Benson v. Labor Commission

2018 UT App 228
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
R ODNEY BENSON ,
Petitioner,
v.
U TAH LABOR C OMMISSION , U TAH DIVISION OF A LCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE C ONTROL, AND WCF M UTUAL I NSURANCE C OMPANY ,
Respondents.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20170872-CA
Filed December 20, 2018
Original Proceeding in this Court
Rodney Benson, Petitioner Pro Se
Matthew J. Black, Attorney for Respondents Utah
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control and
WCF Mutual Insurance Company
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME, M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN
F ORSTER , and K ATE A PPLEBY .1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	Rodney 	Benson 	seeks 	judicial 	review 	of 	the 	Labor
Commission’s decision denying his claim for benefits under the
Workers’ 	Compensation 	Act. 	We 	decline 	to 	disturb 	the
Commission’s decision.
¶2 	Benson 	initially 	argues 	that 	he 	was 	constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial during the formal adjudicative proceeding
before the Labor Commission. However, “[t]he right to jury trial
under article I, section 10 [of the Utah Constitution] extends only
1. Judge Kate A. Toomey has resumed the use of her birth name
and is now known as Judge Kate Appleby.

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20170872-CA 	2 	2018 UT App 228
to actions that were triable to juries when the Constitution was
adopted.” Jensen v. State Tax Comm’n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah
1992). The Labor Commission’s procedures here are “solely
creatures of statute and were not cognizable as civil actions at
common law.” Id. As a result, Benson was not entitled to a jury
trial in the Labor Commission proceedings. See id.; see also Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (noting that “the Seventh
Amendment 	is 	generally 	inapplicable 	in 	administrative
proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the
whole concept of administrative adjudications”).
¶3 	Benson 	next 	asserts 	that 	the 	Labor 	Commission
violated 	various 	provisions 	of 	both 	the 	federal 	and
state 	constitutions 	during 	the 	course 	of 	the 	proceedings.
Benson 	fails 	to 	adequately 	brief 	the 	issue. 	A 	party 	must
support his argument on judicial review “with citations to legal
authority 	and 	the 	record” 	and 	with 	“reasoned 	analysis”
explaining “why the party should prevail.” Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(8). “A brief is inadequate when it merely contains bald
citation[s] to authority [without] development of that authority
and reasoned analysis based on that authority. As we have
repeatedly noted, we are not a depository in which [a party] may
dump the burden of argument and research.” Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 46, 70 P.3d 904
(quotation simplified). “An inadequately briefed claim is by
definition insufficient to discharge an appellant’s burden to
demonstrate trial court error.” Simmons Media Group, LLC v.
Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ¶ 37, 335 P.3d 885. Here,
Benson lists various constitutional provisions he claims that
the 	Legislature 	violated 	in 	creating 	the 	Labor 	Commission,
or 	that 	the 	Labor 	Commission 	violated 	during 	the
adjudicative process. He also states that “each and every point
made in this brief illustrates a violation” of his constitutional
rights. 	However, 	Benson 	fails 	to 	develop 	any 	authority 	or
reasoned analysis as to how each of these “points” is a violation
of a constitutional provision. As a result, Benson has failed to

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carry his burden of demonstrating any error on the part of the
Labor Commission.
¶4 	Benson argues that the Legislature and the executive
branch, including the Labor Commission and the Governor’s
Office, are biased against workers in general, and demonstrated
bias against him in particular. In making this argument Benson
sets forth numerous alleged theories of bias. Many of these
theories concern Benson’s belief that there are systemic issues
concerning how the Labor Commission resolves complaints filed
by injured workers. However, because such issues involve policy
considerations, 	and 	Benson 	has 	failed 	to 	demonstrate 	any
constitutional infirmities in the administrative process, they can
be resolved only by the Legislature. See University of Utah v.
Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51, ¶ 53, 144 P.3d 1109.
¶5 	Benson also raises numerous points of contention that he
believes demonstrate that the Labor Commission was biased
against him individually. However, a closer examination of his
arguments 	demonstrates 	that 	he 	is 	not 	arguing 	that 	the
Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) or the Appeals Board of the
Labor Commission was actually biased against him. Rather, he is
arguing that they did not treat him fairly.2 However, in so
arguing, 	Benson 	fails 	to 	cite 	any 	applicable 	statute 	or
administrative 	rule 	that 	was 	not 	followed 	during 	the
proceedings in the Labor Commission. Further, as stated above,
he fails to properly develop any argument that the alleged
“biases” on the part of anyone at the Labor Commission violated
either the state or federal constitutions. We must, therefore, due
to the absence of any argument to the contrary, assume that the
Labor Commission complied with the procedural requirements
2. This court cannot find any specific claim in which Benson
argues that the ALJ or the Appeals Board had a specific bias
against Benson that would have required recusal.

