In the Interest of S.D.T. and S.D.T. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-24-00381-CV
________________

IN THE INTEREST OF S.D.T. and S.D.T.
________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 3
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23-10-15339-CV
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children,

Sally and Sam 1 (collectively “the children”). The trial court found, by clear and
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convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s

parental rights and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best

interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O), (2). In five issues,

Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the

1To protect the identity of the children, we use pseudonyms to refer to the

children and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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predicate grounds and the best interest finding, and complains that she received

ineffective assistance of counsel.

As more fully discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s Order of

Termination as to Mother.

Background and Facts Leading to Removal

In March 2023, the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the

Department”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Sally and

Sam. 2 The Department supported its petition with the affidavit of its investigator,
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Tameshia Copeland (“Copeland”). Copeland’s affidavit set out the information

leading to the children’s removal.

According to Copeland’s affidavit, the Department received an initial referral

alleging the neglectful supervision of the children. Mother, Sally, and Sam were

residing at the Crisis Center shelter (the “shelter”), and Sally and Sam were left

unaccompanied after Mother was involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility.

Mother stated that she was born in Ethiopia and was a pop star. Mother presented

two different identities at the shelter and had no identification for Sally and Sam.

Mother signed a childcare contract allowing an adult at the shelter to care for Sally

and Sam; however, for legal reasons, the children could not remain at the facility.

2The alleged Father was included in the termination suit; however, he did not

appeal the termination of his parental rights to Sally and Sam, and he is not a party
to this appeal.
2
The Department contacted the relative who Mother listed as an emergency

contact at the shelter. Mother’s relative indicated that Mother stayed at her home for

a few days, and then stayed at a motel before asking to be brought to the shelter.

Mother’s relative indicated that Mother has thought she was Megan Thee Stallion,

Nicki Minaj, and others. Mother’s relative further confirmed that she would like

Sally and Sam to be placed with her; however, she was not an option after a review

of her “CPI history and her criminal history.” The Department contacted several

other family members for possible placement, but none were willing to care for the

children.

The Department contacted the facility were Mother was being treated and was

informed that Mother was admitted under the name “Queen.” Mother was not

admitted under her legal name but under a different identity that she was claiming.

Mother stated that her family members were in the United Kingdom, and she needed

to contact the Royal family. Mother tried to contact two relatives to care for the

children but neither answered the phone. Mother stated that she did not want her

children in foster care and asked that they be transported to another relative for 24

to 72 hours. Mother would not give the Department permission to transport the

children to her relative since her relative does not drive at night. The affidavit

outlined many of Mother’s other claims including that she was married to or

involved with various rappers, she had thirty kids, and she was born blind and deaf.

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The affidavit explained that Mother insisted her name was Queen and

repeatedly denied her legal identity. Mother’s relative informed the shelter that

Mother was once on medication but has been off it for a while. The shelter later

convinced Mother to go to Texana Behavioral Health Care Clinic (“Texana”) for a

medical checkup. During intake, Mother reiterated the same claims regarding her

identity but began to “shut down” once she realized the visit was more about her

mental health rather than a medical checkup. The therapist from the shelter

accompanied Mother to Texana, and she informed the intake worker that Mother

was fine with her children and that there were no concerns of her abusing or

neglecting them. The therapist relayed that Mother did not exhibit violent or

aggressive behavior. The therapist indicated there was a concern that Mother was

incapable of taking care of the children once she left the shelter. It was determined

at the end of the assessment that Mother should be admitted.

The investigator noted that she interviewed Mother at Sun Behavioral

Hospital. During the interview, Mother claimed it all started when she was in college

and received a call that Child Protective Services (“CPS”) had her children. Mother

said she sued the girl who had her kids and that she had to come from England to get

verification from the judge. Mother relayed that President Trump, President Obama,

and Congress had to get involved, that her name is Queen, and she is married to a

rapper who adopted her children. Mother stated that she was married to Prince Harry

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and that King Charles is the father of the children. Mother denied her legal name,

claimed her social security number was stolen, and in addition to Sally and Sam,

claimed that she is the mother of several royal family members. Mother stated that

her mother died during childbirth, her dad works for the government, that she has a

twin sister, that she was born deaf and blind, that she had a heart transplant, and then

began talking about suing caseworkers and a judge and winning a settlement because

she is also a judge.

