Cameron Dontae Robinson v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-23-00059-CR
________________

CAMERON DONTAE ROBINSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 22-01-00130-CR
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Cameron Dontae Robinson (“Robinson”) of the third-degree

felony offense of money laundering in an amount between $30,000 and $150,000,

and it assessed punishment at four years of incarceration. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 34.02(e)(2). In eight issues, Robinson complains: (1) that the evidence was legally

insufficient to support the verdict; (2) about the admission of certain evidence; and

(3) that the cumulative harm resulting from the erroneously admitted evidence

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denied him a fair trial. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

BACKGROUND AND TRIAL EVIDENCE

On December 31, 2021, Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper John

Morris stopped Robinson for driving 102 miles per hour southbound on Interstate

45 in Montgomery County and for committing other traffic violations. During that

traffic stop, Trooper Morris located marijuana residue, a gun, and a stack of money

rubber banded together in a suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle. Initially, Robinson

denied the money was his and said it belonged to his girlfriend, who he had just

picked up from Dallas. The money was found in a suitcase with men’s clothing,

including a red puffer jacket, and a Gucci backpack. A narcotics K-9 alerted on the

stack of money. Evidence admitted at trial showed Robinson in possession of an

identical jacket and Gucci backpack. Additional evidence admitted at trial

established that police arrested Robinson three times within a year of this stop, in

possession of a varying combination of (1) vacuum-sealed marijuana, (2) cash

rubber banded together, (3) guns, (4) pills classified as controlled substances without

a prescription, and (5) digital scales, among other items. A Montgomery County

grand jury later indicted Robinson for money laundering and alleged that on or about

December 31, 2021, he did “knowingly possess the proceeds of criminal activity, to

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wit: possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and the value of said

proceeds was $30,000 or more but less than $150,000.”

Trooper John Morris’s Testimony

Texas DPS Trooper Morris (“Morris”) testified that on December 31, 2021,

he observed Robinson traveling south on I-45 at 102 miles per hour, changing lanes

without a blinker, and moving in and out of the HOV lane while crossing a double

white line. Morris said that Robinson was going almost forty miles per hour over the

speed limit, which was noticeable, but generally, drug traffickers do not want to be

noticed by police. During Morris’s testimony, portions of his bodycam video were

admitted into evidence. Minutes into the stop, Morris had Robinson exit the vehicle,

because he had trouble hearing Robinson due to passing traffic and wind.

Morris testified that Robinson told him that he was originally from Monroe,

Louisiana, recently graduated from college in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and then moved

to Dallas, but Robinson was traveling toward Houston. Morris explained his

experience with drug interdiction work and why he was suspicious of Robinson. He

testified that Robinson had money falling out of his pocket, he was in an out-of-state

car with an out-of-state driver’s license, Robinson stated he lived in a separate city

and was traveling to the next, which are things Morris looks for. Additional bodycam

video admitted during Morris’s testimony showed him locating cash and marijuana

in the car.
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Robinson had about $4,000 in his pocket and told Morris it was not even

$10,000. Morris explained this was significant because many individuals they

encounter in drug interdiction work believe if they have less than $9,999, the money

cannot be seized. Robinson’s knowing this was something else Morris noted. Morris

testified that someone speeding with $4,000 in his pocket was suspicious and

something he put into his “memory bank” with everything else he discovered during

the stop.

Morris observed marijuana residue on the vehicle’s floorboard, so he asked

Robinson if he smoked marijuana. Morris testified that he had probable cause to

search the vehicle based on the marijuana residue and that he handcuffed Robinson

for “officer safety[,]” given the time of night and Robinson’s behavior.

Morris believed there was contraband in the car because Robinson was driving

a car with an out-of-state plate, going from one location to the next with an out-of-

state driver’s license despite living in Texas, and driving from Dallas to Houston.

Additionally, Robinson did not want Morris talking to his girlfriend and tried to walk

up behind Morris. Morris noticed a large bundle of rubber-banded money in

Robinson’s pocket. He testified that based on his training and experience, that sum

of money along with the marijuana residue in the car suggested illegal drug activity.

Morris also testified that he located a handgun in the car, which Robinson

admitted was his. Morris’s bodycam video admitted and played for the jury showed
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him finding the handgun. Other video admitted while Morris testified showed him

searching the vehicle’s trunk and locating black luggage. Inside the luggage, Morris

found a red puffer jacket and tan Gucci backpack, in which he found a pill bottle

containing “pills imprinted with RP on one side and 10325 on the other side.” Morris

testified that the pills were found in a container without a label, “which is indicative

of being in possession of illegal narcotics.” Morris testified that the DPS lab report

later showed the pills were oxycodone, and he never found that Robinson had a

prescription.

Bodycam video showed Morris found a “large sum of U.S. currency” in the

same suitcase inside the Gucci backpack. During his testimony, photographs of the

currency he located were admitted showing the money “rubber-banded together in

the individual stacks[,] . . . then those individual stacks are rubber-banded together

to each other.” Morris said he found $93,971 in cash, including the money in

Robinson’s pocket. Morris explained that people participating in illegal narcotics

activity typically rubber band their money together like this in individual stacks to

have easy access to large sums of money without counting it. Morris said that

Robinson told him to search the entire car, and Morris did not find scales, baggies,

or secret compartments.

For safety reasons, Morris said he eventually moved the investigation from

the highway to a parking lot, and bodycam video of the interaction in the parking lot
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was admitted. In the video, Robinson denied knowing about the money and said it

was “my girl’s money.” Morris testified that Robinson ignored his question about

whether the money was legal. He also told Morris that it was his “girl’s” suitcase

and Gucci backpack. Robinson further told him he just graduated from college and

was driving “hot shot,” his parents gave him money, and he was a “signed artist”

doing rap music for Boosie BadAzz Records but never told Morris it was Little

Boosie’s money. Morris testified he never uncovered anything while he investigated

showing that Robinson was paid as a truck driver or performer but was unfamiliar if

rappers were paid in cash. Morris never found anything that showed the money came

from a legitimate source. Morris explained that when they moved the scene off the

freeway, they called a drug K-9 unit, which hit on the money, indicating the money

was involved in illegal drug activity.

Video and photographs of the suitcase that contained the Gucci backpack with

the money were admitted during Morris’s testimony. They showed contacts inside

the Gucci backpack, and Morris testified Robinson wore contacts, but his passenger

did not. The Gucci backpack was inside a black suitcase with the red puffer jacket.

A photograph of Robinson’s Instagram page was admitted that showed

Robinson wearing a red puffer jacket. Morris testified the jacket Robinson wore in

the photograph was identical to the jacket he found in the suitcase with the drugs and

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money. Morris testified that he located cell phones during his interaction with

Robinson, and he obtained a search warrant for the cell phone.

