Ex Parte John Franklin Williams Jr. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-24-00068-CV
__________________

EX PARTE JOHN FRANKLIN WILLIAMS JR.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24-01-00199-CV
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

John Franklin Williams Jr. filed a notice of appeal of an order denying an

application for a writ of habeas corpus, and in the brief he filed to support his appeal

he complains the trial court erred in denying the Application for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “application”), which he filed with the trial court during January 2024.

Williams alleged in his application that he “is civilly committed pursuant to Texas

Health & Safety Code Chapter 841.” He attached to his application a judgment and

an order of civil commitment in Trial Cause Number 14-02-01500-CV. In his habeas

corpus application Williams contended the 2015 Amendments to Chapter 841 should

not apply to him and he argued the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. After

1
receiving the notice of appeal and docketing the appeal, the Clerk of the Court

questioned this Court’s jurisdiction. Williams responded and argued this Court could

exercise appellate jurisdiction because the trial court had ruled on the merits of the

application. Williams then alternatively asked this Court to consider granting

mandamus relief if the Court found it lacked appellate jurisdiction. After considering

the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal and deny the petition for a

writ of mandamus.

For the reasons explained below, we conclude the trial court did not rule on

the merits of Williams’ application for a writ of habeas corpus. We also conclude

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the application and that

Williams is not entitled to relief under his alternative argument asking the Court to

treat his appeal as a petition for mandamus. We dismiss the appeal and deny the

petition for a writ of mandamus.

Background

In his application for a writ of habeas corpus, Williams alleged he is in the

custody of Marsha McLane, Executive Director of the Texas Civil Commitment

Office (TCCO) and that he is “unlawfully confined and restrained in his liberty at

the Texas Civil Commitment Center[.]” Williams stated that he was civilly

committed in 2014 in the 435th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas. See

2
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.001-.209 (the SVP Act). Williams claimed

the 2015 amendments to the SVP Act, which the 84th Legislature passed as Senate

Bill Number 746 (S.B. 746), are unconstitutional as applied to him because the

enactment language of S.B. 746, subsection 40(a), made the law prospective only

and he was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator before June 17, 2015,

the effective date of S.B. 746. Williams attached to his application orders, signed on

September 1, 2015, amending the order of civil commitment and granting the State’s

motion to place Williams in the TCCO’s Tiered Treatment Program pursuant to the

newly enacted section 841.0831 of the Health and Safety Code. Williams alleged his

involuntary residence in the Texas Civil Commitment Center is illegal because

section 12 of S.B. 746, which deleted “outpatient” from the first and second

sentences of section 841.081 of the Health and Safety Code and section 16 of S.B.

746, and which created a tiered treatment program and required incarceration in a

“total confinement facility” in newly enacted section 841.0831 of the Health and

Safety Code, should not apply to him because he was already subject to civil

commitment under the SVP Act on June 17, 2015. Williams asked the trial court to

issue the writ of habeas corpus and order McLane to release Williams from

confinement in the Texas Civil Commitment Center and “provide him treatment and

supervision in a manner other than in confinement.” Williams requested a

3
videoconference hearing in the trial court on his application for a writ of habeas

corpus.

In a response opposing Williams’ application for a writ of habeas corpus, the

State argued that the appellate court had rejected the same arguments in a mandamus

petition that Williams filed in 2016, and nothing in the law had changed since that

date. The State argued the appellate court had held that the S.B. 746 enactment

language that applied to Williams was subsection 40(b), which required the trial

court to modify Williams’ civil commitment order and place Williams in the tiered

treatment program.

In reply to the State’s response to his habeas corpus application, Williams

argued that although he “referred to” subsection 40(a) in his 2016 mandamus

petition, the State and the appellate court focused on subsection 40(b) without

analyzing subsection 40(a).

On February 1, 2024, the trial court denied Williams’ motion for a hearing

after reviewing the request for a hearing, the State’s response, and “all other

documents related to Williams’ application for writ of habeas corpus[]” and finding

“there are no controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of

Williams’ civil commitment.” In a separate order, the trial court denied Williams’

application for a writ of habeas corpus. In its order, the trial court stated it had

reviewed Williams’ request for a hearing, the State’s response to the request for a

4
hearing, and “all other documents related to Williams’ application[,]” it found “there

are no controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of Williams’

civil commitment[,]” and it found “legal authority overruling Williams’ arguments

in his application.”

On February 5, 2024, Williams filed a motion to strike the State’s response to

his application for a writ of habeas corpus. Williams claimed the Special Prosecution

Unit (SPU) lacked statutory authorization to represent the State in a habeas corpus

proceeding, argued that he had inadvertently served the Montgomery County

District Attorney, and that on January 31, 2024, he served Respondent McLane by

serving the General Counsel of the TCCO by regular mail. Williams submitted a

proposed order that is contained in the clerk’s record and remains unsigned.