The affidavit explained that Mother was brought to Sun Behavioral Hospital

involuntarily by law enforcement, and Mother’s drug tests were negative. As a result

of Mother’s hospitalization and the shelter being unable to keep the children, the

Department took emergency custody before a court order on March 24, 2023.

The affidavit described Mother’s prior CPS history. Her history included

allegations of neglectful supervision, which were ruled out on four occasions, ruled

“reason to believe” twice, and on one occasion the children were removed. Mother

had four class B misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana, theft of

property, and driving with an invalid license.

Trial Evidence

Officer Michael Moote

Officer Michael Moote (“Officer Moote”) testified that he is a licensed peace

officer with the Conroe Police Department. On July 2, 2024, while on patrol, Officer

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Moote observed Mother make several traffic violations while operating a vehicle

including unsafe lane changes and failure to use a turn signal. Mother was alone in

the vehicle and did not have any government-issued identification, but provided

hospital paperwork, hospital armband, and citation from the Livingston Police

Department with an alias name. Through his investigation, Officer Moote

determined that Mother was not the person identified in the documents she provided.

Using a portable fingerprint scanner, Officer Moote was able to correctly identify

Mother. He then arrested Mother for failing to identify and giving “false fictitious

information.” On cross-examination, Officer Moote explained that once her

fingerprint was associated with a name, dispatch also provided a photo from either

a Texas identification card or driver’s license.

Officer Moote testified that it was very difficult to hold a conversation with

Mother, as she rambled and made little sense. For example, Mother stated that she

had a child every year since the age of five, and she continued to use the alias name

even after Officer Moote determined her legal name.

Mother

Mother testified that her name was an alias, “Alyssa Michelle Stephens,”

which is not her legal name. Mother acknowledged that Sally and Sam are her

children. Mother stated that she was the music artists Beyonce and Cardi B, and her

appearance changes. Mother testified that she has been self-employed over fifteen

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or twenty years working for RSDA Records writing books, music, and poems and

making movies. She claimed to have made over a billion dollars last year. She

understood that her children are in the Department’s custody but denied leaving them

unattended at the shelter. According to Mother, she left the children at a day care

with the shelter’s “day care lady,” whose name she does not recall.

Mother acknowledged that the Department provided her with a service plan,

and she claimed she completed the plan including being evaluated by a psychologist,

although she could provide no documentation showing that. She did not have a

residence, was living at a hotel, and claimed to have other properties in Texas.

Mother denied ever using substances and denied ever being arrested for or pleading

guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The State presented Mother’s October

2023 Judgment of Conviction for possession of a controlled substance to the trial

judge, showing she pled guilty for an offense that occurred on September 17, 2023.

When asked if she had seen the children more than once in the past year,

Mother stated that she saw them several times but went into a coma. According to

Mother, she was born blind, mute, and deaf, and had to go to a facility when she

went blind. Mother testified she required therapy because she was raped. Mother

also testified that she has bone cancer, breast cancer, and stomach cancer, and is

receiving chemo treatments and was prescribed prescription marijuana. Mother

acknowledged that it was important for someone with health or mental issues to

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receive treatment to care for their children, and without treatment, it could be

potentially dangerous for their children. Mother stated that she was sent to a facility

to verify her birth name, age, and occupation, but she was then sent home. Mother

denied needing help with her mental health.

For the two days before trial, Mother was renting a bed from someone at

Studio 6 hotel in Conroe. Before that, she stayed at another hotel for nineteen days,

and before that, she was in jail. Before jail, Mother said she lived between the

Salvation Army and an address she did not know, although she claimed that as her

residence.

On cross-examination, Mother stated that she was the children’s sole provider

from birth until the Department removed them. Mother testified that CPS came to

her home looking for a female with the same first name as her legal name, and

although CPS checked on the children they were not removed. According to Mother,

the Department helped to get their birth certificates, music contracts, social security

numbers, and helped the family relocate.

According to Mother, she went to the shelter and was sent to the hospital to

get information, but she acknowledged that she did not go to the hospital voluntarily.

Mother testified that she had an agreement with a lady in the shelter to watch the

children while she was at the hospital. Mother stated that while at the shelter, no one

questioned how she cared for the children. Mother believed she could take care of

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the children but stated she needed help getting the proper documents regarding her

finances. Mother reiterated that she completed everything that the Department asked

of her.