Morris testified about a YouTube music video Robinson made under his rap

artist name, “Lit Cam,” which was posted about two months before the traffic stop.

Additional still photographs from the music video were also admitted while Morris

testified. Morris testified that the same Gucci backpack from the traffic stop that

Robinson claimed was his girlfriend’s and contained over $90,000 was in

Robinson’s music video. Additional photographs from the music video showed

marijuana being placed in a cigar, Robinson holding a pill bottle without a label and

pouring the same kind of pills Morris recovered into his hand. Another photograph

from the music video shows rubber-banded money, which Morris testified meant

proceeds from illegal drug activity. Morris testified that in the video, Robinson raps

that his friends sell “gas” which is slang for marijuana, and that he turns “a quarter

pound into a quarter mill.” Morris explained that Robinson was talking about selling

a quarter pound of marijuana and making $250,000, essentially that Robinson was

saying he makes large sums of money selling drugs.

Kristen Ross’s Testimony

Kristen Ross (“Ross”) is a detective with the Frisco Police Department, but in

January 2021, she was assigned to patrol. Ross received a call to locate a black Ford

F-150 pickup truck and located it about 12:13 p.m. Ross thought the vehicle was
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parked, but it started to pull away, so she activated her emergency lights and began

a traffic stop. Ross explained that she was responding to a suspicious vehicle call,

and she took photos when she conducted the stop. The truck stopped when Ross

activated her emergency lights, Robinson was alone inside, and Ross made him exit

the vehicle. Ross said that as she approached the vehicle, she observed bullet holes

in it and smelled the strong odor of marijuana. Ross explained that the odor of

marijuana gave her probable cause, so she searched the vehicle.

The trial court admitted photographs from the Frisco traffic stop into

evidence. Ross testified that admitted photographs showed a black .22 pistol found

in the driver’s door and ammunition found in the magazine, and since she found it

while Robinson was committing an offense, it added a charge of unlawful carrying

of a weapon. Ross testified that she found a pill bottle containing amphetamine in

the driver’s door next to the gun. She said the prescription contents matched the

label, but the label appeared “to have been tampered with[.]” She also found an

empty pill bottle without a label that contained residue. Ross explained they charged

Robinson with possession of a controlled substance since that pill bottle was not

prescribed to him, and with unlawfully carrying a weapon.

Ross described finding men’s clothes, a Gucci backpack, and a red puffer

jacket in the back seat. Additional photographs admitted by the trial court during

Ross’s testimony showed these items, which Ross discussed. Ross testified they did
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not find drugs, a large amount of cash, or anything illegal in the suitcase. Nothing

inside the truck revealed it was a drug trafficking vehicle. Ross reiterated that

Robinson was driving the truck with the Gucci backpack and red puffer jacket inside

when she stopped it. Looking at a photograph, she testified the Gucci backpack from

the December 2021 stop appeared to be the same one found in her stop. She also

testified that if Robinson said the Gucci bag was not his, it would be a lie. Ross

agreed that rubber-banded money alone does not mean that it is drug money.

Adam Williams’s Testimony

Adam Williams (“Williams”) is a Hunt County Sheriff’s Deputy who patrols

and previously worked in drug interdiction. He estimated he participated in hundreds

of drug trafficking stops. Williams described the flow of drugs and money in

narcotics trafficking generally. He explained drugs arrived from the south, flowing

south to north and eastbound, whereas the proceeds would flow westbound, and

north to south. Williams testified that many drugs come from Mexico into “hub

cities” like Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and Dallas. Williams recognized I-30 as

a major trafficking corridor.

In distinguishing between personal use and trafficking, Williams looked at the

amount involved and the packaging, which is sometimes vacuum-sealed to conceal

the scent from K-9s. He has also found large amounts of cash in trafficking cases.

Williams testified the money varies in denomination and depends on the
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transaction’s size. Williams said that during these stops, they often find guns to

protect the suspects who are trafficking the narcotics.

In April 2021, about eight months before this arrest, Williams encountered

Robinson while working interdiction when he initiated a traffic stop on I-30

eastbound. Robinson was alone in the vehicle. Williams stopped Robinson for

speeding, and when he approached the vehicle, he smelled marijuana coming from

the vehicle. Williams explained that marijuana is illegal in Texas, and with that

smell, Williams suspected there may be marijuana inside the vehicle. Williams asked

Robinson whether he had smoked any marijuana, and Robinson said he smoked

inside the vehicle earlier that day. Williams testified that he searched Robinson’s

vehicle and photographed its contents.

During Williams’s testimony, the trial court admitted a photograph of the

vehicle’s contents. Williams testified the photograph showed “multiple vacuum-

sealed packages of marijuana[,]” multiple pill bottles with white pills believed to be

oxycodone, digital scales, and a stack of U.S. currency. He described the vacuum-

sealed packages as “for-sale” rather than for personal use given “[t]he large quantity

and the packages being vacuum-sealed to help conceal smell in transport.” Williams

explained that “[w]hen located with narcotics, scales are commonly used to weigh

narcotics for sale and distribution.” Williams testified the money removed from the

car was in different denominations, consistent with different sizes of marijuana
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transactions. Williams stopped Robinson traveling eastbound on I-30, and Williams

was unsurprised to find that amount of marijuana traveling that direction, since it

aligned with how drugs moved through the state.

His report did not say whether the money was found on Robinson’s person or

in the vehicle, but Williams believed he found it in the vehicle. Williams testified

the money was rubber-banded but did not recall how it was broken down. They did

not file money laundering charges for the April 2021 stop. Williams knew the

prescription pills he found were not in Robinson’s name. He did not know where the

charges from Robinson’s arrest stood.

John Pryor’s Testimony

John Pryor (“Pryor”) is an Arkansas State Trooper. He testified that since

1998, he handled about 1,000 drug cases, including some personal use amounts and

other “for-sale” type cases. Pryor explained that usually narcotics for sale are

packaged in individually usable amounts of maybe a gram or two, but when you get

over that amount, “you are getting into the sale and distribution.” He has seen drugs

vacuum-sealed, and sometimes, they are trying to hide the smell; they can be sealed

like that in pounds depending on how the sellers are distributing.

Pryor said sometimes they find people with large amounts of narcotics with

cash, depending on whether they are transporting, bringing cash back, picking up,

or delivering. The money is usually in different denominations with “a lot of
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twenties, tens.” Pryor testified they commonly found people trafficking narcotics

with firearms to “protect their product and protect themselves[]” if they are carrying

large amounts of narcotics and cash.

