In the Interest of K.D.R., K.D.R., and K.C.R. v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-24-00089-CV
________________

IN THE INTEREST OF K.D.R., K.D.R., AND K.C.R.

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CIV22-0596
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother 1 appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her

three children, K.D.R. (“Kim”), K.D.R. (“Kendra”), and K.C.R. (“Kevin”). In three

issues, Mother complains about the ineffective assistance of her court-appointed trial

counsel and challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the best-interest finding and the trial court’s appointment of the Department of

Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) as permanent managing

1
To preserve the privacy of the parties, we refer to the parties and the children
by pseudonyms or their familial relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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conservator of the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(2); 161.207.

We affirm the trial court’s Order of Termination.

BACKGROUND

In September 2022, the Department filed a petition seeking the termination

of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children, Kim, Kendra, and Kevin.

The Department included Maddison Peters’s Affidavit in Support of Removal.

Peters, a Department Investigator, states in her Affidavit that the Department

received an intake in September 2022, stating that the oldest child, Kim, made an

outcry to a family member that Father had sexually abused her since she was three

years old, and that both Father and Mother had physically abused her. Kim also

disclosed that Father inappropriately disciplined Kim and hit her with a belt when

he was upset, and that Father had punched her in the face before with both an open

and closed fist. According to the Affidavit, Kim lived with her maternal grandparents

and two younger siblings, Kendra and Kevin, and Mother and Father lived in a

separate home on the same property. Peters stated that the children were forensically

interviewed, and Kim disclosed the sexual abuse continued until she was twelve

years old. Kim reported that her maternal grandmother witnessed Father sexually

abusing her and threatened to call the police if she caught him again. Kim reported

that Mother choked her and tried to strike her with a vehicle. Kim also stated her

parents had violent and physical arguments about “dope.”

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Peters further explained in her Affidavit that Mother claimed she did not know

about the abuse and that Kim wanted to be removed to have a better life. Peters stated

that Mother admitted leaving the children with the maternal grandparents despite

knowing the grandparents had substance abuse issues and had tested positive for

drugs during past cases with the Department. According to Peters, after the forensic

interview of Kim, Mother agreed to submit to a drug test but stated she would test

positive for methamphetamines.

Peters’s Affidavit described Mother’s history with the Department, which

began in December 2018 and included allegations of neglectful supervision, physical

neglect, and medical neglect. The Department found “Reason to Believe[]”

concerning the medical neglect allegation, finding the family failed to attend the

medical procedure for Kendra’s teeth, which were severely decayed. The past

allegations against Mother included complaints about Mother, Father, and the

maternal grandparents using methamphetamines and about the children being filthy,

having rotten teeth, and not having running water. Peters’s Affidavit outlined Mother

and Father’s criminal records, which included one criminal offense by Mother for

public lewdness and thirteen criminal convictions as to Father dating from 1981-

2012, including convictions for a sex offense against a child, indecency with a child,

public lewdness, burglary of a vehicle, fraud, and theft.

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Peters’s Affidavit concluded that Mother knowingly and willingly placed the

children in an unsafe environment with caregivers who have substance abuse issues,

and she displayed a lack of protectiveness as she doubted the validity of her child’s

ongoing sexual abuse outcry. The Department requested Temporary Managing

Conservatorship of the children to ensure their immediate and future safety and well-

being, and the trial court issued an Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency.

In September and December 2023, the trial court conducted a bench trial on

the Department’s petition. Peters testified that she investigated Kim’s sexual abuse

allegations against Father. Peters testified that Mother did not believe Kim’s

allegation but wanted the best for her child. Peters testified that Kim also alleged

that Mother physically abused her by choking her until she could not breathe and

trying to run over her with a car. Peters explained that Kim reported her parents used

“dope” and that she saw Mother exchange money for white powder, and after the

children were removed, Mother admitted using methamphetamines. Peters testified

that a prior Department investigation of the parents showed that the family was

staying at the maternal grandparents’ house and had to leave because the

grandparents tested positive for methamphetamines. The Department also made a

finding against the parents for medical neglect.