Mother testified that in addition to Sally and Sam, her children are Princess

Charlotte and others fathered by Prince Harry, Prince Charles, and rappers. She

stated that she and her kids lived at “Kingston Palace.” Mother also stated that she

was not born black, but she darkened her skin color.

According to Mother, if a relative has the children, it is because the children’s

father gave them to her even though she is not a relative. Mother stated that if she

felt the need to talk to a psychologist, then she would, but right now she is dealing

with racial issues and “a lot of discrimination.” Mother does not believe that she

needs any mental health help right now.

Samantha Causey

Samantha Causey (“Causey”) is an investigator with the Department, and she

had been involved in Mother’s case since May 2022, when she visited Mother and

the children at an apartment. During that initial visit, Mother denied her legal name

and provided an alias before threatening to call the police and file a restraining order

on Causey. Once a police officer arrived, Causey “reengaged” with Mother over the

phone, but Mother stated that the FBI was on her case, and she refused to meet with

Causey without a police officer and her attorney.

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Causey was eventually able to go inside Mother’s home and as a result,

Mother was detained so Causey could interview the children. Causey noted that the

home was messy but had lights, utilities, and working appliances. The children were

eating McDonald’s on the floor. Throughout this time, Mother claimed to be Kate

Middleton, Halle Berry, the mother of Prince Archie and Prince William, and that

she is a member of the royal family. The children seemed okay, although Causey

could not understand Sam’s speech very well. Causey testified she was concerned

about Mother’s mental health because she did not seem to understand who she was

and the impact it would have on the children. She explained that “the children were

living in that environment with the mother on a daily basis and her mental health

was influencing their daily lives.” Causey noted that Mother believed and was telling

the children they were royal family members, and Causey felt that could impact the

children’s mental health and development. Causey stated that leaving the children

unattended at a shelter would be a concern and a reason for removal of the children

by the Department.

Causey testified that she contacted Mother on two occasions, the children’s

general appearance was fine, and she did not observe marks or bruises on them. To

Causey’s knowledge, Mother was the children’s sole caregiver. Causey did not have

any concerns necessitating removal of the children. The children were four and five

years old; they had clothes and food in the apartment but were not enrolled in school.

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After her visit, Causey applied for court-ordered services with the Department, but

it was denied.

Tawanna Anderson

Tawanna Anderson (“Anderson”) was a caseworker assigned to Mother’s case

from October or November 2023 to June 2024. Anderson’s review of Mother’s file

revealed Mother had not completed any assignments on her service plan, and Mother

stated that she would talk to her attorney about the plan. Anderson testified that it

was always difficult to contact Mother when requesting that she take a drug test,

Mother always said to go through her attorney, and Anderson never received any of

Mother’s drug test results. Mother never provided information on where she was

living or evidence she was working. While Anderson was the caseworker, the

children were in foster care and there was no visitation between Mother and the

children. Anderson explained that when she contacted Mother to schedule a visit,

Mother requested a time approximately six weeks away, but was incarcerated before

the visit occurred.

According to Anderson, Mother denied her legal name, which concerned her.

Anderson believed Mother had mental health issues, which her service plan would

have addressed, but Mother did not complete the plan. During Anderson’s time as

the caseworker, Mother did not demonstrate that she was able to provide the children

a safe environment.

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Anderson acknowledged that she never met Mother nor arranged to meet

Mother outside of the courtroom. Anderson stated that although Mother did a

psychological evaluation in another county, Mother did not complete any tasks while

she was the caseworker. Anderson testified that Mother’s phone was out of service

at times, and she spoke with Mother to set up visitation with the children. In total,

Anderson spoke with Mother twice in-person in the courtroom, never spoke to her

over the phone, but she did exchange text messages with her. Anderson has never

spoken with the alleged father and does not know who he is.

Maria Reza-Day

Maria Reza-Day (“Reza-Day”) was the assigned caseworker on Mother’s case

from May to September 2023. Mother’s family plan of service indicated that she was

to participate in psychiatric services for her mental health and follow all

recommendations of her doctor, including taking medications. Reza-Day testified

that Mother completed a psychosocial evaluation through Heart to Heart, but that is

not a psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychosocial evaluation was

reviewed, and it stated that on the day Mother was evaluated, Mother “was floridly

psychotic and would not be able to care for her children appropriately due to very

poor reality testing.” After her psychosocial evaluation, inpatient psychiatric care

was recommended for Mother.