On February 22, 2024, Williams filed a notice of appeal. Upon receiving the

clerk’s record, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued a notice questioning whether

the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal. In response, Williams

argued he could appeal the order because the trial court had ruled on the merits of

the habeas corpus application. He argued that, although the trial court declined to

issue the writ, it had considered the facts argued in the application and considered

the arguments raised in Williams’ application. Finally, Williams asked that this

Court consider his request in the alternative as seeking a writ of mandamus. The

Clerk of the Court notified Williams that if he wanted the appellate court to consider

5
a request for mandamus relief, he would be required to file a mandamus petition at

the same time or combine his petition with the Appellant’s Brief.

After Williams appealed, Williams filed a motion to strike the brief filed by

the SPU on behalf of the State of Texas. He argues the SPU “does not have standing

to be a party in this nor to represent a party on this case.” He argues the Respondent

is Marsha McLane in her capacity as Director of the TCCO, and the SPU should not

have the right to file a brief.

Special Prosecution Unit

Williams’ objection to the SPU’s appearance in the trial court and in the

appellate court lacks merit because Williams ignores the fact that the SPU represents

the State of Texas. In his application for a writ of habeas corpus, as the person held

in custody Williams is the Applicant, as the person holding Williams in custody

McLane is the Respondent, and as the party whose petition for civil commitment

resulted in the trial court’s judgment and order of civil commitment the State of

Texas is the Real Party in Interest.

The source of Williams’ current “confinement” is the 2014 Final Judgment

and Order of Commitment. That order required Williams to reside in supervised

housing at a Texas residential facility under contract with TCCO’s predecessor

agency, or at another location or facility approved by that agency. See Act of May

23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1201, § 8, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3197, 3200-01

6
(amended 2015, 2017). The SPU provides legal assistance in civil commitment cases

filed under the SVP Act. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.042 (“On

request of the attorney representing the state, the special prosecution unit shall

provide legal, financial, and technical assistance to the attorney for a proceeding

conducted under this chapter.”). An application for a writ of habeas corpus is a

procedural vehicle for challenging the legality of a person’s confinement. See

generally Tex. Const. Art. I, § 12 (“The writ of Habeas Corpus is a writ of right, and

shall never be suspended. The Legislature shall enact laws to render the remedy

speedy and effectual.”). In Williams’ case, the confinement he alleges is illegal is

based on the 2014 order of civil commitment, as modified through later proceedings,

including the 2015 Amended Order of Civil Commitment that ordered TCCO to

provide Williams with sex offender treatment and required that Williams reside

where instructed by TCCO.

In his application for a writ of habeas corpus, Williams acknowledged he is

subject to the order of civil commitment. When a person subject to an order of civil

commitment under the SVP Act challenges an alleged confinement imposed by

virtue of that civil commitment, the SPU is authorized to represent the State in the

courts where the order’s validity is challenged.

7
Appeal

Next, we consider whether we may review the trial court’s order as an exercise

of our appellate jurisdiction. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220(a); see also Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (allowing an appeal from a final judgment

of the district court). In his response to the Clerk’s notice regarding jurisdiction,

Williams argues the order signed by the trial court in his case is similar to the order

signed by the trial court in Ex parte Rubio, in which we held the trial court ruled on

the merits of the SVP’s application seeking habeas relief. See No. 09-22-00219-CV,

2023 WL 4781646, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 27, 2023, mand. denied,

habeas corpus denied) (mem. op.). In Ex parte Rubio, Rubio (also an SVP) filed an

Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus wherein he alleged 23 grounds in his

application making both legal and factual complaints against his continued

confinement. However, Rubio did not support his application for habeas relief with

a supporting affidavit or with documents to support his application for habeas corpus

relief. When the State answered Rubio’s application, it supported its answer with

this Court’s 2013 memorandum opinion dismissing Rubio’s appeal from the civil

commitment order, our mandate, the denial of Rubio’s petition for review by the

Supreme Court of Texas, and this Court’s 2017 memorandum opinion denying

Rubio’s petition seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to rule on his

motion seeking to declare the judgment committing him as a sexually violent

8
predator void because he claimed that one of his prior convictions arose from a no

contest plea. The SPU argued the grounds raised by Rubio were not cognizable in a

habeas proceeding. The trial court in Ex parte Rubio entered an Order denying the

application and, in the order, stated that the application “should be on all grounds

Denied.” On appeal to this Court and, after examining the record as a whole, we

concluded that we had appellate jurisdiction because the trial court in denying

Rubio’s application had made a “merits ruling.”

