Shannon Rendell Horace v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-24-00052-CR
________________

SHANNON RENDELL HORACE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 435th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 22-02-01647-CR
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Shannon Rendell Horace appeals his conviction for possession of a

controlled substance with intent to deliver, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Health &

Safety Code Ann. § 481.112. In his sole issue, Horace complains the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his Motion to Suppress the evidence of a

warrantless search and seizure because his temporary detention was unduly

prolonged. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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BACKGROUND

Horace moved to suppress evidence from a warrantless search and seizure that

he alleged was obtained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Horace

argued his prolonged detention involving the delay of a canine unit was unlawful

and the evidence seized should be suppressed because the facts and circumstances

of the stop were insufficient for the officer to reasonably suspect he was trafficking

narcotics.

The trial court conducted a suppression hearing, during which Horace

challenged his prolonged detention. Bruno Miauro testified he was a Trooper with

the Texas Department of Public Safety when he stopped Horace for speeding in

Montgomery County around 12:47 a.m. Miauro asked Horace for insurance

information and observed the passenger looking for paperwork. Miauro told Horace

he would give him a warning if everything checked out okay to reduce any anxiety

and asked him to come back to his patrol car. Miauro observed that Horace’s hand

was shaking when he handed him his driver’s license. Miauro testified that Horace

reported his girlfriend, who was the passenger in the car, owned the vehicle, which

had a Louisiana plate.

While waiting for the information to return on Horace’s license, Miauro asked

Horace about his trip, and Horace reported he was headed to Leesville, which was a

few hours away. Horace explained he traveled from Louisiana to Houston to eat at

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Pappadeaux, but it was closed when they got there, so he sat in a parking lot, visited

with his brother, and headed back to Leesville because his girlfriend had to be at

work. Miauro testified that Horace’s story was difficult to follow, because someone

making a long trip late at night to go to a specific restaurant would check the

restaurant’s hours. Miauro stated he suspected there was more going on when he

observed Horace breathing harder and moving his hands a lot when he talked about

his trip’s purpose.

Miauro testified that when the check showed the vehicle was not registered to

Horace’s girlfriend, Horace stated it belonged to her stepdad. Miauro explained he

had special training in narcotics interdiction and that it was common practice for

someone trafficking drugs to use someone else’s vehicle. Miauro testified that when

he exited his patrol car to talk to Horace’s girlfriend about the vehicle’s insurance,

Horace got out in front of him and headed toward the vehicle.

Miauro explained that was a huge, red flag, and he thought Horace could try

to flee or that there could be a weapon or contraband in the vehicle. Miauro grabbed

Horace and pulled him back next to the patrol car for safety reasons because

Horace’s behavior was abnormal and made Miauro very uncomfortable. Miauro

explained that another red flag was that Horace said he was going to the vehicle to

get a lighter or his cigarettes, but the video shows Horace had both on his person.

Miauro testified that at that point, he had not confirmed that the vehicle was not

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stolen, and he suspected that criminal activity was afoot and that something was not

right. Miauro explained he called for a second unit, because he needed to complete

the traffic stop and did not believe it was safe for him to leave Horace to talk with

Horace’s girlfriend. Miauro explained that he knew Horace was extremely nervous

because when he patted Horace down for weapons, he felt Horace’s chest pumping

hard. Miauro was on the border between Montgomery and Liberty County, and it

took backup about nineteen minutes to arrive.

Miauro proceeded to question Horace’s girlfriend about the vehicle’s

insurance and the trip and to check the vehicle’s VIN number. Miauro testified

Horace’s girlfriend reported they ate at the restaurant and did not talk to or see

anyone, which completely contradicted Horace’s story and raised Miauro’s

suspicions even more that criminal activity was taking place. Miauro asked Horace’s

girlfriend if he could search the vehicle, which he believed contained contraband,

and after she denied consent, Miauro requested a canine unit to check for narcotics

because he had reasonable suspicion. Miauro explained that when he requested the

canine, twenty-six and one-half minutes into the stop, he had not completed the

traffic stop because he had not issued the warning.

Miauro testified that it took about twelve minutes for the canine unit to arrive

on scene. Miauro explained that after the canine positively alerted on the vehicle, he

searched the vehicle and found two kilos of methamphetamine.

