

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20170074-CA 	2 	2018 UT App 102
the agreement. Albiston did not pay any part of the balance due,
and Design Academy filed a complaint against her to collect it.
Albiston failed to answer the complaint or make an appearance,
and Design Academy obtained a default judgment from which
Albiston did not appeal.1
¶3 	Albiston did not make any payments on the judgment.
Two years after entry of the judgment, Design Academy filed a
motion in the district court, requesting that, under section 511 of
the 	Financial 	Responsibility 	of 	Motor 	Vehicle 	Owners 	and
Operators Act (the Act), Albiston’s driver license and vehicle
registration be suspended for failure to satisfy the judgment
within 60 days. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-511 (LexisNexis
2014). The district court denied the motion, explaining that to
trigger the license and registration suspensions, the Act requires
a judgment arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle and that the “suspension of a license on an
unsatisfied judgment applies only to judgments obtained under
[the Act]” and not to Design Academy’s judgment premised on
the breach of a cosmetology tuition contract. Design Academy
appeals.
¶4 	Design Academy contends that the district court erred in
interpreting “judgment” as defined in subsection 103(2) of the
Act. See id. § 41-12a-103(2). We review questions of statutory
interpretation for correctness, giving no deference to the district
court’s legal conclusions. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship,
2011 UT 50, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 863.
¶5 	Section 	511 	of 	the 	Act 	permits 	the 	suspension 	of 	a
judgment debtor’s driver license and vehicle registration when
he or she fails to satisfy a judgment within 60 days. Utah Code
Ann. § 41-12a-511(1)‒(2). The clerk of the court or the judge,
1. Albiston also failed to file a brief in this appeal later taken by
Design Academy.

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20170074-CA 	3 	2018 UT App 102
“upon 	the 	written 	request 	of 	the 	judgment 	creditor 	or 	his
attorney,” forwards a certified copy of the judgment to the
Department of Public Safety “immediately after the expiration of
the 60 days.” Id. § 41-12a-511(1). Upon receiving a copy of the
judgment, the Department of Public Safety “shall suspend the
license and registration . . . of any person against whom the
judgment was rendered.” Id. § 41-12a-511(2). The Act defines a
“judgment” as
any judgment that is final by:
(a) expiration without appeal of the time within
which an appeal might have been perfected; or
(b) final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the
United 	States, 	upon 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	for
damages:
(i) 	arising 	out 	of 	the 	ownership,
maintenance, 	or 	use 	of 	any 	motor
vehicle . . . .
Id. § 41-12a-103(2).
¶6 	Design Academy contends that the Legislature’s “use of
the coordinating conjunction ‘or’” at the end of subsection 2(a)
“defines 	two 	mutually 	exclusive 	alternatives 	for 	when 	a
judgment is final” under the Act and triggers the suspension
penalty: “expiration without an appeal” and “final affirmation
on appeal.” Because these alternative definitions are exclusive of
each other and, unlike with subsection 2(b), no restrictions
follow 	subsection 	2(a), 	Design 	Academy 	suggests 	that 	the
Legislature “unambiguously demonstrates an intent” to include
all causes of actions for judgments that become final without an
appeal, while categorizing only judgments that become final by
“affirmation 	on 	appeal” 	as 	needing 	to 	“aris[e] 	out 	of 	the

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20170074-CA 	4 	2018 UT App 102
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle.” See id.
§ 41-12a-103(2)(b). To be sure, the punctuation and organization
of subsection 2, read in the abstract and taken at face value,
support Design Academy’s position.
¶7 	That said, when interpreting a statute, “our primary goal
is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature,” and,
to be sure, the best evidence of that typically “is the plain
language of the statute itself.” Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14
(quotations simplified). But we will not adopt the plain meaning
of a statute if doing so “works an absurd result.” Savage v. Utah
Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242. The absurdity
doctrine 	“recognizes 	that 	although 	‘the 	plain 	language
interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its
favor, it is also true that [the Legislature] cannot, in every
instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have
meant what it said.’”2 In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 1206
(quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)). And “we apply this canon to reform unambiguous
statutory language where applying the plain language leads to
results so overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could
have intended them.” Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75,
¶ 46, 357 P.3d 992 (Durrant, C.J., concurring).
¶8 	We do not use this tool of statutory interpretation to
usurp “legislative power through judicial second guessing of the
wisdom of a legislative act”; instead, we seek to “preserve
legislative intent.” In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 12. For that reason,
we recognize that the absurdity doctrine “is strong medicine, not
2. 	This 	doctrine 	is 	not 	to 	be 	confused 	with 	the 	absurd
consequences canon, a different interpretative tool that resolves
ambiguities in a statute when the “statutory language lends itself
to 	two 	alternative 	readings” 	by 	selecting 	“the 	reading 	that
avoids absurd consequences.” Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015
UT 75, ¶ 46, 357 P.3d 992 (Durrant, C.J., concurring).

