Kenneth George Broderick v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-24-00166-CR
__________________

KENNETH GEORGE BRODERICK, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 443rd District Court
Ellis County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 48939CR
__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kenneth George Broderick was indicted for the third-degree felony offense of

unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.04.1 The

indictment contained seven enhancement paragraphs. Broderick pleaded not guilty.

After a jury trial, the jury found Broderick guilty. In the punishment phase of trial,

1
This case was transferred from the Tenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a
docket equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See Tex. Gov’t
Code Ann. § 73.001.
1
Broderick pleaded “not true” to the enhancement allegations. The jury found two or

more of the enhancement paragraphs to be “true” and assessed punishment at

twenty-five years’ confinement.

Broderick complains of three issues on appeal. First, Broderick complains that

the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon. Second, Broderick complains that the trial court improperly instructed the

jury regarding parole eligibility in the punishment charge. Last, Broderick complains

that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that two of the

enhancement paragraphs are true. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment as modified herein.

Background

Broderick was tried in a single trial for two indictments – unlawful possession

of a firearm by a felon and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 2 In the present

case, the indictment contained seven enhancement paragraphs, which alleged as

follows:

**PUNISHMENT ENHANCEMENTS**

It is further presented that on or about May 5, 1983, and prior to the
commission of the aforesaid offense, hereinafter referred to as “the
principal offense,” the defendant was finally convicted in Criminal
Action No. F-8103651-U, in the 291st Judicial District Court of Dallas

2
The jury found Broderick guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
and he appeals that decision. Broderick’s appeal of the aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon charge is docketed as No. 09-24-00167-CR.
2
County, Texas, of the first-degree felony offense of burglary of a
habitation.

It is further presented that prior to the commission of the principal
offense but after the conviction in Criminal Action No. F-8103651-U
had become final, the defendant committed and on or about March 24,
1987, was finally convicted in Criminal Action No. F-8694247-N, in
the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, of the third-
degree felony offense of theft of property.

It is further presented that prior to the commission of the principal
offense but after the convictions in Criminal Action Nos. F-8103651-U
and F-8694247-N had become final, the defendant committed and on
or about January 5, 1989, was finally convicted in Criminal Action No.
F-8868929-L, in the Criminal District Court No. 5 of Dallas County,
Texas, of the second-degree felony offense of burglary of a building.

It is further presented that prior to the commission of the principal
offense but after the convictions in Criminal Action Nos. F-8103651-
U, F-8694247-N, and F-8868929-L had become final, the defendant
committed and on or about September 25, 1990, was finally convicted
in Criminal Action No. F-8881264-S, in the 282nd Judicial District
Court of Dallas County, Texas, of the third-degree felony offense of
forgery.

It is further presented that prior to the commission of the principal
offense but after the convictions in Criminal Action Nos. F-8103651-
U, F-8694247-N, and F-8868929-L had become final, the defendant
committed and on or about September 25, 1990, was finally convicted
in Criminal Action No. F-8985781-M, in the 194th Judicial District
Court of Dallas County, Texas, of the third-degree felony offense of
theft of property.

It is further presented that prior to the commission of the principal
offense but after the convictions in Criminal Action Nos. F-8103651-
U, F-8694247-N, and F-8868929-L had become final, the defendant
committed and on or about September 25, 1990, was finally convicted
in Criminal Action No. F-9033099-M, in the 194th Judicial District
Court of Dallas County, Texas, of the third-degree felony offense of
theft of property.
3
Finally, it is presented that prior to the commission of the principal
offense but after the convictions in Criminal Action Nos. F-8103651-
U, F-8694247-N, F-8868929-L, F-8881264-S, F-8985781-M, and F-
9033099-M had become final, the defendant committed and on or about
June 28, 2007, was finally convicted in Criminal Action No. 1119379,
in the 176th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, of the
third-degree felony offense of theft of property.

At the punishment phase of the trial, Broderick pleaded “not true” to all seven

enhancement allegations in the indictment.

Following the entry of Broderick’s pleas, the State introduced Exhibits 97, 98,

99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 106, which contained documents evidencing

the seven prior convictions alleged in the enhancement paragraphs. These exhibits

were admitted into evidence.

