In the Interest of W.A.L., J.B.L., and V.E.L. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00307-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF W.A.L., J.B.L., AND V.E.L.

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 410th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 21-04-04951-CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals from a Final Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child

Relationship naming Father sole managing conservator and Mother possessory

conservator of three minor children, W.A.L., J.B.L. and V.E.L. 1 Mother complains

she was denied due process and effective assistance of counsel when she was forced

to proceed to trial without an attorney, and she claims the trial court erred in

1To protect the identity of the children, we use initials for the children and

refer to the parents as “Mother” and “Father.” See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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admitting “demonstrably false sworn testimony” and “documents containing

demonstrably forged signatures.” We affirm.

Background

After the parties were named joint managing conservators in April 2022 based

on a 2018 Mediated Settlement Agreement, Father filed a Motion to Modify Parent-

Child Relationship asserting there had been a material and substantial change since

the parties entered into the MSA. Mother answered and filed a counterpetition, and

the case was set for trial in November 2022. The parties filed a Joint Motion for

Continuance, and trial was reset for January 2023. Mother filed a motion for

continuance, and trial was reset for March 2023. Mother’s trial counsel filed a

motion to withdraw and asked that the court continue the case to give Mother time

to secure new counsel. The motion to withdraw was granted on March 28, 2023, trial

was reset for May 2023, and the court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss if one of

the parties did not file a timely motion to retain the case on the docket.

Representing herself, Mother filed a motion for continuance indicating she

needed time to hire a lawyer. Because neither side filed a timely motion to retain,

the case was dismissed without prejudice but was reinstated at Father’s request.

After reinstatement, trial was set for June 5, 2023, but was soon reset for June 26,

2023. According to the Amended Docket Control Order, the deadline for filing a

motion for continuance was June 12, 2023.

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On June 15, 2023, the trial court sent notice that the case would be called to

trial before the associate judge at 9:00 a.m. on June 27, 2023. At 8:22 a.m. on June

27, 2023, Mother filed a motion for continuance asserting she had not retained

counsel. The motion was not verified and did not indicate whether Mother had used

diligence in seeking to retain counsel. When the case was called for trial that

morning, it was brought to the associate judge’s attention that Mother’s

counterpetition included an objection to having the final trial heard by the associate

judge. The associate judge noted Mother had filed a motion for continuance which

was not set for hearing, in response to which Mother indicated she was “in the

process of hiring an attorney.” After taking notice of the age of the case, the associate

judge indicated that the case could be tried either that day with the associate judge

or the following day with the presiding judge. After a short break, Mother indicated,

“I’ll go with [the presiding judge] tomorrow morning[.]”

On June 28, 2023, the presiding judge denied Mother’s continuance as

“untimely [and] unsworn[,]” and the case was tried to the court. A Final Order in

Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship was signed in August 2023, and Mother

timely appealed.

Analysis

Mother represents herself on appeal. We liberally construe pleadings and

briefs filed by a self-represented litigant. Giddens v. Brooks, 92 S.W.3d 878, 880-81

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(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). Nevertheless, a self-represented litigant

“is still required to comply with the law and rules of procedure.” Id. “There cannot

be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for

litigants representing themselves. Litigants who represent themselves must comply

with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage

over litigants represented by counsel.” Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d

181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978).

Mother presents six issues on appeal, three of which complain that the trial

court engaged in misconduct and denied Mother due process and effective assistance

of counsel by proceeding to trial “despite the absence of [Mother’s] attorney[,]” two

of which complain about the admission of “demonstrably” false evidence, and one

of which complains that these were cumulative errors, warranting reversal of the

judgment.