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to be administered lightly,” Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20, ¶ 71, 345
P.3d 689 (Lee, J., concurring), and is not to be used to “substitute
our preferences” for the Legislature’s decisions, id. ¶ 72. “[T]o
override the plain language under the absurdity doctrine, the
operation of the plain language must be more than improvident,
it must be so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational legislator
could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.”
Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 48 (Durrant, C.J., concurring). And “[t]his
standard is satisfied only if the legislature could not reasonably
have intended the result.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28, 387
P.3d 1000.
¶9 	Design 	Academy 	contends 	that 	the 	statute 	is
unambiguous and plainly means just what Design Academy
says 	it 	means. 	Reading 	the 	statute 	uncritically, 	Design
Academy’s position is sound. First, although the use of “or” runs
the risk of creating an ambiguity in a statute, see Bryan A.
Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 639 (3d ed. 2011), here
the Legislature’s use of “or” between subsections 2(a) and 2(b) is
clearly exclusive for the reason that a judgment cannot become
final without an appeal and also be affirmed on appeal. And
second, the organizational scheme of section 103(2) clearly states
that the requirement that a cause of action “aris[e] out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle” is a
qualifier 	of 	subsection 	2(b) 	only—not 	a 	qualifier 	of 	both
subsections 2(a) and 2(b). Because subsection 2(a) is exclusive of
subsection 	2(b), 	this 	qualifier 	would 	not 	be 	applicable 	to
subsection 	2(a), 	given 	the 	organizational 	scheme 	of 	section
103(2). As a result, a plain reading of the statute suggests that the
holder of any judgment that becomes final without appeal has
the right to seek suspension of the judgment debtor’s driver
license and vehicle registration.
¶10 	Obviously, such an interpretation of “judgment” in light
of the purpose of the Act and its relevant provisions results in an
absurdity given that license and registration suspensions can
result from final judgments that are affirmed on appeal only if

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they arise out of motor vehicle ownership, maintenance, or
usage, while judgments that become final without an appeal can
arise from all manner of cases, including divorce, mechanic’s lien
foreclosure, collection, defamation, or eviction.
¶11 	Viewed on its own terms, the statutory interpretation
urged by Design Academy makes no sense. Why would the
Legislature give more favored treatment to judgment debtors
who appeal and lose than those who simply forgo an appeal?
And why would the Legislature further burden a civil judgment
debtor—who 	already 	will 	be 	dealing 	with 	appearances 	in
supplemental proceedings, wage garnishments, and execution
on personal and real property—with the added sanction of
driver license and vehicle registration suspension (unless the
judgment debtor had the foresight to appeal even if there were
no 	good 	grounds 	for 	appeal, 	thereby 	avoiding 	this 	added
sanction)? And if, as Design Academy contends, this loss of
driving and vehicle privileges applies to all judgments that go
unappealed, why is there no mention of this civil sanction in the
statutory 	provisions 	dealing 	with 	judgments 	and 	appeals?
Instead, the provision Design Academy relies on is found in the
Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act,
and it seems absurd that the Legislature would vest unappealed
civil judgments not related to the subject matter of the Act with
the added burden of license and registration suspensions.
¶12 	In sum, the punctuation of the statute is flawed, but the
Legislature surely did not mean to enact a bizarre scheme that
imposes 	license 	and 	registration 	suspension 	on 	those 	who
appeal and lose if and only if the judgment is for damages
“arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor
vehicle,” Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-103(2)(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2014),
while imposing the same suspensions across the wide range of
judgments, including those with no connection whatsoever to
the “ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle,” see
id., if the judgment becomes final without an appeal.

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¶13 	This, quite clearly, is what the Legislature meant and how
the provision should be read:
“Judgment” means any judgment that is final by:
(a) expiration without appeal of the time within
which an appeal might have been perfected, or
(b) final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the
United States,
upon a cause of action for damages arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor
vehicle . . . .
We interpret the provision accordingly and uphold the district
court’s 	denial 	of 	Design 	Academy’s 	motion 	to 	suspend
Albiston’s license and registration.
¶14 	Affirmed.