In mid-January 2022, while working, Pryor briefly came across Robinson. A

local police officer called and wanted his help on a traffic stop searching a vehicle

with a strong odor of marijuana. When Pryor arrived, he saw Robinson was in a

Dodge Challenger stopped by the officer, so Pryor “initiated” his lights. Robinson

was still in his car, and the other officer was in his unit waiting for Pryor. As Pryor

activated his lights and approached the other officer, the other officer began

explaining why he stopped the vehicle and wanted to search it. As he did, Robinson

fled in the vehicle, so they ended up in a “small pursuit” before Robinson wrecked.

Robinson then fled on foot, and the other officer chased him but could not locate

Robinson that day.

They secured the vehicle, and Pryor searched it on-site. The trial court

admitted a photograph of the vehicle’s contents. Pryor described the photograph as

showing a pound of sealed marijuana, about $6,000 in cash, a thirty-round empty

magazine, and another magazine containing unspent rounds. Pryor believed that

amount of marijuana was for delivery rather than personal use. Pryor found the

$6,000 in the center console in different denominations and testified the money plus

marijuana provided possession “with intent[.]”
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Pryor described Arkansas as having a “hybrid” model for marijuana’s legality

but explained that the marijuana Robinson possessed was not legal since there was

no label, and it was too much to come from a dispensary. He opined that it was illegal

and marijuana rather than hemp. Pryor did not believe Robinson would flee if it was

legal.

Pryor did not remember whether the money they found was banded, and he

was unaware of money laundering charges being filed, but explained it was not his

case. Pryor did not know the Arkansas case’s status but noted the money was seized

and forfeited.

Jeff Chappell’s Testimony

Jeff Chappell (“Chappell”) testified that he works as an investigator for the

Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office. He has worked there for a year, but

he previously worked for eighteen years as a special agent in the Department of

Homeland Security assigned to the cyber investigative unit and computer forensics.

In the DA’s office, Chappell is assigned to the digital forensic unit and performs

digital forensics, among other things. Based on his experience as a border patrol

agent, Chappell testified that drugs typically flow from Mexico into the U.S. and

other countries, and money flows back from the U.S. toward Mexico.

He described his specialized training in cyber investigations, computer

forensics, and cell phones. Chappell has taught others how to analyze cell phones
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and estimated that he has examined “well over 1,000” cell phones. Chappell

explained how he performed extractions. He testified, “An extraction is all readable

data off of a device. We can’t just pick and choose what we want[,]” and that they

“will process that copy or that extraction to search for any evidence or anything else

involved in the case.” Once the search and seizure of the phone is complete, in most

cases, they work with the data extracted from the phone.

Chappell explained that one of his colleagues performed the phone extraction

in this case, but she was out with health issues. Since his colleague was unavailable,

Chappell reviewed her extraction and formed an independent opinion about its

contents. Chappell testified that his colleague has been trained to perform cell phone

extractions and estimated she had performed hundreds.

Chappell identified the cell phone in this case and explained how he verified

it was the correct extraction for that phone. Chappell identified the Cellebrite

Physical Analyzer report regarding image or graphic files and testified how he

verified the information. Specifically, he reviewed the reports provided and “then

went back and processed the actual extraction and matched that up to the reports to

verify that it was good and then did as much of a search that [he] could in the time

frame that was allotted[.]”

Defense counsel took Chappell on voir dire, and he testified that his

colleague’s report was valid, and his conclusions were “the exact same.” Chappell
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testified that State’s Exhibits 27 through 57 are images described in State’s Exhibit

26 (the Extraction Report) and that he verified were on Robinson’s cell phone

device, and the trial court admitted the exhibits. Chappell testified the images were

from Robinson’s phone and showed marijuana under various brand names with

prices for different quantities. Chappell said that two photographs admitted showed

Robinson holding a large quantity of what appears to be cash bundled with rubber

bands. He described another photograph showing a “medium” quantity of blue pills

and another photograph that appeared to be a discussion of a drug transaction.

Chappell explained Robinson’s phone had more data related to drug transactions,

and within the SnapChat messages, he “read several things related to someone

requesting to purchase marijuana.” Even so, Chappell testified they could not

download certain parts of the phone, like Apple iMessages, since they were

“encrypted,” and they did not have a passcode.

Despite searching for location data in the phone, some of that information was

encrypted, and he did not see any “longitude or latitude” data, including GPS

coordinates showing travel between Houston and Dallas. Chappell testified it was

possible that some information about Robinson on this phone downloaded from prior

phones in the cloud, which could have existed before this phone was invented, and

some data had a created date of at least 2014. Chappell did not find any messages

about marijuana on December 30 or 31, 2021. He explained that he “recovered
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nothing from the iMessaging, Facebook Messenger or any other messaging app,

except for SnapChat, because all of that resides on the encrypted portion of the

phone.” Chappell did not find drug ledgers on the phone but did not specifically look

for them. Even so, he said he found images showing large amounts of cash,

marijuana, and pills. During cross-examination, Robinson’s attorney asked Chappell

if he had seen the money, where it was, if anyone ran the serial numbers, and if the

money was real, which Chappell did not know.

Louis Givens’s Testimony

Louis Givens (“Givens”) testified that he is a “music manager executive” with

“Badazz Music Syndicate.” He explained that is a record label based in Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, and started by a rap artist named “Boosie,” who is his relative. Givens

explained that they sometimes give advances to new artists who have a fan base.

Givens said payment in the music business comes in different forms including cash,

royalties, and wire transfers. Givens said the cash comes from show promoters and

from the box offices. Givens testified that they pay artists in cash after shows.

Givens testified that he had known Robinson since 2018 when he became

involved with their record label. Givens testified their label signed Robinson to a

record contract and distribution contract. Givens testified that he entered into an

agreement with Robinson, whose artist name is “Lit Cam,” but the contracts the

defense offered into evidence were unexecuted, so the trial court excluded them.
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Givens said they entered into an agreement “on the record side and something on the

distribution side.” Givens explained that he manages money by ensuring that the

artists deliver their required projects and receive the resources they need. They

started working with Robinson in 2018, and their agreement with him will continue

“until he delivers all his projects.”

Givens did not know how much money they gave Robinson in the first

agreement, but they usually offer at least $50,000, which would be memorialized in

the contract “for the most part.” Since then, they entered into three agreements with

Robinson, and they make money on the “performance-side” or shows. In 2021, they

contracted with Robinson to do three shows. Givens testified that according to the

unsigned contract, Robinson was supposed to be paid $25,000 for a show in May

2021, $20,000 for a June 2021 show, and $30,000 for an October 2021 show. He

explained that some photographs pulled from Robinson’s video showing drug use

were used by rappers to depict “the culture.” Givens noted that since the 1980s, rap

culture pushed “a flashy lifestyle, drugs, you know, things of that nature for the rap

business.” Givens testified that sometimes, they use prop money in music videos,

and other times it was real money; he did not know whether the drugs or money in

Robinson’s videos were real.