State’s Exhibit 97 contains a certified copy of the judgment and conviction in

cause number F81-3651-PK, which shows that Broderick committed the first-degree

felony offense of burglary of a habitation on March 12, 1981, and was sentenced to

prison for seven years on June 19, 1981 but that the sentence was suspended and he

was placed on probation for a period of seven years. State’s Exhibit 97 also contains

an order revoking probation which shows that Broderick’s probation was revoked,

his conviction became final on May 5, 1983, and he received a term of five years in

prison.

State’s Exhibit 98 contained a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number F86-94247-LN, which shows that Broderick committed the third-
4
degree felony offense of theft on November 1, 1986, and was sentenced to two years

in prison on March 24, 1987. State’s Exhibit 98 also contained a certified copy of

the judgment of conviction in cause number 189890D which shows that Broderick

committed the felony offense of burglary of a building on April 8, 1982, and was

sentenced to five years in prison on May 25, 1983.

State’s Exhibit 99 contained a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number F88-68929-UL, which shows that Broderick committed the second-

degree felony offense of burglary of a building on August 2, 1988, and was

sentenced to ten years in prison on January 4, 1989.

State’s Exhibit 100 contained a certified copy of the judgment of conviction

in cause number F88-81264-M, which shows that Broderick committed the third-

degree felony offense of forgery on March 19, 1988, and was sentenced to ten years

in prison on September 25, 1990. State’s Exhibit 100 also contained a certified copy

of the judgment of conviction in cause number F89-85781-M, which shows that

Broderick committed the third-degree felony offense of theft on July 23, 1989, and

was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison on September 25, 1990. State’s Exhibit

100 further contained a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in cause number

F90-33099-M, which shows that Broderick committed the third-degree felony

offense of theft on July 19, 1990, and was sentenced to ten years in prison on

September 25, 1990. Furthermore, State’s Exhibit 100 contained a certified copy of

5
the judgment of conviction in cause number 1119379, which shows that Broderick

committed the third-degree felony offense of theft on June 2, 2007, and was

sentenced to three years in prison on June 28, 2007.

State’s Exhibit 101 contains a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number 380-80493-01, which shows Broderick committed the state jail felony

offense of theft on December 13, 2000, and was sentenced to twenty months in

prison on September 10, 2001.

State’s Exhibit 102 contains a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number 137829901010, which shows Broderick committed the state jail

felony offense of theft on February 12, 2013, and was sentenced to six months in

state jail on August 22, 2013.

State’s Exhibit 103 contains a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number F-1459729-M, which shows Broderick committed the state jail felony

offense of theft on October 27, 2014, and was sentenced to five months in state jail

on January 20, 2015.

State’s Exhibit 104 contains a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number F-1659947-S, which shows Broderick committed the state jail felony

offense of theft on November 26, 2016, and was sentenced to sixty days in the county

jail on December 21, 2016.

6
State’s Exhibit 105 contains a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number 157142401010, which shows Broderick committed the state jail

felony offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle on November 20, 2017, and was

sentenced to six months in state jail on June 14, 2018.

State’s Exhibit 106 contains a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in

cause number 160659001010, which shows Broderick committed the state jail

felony offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle on September 26, 2018, and was

sentenced to one hundred eighty days in state jail on March 25, 2019.

The trial court’s charge to the jury included an instruction that Broderick

pleaded “Not True” to the seven enhancements the State alleged in the indictment.

It further instructed the jury that they “must be unanimous as to which allegations in

the Enhancement Notice you find ‘True’ beyond a reasonable doubt, if any.” The

charge further instructed the jury:

You are instructed that if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that two
or more of the allegations of the Enhancement Notice are “True,” you
will so state in your verdicts and conclude your deliberations in this
cause, and assess the punishment of the Defendant as confinement in
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twenty-five (25) years to
ninety-nine (99) years, or Life, and in addition a fine not to exceed
$10,000.

The charge to the jury also contained an instruction regarding the law of

parole:

The length of time for which a defendant is imprisoned may be reduced
by the award of parole.
7
Under the law applicable in this case, if the Defendant is sentenced to
a term of imprisonment, the Defendant will not be eligible for parole
until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or
30 years, whichever is less. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of
less than four years, the defendant must serve at least two years before
the defendant is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not
guarantee that parole will be granted.

It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law might be applied
to this Defendant if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the
application of that law will depend on decisions made by parole
authorities.

You may consider the existence of the parole law. You are not to
consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this
particular Defendant.