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Based on the results, Reza-Day spoke with Mother about receiving inpatient

treatment, and Mother said she would go on her own to Sun Behavioral. Reza-Day

lost communication with Mother but when located, Mother stated that she did not

go to Sun Behavioral because she did not have identification. Reza-Day located

facilities that would take Mother but when contacted, Mother responded that she was

sick. In later calls, Mother represented that she was sick or moving around. Reza-

Day never received confirmation that Mother went to a psychiatric hospital, so

Mother did not complete her service plan while she was the caseworker.

The plan also required that Mother complete a parenting class and take drug

tests. Reza-Day never received a parenting class certificate from Mother, and

although Mother was sent for drug tests, she did not appear for testing. The plan

required that Mother complete a substance abuse assessment and individual

counseling, but neither provider could contact her for scheduling. From May through

September, Reza-Day was aware of Mother visiting the children twice. The notes

from the visit indicate that Mother did not interact with the children much. Mother

also refused visits in June and July, and did not participate in visits in August 2023.

During Reza-Day’s time on Mother’s case, Mother stated that she lived in an

apartment complex, a hotel, and that she was between homes.

Documents regarding Mother’s initial permanency conference were presented

to Reza-Day, and she did not dispute evidence that Mother participated in the initial

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permanency conference. Reza-Day recalled that she met with Mother in

Montgomery County to go over the tasks in the plan. Reza-Day did not receive an

evaluation report from the physician that was appointed to conduct Mother’s

psychological or psychiatric evaluation, and she does not know if Mother had an

evaluation. Reza-Day is not aware of Mother completing the substance abuse

assessment, but she does not dispute any evidence that Mother went to an

assessment. It was later clarified that the document regarding a drug screening was

for a DNA test to determine maternity.

During Reza-Day’s time on the case, Mother went by multiple names. She

recalled Queen as one of the names and stated that Mother would get angry if called

by her legal name. Also during her time, the children were placed with a relative in

Montgomery County and doing well. Reza-Day did not know the father of the

children.

Reza-Day believed that Mother had mental health issues because when they

spoke, Mother would say she had record deals, she referred to her attorney as her

immigration attorney, she continued to ask her attorney ad litem about her

immigration, she said someone stole her identity, and she said that she was a record

producer. She believed Mother had a substance abuse issue because Mother admitted

to the use of marijuana. Reza-Day did not attempt to verify if Mother worked in the

music industry or if she went to the police to obtain documents. During her time on

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Mother’s case, Reza-Day did not see evidence that Mother was able to care for the

children, and she did not have stable housing, provide check stubs from employment,

or have a driver’s license or identification.

Cassie Beals

Cassie Beals (“Beals”) has been the conservatorship caseworker on Mother’s

case since June 2024. Beals testified that she has not seen any evidence or reports of

service that Mother has completed. Beals stated that since she has been on the case,

Mother had only one visit with the children on August 20, 2024. According to Beals,

she was concerned with some of Mother’s statements to the children. Beals testified

that Mother was adamant that the children know their real identities; she referred to

them as Prince Sam and Princess Sally, and she told them that she was suing the

Department for providing false documentation of their true royal titles. Mother also

stated that the term Prince and Princess is on the children’s birth certificate.

Beals stated that she feels termination is in the children’s best interest given

Mother’s mental health and inability to provide a safe and stable home environment.

Beals has no information regarding where Mother is living, and Mother has not

provided Beals any pay stubs. Beals testified that the plan is to transition the children

to an adoptive home.

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Tamara Adams

Tamara Adams (“Adams”) has been the CASA advocate on Mother’s case

since November 2023. Adams has visited the children and described Sally as “very

girly” and “sweet,” and Sam as a “sweet boy.” Sally has some behavioral issues,

such as food hoarding, that are being addressed in therapy.

Adams explained that a scheduled visit in July was cancelled because they

learned that Mother was incarcerated on the day of the visit. Mother visited with the

children on the Friday before trial, and Adams was concerned with what Mother said

to the children. According to Adams, Mother told the children that she had houses

in California, she was working to get their paperwork and birth certificates, and she

planned to have them stay with her parents. Adams was concerned because Mother’s

statements were not true and could affect the children’s reality and identity. Adams

believes it is in the children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights and

allow adoption because Mother is unable to care for them in a stable and safe

environment.