Here, unlike the application filed by Rubio, Williams’s application for a writ

of habeas corpus makes a legal argument about why he contends the 2015

Amendments and the Tiered Treatment Program do not apply to him. Williams does

not controvert any of the historical facts. In the trial court’s Order denying Williams’

application, the trial court states there is “legal authority overruling Williams’s

arguments in his application. Therefore, Williams’ Application for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is also DENIED.” There are additional recitals along with the nature of the

application filed by Williams to distinguish this case from Rubio.

“[A]n appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal when the trial court

did not deny the application for writ of habeas corpus on its merits.” Ex parte Miller,

No. 09-08-00194-CV, 2008 WL 5780816, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 2,

2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). After reviewing the record as a whole in this case, we

conclude the order denying Williams’ application for a writ of habeas corpus was

9
not appealable as a final judgment and that the trial court determined the application

lacked merit from the face of Williams’ application.

Mandamus

An appellant may invoke the court’s mandamus jurisdiction by requesting that

we consider the appeal brief as a mandamus petition in the event the appellate court

determines it lacks appellate jurisdiction over the case. See In re Commitment of

Renshaw, 672 S.W.3d 426, 427-28 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); CMH Homes v.

Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex. 2011). Williams requested that the Court treat his

appellate brief as a request for mandamus relief.

We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial

court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827

S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion

if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because “‘[a] trial court has no

“discretion” in determining what the law is or [in] applying the law to the facts[.]’”

See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135 (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840).

10
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo. In re D.S., 602

S.W.3d 504, 514 (Tex. 2020). “Our primary objective in construing statutes is to

give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411

(Tex. 2011). “The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent

unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads

to absurd or nonsensical results.” Id. “If the meaning of the statutory language is

unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the

statute.” In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 71 (Tex. 2021). We presume that each word

contained in a statute has a purpose and that words not included were omitted

purposefully. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex.

2017).

When the trial court signed the order committing Williams as a sexually

violent predator in 2014, section 841.082 of the Health and Safety Code allowed the

committing court to sign an order “requiring the person to reside in a Texas

residential facility under contract with the office or at another location or facility

approved by the office;” and “requiring the person’s participation in and compliance

with a specific course of treatment provided by the office and compliance with all

written requirements imposed by the case manager or otherwise by the office;” in

addition to “any other requirements determined necessary by the judge.” See 2011

Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. at 3200. And, this Court has previously rejected challenges,

11
by Williams and others, to the committing court’s order modifying the order of civil

commitment to order a person who had been civilly committed before 2015 to be

placed into the tiered treatment program that the Legislature mandated in 2015. See

In re Wilson, No. 09-16-00243-CV, 2016 WL 5225422, at **3-4 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Sept. 22, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Martinez, No. 09-16-

00263-CV, 2016 WL 4698645, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 8, 2016, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Williams, No. 09-16-00087-CV, 2016 WL 4249175,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 11, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). The

relator in Wilson also argued that his amended commitment order unlawfully

interfered with his rights under the original commitment order to receive outpatient

treatment. See 2016 WL 5225422, at *3. This Court rejected that argument, finding

that the trial court had the authority to modify its prior orders and the relator “had

no vested rights under the trial court’s previous orders.” Id. at *4. We explained that

the judgment allowed the agency in charge of the relator’s treatment to decide both

where he would be required to live and to supervise the program of sex offender

treatment that the commitment order required that he receive. Id. “[B]y amending

the commitment order so that the amended order complied with the changes the

Legislature made to the SVP statute in 2015, the trial court did not violate [the

relator’s] constitutional rights.” Id. at 3; see also In re Commitment of May, 500

12
S.W.3d 515, 524-26 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. denied); In re Commitment

of Cortez, 405 S.W.3d 919, 935-36 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.)

Williams attempts to distinguish our 2016 opinion denying mandamus relief

because he is presenting a different argument, that S.B. 746 is prospectively applied

rather than that S.B. 746 is unconstitutionally retroactive. Williams presents an

inaccurate description of his argument in his 2016 mandamus petition. We described

his argument, as follows:

Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
him into the tiered treatment program because section 40(a) of the
amending legislation, S.B. 746, provides that the 2015 amendments to
Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code apply only to a civil
commitment proceeding that is initiated on or after June 17, 2015.

In re Williams, 2016 WL 4249175, *1. We rejected Williams’ argument, holding

instead that because sex offender treatment is a civil commitment requirement

imposed by section 841.082 of the Health and Safety Code, “Section 40(b) of S.B.

746 required the trial court to modify the sex offender treatment requirement

imposed by section 841.082 to a tiered treatment program after notice to the

committed person and a hearing.” Id.