Mother’s first, second and fifth issues relate to the trial court’s denial of her

motion for continuance. We will not disturb a trial court’s denial of a continuance in

the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. In the Int. of A.E.M., No. 09-18-00288-

CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1439, at *48 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 20, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably,

or without reference to any guiding principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators,

Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251

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requires a motion continuance to demonstrate “sufficient cause supported by

affidavit.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. Mother’s motion merely indicated she had not

retained counsel; it included no facts from which the trial court could determine

whether Mother had used due diligence in seeking to retain counsel during the three

months between her attorney’s withdrawal and the trial date, and it was not

supported by affidavit. Although Mother’s position on appeal appears to be that she

had retained counsel who was unable to attend trial, her position in the trial court

was that she had not yet retained counsel but was “in the process” of doing so. “[W]e

do not consider factual assertions that appear solely in briefs and are not supported

by the record.” Marshall v. Hous. Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006).

Contrary to Mother’s position on appeal, the trial court did not force Mother

to trial in the absence of a retained attorney, nor did it deny Mother the opportunity

to retain counsel. Rather, in the absence of evidence of due diligence, the trial court

denied Mother’s untimely and unsworn motion for continuance which was filed on

the morning of trial, three months after Mother’s counsel had withdrawn. The trial

court did not act without reference to guiding rules or principles. In denying the

motion for continuance, the trial court applied the requirements of Rule 251 and the

Amended DCO, and we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in doing so.

We overrule Mother’s first, second and fifth issues.

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Mother’s third issue asserts the trial court erred in admitting “documents

containing demonstrably forged signatures[.]” Mother does not identify which

documents were supposedly forged. “Courts are not required to comb through the

record to find evidence to support a party’s appellate issues, but nothing prevents

courts from undertaking reasonable efforts to locate evidence described in a party’s

brief[.]” Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Tex. 2019). Upon reviewing of the

record, we infer Mother’s complaint about an allegedly forged document relates to

Petitioner’s Exhibit 20 which is a copy of a paycheck payable to Father. Father

testified Mother went to his place of employment, and “they gave her my paycheck,

[and] she signed the back of it and cashed that paycheck.” Father testified Exhibit

20 was a copy of the front and back of the paycheck. When Exhibit 20 was offered

into evidence, Mother objected, “That’s not my signature.” The trial court overruled

Mother’s objection and admitted the exhibit.

“We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion

standard.” In the Int. of A.E.M., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1439, at *50. To establish

the authenticity of a document, Texas Rule of Evidence 901(a) merely requires the

proponent of the exhibit to “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

item is what the proponent claims it is.” Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). Father’s testimony

that the exhibit was a copy of the front and back of the check met the threshold for

establishing the authenticity of the exhibit, and Mother’s objection denying the

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authenticity of the signature on the back of the check constituted a challenge to the

exhibit’s weight and credibility, rather than its admissibility. The requirements of

Rule 901(a) having been met, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in

overruling Mother’s objection and admitting Exhibit 20, leaving Mother free to

continue to deny that she endorsed the check. We overrule Mother’s third issue.

Mother’s fourth issue asserts the trial court erred in admitting “the opposing

party’s demonstrably false sworn testimony about obtaining a house[.]” Mother does

not cite where in the record the allegedly false testimony about a house can be found.

Upon reviewing the record, we infer Mother’s complaint relates to Father’s

testimony as follows:

Q. As far as your home, where are you going to be living?

A. I’m actually closing on a house [. . .] I should be closing July
17th, closing date they gave me it’s a three bedroom, two bath 19 or 22
hundred square foot.

Q. It’s a reasonably big house?

A. Yes. Nice house right down the street from [the elementary
school]. It’s about six, seven houses down so they can easily walk to
school.

By failing to make a timely objection to this testimony, Mother failed to

preserve her complaint for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (requiring the

record to contain a timely objection by the complaining party and a ruling by the

trial court). We overrule Mother’s fourth issue.

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In her sixth issue, Mother complains the cumulative effect of the foregoing

alleged errors deprived her of a fair trial, warranting reversal of the judgment. The

trial court’s rulings, which we have found not to have been erroneous, could not have

had an erroneous, cumulative effect on the judgment. We overrule Mother’s sixth

issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled all of Mother’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS
Justice

Submitted on March 26, 2025
Opinion Delivered June 19, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.

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