At the charge conference, Broderick objected to the inclusion of the parole

language. Broderick objected on the basis that the jury had not made an affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon and requested that the parole language under Texas Code

of Criminal Procedure article 37.07, section 4(b) be included in the jury charge. The

trial court overruled Broderick’s objection.

The jury’s verdict stated:

We, the jury, having found the Defendant guilty of the offense of
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, as charged in the
indictment, do further find beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more
of the allegations in the Enhancement Notice are TRUE, and we assess
his punishment as confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice – Institutional division for a term of 25 yrs. In addition, we
assess a fine of $0 ($0-$10,000).

8
The judgment reflected that there was a finding of “true” on the first

enhancement paragraph and a finding of “true” on the second enhancement

paragraph. Additionally, the judgment reflected an affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon, namely a firearm.

Deadly Weapon Finding

In his first issue, Broderick complains that the evidence is insufficient to

support the trial court’s affirmative finding of a deadly weapon. Broderick argues

that because the indictment does not allege the “use” of a deadly weapon per se and

no special issues concerning his “use” of a deadly weapon were submitted to the

jury, it was error for the trial court to enter a finding of the use of a deadly weapon

in connection with that offense. The State agrees that the deadly weapon finding was

improper and should be deleted from the judgment.

The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “authorizes a deadly weapon finding

upon sufficient evidence that a defendant ‘used or exhibited’ a deadly weapon during

the commission of or flight from a felony offense[.]” Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d

795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A trial court is required to enter a jury’s

affirmative deadly weapon finding in the judgment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

arts. 42.01, § 1(21), 42A.054(c), (d). “To hold evidence legally sufficient to sustain

a deadly weapon finding, the evidence must demonstrate that (1) the object meets

the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon; … (2) the deadly weapon was used

9
or exhibited ‘during the transaction from which’ the felony conviction was obtained;

… and (3) that other people were put in actual danger.” Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798

(internal citations omitted).

“It is very well-settled that a defendant is entitled to notice in some form that

the State intends to pursue the entry of an affirmative finding of the use or exhibition

of a deadly weapon.” Narron v. State, 835 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

“Notice can be sufficiently provided by the language in an indictment that

specifically mentions a particular object or substance and its use with respect to death

or serious bodily injury.” Id. A firearm is a deadly weapon per se. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A).

An “affirmative finding” means “the trier of fact’s express determination that

a deadly weapon or firearm was actually used or exhibited during the commission

of the offense.” Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)

(emphasis added). There are three different ways in which a court can determine that

the trier of fact actually made an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon: (1) the

indictment specifically alleged a “deadly weapon” was used (using the words

“deadly weapon”) and the defendant was found guilty “as charged in the

indictment;” (2) the indictment did not use the words “deadly weapon” but alleged

use of a deadly weapon per se (such as a firearm); or (3) the jury made an express

finding of fact of use of a deadly weapon in response to submission of a special issue

10
during the punishment stage of trial. Duran v. State, 492 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016) (citing Polk, 693 S.W.2d at 396). Here, the indictment alleged a

deadly weapon per se as it alleged that Broderick intentionally, knowingly, and

recklessly possessed a “firearm” and the jury found the defendant guilty “as charged

in the indictment.” Therefore, Broderick’s and the State’s assertion that the deadly

weapon finding was improper because the jury did not make a finding of a deadly

weapon is incorrect. However, our analysis does not end here.

The “use” of a deadly weapon finding in the context of an affirmative deadly

weapon finding includes simple possession if such possession facilitates the

associated felony. Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989);

see Tyra v. State, 897 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). In other words, an

affirmative deadly weapon finding will not be supported where the crime is mere

possession, as opposed to possession that facilitates the commission of a separate

and distinct felony. Narron, 835 S.W.2d at 644; Ex parte Petty, 833 S.W.2d 145,

145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). “[A] deadly weapon finding for a felony offense must

contain some facilitation connection between the weapon and the felony. The deadly

weapon must, in some manner, help facilitate the commission of the felony.”

Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). To that end, the

weapon must “increase the risk of harm,” “otherwise contribute to the result,” or

play a role in “enabling, continuing, or enhancing” the associated felony. Id.