Givens had “no idea” about the source of the money seized from Robinson in

December 2021 or if whether it came from criminal activity. He said the contracts
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were not signed in his presence, but they were signed, and Robinson had done

“plenty of shows[]” for them. Givens knew nothing about whether they ever paid

Robinson money under those contracts or whether Robinson received money from

the shows. Despite being the company’s CFO, Givens did not know the “exact”

amount they paid Robinson. He also testified they did not have a 1099 for Robinson.

Givens did not know where the $94,000 Robinson had in December 2021 came

from.

Givens testified that their company CEO is Torrance Hatch a/k/a “Boosie

Badazz” but denied Hatch was a drug dealer. In response to this testimony, the State

sought to introduce a video of Hatch admitting he was a drug dealer over the

defense’s objection, which the trial court allowed.

Additional Evidence

Along with the above-described testimony and evidence, other evidence

admitted at trial included: (1) certified court records for an uncontested civil court

judgment forfeiting the funds; (2) photographs obtained from Robinson’s cell phone

showing marijuana, some with brand names and prices; (3) photographs from his

cell phone holding stacks of rubber-banded money; and (4) a music video of

Robinson wearing a red puffer jacket like the one found in the car where he raps

about turning a “quarter pound” into a “quarter mill” and holding stacks of rubber-

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banded cash. We discuss this evidence and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings in

greater detail below, since Robinson challenges its admissibility.

Motion to Suppress

Robinson filed a generic pretrial Motion to Suppress, which did not mention

the cell phone, and later filed written objections to the warrant authorizing the cell

phone search arguing, among other things, that the affidavit was invalid under

United States v. Oglesby, No. 4:18-CR-0626, 2019 WL 1877228, at *1 (S.D. Tex.

Apr. 26, 2019), and State of Texas v. Baldwin, 614 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020). Specifically, Robinson argued that “the warrant was overbroad in its

description of which categories of data on the cell phone could be searched, as it

allowed the police to search the entire contents of the phone, without limitations.”

In a hearing before voir dire, the trial court addressed Robinson’s objections

to the warrant. Robinson stated that “the cell phone warrant was bad.” The State

responded that although Robinson cited Baldwin, which addressed boilerplate

language, that case was distinguishable because the cell phone was found four days

later, but this one was found in Robinson’s possession at the time of the offense

when he was in possession of $94,000. Robinson then countered that the warrant

was not limited to specific types of cell phone information, thus it was overbroad

and constituted a general warrant under United States v. Oglesby. Robinson noted

that “they applied to search for everything in the phone[,]” and “couldn’t point to a
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specific or a particular item or why they wanted it[.]” The trial court did not rule but

told the parties it would have a hearing on the Motion to Suppress after they picked

the jury.

The next day, at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the defense argued:

(1) the affidavit that the search warrant was based on did “not create the sufficient

nexus between the cell phone . . . and meeting a probable cause that it would contain

evidence of a crime[;]” and (2) the warrant did “not comply with U.S. v. Oglesby in

that . . . this warrant authorizes a general search and that it does not limit the search

to a particular day. . . [i]nstead it allows access through GPS, social media,

messaging, photos, videos, and complete phone contents, thus it is a general search

and violates the Fourth Amendment.” During the suppression hearing, Trooper

Morris testified about the traffic stop and search. He testified that he stopped

Robinson for going 102 miles per hour on I-45, and during that stop, he observed

marijuana residue. Based on the marijuana residue, Morris said he conducted a

probable cause search of the vehicle. Morris testified that during the search, he found

a large sum of money and multiple cell phones.

Morris testified that he seized the cell phones and sought a warrant, so they

could search the cell phones. Morris testified that a judge signed the warrant in his

presence, and an affidavit supported the warrant. The search warrant and affidavit

were admitted into evidence for purposes of the suppression hearing.
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Seemingly relying on Robinson’s written objections, the State argued at the

suppression hearing that the affidavit demonstrated probable cause to search the cell

phones, and this case is distinguishable from Baldwin. The State noted this phone

was found in Robinson’s possession at the crime scene when the crime was

committed, and the information to be searched for is set out through his GPS

information, where he claimed to be traveling from place to place. The State added

that messages, communication, and other data from the phone would help explain

whether Robinson was involved in money laundering.

During the suppression hearing, rather than respond to what the State said

distinguishing Baldwin or point out that Morris failed to provide specific facts

supporting probable cause, Robinson answered, that his “biggest contention is

related to paragraph No. 4” of the affidavit, which states,

THERE IS CONTAINED WITHIN SAID ITEM EVIDENCE OF
SAID OFFENSE AND CONSTITUTING EVIDENCE THAT A
PARTICULAR PERSON COMMITTED SAID OFFENSE,
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: Data, texts, digital information,
photos, images, videos, digital storage devices, records/logs of
incoming and outgoing calls and any GPS/location data available, any
and all internet searches and other electronically stored data, messages,
or images which provide relevant and pertinent information regarding
the offense of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
deliver, any evidence that may identify Cameron Dontae Robinson,
[Co-defendant], or other potential parties involved in narcotics
transactions and money laundering transactions.

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In the suppression hearing, Robinson argued the affidavit authorized a “general

search of the entire phone.” He complained that it allowed the government to search

and find any available GPS and location data unlimited to any one day. He argued

that since it authorized a general search, it failed to meet the Oglesby standard.

The State responded that it was impossible to parse data with the available

technology, and technology did not exist that allowed the search of a cell phone for

partial data. The software program used to extract data downloads everything, then

the investigator must review the data to determine what is relevant. Finally, there

was no way not to download everything off the phone by a specific day.

Before ruling, the trial court asked Robinson’s attorney, “You are just saying

this warrant was too broad?” Counsel responded, “Correct.” The trial court denied

the Motion to Suppress.

ISSUE ONE: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In issue one, Robinson argues the evidence was legally insufficient to

establish that he possessed over $30,000 of proceeds from felony marijuana

transactions. The State responds that the evidence is legally sufficient if “the

cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances supports a defendant’s guilt.”

Standard of Review

In evaluating legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove the charged offense,

we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
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whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 318–19

(1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Metcalf

v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). “Our review of ‘all of the

evidence’ includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted.” Clayton v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citation omitted). We measure

the sufficiency of the evidence by the offense’s elements as defined by a

hypothetically correct charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge “sets out the law, is authorized

by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or

unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.