Williams concedes “the committing court has always had the authority to

modify the § 841.082 terms of commitment after notice and a hearing, both prior to

and after the amendments[]” which includes “requiring the person to reside where

instructed” and “requiring the person’s participation in and compliance with the sex

13
offender treatment program[.]” Even though the trial court already had the power to

modify Williams’ court-ordered sex offender treatment, Williams argues the 2015

amendment to the SVP Act “does not authorize placing Williams, or anyone else

into the tiered program, requiring total confinement.” Williams argues he is entitled

to “treatment and supervision in a manner other than in confinement.” We disagree.

Subsection 40(b) of S.B. 746 states:

If a civil commitment requirement imposed under Chapter 841,
Health and Safety Code, before the effective date of this Act differs
from any of the civil commitment requirements listed in Section
841.082, Health and Safety Code, as amended by this Act, the
applicable court with jurisdiction over the committed person shall, after
notice and hearing, modify the requirement imposed as applicable to
conform to that section.

Act of May 21, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 845, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2701,

2711. Williams argues this paragraph applies only to section 13 of S.B. 746, which

amended section 841.082 of the Health and Safety Code. See id. 2015 Tex. Sess.

Law Serv. at 2704-05. Williams argues the changes S.B. 746 made to other sections

within Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code, including the tiered treatment

program requirements found in newly added section 841.0831, are prospective only

and cannot be applied to him due to the operation of subsection 40(a) of S.B. 746,

which provides:

SECTION 40. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (a-1) of this
section, the changes in law made by this Act to Chapter 841, Health and
Safety Code, apply to a civil commitment proceeding under that chapter

14
that is initiated on or after the effective date of this Act, regardless of
when the applicable petition for civil commitment was filed.

Id. 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 2711. 1

Williams argues section 41 of S.B. 746 applies only to the 2015 amendment

to section 841.085 of the Health and Safety Code, subsection 40(b) applies only to

the 2015 amendment to section 841.082 of the Health and Safety Code, and

subsection 40(a) applies to all remaining sections of the SVP Act that the legislature

amended in S.B. 746. Williams misinterprets subsection 40(a), he reads it in

isolation, without considering the purpose of S.B. 746, and he ignores the plain

language of what section 40 actually says. For example, in sections 1, 3, and 35-38

of S.B. 746, the legislature replaced the Office of Violent Sex Offender Management

with the TCCO. See 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 2701 (amending Health & Safety

Code Ann. §§ 841.002(4); 841.007), 2711 (amending Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §

420A.001-.004). Under Williams’ misguided arguments, the statutes creating the

1
Subsection (a-1), which provides an exception to Section 40(a), states:

(a-1) The jurisdiction of a district court, the representation of the state
by the civil division of the special prosecution unit, and the
representation of a respondent by the Office of State Counsel for
Offenders or other court-appointed counsel in any civil commitment
trial, any review of a petition for release, or any biennial review under
Chapter 841, Health and Safety Code, that is pending on the effective
date of this Act remain unaffected by this Act until the conclusion of
that proceeding.

15
TCCO and giving it the responsibility for administering the state’s civil sex offender

treatment program would not apply to anyone who was civilly committed before

June 17, 2015. That would be expressly contrary to the statute.

Subsection 40(b) expressly requires the court with jurisdiction over a

committed person, after notice and a hearing, to modify any civil commitment

requirement imposed under Health and Safety Code Chapter 841 to conform with

the changes that S.B. 746 made to any of the civil commitment requirements listed

in Health and Safety Code section 841.082. Id. at 2711. The civil commitment

requirements of section 841.082 include requiring the person to reside where

instructed by the TCCO, requiring the person’s participation in and compliance with

the sex offender treatment program provided by TCCO, and requiring the person to

submit to the supervision. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.082. Williams’

argument is contrary to our prior precedent, as well as contrary to the express

language in the statute.

For all the reasons outlined above, we conclude the 2015 amendments to the

SVP Act, including the tiered treatment program, apply to Williams as a matter of

law and are not unconstitutional as applied to Williams. We deny Williams’ request

for mandamus relief.

16
Conclusion

In conclusion, when the trial court denied Williams’ request and application

for a hearing, the trial court did not rule on the merits of Williams’ application

seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction over

Williams’ attempted appeal of the trial court’s order denying Williams’ application

and his appeal is dismissed. That said, after considering Williams’ brief as a petition

for a writ of mandamus, we further conclude that the trial court acted within its

discretion and that Williams is not entitled to mandamus relief because we conclude

that the 2015 amendments to the SVP Act, including the tiered treatment program,

apply to Williams as a matter of law. We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.

See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f), 52.8(a).

APPEAL DISMISSED; PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on May 21, 2024
Opinion Delivered June 27, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

17