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The trial court admitted and viewed Miauro’s body camera video of the traffic

stop, and the video supports Miauro’s testimony about the stop. The video shows

Miauro stopped Horace for speeding, obtained Horace’s driver’s license, and

requested insurance information. After two minutes and twenty-five seconds,

Miauro asked Horace to come back to the patrol car so he could see if everything

checked out, and Horace told him it was his girlfriend’s vehicle. After being in

Miauro’s patrol car for about two minutes, Horace told the story of traveling from

Louisiana to Houston to eat at Pappadeaux, which Horace claimed was closed. After

about three more minutes, Miauro and Horace exited the car so Miauro could ask

Horace’s girlfriend for insurance information, and Miauro had to stop Horace from

walking back to the vehicle by pulling on Horace’s arm. Miauro asked Horace to

wait by the patrol car and he stayed with Horace to make sure he did not flee.

Approximately a minute-and-a-half later, Miauro told Horace to stop putting his

hands in his pockets to get cigarettes and a lighter, patted Horace down for weapons,

and requested a second unit. Approximately twenty-five minutes after the initial

stop, the second unit arrived, which allowed Miauro to talk with Horace’s girlfriend

about the vehicle’s registration and insurance. When Horace’s girlfriend provided

contradictory information about the trip, Miauro asked for permission to search her

vehicle. After she denied consent, Miauro requested a canine unit about twenty-six

minutes after the stop, and the canine unit arrived about forty minutes after the stop

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and positively alerted on the vehicle. Miauro searched the vehicle and found two

kilos of methamphetamine.

The trial court denied Horace’s Motion to Suppress and found the evidence

was admissible. The trial court found that Horace’s prolonged detention was justified

because it occurred before Miauro completed the tasks associated with the stop, and

during that valid detention, Miauro developed reasonable suspicion that Horace was

engaged in criminal activity other than the traffic violation. The trial court found

Miauro diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to quickly

confirm or dispel his suspicions, which included requesting backup for safety

reasons eight and a half minutes after initiating the stop and requesting a canine unit

after consent for a search was denied twenty-five minutes into the stop. The trial

court also found the time Miauro spent waiting on backup and the canine unit was

not unreasonable under the circumstances.

Horace pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony offense of possession of a

controlled substance with intent to deliver, and the trial court accepted Horace’s plea,

found him guilty and assessed his punishment at twelve years of confinement.

ANALYSIS

In his sole issue, Horace complains the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his Motion to Suppress because there was no separate justification beyond

the purpose of the original stop for Miauro to prolong his detention and wait for a

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canine unit to dispel his suspicions that criminal activity was afoot. Specifically,

Horace argues his temporary detention was unduly prolonged by Miauro’s lack of

diligence in requesting the canine unit after he formed additional reasonable

suspicion during the stop.

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated

standard for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2023). “We defer to a trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by

the record.” Id. We review de novo legal questions and mixed questions that do not

turn on credibility and demeanor, such as the facts of a case that would establish

probable cause. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The

evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the

trial court’s ruling, and the trial court’s ruling must be upheld if it is reasonably

supported by the record and is correct under a theory of law applicable to the case.

Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Under the Fourth Amendment, a person can be detained no longer than is

necessary to effectuate the purpose of a valid traffic stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 500 (1983). In investigating a traffic violation, an officer is to use the least

intrusive means reasonably available to the officer to verify or dispel the suspicion

that led to the stop. Id. Thus, the reasonableness of the duration of a stop does not

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depend solely on the time needed to determine whether a traffic offense occurred.

See Love v. State, 252 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d).

If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting a person committed a traffic

offense, he may legally initiate a traffic stop. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted). “A seizure for a traffic violation

justifies a police investigation of that violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575

U.S. 348, 354 (2015). A routine traffic stop is analogous to a Terry stop, during

which “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop context is

determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’ — to address the traffic violation that

warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns[.]” Id. (internal citations

omitted). Because addressing the traffic violation is the purpose of the traffic stop,

authority for the seizure ends when the tasks tied to the traffic violation are

completed or reasonably should have been completed. Id.