Under the Jackson standard, we defer to the jury’s responsibility to fairly

resolve conflicting testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. The jury as

factfinder is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and witnesses’ credibility,

and it may believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the

parties. Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855 (citations omitted). We do not reweigh the

evidence or determine the credibility of the evidence, nor do we substitute our

judgment for the factfinder’s. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.
23
Crim. App. 2007). “Each fact need not point directly and independently to a

defendant’s guilt, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d

756, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Garcia v. State, 667

S.W.3d 756, 761–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citation omitted) (“A proper review

of evidentiary sufficiency considers the cumulative force of the evidence.”).

Applicable Law

As applicable here, a person commits money laundering if he “knowingly . . .

possesses . . . the proceeds of criminal activity[.]” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02

(a)(1). Texas Penal Code section 34.01 defines “criminal activity” as “any offense

. . . classified as a felony[.]” Id. § 34.01(1)(A). Further, “proceeds” are defined as

“funds acquired or derived directly or indirectly from, produced through, realized

through, or used in the commission of an act[.]” Id. § 34.01(4)(A). The State alleged

in the indictment that the criminal activity was possession of a controlled substance

with intent to deliver, and the proceeds were $30,000 or more but less than $150,000.

See id. § 34.02(e)(2).

“Frequently, there is no direct evidence that the cash seized constitutes such

proceeds, but a criminal conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence.”

Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citation omitted).

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence to establish an actor’s
24
guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to prove guilt. Id. (quoting

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). Every fact and circumstance need not “‘point directly

and independently to the defendant’s guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted

by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.’” Id.

(quoting Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). The trier

of fact can use common sense and apply common knowledge when drawing

inferences from evidence. See id.; Booker v. State, 929 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 1996, pet. ref’d).

Relevant evidence to show a nexus between money and drug dealing includes:

(1) denying knowledge of the money; (2) a narcotics-dog alert on the money; (3) the

money’s packaging; (4) the amount of money; (5) secret storage of the money; (6)

the presence of illegal drugs; (7) presence of records of drug transactions; (8) travel

on a known drug route; and (9) courier profile evidence. See Acosta, 429 S.W.3d

at 625–26. “Sufficient evidence of a nexus may not be found unless the sum total of

incriminating facts would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the property (cash) was exchanged for drugs.” Id. at 626.

In Acosta v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained,

“A common sense reality of everyday life is that legitimate businesses
do not transport large quantities of cash rubber-banded into bundles and
stuffed into packages in a backpack. They don’t, because there are
better, safer means of transporting cash if one is not trying to hide it
from the authorities. . . . Legitimate businesses wire cash between bank

25
accounts or they convert large sums of cash into cashier’s checks. . . .
Although the quantity of the cash alone is not enough to connect it to
illegal drug transactions, it is a significant fact and weighs heavily into
the. . . calculus.”

Id. at 629 (quoting United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1160–61 (11th Cir.

2004) (en banc)).

Application

The evidence admitted at trial established the following: (1) Robinson had

over $93,000 in his possession; (2) the money was rubber-banded, and witnesses

testified this is common with drug trafficking; (3) he had an out-of-state driver’s

license and traveled on known drug corridors between Arkansas, Dallas, and

Houston; (4) a gun was found in his vehicle; (5) he denied knowledge of the money,

which was found in a suitcase containing a Gucci bag and puffer jacket identified as

his; (6) a K-9 alerted on the money; (7) there was no legitimate source of the

proceeds; (8) he was in possession of oxycodone in an unlabeled pill bottle without

a prescription; (9) Robinson had been arrested three times within a year of this arrest

while in possession of pills, digital scales, and vacuum-sealed marijuana; and (10)

his most recent arrest was less than a month after this one, and he had $6,000 in cash

plus a pound of sealed marijuana.

On appeal, Robinson asserts that the money could have come from multiple

smaller transactions rather than one large one. “Beyond a reasonable doubt,

26
however, does not require the State to disprove every conceivable alternative to a

defendant’s guilt.” Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)

(explaining that reasonable hypothesis construct was rejected in 1992). The State

was not required to disprove the alternative possibility that the money could have

come from many smaller transactions. See id.

The “‘combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances’”

point to Robinson’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to

uphold a conviction. See Acosta, 429 S.W.3d at 625 (quoting Johnson v. State, 871

S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); see also Ramsey, 473 S.W.3d at 808–09.

From the evidence admitted and rational inferences made from that evidence, a jury

could reasonably conclude that Robinson possessed proceeds in an amount between

$30,000 and $150,000 derived from criminal activity, distributing narcotics.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 34.01(1)(A), (4)(A), 34.02(a)(1), (e)(2). Here, there

was “[s]ufficient evidence of a nexus” since the “sum total of incriminating facts”

allowed the jury “to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the property (cash) was

exchanged for drugs.” Acosta, 429 S.W.3d at 626. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational factfinder could find the

essential elements of money laundering beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 318–19; Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see

also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02(a)(1). Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient.
27
See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d

at 13; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 34.02(a)(1), (e)(2). We overrule Robinson’s

first issue.

ISSUE TWO: CELL PHONE SEARCH AND WARRANT

In his second issue, Robinson asserts the trial court erred in admitting his cell

phone’s contents because the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable

cause. In support of this issue, he argues that Morris failed to provide “any factual

basis to support his belief that appellant’s cell phone would contain [ ] evidence.”

The State responds that Robinson failed to preserve this complaint for our review

since his complaint on appeal fails to comport with his complaint in the trial court.

We agree with the State.

To preserve error for appellate review, the record must establish the party

made the complaint to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that

stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial

court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless

the specific grounds were apparent from the context. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);

Vasquez v. State, 483 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Clark v. State, 365

S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). No hyper-technical or specific words are

required for an objection to preserve an error. See Vasquez, 483 S.W.3d at 554;

Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339. Rather, the objecting party must let the trial judge know
28
what he wants, why he believes he is entitled to it, and do so clearly enough that the

judge understands him at a time when the judge is in a position to do something

about it. See Vasquez, 483 S.W.3d at 554; Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339. “Whether a

party’s particular complaint is preserved depends on whether the complaint on

appeal comports with the complaint made at trial.” Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459,

464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In analyzing this, we consider “the context in which

the complaint was made and the parties’ shared understanding at that time.” Id.

Although Robinson mentioned Baldwin in his pretrial filings and the State

factually distinguished Baldwin during the hearing, Robinson only briefly addressed

it during the suppression hearing. He initially complained the affidavit did not create

a sufficient nexus creating probable cause that it would contain evidence of a crime.

Later during the hearing, he limited his argument saying only that the affidavit was

too broad and constituted a general search. When the trial court specifically asked if

he was “just saying this warrant is too broad,” he responded affirmatively, thus

limiting his argument. He did not argue that Morris failed to provide a sufficient

factual basis in the affidavit to support his belief that Robinson’s phone would

contain evidence, the argument he makes on appeal.