Peters testified that the children were interviewed at Childrenz Haven and,

based on Kim’s allegations, the Department sought immediate removal and

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temporary managing conservatorship of the children, and the children were placed

together in a group home because there were no relative placements. When the

children were removed, Kim was fourteen, Kendra was nine, and Kevin was seven.

Peters believed that there was a continuing danger to the children if they remained

in their home and that it was in their best interest to be placed in foster care. Peters

explained that the children were significantly behind academically, and her first

impression was that they appeared “unkempt,” had dirty hair and clothes, and an

unclean scent. After their removal, the case was transferred to the conservatorship

department.

Keflyn Wilridge, a Department Caseworker, testified that she spoke with

Mother, who was still living with Father, and the Department was concerned the

parents were still together due to Kim’s allegations of sexual abuse against Father.

Wilridge testified that Kim did not want to return to her parents’ home, and Wilridge

had not visited the home because of the Department’s concerns. Wilridge reviewed

the family plans of service with the parents, who did not show up for drug screenings,

and she explained Mother had sobriety issues and went to inpatient care but relapsed,

used methamphetamine, and was arrested. Wilridge explained Mother was required

to maintain safe and stable housing and complete an ADAC assessment, random

drug screenings, a psychological assessment, and individual counseling. Wilridge

testified that Mother was applying for disability benefits, but Wilridge did not know

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the nature of her disability. Wilridge explained Mother completed a parenting class

and the ADAC and psychological assessments, but Mother failed to follow the

recommendations of those assessments, including completing inpatient treatment.

Mother failed to submit to random drug screenings, enroll in individual counseling,

and maintain contact with the Department. Wilridge testified that Father also failed

to complete his services.

Wilridge did not recommend returning the children to the parents. Wilridge

testified that Kendra and Kevin were doing well in their current placement, but Kim

was trying to harm herself and had a new counselor. Wilridge testified that the

children’s placement provided weekly therapy, a local school, transportation,

medical care, and dental care. Wilridge explained the children’s education had been

neglected, but they were getting caught up academically and doing well in school.

Wilridge testified that Mother allowed the children to remain in an

environment that was harmful to the children’s physical and emotional well-being,

engaged in actions that were harmful to the children’s emotional and physical well-

being, and that the children would be in continuing danger if they were returned to

Mother. Wilridge believed that Mother continues to have substance abuse issues.

Wilridge explained the Department recommended terminating parental rights,

appointing the Department as Permanent Managing Conservator, and finding a

foster home for all three children to have permanency. Wilridge believed termination

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was in the children’s best interest. Wilridge agreed that due to their age, it was hard

finding one placement for the children, and she explained that at times, Kim did not

want to see Kevin because she alleged that Father had incorporated Kevin into the

sexual abuse. Wilridge testified that Kim also alleged that Mother participated in the

sexual abuse. Wilridge explained that Kim and Kendra had some virtual visits with

Mother, but Kevin did not want any contact with his parents. Wilridge also explained

that Kendra and Kevin were open to being placed with an adoptive family and had

told Mother they would not live with her again, but Kim wanted to age out of the

system to receive educational opportunities.

Emily Pillows, the Department Supervisor, testified about the investigation

concerning the allegations against the parents, and she explained that the initial

Investigator’s findings were made before the Department became involved and those

findings did not end the Department’s civil case against the parents. Pillows

explained that the investigation was closed, the children were removed, and the

Department took over the conservatorship portion of the case. Pillows testified that

the parents completed a psychological assessment, and to her knowledge, neither

had a diminished intellectual capacity. Pillows testified that the Department

requested termination because it was in the children’s best interest.

Kaycee Hendrix, the forensic interviewer with Childrenz Haven, testified that

she conducted a forensic interview of the children, and Mother was with the children

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before and after the interview. Hendrix testified that Kim made outcries of sexual

and physical abuse. Hendrix explained that Kim reported Father had sexually abused

her from the age of three to the age of twelve, and she remembered the age of three

because grandmother caught Father performing acts on her. Specifically, Kim stated

that Father “stuck his fingers inside of her lower area[,]” which she confirmed was

“used for going to the restroom[,]” and that the abuse occurred while she was in the

shower, her room, and her Mother’s room. Hendrix stated that Kim reported that her

parents used drugs, and Father physically abused her, Mother, and Kendra. Kim also

reported that Mother choked her multiple times until she could not breathe and tried

to run her over twice with a car.