Adams testified that she has had contact with Mother in court and by text and

telephone. Adams said that she facilitated the first scheduled visit but has not talked

with Mother about helping her with other services that CASA could provide. Other

than Mother’s comments to the children, her visit with the children was appropriate,

and the children were excited to see her. Adams is unaware of the children’s current

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placement wanting to adopt either child. Placement of the children with their

maternal grandmother is not an option because she is deceased, and Adams has not

looked into placement of the children with another family. The children are no longer

placed with a maternal great aunt because the great aunt was also raising Mother’s

other four children. Adams has no knowledge of Mother working and she does not

know where Mother is living.

Adams believes it is in the children’s best interest to terminate the parental

rights of Mother and the father.

The Termination Order

After the bench trial, the trial court signed a final order terminating Mother’s

parental rights to the children. The trial court found that the Department had shown,

by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in the children’s best interest for

Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). The trial court

also found that the Department had shown by clear and convincing evidence grounds

for termination of Mother’s parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O).

See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O). The trial court found that Mother had engaged

in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct

which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children; she

constructively abandoned the children under section 161.001(b)(1)(N); and she

failed to comply with the court-ordered service plan. See id.

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Mother appealed the trial court’s order and argued the evidence was legally

and factually insufficient to support termination under sections 161.001(b)(1)(E),

(N), (O), and (2). Mother further argues that she received ineffective assistance of

counsel which resulted in an improper result.

Standard of Review

Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing

evidence. Id. § 161.001(b). Under the Family Code, “‘[c]lear and convincing

evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established.” Id. § 101.007; see In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005) (citation

omitted). The movant must show that the parent committed one or more predicate

acts or omissions and that the termination is in the child’s best interest. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a parental rights

termination case, we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the finding was true. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344–45 (Tex.

2009) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). We assume the

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder

could do so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have

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disbelieved. Id. In a factual sufficiency review, we “give due consideration to

evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and

convincing.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25

(Tex. 2002)). We must determine “‘whether the evidence is such that a factfinder

could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s

allegations.’” Id. (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25). “If, in light of the entire

record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in

favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have

formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.

(citation omitted). In cases tried to the bench, the trial court in its role as factfinder

determines the credibility and weight of the witnesses’ testimony and resolves any

inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence. See Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570,

578 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s credibility

determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. See In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d

570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex.

2004)).

Analysis

Predicate Grounds

Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination

under section 161.001(b)(1)(E). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

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Under subsection (E), the Department had the burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that Mother “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the

children with persons who engaged in conduct” that endangered their physical or

emotional well-being. Id.

Generally, a parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and

instability has engaged in conduct that endangers their child’s physical and

emotional well-being. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 n.4 (collecting cases).

That said, proof of endangerment requires “more than a threat of metaphysical injury

or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment[,]” yet “it is not

necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers

injury.” Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)

(citations omitted). Rather, endangering a child based on the parent’s conduct means

“‘to expose a child to loss or injury’” or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical

health. In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at

533). Importantly, the parent’s endangering conduct need not occur in the child’s

presence, so conduct relevant to the factfinder’s decision may include conduct that

occurred before or after the child the subject of the Department’s suit was born. See

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re B.P., No. 09-22-00031-CV, 2022 WL 2251739, at

*9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Generally, from

evidence of a parent’s past conduct showing the parent subjected a child to a life of

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uncertainty and instability, a factfinder may infer that the parent will continue to

engage in the conduct and the same conduct will endanger another child’s physical

and emotional safety and well-being. See J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re D.P., No.

09-22-00048-CV, 2022 WL 2975691, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2022,

pet. denied) (mem. op.).

A parent’s mental instability may contribute to a finding that the parent

engaged in a course of conduct that endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-

being. In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no

pet.). A parent’s mental illness or incompetence “alone are not grounds for

terminating a parent-child relationship; however, if a parent’s mental state causes

her to engage in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a

child, that conduct can support termination under subsection E.” Id. (citations

omitted). Evidence of a parent’s failure to comply with services to improve their

mental health is a factor that the trial court can consider in determining whether a

parent has engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the physical and

emotional well-being of a child. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 365 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). A parent’s untreated mental illness can

expose a child to endangerment, because when a parent fails to take required

medication, the parent can behave erratically and neglect the care of the child. See

In re P.H., 544 S.W.3d 850, 857–58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).