In examining the record and considering the context in which the complaint

was made and the parties’ understanding at the suppression hearing, we conclude

that Robinson’s complaint in the trial court that the warrant was too broad or
29
“general” does not comport with his complaint on appeal. See id. The record of the

suppression hearing shows the trial court understood Robinson’s complaint to be

that the warrant was “too broad” rather than Morris failed to set out sufficient facts

in the affidavit, when the trial court was “in the position to do something about it.”

See Vasquez, 483 S.W.3d at 554; Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; see also Tex. R. App.

P. 33.1(a). We conclude that by later limiting his argument during the suppression

hearing to the warrant being “too broad” Robinson has failed to preserve his specific

complaint that the affidavit did not establish a nexus between his cell phone and

criminal activity for our review. We overrule issue two.

ISSUES THREE THROUGH SEVEN: EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

In issues three through seven, Robinson complains that the trial court abused

its discretion in admitting certain evidence.

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse

of discretion and must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was “within the zone of

reasonable disagreement.” Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). This

includes our review of a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b)

for an abuse of discretion. See Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016); De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);

Guevara v. State, 667 S.W.3d 422, 439 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, pet. ref’d)
30
(explaining that we review the admission of “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts under an abuse of discretion standard.”). A trial court abuses its discretion if it

acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily or

unreasonably. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We

uphold the trial court’s decision if correct on any theory of law applicable to the case

even if the trial court states the wrong reason for the correct ruling. De La Paz, 279

S.W.3d at 344; Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

If the trial court erred in admitting or excluding evidence, then we generally

apply the harm standard in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), which

requires us to disregard any errors that do not affect substantial rights. See Tex. R.

App. P. 44.2(b); see also Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 218–19 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007). This is construed “to mean that an error is reversible only when it has a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”

Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citation omitted). We

will not reverse if we have fair assurance from examining the whole record “that the

error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect.” Id. (citation omitted).

Evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence is relevant. See Tex. R. Evid. 401. Rule 403 permits

a trial court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially
31
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing

the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence.” Id. 403. When conducting a Rule 403 analysis, a trial court must balance:

(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along
with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency
of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any
tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main
issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a
jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the
evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence
already admitted.

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also

Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Rule 403 favors admitting

relevant evidence and “carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more

probative than prejudicial.” Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010) (citation omitted).

Generally, evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is inadmissible to show

bad character and that a defendant acted in conformity with that bad

character. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2022). Still, extraneous-offense evidence may be admissible for other

purposes, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. See id. at 404(b)(2); Moses v. State,

105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Extraneous-offense evidence is also
32
admissible to rebut a defensive theory. See Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626 n.4 (noting

such evidence is often admitted to rebut a defensive theory). “A defensive theory

may be raised through voir dire, opening statements, or cross-examination.” Donald

v. State, 543 S.W.3d 466, 482 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see

also Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 318 (opening statements and voir dire); Bass v. State,

270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (opening statement); Ransom v. State,

920 S.W.2d 288, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on reh’g) (cross-examination).

“The trial court’s ruling on whether extraneous-offense evidence was admissible to

rebut a defensive theory should be upheld if it is within the zone of reasonable

disagreement.” Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 318. A trial court’s ruling is generally

considered to fall within this zone if the evidence establishes “1) an extraneous

transaction is relevant to a material, non-propensity issue, and 2) the probative value

of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344;

Guevara, 667 S.W.3d at 439. Even if extraneous-offense evidence is admissible for

a purpose apart from showing character conformity, the trial court may still exclude

it under Rule 403 if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of

unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403; see also Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626.

33
Forfeiture Documents

In issue three, Robinson complains the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting evidence of a civil court’s default judgment forfeiting the money found in

his vehicle with a finding that it was “contraband.” In support of this issue, Robinson

argues that the documents were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. See Tex. R. Evid.

403. Robinson also contends the documents were inadmissible under Texas Rule of

Evidence 408(a)(1). See id. at 408(a)(1).

During the defense’s cross-examination of Chappell, the following exchange

occurred:

Q. Have you seen the money in this case?
A. The physical money?
Q. Yes.
A. No, sir.
Q. Where is it?
A. I don’t know, sir.
Q. Has anyone actually gone through and photographed each of the bills
and run the serial numbers through it?
A. I wouldn’t know, sir.
Q. So we don’t even know if the money we are talking about today is
real money or fake money?
A. I don’t know, sir.

After these questions, the State asked to approach the bench and sought to introduce

certified copies of the forfeiture case petition and judgment, arguing that the

defense’s questions about whether the money was real made the documents relevant

as rebuttal evidence. The State asserted that the exhibits document that the money

34
was forfeited and deposited. Robinson objected based on relevance, 403, and 404,

among others, and contended that the documents did not prove the money was real,

only that it was forfeited. 1 The trial court noted that “it becomes relevant as

rebuttal[,]”and “the issue is whether it is currency and it says ‘currency’ there.”

When the defense again questioned the probative nature of the documents, the

State responded that it had asked Morris during cross-examination what happens to

the seized money, how it was turned over to asset forfeiture, and if the State benefits

and gets cars from the money. The State then argued the defense made it relevant by

asking Chappell what happens to the forfeited money, and that “counsel by his own

questions has made this highly probative.” Defense counsel responded that it gives

the impression there is a finding against Robinson, which “runs a major risk of

confusing and misleading the jury.” The State countered that the defense opened the

door with its questions.

Rule of Evidence 408(a)(1) governs compromise offers and negotiations. See

id. 408(a)(1). Rule 408(a)(1) specifies that evidence of “furnishing, promising, or

offering – or accepting, promising to accept, or offering to accept – a valuable

consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim[]” is

inadmissible to prove the validity or amount of a disputed claim. Id. Even so, we

1Robinson’s other objections to the forfeiture exhibit included confrontation

and hearsay, but he does not raise these on appeal, so we do not address them.
35
need not address this argument or its applicability to these circumstances, because

Robinson failed to raise this objection in the trial court. Accordingly, he has failed

to preserve this complaint for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Vasquez,

483 S.W.3d at 554; Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339.

We now turn to Robinson’s arguments that the evidence was irrelevant and

unduly prejudicial. By questioning whether the money was fake, the defense put at

issue the amount seized and whether it was proceeds of criminal activity. The seizure

notice and default judgment rebutted a defensive theory that the money was fake.

The forfeiture documents established that “$93,971.00” in “U.S. currency” was

seized. The evidence was relevant to rebut a defensive theory. See Tex. R. Evid. 401,

403.