A traffic stop becomes unlawful when it is prolonged beyond the time

reasonably required to complete the mission of the traffic stop, which includes

ordinary inquiries incident to the stop. Id. at 354-55. Typical inquiries include,

among other things, checking the driver’s license, inspecting the vehicle’s proof of

insurance, and requesting information about the ownership of the vehicle, the

driver’s destination, and purpose of the trip. Id. at 355; Veal v. State, 28 S.W.3d 832,

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835 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref’d). An officer may conduct a computer

verification of the person’s license and insurance, and the traffic-stop investigation

is not complete until the check is complete, and the officer confirms that the person

has a valid license and insurance. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63-64 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004); see Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003,

pet. ref’d). Because traffic stops can be dangerous, an officer may need to take

certain safety precautions to complete his mission safely, including on-scene

investigations into other crimes. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63-64.

In gathering the types of information typically associated with a traffic stop,

an objectively reasonable officer may form a reasonable suspicion that some crime

other than a traffic violation is afoot. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86

(1985). If so, the focus in determining whether the detention is prolonged shifts to

evaluating whether those suspicions were objectively reasonable, and whether they

were investigated in a manner designed to quickly confirm or dispel them. Belcher

v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). In evaluating

a complaint about an allegedly prolonged detention, courts are allowed to consider

whether legitimate law enforcement purposes are served by any delays that arose

during the investigation. Id. In reviewing complaints about allegedly prolonged

detentions, we look at the totality of the circumstances developed during the stop to

determine whether there is evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s

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conclusion that reasonable suspicions existed justifying the defendant’s detention

while the officer investigated matters that extended beyond the initial reason for the

stop. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989); Woods v. State, 956

S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Although a detention that follows a traffic

stop may become unduly prolonged, there is no rigid, bright-line rule governing the

time that detentions should take. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685.

Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch, and it exists if the officer

has specific articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those

facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude the person is, has been, or soon

will be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2022) (citing Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007)); Delafuente v. State, 414 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). These

facts must show unusual activity, some evidence that connects the detainee to the

unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to a crime.

State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Martinez v.

State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Nervousness is a factor that an

officer may consider in establishing reasonable suspicion for an investigative

detention. Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

An officer may also ask the driver if he possesses any illegal contraband and

solicit voluntary consent to search the vehicle. Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491. If a valid

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traffic stop evolves into an investigative detention for a drug-related offense, the

temporary detention may continue for a reasonable time, and one reasonable method

of dispelling the reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains drugs is to have a

trained drug dog perform an “open air” search by walking around the vehicle.

Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Increasing

nervousness, conflicting or implausible information, and other factors can raise a

reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging a detention to wait on a canine unit. Haas

v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 54 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d); Neuwirth v. State,

No. 09-18-00248-CR, No. 09-18-00249-CR, 2019 WL 3937997, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Aug. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

There is no requirement that a canine unit must arrive at the location of the

traffic stop within a certain period. State v. Martinez, 638 S.W.3d 740, 752 (Tex.

App.—Easland 2021, no pet.). That said, the timing of the canine unit’s arrival must

not be unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. Here, the video of the stop shows

the canine unit arrived about forty minutes after the initial stop, which was only

fourteen minutes after it was requested. Our sister courts have found that detentions

awaiting a canine unit that were similar in length to Horace’s were not unreasonable

under the circumstances. See Martinez, 638 S.W.3d at 752 (thirty-eight-minute

detention not unreasonable); Parker v. State, 297 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2009, pet. ref’d) (seventy-minute detention not unreasonable); Willis v.

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State, 192 S.W.3d 585, 589-90, 592 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, pet. ref’d) (twenty-

nine-minute detention not unreasonable); Strauss, 121 S.W.3d at 491-92 (seventy-

five-minute detention not unreasonable). Considering the totality of the

circumstances developed during the stop and the deceptive behaviors and statements

made by Horace, on balance we cannot say that the detention was unreasonable.

The evidence developed in the suppression hearing shows that Horace’s

detention was supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

Thus, Miauro’s investigatory detention of Horace was lawful. The evidence also

shows Miauro was diligent in requesting backup for his safety and a canine unit to

confirm or dispel his suspicion that there were narcotics in the vehicle. Based on the

totality of the circumstances developed during the stop, we conclude that the

evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Horace’s temporary

detention was not unduly prolonged and that the length of time between the initial

stop and the arrival of the canine unit was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Horace’s detention was not unduly prolonged or

unreasonable under the circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not err by

denying Horace’s Motion to Suppress. We overrule Horace’s sole issue and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

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AFFIRMED.

JAY WRIGHT
Justice

Submitted on July 18, 2025
Opinion Delivered August 27, 2025
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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