11
In this instance, we conclude that Broderick did more than merely possess a

prohibited weapon. Here, the State charged Broderick with a separate felony based

on his conduct – aggravated assault. While in possession of the prohibited weapon,

the evidence establishes that he used or exhibited the gun while unlawfully

possessing it. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(b). Broderick shot the

prohibited weapon and shot the victim in the right arm. The victim had a bullet hole

in his right arm and a large gash under his right eye, consistent with his description

of being hit in the face with a gun. Video surveillance footage showed Broderick

approaching the victim with a gun drawn and chambering a round.

This case is distinguishable from Narron and Petty, where the trial courts

entered the deadly weapon finding based on “mere possession.” See Narron, 835

S.W.2d at 644; Petty, 833 S.W.2d at 145-46. Here, Broderick employed, wielded

and shot the deadly weapon while unlawfully possessing it. Therefore, the evidence

established more than “mere possession” of the firearm. Compare Benton v. State,

No. 05-21-00806-CR, 2023 WL 2300542, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 1, 2023,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (deadly weapon finding upheld

where evidence established defendant fired gun in residential neighborhood), Collins

v. State, No. 07-24-00151-CR, 2025 WL 1243906, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr.

29, 2025, pet. granted) (mem. op., no designated for publication) (deadly weapon

finding upheld where evidence showed defendant fired a weapon at least twenty

12
times over a highway), and Nelson v. State, No. 10-19-00082-CR, 2020 WL

1182235, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (deadly weapon finding upheld where evidence showed defendant

pulled out the gun when stopped by a trooper, laid the gun on his chest with it pointed

at the passenger side window, and used the gun in shooting at a state trooper), with

Medina v. State, No. 13-23-00198-CR, 2024 WL 4784394, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi Nov. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(deadly weapon finding deleted from judgment where evidence did not show firearm

was used to facilitate another felony), and Spencer v. State, Nos. 05-11-01565-CR,

05-11-01566-CR, 2013 WL 1282307, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 6, 2023) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (deadly weapon finding deleted from judgment

where evidence showed that a gun was found in defendant’s car but defendant did

not brandish the weapon as officers pursued him as he attempted to flee). We

conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the affirmative finding that Broderick

used a deadly weapon in the commission of the felony offense of unlawful

possession of a firearm. See Plummer, 410 S.W.3d at 865; see also Garner v. State,

864 S.W.2d 92, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). We overrule

Broderick’s first issue.

13
Parole Instruction

In his second issue, Broderick complains that in the punishment charge the

trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding parole eligibility. Broderick

argues that because the deadly weapon finding was not appropriate on the facts of

this case, the jury should not have been instructed pursuant to Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure article 37.07, section 4(a) and that the trial court should have

instead instructed the jury pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article

37.07, section 4(b). See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a), (b).

We review a claim of alleged jury charge error using a two-step process in

which we examine (1) whether error existed in the charge and (2) whether sufficient

harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743-

44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc). Here, Broderick properly objected to the

charge at trial, and therefore a jury charge error requires reversal if we find “some

harm” to his rights. See id. at 743 (citing Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).

The Almanza standard requires that an appellant show actual, and not theoretical,

harm from jury instruction error. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750; see also Cornet v. State,

417 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Where the jury assesses punishment and the judgment of conviction includes

an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

14
requires the trial court to include the instruction on parole eligibility in article 37.07,

section 4(a), the language of which was tracked in the court’s charge in this case.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 37.07, § 4(a), 42A.054(c), (d). If prior

convictions have been alleged for enhancement of punishment as provided by

section 12.42(d) of the Penal Code, the trial court is required to give the parole-

eligibility instruction set forth in section 4(b). See id. art. 37.07, § 4(b). Given our

resolution in issue one – that the trial court properly made an affirmative finding of

a deadly weapon – we cannot say that error existed in the jury charge, and contrary

to Broderick’s contention, section 4(a) is applicable. Because the trial court did not

submit the wrong statutory parole instruction, we overrule Broderick’s second issue.

Enhancements

In Broderick’s third issue, he argues that the State failed to prove the offense

dates for the enhancement paragraphs in the indictment and therefore the State could

not prove the sequence of convictions. Moreover, he argues that the offenses alleged

in paragraphs four, five, and six of the indictment are non-sequential felony

convictions occurring on the same date. Because the jury found two of the

paragraphs “true” but did not designate which two, Broderick argues if the jury

found paragraphs four, five and six true, then the convictions were non-sequential,

and punishment was incorrectly assessed.