Benson v. Labor Commission
20170872-CA 	4 	2018 UT App 228
provided by the statute and administrative rules. Because we
assume that the Labor Commission complied with all applicable
statutes and rules, Benson cannot demonstrate that the Labor
Commission treated him any differently than any other person
seeking benefits. As such, Benson fails to demonstrate that the
Labor Commission was biased against him.
¶6 	The arguments raised by Benson could be construed as a
claim that the Labor Commission erred in failing to award him
benefits. The Labor Commission’s decision to award benefits is a
mixed 	question 	of 	fact 	and 	law. 	Danny’s 	Drywall 	v. 	Labor
Commission, 2014 UT App 277, ¶ 9, 339 P.3d 624. “The standard
of review we apply when reviewing a mixed question can be
either deferential or non-deferential” depending upon whether
the question is more fact-like or law-like. Jex v. Labor Commission,
2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (quotation simplified). “Due to the
fact-intensive 	inquiry 	involved 	at 	the 	agency 	level” 	in
determining 	whether 	it 	is 	appropriate 	to 	award 	benefits,
including credibility determinations that an appellate court is “in
an 	inferior 	position 	to 	review,” 	cases 	like 	these 	not 	lend
themselves 	“to 	consistent 	resolution 	by 	a 	uniform 	body 	of
appellate precedent.” Carbon County v. Workforce Appeals Board,
2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (quotation simplified); see also
Hutchings v. Labor Commission, 2016 UT App 160, ¶ 23, 378 P.3d
1273 (stating that “[m]edical causation is fundamentally a factual
determination”). This decision is therefore more fact-like, and
deference to the Labor Commission’s decision is warranted.
¶7 	Benson 	asserts that his need 	for 	a 	knee replacement
surgery was the result of a work-related accident and was not
related to a prior motorcycle accident. In so arguing, Benson
points this court to various facts and evidence to support his
argument. However, this court has previously concluded that a
petitioner must do more than simply point to evidence that
supports his argument, the petitioner must “demonstrate that
the 	Commission’s 	medical 	causation 	finding 	itself 	is 	not

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20170872-CA 	5 	2018 UT App 228
supported by substantial evidence.” Hutchings, 2016 UT App
160, ¶ 31. Here, there is substantial evidence in the record from
which the Labor Commission could have reasonably found that
Benson’s ongoing knee issue was not caused by the industrial
accident, but rather by a motorcycle accident that predated the
industrial accident, coupled with degenerative changes resulting
from age and weight.
¶8 	A medical panel’s report alone may provide substantial
evidence to support the Labor Commission’s determination of
medical causation. See id. ¶ 32. Here, the medical panel reviewed
Benson’s 	relevant 	medical 	records, 	considered 	Benson’s
diagnostics, and performed its own examination of Benson.
After reviewing the totality of the evidence, the medical panel
determined that Benson’s industrial injury was a temporary
aggravation of his pre-existing condition and that aggravation
was fully resolved within a year of the industrial accident. The
panel added that because of the prior motorcycle accident and
the natural progression of degeneration due to age and weight,
Benson’s current knee problems would likely have been the
same even if the work accident had never occurred. The medical
panel’s report was comprehensive and supported by various
medical records generated during the history of Benson’s knee
problems. 	Thus, 	the 	medical 	panel’s 	report 	constituted
substantial 	evidence 	in 	support 	of 	the 	Labor 	Commission’s
decision. 	Because 	substantial 	evidence 	supported 	the 	Labor
Commission’s decision, Benson has failed to demonstrate that
the Labor Commission abused its discretion.
¶9 	For the above reasons, we decline to disturb the Labor
Commission’s order.