24-0905 UATP MANAGEMENT, LLC; UATP IP, LLC; UA ATTRACTIONS, LLC; RACHELLE NURSE-GOODLY; AND JOSEPH GOODLY v. CHINIQUA GETER AS NEXT FRIEND OF K.G., A MINOR; from Fort Bend County; 14th Court of Appeals District (14-23-00850-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 09-12-24) — Per Curiam Opinion

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 24-0905
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UATP Management, LLC; UATP IP, LLC; UA Attractions, LLC;
Rachelle Nurse-Goodly; and Joseph Goodly,
Petitioners,
v.
Chiniqua Geter as next friend of K.G., a minor,
Respondent
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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════
PER CURIAM
A mother released liability on her minor daughter’s behalf in
favor of a trampoline park. 	The agreement contains indemnity and
arbitration 	provisions. 	The 	indemnity 	provision 	identifies 	several
park-affiliated individuals and entities as “protected parties,” but the
protected parties did not sign the agreement.
The daughter was injured while visiting the park. 	Her mother
sued on her behalf, naming the park and the protected parties as
defendants. 	The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the
release agreement, and the trial court denied the motion. 	The court of

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appeals reversed as to the park, holding that an arbitration agreement
existed between the park and the minor child. 	The court further held,
however, that the non-signatory affiliates identified in the agreement
had no contractual right to compel arbitration. 	Because the protected
parties are third-party beneficiaries of the agreement, we reverse this
portion of the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
I
Chiniqua Geter sued on behalf of her minor daughter, K.G., for
injuries K.G. sustained while playing at an Urban Air trampoline park
in 	Beaumont, 	Texas. 	The 	named 	defendants 	include 	Beaumont
Adventure Park Urban Air LLC (Beaumont Urban Air) and petitioners
UATP 	Management, 	LLC; 	UATP 	IP, 	LLC; 	UA 	Attractions, 	LLC;
Rachelle Nurse-Goodly; and Joseph Goodly.
Before entering the play area of the park, Geter signed a release
and indemnification agreement in favor of Beaumont Urban Air on
behalf of K.G. 	The release and indemnity provision in the agreement
identifies 	the 	non-signatory 	petitioners 	as 	“protected 	parties” 	that
Geter, in signing the agreement, “releases, agrees not to sue, and shall
indemnify.”1 	The agreement further contains an arbitration provision
providing that “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, breach thereof, the Premises, Activities, property damage
(real or personal), personal injury (including death), or the scope,
1 “[The signatory] releases, agrees not to sue, and shall indemnify
Urban Air, UATP Management, LLC, UATP IP, LLC, UA Attractions, LLC,
[and] the legal owner of the premises . . . (collectively, protected parties).”

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arbitrability, 	or 	validity 	of 	this 	arbitration 	agreement . . . shall
be . . . settled by binding arbitration before a single arbitrator” under
the Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
In their answer, Beaumont Urban Air and the protected parties
included a notice of their right to arbitrate the parties’ dispute pursuant
to the release. They then moved to compel arbitration. The trial court
denied the motion.
Beaumont 	Urban 	Air 	and 	the 	protected 	parties 	filed 	an
interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s ruling. 	See TEX. C IV.
PRAC. & R EM. CODE § 51.016; 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). The court of appeals
reversed and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration as to
Beaumont Urban Air, holding that a valid arbitration agreement exists
between 	K.G. 	and 	Beaumont 	Urban 	Air 	under 	the 	direct-benefits
estoppel doctrine. 	___ S.W.3d ___, 2024 WL 4163646, at *3-4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 12, 2024). The court of appeals further
held, however, that the protected parties had no contractual right to
compel 	arbitration 	because 	they 	did 	not 	sign 	the 	agreement 	and
direct-benefits 	estoppel 	does 	not 	apply 	to 	claims 	that 	“exist
independently of the contract.” Id. The court of appeals observed that
the arbitration clause—in contrast to the agreement itself—does not
mention the protected parties. 	Id. at *3. 	The protected parties
petitioned for review in this Court.
II
As a general matter, a party seeking to compel arbitration must
establish that the claims at issue fall within the scope of a valid
arbitration agreement. 	Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115

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(Tex. 2018). 	Whether an agreement to arbitrate exists is a question of
law for courts to decide. Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero, 642
S.W.3d 583, 586 (Tex. 2022).
The court of appeals held that a valid arbitration agreement
exists and binds K.G. because Geter signed the agreement on K.G.’s
behalf and K.G. accepted benefits under the agreement by gaining
access to the park. 	___ S.W.3d at ___, 2024 WL 4163646, at *3. 	Geter
challenges this holding, arguing that K.G., as a minor, may disavow the
contract and did so by instituting this action.2
The arbitration agreement binds K.G. because Geter signed it on
K.G.’s behalf as her parent as Texas law permits. 	The direct-benefits
estoppel doctrine is not required to reach that conclusion. The court of
appeals relied on our opinion in Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Ha to
support its direct-benefits estoppel application. 	Id. at *2-3 (citing 660
S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tex. 2023)). 	In Ha, we held that a contractor could
compel minor children to arbitrate their construction-defect claims
under a home-purchase agreement their father signed because the
children had accepted the benefits of the agreement in occupying the
home. 660 S.W.3d at 531-35. The direct-benefits estoppel doctrine was
necessary to reach this conclusion because the children’s father had not
signed the purchase agreement on the children’s behalf. See id. at 531.
2 As Geter did not timely file a petition challenging the court of appeals’
judgment, the judgment in favor of Beaumont Urban Air is final. See TEX . R.
APP. P. 53.1 (“A party who seeks to alter the court of appeals’ judgment must
file a petition for review.”). 	We address the validity of the agreement only
insofar as it affects the protected parties’ appeal.

