In Re David Wayne Jones v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00525-CV
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IN RE DAVID WAYNE JONES

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Original Proceeding
435th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 03-05-03117-CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

David Wayne Jones petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court

to vacate a 2019 order modifying the terms of his civil commitment as a sexually

violent predator under Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code (the SVP Act). 1

We deny mandamus relief.

1
Jones failed to certify that he mailed a copy of the mandamus petition and
record to the attorney of record for the State as the Real Party in Interest. See Tex.
R. App. P. 9.5(a); 52.7(c). We use Rule 2, however, to look beyond this and other
deficiencies to reach an expeditious result. See id. 2.

1
Jones filed an appendix that contains a docket sheet for Trial Cause Number

03-05-03117-CV, the cover page of Applicant’s Motion to Modify Commitment

Order filed September 25, 2025, a copy of Applicant’s Request to Judge for a

Hearing filed October 22, 2025, a letter to the clerk dated October 24, 2025, asking

if a hearing had been set, and a letter from a deputy district clerk responding to a

request for records.2

According to Jones, a 2005 civil commitment order of the 435th District Court

committed Jones as a sexually violent predator, in 2007 Jones was convicted of

violating the civil commitment requirements and received a twenty-year sentence,

Jones has been continuously incarcerated since 2007, and he is scheduled for release

from prison on February 27, 2026. On October 22, 2025, Jones filed a request for

in-person oral arguments on his motion.

Jones complains he has not received a response to his request for a setting on

his Motion to Modify Commitment Order, but he does not ask this Court to compel

the trial court to set a hearing. Instead, Jones asks this Court to compel the trial court

to vacate the 2019 order.

According to Jones, in January 2019, the trial court signed an order that placed

Jones in the Tiered Treatment Program operated by the Texas Civil Commitment

2
Jones failed to provide certified or sworn copies of the documents and failed
to certify that every factual statement in the petition is supported by competent
evidence included in the appendix or record. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(j), 52.7(a)(1).
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Office (TCCO). Jones contends the January 2019 order is void because the trial

court’s duties are suspended during Jones’s imprisonment. See Tex. Health & Safety

Code Ann. § 841.150 (“The duties imposed on the office and the judge by this

chapter are suspended for the duration of a detention or confinement of a committed

person in a correctional facility[.]”). He argues that if the trial court has declined to

hold an oral argument on his Motion to Modify Commitment Order because its

duties are suspended while Jones is incarcerated, the 2019 order modifying the

commitment order to place Jones in the Tiered Treatment Program must be void

because the trial court signed the order during Jones’s imprisonment.

Jones appears to presume that if the trial court’s duties under Chapter 841 are

suspended it somehow loses either personal jurisdiction over the committed person

or subject matter jurisdiction over the commitment order. Under Section 841.082(d)

and (e) of the Health and Safety Code, after a person is committed, the trial court

retains both personal jurisdiction over the committed individual and subject matter

jurisdiction over the civil commitment. In re Commitment of Davis, 291 S.W.3d 124,

127 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. denied). Jones cites no authority other than

section 841.150 to support his argument that the 2019 order is void.3 Section 841.150

3
Jones cited a contempt case for the proposition that the order “must spell out
the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that such
person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed upon him.”
Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967). Jones contends that the 2019 Order
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does not mention either personal or subject matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Health &

Safety Code Ann. § 841.150. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)

provides sex offender treatment while a person is in TDCJ custody. See Tex. Health

& Safety Code Ann. § 841.0821. There is no reason for the TCCO to provide sex

offender treatment or for the trial court to conduct biennial reviews of the person’s

status while that person is confined in a TDCJ facility. But nothing in section

841.150 prohibits the trial court from complying with the legislative mandate to

implement the Tiered Treatment Program by modifying the commitment orders of a

person committed pursuant to the SVP Act. See Act of May 21, 2015, 84th Leg.,

R.S., ch. 845, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2701, 2711 (“If a civil commitment

requirement imposed under Chapter 841, Health and Safety Code, before the

effective date of this Act differs from any of the civil commitment requirements

listed in Section 841.082, Health and Safety Code, as amended by this Act, the

applicable court with jurisdiction over the committed person shall, after notice and

hearing, modify the requirement imposed as applicable to conform to that section.”).

Jones argues that subsection 40(b) of Senate Bill 746 does not authorize the

trial court to place Jones in the Tiered Treatment Program because tiered treatment

was not mentioned in section 841.082 before 2015. We disagree. Since the

was ambiguous. We need not address this argument because Jones failed to include
a copy of the 2019 Order in his appendix.
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enactment of the SVP Act in 1999, section 841.082 has required that SVP

commitment orders “requir[e] the person to reside in a particular location[]” and

“requir[e] the person’s participation in a specific course of treatment[.]” See Act of

May 30, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1188, § 4.01, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4122, 4143-

52 (amended 2003, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015). When Jones was originally committed,

section 841.082(e) provided that “[t]he requirements imposed under Subsection (a)

may be modified [by the committing court] at any time after notice to each affected

party to the proceedings and a hearing.” Act of May 30, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch.

347, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1505, 1516-17.

We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). “A trial

court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Walker, 827

S.W.2d at 839 (internal quotations omitted). A trial court also abuses its discretion

if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law, because a trial court has no discretion

in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. See Prudential,

148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. We conclude that on this record the

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Relator has not shown that he is entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny

the petition for a writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on January 21, 2026
Opinion Delivered January 22, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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