15
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that an

enhancement allegation is true, we consider all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to the finding and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Wood

v. State, 486 S.W.3d 583, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The sufficiency of the

evidence to support an enhancement should be measured by the hypothetically

correct jury charge for the enhancement, as defined by statute. See Roberson v. State,

420 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 750

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

An individual found guilty of an unenhanced unlawful possession of a firearm

by a felon cannot be sentenced to more than ten years’ imprisonment in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.34(a). However, if it is

shown on the trial of a felony offense “that the defendant has previously been finally

convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for

an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become

final,” then the punishment range is twenty-five to ninety-nine years. Id. § 12.42(d).

To properly apply this habitual-offender statute to enhance Broderick’s sentence, the

State must have proven:

(1) the first conviction became final; (2) the offense leading to a later
conviction was committed; (3) the later conviction became final;
and (4) the defendant subsequently committed the offense for which
he presently stands accused.
16
Hopkins v. State, 487 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Roberson, 420

S.W.3d at 839; Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286, 290-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Prima facie proof of a prior conviction is made by the introduction of the prior

judgment and sentence. Davy v. State, 525 S.W.3d 745, 752 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2017, pet. ref’d). If, as in this case, there is no affirmative evidence in the record

showing a plea of “true” to the enhancement, the State is required to prove these

elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Wood, 486 S.W.3d at 588.

When there is no evidence to show that the offenses were committed and

became final in the proper sequence, the defendant’s sentence may not be enhanced

under section 12.42(d). Roberson, 420 S.W.3d at 839-40. In such a case, we must

reverse the assessment of punishment and remand for a new punishment hearing,

without conducting any harm analysis. See Jordan, 256 S.W.3d at 290-93. But here,

the record reflects that the sequence of the alleged prior convictions did indeed occur

in the required order. For example, the offense for first punishment enhancement

was committed on March 12, 1981, and the conviction became final on May 5, 1983.

The offense for the second punishment enhancement was committed on November

1, 1986, after the first conviction became final, and the second conviction became

final on March 24, 1987. Both convictions were final before the commission of the

instant offense on April 24, 2022. Broderick’s complaint that the State did not prove

the offense dates of the prior convictions is without merit because each of the State’s
17
exhibits showing the prior convictions contains an offense date, and each such date

was after the conviction of the previous offense became final.

Broderick also complains that “[t]he jury charge should have required the jury

to state which enhancement paragraphs it found ‘true’” and that it cannot be

determined whether the judgment comports with the jury’s findings because the

judgment states that the first and second enhancement paragraphs were found “true.”

However, Broderick does not support his argument with appropriate citations to any

authorities and does not adequately explain how his complained of error resulted in

harm. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. Where, as here, a party fails to adequately brief a

complaint, the complaint is waived on appeal. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d

89, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). That said, “The law is that, when a general verdict

is returned and the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the

paragraphs submitted, the verdict will be applied to the paragraph finding support in

the facts.” Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing

Aguirre v. State, 732 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). Here, the jury was

instructed that it “must be unanimous as to which allegations in the Enhancement

Notice [it found] ‘True’ beyond a reasonable doubt, if any[,]” and the evidence is

sufficient to support the jury’s general verdict that two or more of the enhancement

paragraphs are true. Therefore, it matters not which two (or more) paragraphs were

found by the jury to have been true, nor was it error for the trial court to ask the jury

18
to return a general verdict. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 1(a) (“The

verdict in every criminal action must be general.”).

We overrule Broderick’s third issue. However, in doing so, we note that the

judgment references only the first and second enhancement paragraphs, implies that

Broderick pleaded “Not True” to both, and recites that both were found to have been

true. In fact, there were seven enhancement paragraphs, Broderick pleaded “Not

True” to each, and the jury found two or more to be true. We have the power to

modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do

so. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1993). Therefore, we modify the judgment to delete its references to “1st

Enhancement Paragraph” and “2nd Enhancement Paragraph” and to reflect that

“Broderick pleaded ‘Not True’ to Enhancement Paragraphs (1) through (7)” and that

“Two or more of Enhancement Paragraphs (1) through (7) were found to be ‘True.’”

Conclusion

Having overruled each of Broderick’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court as modified herein.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

KENT CHAMBERS
Justice
Submitted on December 29, 2025
Opinion Delivered February 11, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.
19