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Here, the evidence shows that Mother and the children were staying at a

shelter when Mother left the children unaccompanied while she was involuntarily

admitted into a mental health facility. Mother’s trial was around eighteen months

after the Department became involved in Mother’s case. Throughout that time,

Mother did not have a permanent place to live and was never able to demonstrate

employment with income. At the time of trial, Mother testified that she was renting

a bed from someone at a hotel. Mother further testified that before the hotel where

she is currently renting a bed, she lived at another hotel, the jail, and the Salvation

Army. At trial, Mother also identified herself by an alias name that she had assumed,

denied her legal name, stated that she is a famous musical artist such as Cardi B and

Beyonce, and claimed that Princess Charlotte and others are her children, and her

children were fathered by Prince Harry, Prince Charles, and rappers.

The evidence at trial further shows that Mother received a service plan from

the Department, and at trial, Mother claimed that she completed the plan including

being evaluated by a psychologist. However, two caseworkers testified at trial that

Mother has not completed the service plan. Caseworker Anderson testified that

Mother was unable to demonstrate that she was able to provide the children a safe

environment and that although Mother did a psychological evaluation in another

county, Mother did not complete any tasks while Anderson was the caseworker.

Caseworker Reza-Day testified that Mother had a psychosocial evaluation by Dr.

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Stadler, which differs from a psychological or psychiatric evaluation, and it specified

that at the time of the evaluation, Mother was floridly psychotic and unable to care

for the children. The evaluation further recommended that Mother receive inpatient

psychiatric treatment for her mental health, and Mother has failed to do so despite

Caseworker Reza-Day locating an available facility. Dr. Stadler further explained

that Mother’s delusions are very severe, Mother will probably not become stable

quickly, and that Mother will likely have recurring episodes throughout her life.

The record also established that Sally was exhibiting problematic behaviors

like food hoarding and was receiving treatment. Additionally, the record showed that

multiple witnesses testified that Mother’s erratic behavior in the children’s presence

and telling them things that had no basis in reality were a danger to their emotional

mental health and development. Likewise, the record showed that Mother’s

untreated mental illness had led to arrests when she failed to provide accurate

identifying information, which is another example of the instability she exposed her

children to.

The trial court could have reasonably believed that Mother’s abandonment of

the children at the shelter without a caregiver endangered the children’s physical and

emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d at 345; M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re D.P., 2022

WL 2975691, at *8; In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d at 14. At that time, Mother left the

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children unaccompanied when she went to the hospital involuntarily because

workers at the shelter were concerned about Mother’s mental health. The evidence

shows that the Department also had a concern about Mother’s mental health and that

at the time of trial, Mother still had not been mentally evaluated in accordance with

the service plan or received any treatment. Mother’s delusions and failure to receive

treatment for her mental health can endanger the physical and emotional welfare of

the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at

345; M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re D.P., 2022 WL

2975691, at *8; In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d at 14. The evidence further showed

that Mother does not have a residence or income to provide the children with a safe

and stable environment.

Having determined that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support predicate endangerment findings under subsection (E), we need not address

whether the evidence would also support the trial court’s predicate findings of one

or more of subsections (N) or (O), the remaining predicate findings that Mother

challenged in her brief. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (explaining

that a single predicate finding can support termination under prior version of statute);

In re G.M.S., No. 09-24-00207-CV, 2024 WL 4643302, at *8 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Oct. 31, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that if evidence is

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sufficient to support single predicate finding under D or E, we need not address other

predicate grounds). We overrule Mother’s first issue.

Best Interest

Next, we address Mother’s argument that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding. With respect to the

child’s best interest, there is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is

served by keeping the child with the parent. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b); In

re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Even so, it is also presumed “the prompt

and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is…in the child’s best

interest.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).

In reviewing a parent’s challenge to a best interest finding and when

considering the non-exclusive factors outlined in Holley v. Adams, “courts focus on

the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent.” In re H.M.R.J., No.

09-22-00171-CV, 2022 WL 17001955, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 17, 2022,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted); see Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–

72 (Tex. 1976). Additionally, the Department is not required to present evidence

addressing all the Holley factors. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The fact that the

Department does not present evidence on some factors does not preclude the trier of

fact from forming a strong belief or conviction that terminating the parent’s

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relationship with the child is in a child’s best interest, particularly when the evidence

is undisputed that the parent endangered the child. See id.

In a best interest analysis, the evidence supporting a trial court’s subsection

(E) finding may also support the trial court’s best interest finding. In re T.R.S., No.