We now consider whether its probative value was substantially outweighed

by the risk of unfair prejudice. See id. 403. The probative force of the forfeiture

documents was strong and related to the funds seized in this case, as was the State’s

need for the State to counter Robinson’s argument that the money may have been

counterfeit. See Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 32 (balancing factors); Gigliobianco, 210

S.W.3d at 641–42 (same). Any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an

improper basis or to confuse or distract from the main issues was low, as this went

to the amount of proceeds seized and rebutted any suggestion the money was fake.

See Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 32; Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. The jury may
36
have given weight to the forfeiture proceeding finding that the money was

“contraband,” which goes against its admission. See Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 32;

Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. Finally, the evidence took little time to

present, since the State submitted it, showed it to the jury in rebuttal, and the

presentation of evidence concluded immediately. See Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 32;

Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. On balance, the trial court could have

reasonably concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially

outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403; Gigliobianco, 210

S.W.3d at 641–42; see also Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 32.

Since the trial court’s ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement,

it did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of forfeiture documents.

See Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 427; Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 318; Montgomery, 810

S.W.2d at 391. We overrule issue three.

Evidence of Extraneous Traffic Stops

In issues four through six, Robinson complains that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting extraneous offense evidence from three separate traffic stops

and what law enforcement found in Robinson’s sole possession during those stops.

Two of these stops occurred before Robinson’s December 2021 arrest in this case,

one in January 2021 and another in April 2021. The third stop occurred in January

2022, several weeks after this arrest. Robinson specifically complains of the
37
following evidence the trial court admitted about items found during these

extraneous stops: (1) from the January 2021 stop, a pistol and pill bottle containing

amphetamine; (2) from the April 2021 stop, marijuana, pills, digital scales, and

money; and (3) from the January 2022 stop, marijuana, money, and gun parts. We

have outlined the circumstances of these stops in our prior discussion of the trial

evidence.

A defensive theory Robinson put forth in his opening statement was that the

money seized constituted legitimate proceeds from his career as a “successful

rapper[]” and not from “any sort of drug trade.” Further, evidence showed that when

Morris stopped Robinson in this case, he denied the money was his. Even so, the

money was found in a suitcase among items linked to Robinson in other traffic stops

and in a music video.

During a pretrial hearing, the trial court first addressed the admissibility of

these extraneous traffic stops. The State initially sought to mention the January 2021

Frisco traffic stop in opening statements to show that Robinson was in possession of

the same Gucci backpack and red puffer jacket the money was found with in this

case to establish ownership and identity. Robinson argued it was more prejudicial

than probative under Rule 403. The State responded it was highly probative and

substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect since it proved ownership. The trial

38
court initially allowed the State to mention the Frisco stop in opening but limited it

to items linking Robinson to this case.

The trial court next addressed the other two stops. In April 2021, police

stopped Robinson in Hunt County, Texas, and the State noted a deputy found about

forty pounds of marijuana and cash bundled like in this case. In January 2022, about

three weeks after his arrest in this case, Arkansas state police stopped Robinson.

They searched the vehicle and found a vacuum-sealed bag of marijuana like the

vacuum-sealed bag of marijuana found in the Hunt County stop. The State argued

that the stops in Hunt County and in Arkansas, although extraneous, were relevant

to the elements of money laundering alleged here: possessing a controlled substance

with intent to deliver. The State also asserted that the evidence of these stops related

to Robinson’s course of conduct between April 2021 and January 2022 to establish

that not only did he engage in trafficking narcotics but also profited by laundering

the money from the sales. Robinson objected based on Rules 403 and 404 and

Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), arguing that the State

must prove the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things. For opening

statements, the trial court ultimately decided that the State could mention only the

January 2021 Frisco stop to establish identity, but the court would wait to address

the other two offenses during trial.

39
Later, Ross testified about the January 2021 traffic stop in Frisco, Texas, in

which Robinson was the vehicle’s sole occupant. During Ross’s testimony, the State

offered Exhibits 59 through 90, which were photographs identified as items seized

during the Frisco traffic stop. Robinson objected to Exhibits 59–62, 65–69, 72, 74,

76–78, and 80–81, arguing that they were more prejudicial than probative and

cumulative. He also argued with respect to the photographs of the firearm and pill

bottles that in addition to being more prejudicial than probative, they constituted

Rule 404 evidence that the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State argued that the trial court must perform a balancing test to determine

whether the evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect. The State noted that in this money laundering case, it alleged the

criminal activity was possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and

particularly, the photos of the pill bottles with labels removed plus a firearm with

live rounds, go “directly to the criminal activity that the State has to prove” and its

“probative value here is substantial[.]”Additionally, the red puffer jacket and Gucci

backpack were found in Robinson’s possession during this stop. The trial court

excluded State’s Exhibits 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 77, and 80 but admitted the others.

The next day, when the trial resumed, Robinson re-urged his objections to all

the pictures and claimed they could mislead or confuse the jury. The trial court noted

that the defense claimed the money had nothing to do with criminal activity, he is a
40
successful rapper, and the money comes from legal proceeds, plus the defense

claimed he was in college. Additionally, the trial court noted that the State must

prove the money is from criminal activity, here, a controlled substance with intent

to deliver. The State continued to argue that the probative value must be substantially

outweighed by the prejudicial effect. The trial court overruled the defense’s

objection and admitted the pictures she delineated the previous day. The trial court

explained the nature of the charge “lends itself to other things coming in . . . to show

intent. . . . what makes it illegal is the scheme.”

Witnesses testified that individuals trafficking narcotics for distribution often

carry weapons to protect their product, their money, and themselves. Williams

explained that digital scales were commonly used to weigh narcotics for sale and

distribution. Morris testified that dealers often band their money together. Despite

Robinson’s contention on appeal that the pills were “not street drugs,” amphetamine

is a controlled substance, and he did not have a prescription for the substances or

labeled bottles that showed they belonged to him. Finally, witnesses testified that

drug traffickers often vacuum-seal marijuana to conceal the scent from K-9

detection. The State had to prove the proceeds in this case came from possession of

a controlled substance with intent to deliver. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 34.02(a)(1).

41
The trial court correctly determined that the complained-of evidence from the

three extraneous traffic stops had relevance apart from character conformity, which

was to show intent and to rebut defensive theories that the money was obtained

legitimately from Robinson’s work as a rapper. See Tex. R. Evid. 401, 403, 404(b).