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As 	we 	recognized 	in 	Ha, 	“parents 	may 	sign 	arbitration
agreements on behalf of their children” under the Family Code, which
recognizes 	parents’ 	rights 	to 	make 	“‘decisions 	of 	substantial 	legal
significance’ concerning their children.” 	Id. at 534 (quoting TEX. FAM.
CODE § 151.001(a)(7)). 	Exceptions apply only “[i]n rare cases . . . such
as when a parent’s interests are adverse to the child’s interests.” Id. at
534 n.6. 	In this case, the parties do not advance an exception to the
general rule. Geter signed the agreement on K.G.’s behalf to allow her
to play at the trampoline park. 	K.G. thus is bound by her mother’s
signature irrespective of the direct-benefits estoppel doctrine.
Nor can K.G. disavow the agreement, having accepted the benefit
of visiting the trampoline park. 	As Geter correctly points out, we
recognize that a contract obligating a minor is “voidable at the election
of the minor.” 	Dairyland Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Roman, 498
S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1973). However, we also have long recognized the
corollary principle that a minor “is not permitted to retain the benefits
of a contract while repudiating its obligations.” Id. K.G. lost any ability
to disavow the agreement upon gaining entry to the trampoline park.
Having confirmed that an arbitration agreement exists and binds
K.G., the remaining issue is whether the protected parties, who did not
sign the agreement, may nonetheless compel arbitration as beneficiaries
of that agreement. We hold they can.
As a preliminary matter, the protected parties assert that the
court of appeals erred in reaching the issue of enforceability against
non-signers 	to 	the 	agreement 	because 	the 	agreement 	delegates
questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. We disagree.

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Parties may agree to delegate questions about the scope of an
arbitration agreement to arbitrators rather than courts. TotalEnergies
E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mex., LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tex.
2023). 	If a valid delegation clause exists, “courts must enforce that
agreement 	just 	as 	they 	must 	enforce 	an 	agreement 	to 	delegate
resolution of the underlying merits to the arbitrator.” 	Id. 	Whether a
party who did not sign the agreement may compel arbitration, however,
“raises the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists between
those parties.” Cerna ex rel. R.W. v. Pearland Urb. Air, LLC, 714 S.W.3d
585, 589 (Tex. 2025). 	“[T]he existence of a valid arbitration clause
between specific parties” is “a gateway matter for the court to decide.”
G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 524
(Tex. 2015) (quoting In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011)). We
hold that it is for the courts, not an arbitrator, to decide whether the
non-signatory protected parties may invoke the agreement. We review
the court of appeals’ resolution of that question de novo. 	Jody James
Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Tex. 2018).
Because 	“[a]rbitration 	is 	a 	creature 	of 	contract 	between
consenting 	parties,” 	we 	examine 	contract 	principles 	to 	determine
whether an agreement encompasses non-signatory parties. 	Id. at 629.
We have recognized six such principles that may establish contractual
application 	to 	non-signatories: 	“(1) incorporation 	by 	reference,
(2) assumption, (3) agency, (4) alter ego, (5) equitable estoppel, and
(6) third-party beneficiary.” 	Id. at 633. 	Pertinent to this case, the
protected 	parties 	claim 	third-party 	beneficiary 	status 	as 	to 	the
agreement.

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“Like 	other 	contracts,” 	third-party 	beneficiaries 	may 	enforce
arbitration agreements “so long as ‘the parties to the contract intended
to secure a benefit to that third party and entered into the contract
directly for the third party’s benefit.’” 	Id. at 635 (quoting In re Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006)). 	“The benefit
must be more than incidental, and the contracting parties’ intent to
‘confer a direct benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled
out or enforcement by the third party must be denied.’” Id. (quoting MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex.
1999)).
In this case, the agreement names each non-signatory as among
the “protected parties” that Geter “releases, agrees not to sue, and shall
indemnify.” Geter argues that this indemnity provision does not confer
third-party 	beneficiary 	status 	to 	the 	parties’ 	arbitration 	provision
because the arbitration provision does not separately include them. The
protected parties respond that the dispute resolution clauses—including
the arbitration provision—are the mechanisms to enforce the benefits of
release 	and 	indemnity 	conferred 	to 	them 	as 	intended 	third-party
beneficiaries. We agree.
The release and indemnity provision expressly identifying the
non-signatory entities as “protected parties” demonstrates the parties’
intent to benefit these entities. 	“By its own terms, the agreement was
entered into, in part, directly for [the non-signatory entities’] benefit.”
Palm Harbor Homes, 195 S.W.3d at 677. 	The arbitration provision
applies to undefined “parties” and does not exclude the protected parties
named elsewhere in the agreement. Construing the contract as a whole

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and harmonizing its provisions, as we must, Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2005), it follows that the protected
parties 	may 	enforce 	the 	arbitration 	agreement 	as 	third-party
beneficiaries; arbitration is the parties’ chosen means of enforcing the
agreement’s release and indemnification provision. Having decided that
the parties agreed to arbitrate, “courts must respect the agreement’s
terms.” 	Cerna, 714 S.W.3d at 592. 	As third-party beneficiaries of the
agreement, the protected parties may invoke the arbitration provision.
* 	* 	*
Without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, we grant
the petition for review and reverse the portion of the court of appeals’
judgment affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel
arbitration as to the protected parties. 	The remainder of the court of
appeals’ judgment, unchallenged on appeal, remains in effect. 	We
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
OPINION DELIVERED: October 16, 2026