09-18-00482-CV, 2019 WL 2455273, at *5 (Tex. App. —Beaumont June 13, 2019,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that the same evidence that supports a trial court’s

subsection (E) findings may be relevant to the trial court’s best interest finding). A

trial court’s best interest finding may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence,

or it may be based on subjective factors that the trial court may have observed in the

trial. Id. at *4. When evaluating what is best for a child’s future, trial courts may

consider a parent’s past conduct when that conduct is relevant to the child’s best

interest. Id. Ultimately, the question is whether the evidence when considered as a

whole allowed the trial court to reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that it

was in the children’s best interest for the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental

relationship with Sally and Sam. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25, 27–28. The trial

court was free to infer from the evidence that Mother’s mental health issues were

longstanding and persisted after the children were born. For example, the trial court

heard testimony that Mother failed to obtain treatment for her mental health during

the pendency of this case even though she was required to do so in the service plan.

The plan also required that Mother be gainfully and fully employed, provide proof

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to the Department of her finances, and obtain and maintain a safe and stable home

environment.

When they testified, both the CASA advocate and a caseworker expressed

concerns about whether the children would be safe were they placed in Mother’s

care considering Mother’s untreated mental health. Mother provided the trial court

with no evidence that she could provide the children a safe and stable home. The

record shows that Mother is unemployed, has no permanent residence, and no

evidence that she has been treated for her mental health issues.

“While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute.”

Id. at 28. Given Mother’s mental health history, the trial court could have reasonably

formed a firm belief or conviction that terminating Mother’s parental rights so that

the children could be permanently placed in a safe home where their needs can be

met is in their best interest. See id. at 27–28. We overrule Mother’s fourth issue.

Ineffective Assistance

In her fifth issue, Mother complains that she received ineffective assistance of

counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the timeliness of the adversary hearing

that was continued four times. According to Mother, trial counsel not only failed to

object to the timeliness of the adversary hearing, but also failed to file a mandamus.

Mother argues that she was prejudiced by the errors committed by her trial counsel

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such that the trial court either lost jurisdiction or the children should have been

returned to Mother upon the expiration of the deadline.

Claims that trial counsel provide ineffective assistance in cases involving

termination of parental rights are governed by the two-prong test stated in Strickland

v. Washington. See 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Tex.

2021); In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544–45 (Tex. 2003). Under the Strickland test,

the complaining party must show: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, which

means counsel made errors so egregious that they were not functioning as

“‘counsel’” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the complaining party such that there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings

would have been different. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687); see also In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 73.

When evaluating trial counsel’s performance, we indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable,

professional assistance, which includes trial strategy. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (other citations omitted). An appellant has the

burden to overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

conduct might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689

(citation omitted). If the record is silent about the reasons for counsel’s actions, we

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do not speculate to find ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re A.S., No. 09-21-

00142-CV, 2021 WL 5113817, at *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 4, 2021, pet.

denied) (mem. op.); see also Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,

312 S.W.3d 608, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (citation

omitted). “Any claim of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record

and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the ineffectiveness.” In re S.M.T., 241

S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (citation omitted).

The trial court does not lose jurisdiction if it fails to timely conduct the

adversary hearing. Instead, the remedy for the parents and the Department is to

compel the trial court by mandamus to conduct the adversary hearing promptly. In

re J.M.C., 109 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re E.D.L.,

105 S.W.3d 679, 687 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). Therefore, without

addressing whether counsel acted competently, we hold that Mother failed to show

she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to seek return of the children on the basis

that there was no adversary hearing within the fourteen-day window.

The evidence also indicates that at the time the adversary hearing was

extended, Mother claimed that another woman was the birth mother of the children.

During the time of Mother’s assertion, the trial court removed the attorney appointed

for Mother and appointed an attorney to represent the alleged birth mother. The trial

court then ordered genetic testing on both Mother and the alleged birth mother to

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determine the maternity of the children. The genetic testing results indicated that

Mother was the birth mother of the children. At the adversary hearing, the trial court

found that Mother and the alleged birth mother are the same person. It is therefore

reasonable to conclude that the extension and delay in conducting the adversary

hearing was to determine the maternity of the children. We overrule Mother’s fifth

issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Mother’s issues necessary to the appeal’s disposition, we

affirm the trial court’s termination order.

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice

Submitted on March 12, 2025
Opinion Delivered May 1, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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