We turn to the balancing of factors. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. The

State’s need for the evidence from the three extraneous traffic stops was strong, as

collectively, those stops showed possession of narcotics and were relevant to

Robinson’s intent. See id. Particularly, the evidence showed that law enforcement

stopped Robinson with quantities of vacuum-sealed marijuana that appeared to

exceed personal-use quantities and was packaged in a manner to avoid K-9

detection. The complained-of evidence also included cash, rubber-banded just like

it was in this case, found with the narcotics. This weighs in favor of admission. As

to the next factor, the evidence of these other stops might tend to suggest a jury to

decide the case on an improper basis, yet the trial court instructed the jury in the

charge as to what these extraneous offenses could be used for, which included intent,

identity, and plan, among other things. See id. Since the evidence substantiated the

predicate offense, particularly showing intent to deliver, a central issue in the case,

the potential for distracting the jury was low, favoring its admission. See id. While

the evidence may have tended to be given undue weight by the jury, the trial court’s

instruction in the charge would have mitigated this factor as it told the jury the
42
limited purposes for which they could use the evidence. See id. Finally, the last factor

weighs against the evidence’s admission, as it took time to develop the evidence of

these extraneous traffic stops, although the evidence was not cumulative of other

evidence. See id.

Balancing the probative force of the evidence with using the applicable

factors, we also conclude the trial court could have reasonably determined the

probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403; see also Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–

42; see also Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 32. The evidence from these three extraneous traffic

stops over the course of a year was highly probative to establish the requisite intent

to deliver a controlled substance and rebutted the defensive theory that Robinson

obtained the funds through legitimate means as a “successful rapper.” See Tex. R.

Evid. 404(b)(1).

The combined force of the evidence from a series of multiple traffic stops

within a year was highly probative of the State’s case as it related to intent and

rebutted defensive theories. See id. 403, 404(b)(1). Although prejudicial to the

defendant, we cannot say that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its

probative value. See id. at 403. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

acknowledged the frequent absence of direct evidence in money laundering cases

and observed that circumstantial evidence often is critical to proving the offense. See
43
Acosta, 429 S.W.3d at 625. This case is no exception. Admission of the complained-

of evidence fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement, thus the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of evidence. See Hall, 663

S.W.3d at 32; Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. We overrule issues four through

six.

Video of Robinson’s Associate Admitting to Prior Drug Dealing

In issue seven, Robinson complains that the trial court abused its discretion

when it admitted a video of Givens, one of his record label business associates,

admitting that he had dealt drugs. Robinson complains in his brief that the State

improperly tried to impeach Givens on an improper collateral matter when he asked

whether the label’s founder, also Givens’s cousin, dealt drugs. Givens, a BadAzz

Music Syndicate executive, testified that the CEO and founder of the record label

was Torrance Hatch (aka “Boosie”). As discussed above, the defense’s main theory

was that Robinson’s money came from his rap performances as “Lit Cam,” although

as the CFO, Givens provided no tax documentation showing how much the record

label paid Robinson nor could he say definitively how much they paid him.

During Givens’s testimony, the following exchange occurred:

[STATE:] Now, the CEO of your company is Boosie Badazz, right?
[GIVENS:] Correct.
[STATE:] And his birth name was Torrance Hatch?
[GIVENS:] Correct.

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[STATE:] So, and Mr. Badazz – in the past he has been a drug dealer,
right?
[GIVENS:] No.

Robinson did not object to the State’s question or Givens’s testimony. Just after this,

the State attempted to show Givens a video where Hatch admitted during an

interview to being a “drug dealer” previously while in prison, and the trial court sent

the jury out of the courtroom.

Outside the jury’s presence, the State played a portion of a video marked as

State’s Exhibit 106 for Givens. Givens identified the individual in the video as

Hatch, and in the video, Hatch admitted that while in prison, he “was a drug dealer.”

The video lasted about a minute. Givens responded that he only began working with

Boosie in 2014 and anything before then, he had “no prior knowledge of that.” Still

outside the jury’s presence, the State offered Exhibit 106, and Robinson objected

based on confrontation, hearsay, lack of predicate, and lack of authentication. The

trial court admitted the video for the limited purpose of Hatch’s statement that he

was a drug dealer. When the trial court admitted it for that limited purpose, Robinson

objected under Rule 403.

When the State played the video for the jury, Robinson objected based on

“optional completeness,” but the trial court responded it was not admitting the entire

video as evidence. The trial court then instructed the jury that “the trial is about

whether or not the crime was committed in this case as indicted in Montgomery
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County . . . not about Mr. Hatch or Boosie . . . .” Later, in closing, the State alluded

to the statement when discounting Robinson’s defensive theories, noting, “He has

got no legitimate means of income. He says variously that he is a hotshot truck

driver, that he is a signed artist by a self-described drug dealer, supported by his

parents, he is an engineer. He is all over the place.”

We will assume without deciding the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the video where Hatch admitted he dealt drugs. Still, we disregard any

errors that do not affect a defendant’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P.

44.2(b); see also Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218–19. We cannot say that Robinson’s

substantial rights were affected since we are confident after examining the whole

record that the error, if any, “did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect.” See

Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 592 (citation omitted). The evidence

of Robinson’s guilt in this case was substantial, including: being stopped with more

than $94,000 in banded cash that testimony showed was “typical” of drug dealers; a

K-9’s alert on the money; no legitimate explanation for the money; and his denials

the money was his despite being found with his possessions. Additional evidence

included two other traffic stops before this and one after, where Robinson was found

with varying combinations of pounds of vacuum-sealed marijuana, scales, guns, and

pills which are also controlled substances, not prescribed to him. Photographs from

Robinson’s phone showed multiple types of marijuana with brand names and prices.
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This complained-of video clip was about one-minute-long depicting

Robinson’s record label CEO making one statement that he dealt drugs in prison.

Considering multiple days of testimony from various witnesses and all the other

evidence, it was not significant. Although the State alluded to Hatch’s statement in

closing, it was in the context of the implausible defensive theories Robinson put

forward and was one of several the State dismissed. Further, when the jury saw the

video, the trial court instructed them that the trial was not about Hatch, but whether

the defendant committed the crime as charged in the indictment. We presume that

the jury followed the trial court’s cautionary instructions. See Archie v. State, 340

S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“The law generally presumes that

instructions to disregard and other cautionary instructions will be duly obeyed by the

jury.”). Having determined the error, if any, in the admission of State’s Exhibit 106

did not affect Robinson’s substantial rights, we overrule issue seven. See Tex. R.

App. P. 44.2(b); Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 592.

ISSUE EIGHT: CUMULATIVE HARM

In issue eight, Robinson complains that cumulative harm resulting from

erroneously admitted evidence denied him a fair trial. As we have explained in issues

three through six, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

complained-of evidence. We have also determined that the error, if any, in issue

seven is harmless. When there is little error or no error shown, there can be no
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cumulative harm. See Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(noting that “appellant has failed to prove error concerning each of these claims

separately, and so we find no cumulative harm[]”); Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d

592, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“Because we have found little or no error in the

above-alleged points, there is no harm or not enough to accumulate.”). We overrule

issue eight.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Robinson’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice

Submitted on May 6, 2024
Opinion Delivered August 28, 2024
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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