Hendrix testified that Kendra and Kevin did not make any outcries or disclose

any physical abuse, sexual abuse, or drug use. Hendrix explained it is not uncommon

for children not to make outcries during the interview, and the presence of a parent

or perpetrator could impact the interview.

Terri Sarver, the CASA advocate, testified that Kim has emotional problems

and did not feel safe returning home. Sarver testified that Kim likes her placement,

which is addressing her educational needs to catch up in school, and she is doing

well overall. Sarver explained that Kim was going to therapy twice per week to deal

with her self-harm issues. Sarver testified that Kim told Mother she never wanted to

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live with her again. Kim is bonded with Kendra and Kevin and visits them regularly.

Sarver believed it was in Kim’s best interest for parental rights to be terminated.

Sarver testified that Kendra was a fun-loving girl with minor behavioral

issues. Kendra was also behind in school and was getting accommodations. Kendra

told Mother that she did not want to return home, and she wanted to be placed in a

foster home and be adopted. Sarver explained that Kim and Kendra shared a room

at their current placement. Sarver described Kevin as a cute kid who was behind in

school but was doing “fairly well.” Sarver testified that Kevin is not interested in

visiting with his parents but wants to be with his sisters. Sarver explained the

children did not want to return home because of safety concerns, and she believed

that termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children’s emotional

well-being. Sarver testified the children should stay in their current placement,

which was safe and stable and providing the services they needed. Sarver believed

that Kendra and Kevin should be placed in an adoptive home together, and Kim

should remain in contact with them and receive the Department’s “aging-out

services[.]”

The State called Mother and Father to testify, but they invoked their Fifth

Amendment right not to testify.

The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported three

predicate statutory grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights and that

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termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of Kim, Kendra, and

Kevin. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). Specifically, the

trial court found that Mother: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the

children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or

emotional well-being of the children; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed

the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or

emotional well-being of the children; and (3) failed to comply with the provisions of

a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for Mother to obtain

the return of the children who have been in the permanent or temporary managing

conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a result of the

children’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect of the

children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial court appointed the

Department as the permanent managing conservator of the children. The trial court

issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Mother appealed.

ANALYSIS

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In issue one, Mother argues her court-appointed trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance. Specifically, Mother argues her trial counsel was ineffective

in failing to object to “numerous inadmissible statements during testimony[]” to

support the termination grounds, including inadmissible hearsay and expert

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testimony by a lay witness, non-responsiveness, and testimony based on speculation

and lack of personal knowledge. Mother complains that trial counsel’s ineffective

assistance caused an improper result.

A parent who cannot afford to retain counsel in Texas parental-termination

cases has a right to an appointed attorney who provides effective assistance. In re

D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 69-70 (Tex. 2021); In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex.

2003); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.013(a). Ineffective-assistance-of-

counsel claims in parental-termination cases, as in criminal cases, are governed by

the United States Supreme Court’s two-prong test articulated in Strickland v.

Washington. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 544-45 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984)). First, the parent must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. Id. at 545. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that

counsel did not function as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id.

Second, the parent must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the case. Id.

This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the party

of a fair trial–a trial whose result is reliable. Id.

When examining counsel’s performance under the first prong, “we must take

into account all the circumstances surrounding the case, and must primarily focus on

whether counsel performed in a ‘reasonably effective’ manner.” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Counsel’s performance falls below acceptable levels

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only if the “‘representation is so grossly deficient as to render proceedings

fundamentally unfair[.]’” Id. (quoting Brewer v. State, 649 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1983)). We give great deference to counsel’s choices and indulge “‘a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance,’ including the possibility that counsel’s actions are

strategic.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The challenged conduct will

constitute ineffective assistance only when “‘the conduct was so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it[.]’” Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 57

S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).

In conducting the harm analysis under the second prong of Strickland,

reviewing courts must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but

for the deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would be different. Id. at

549-50. In this context, “[a] reasonable probability is sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Thus, a parent must show

that “counsel’s ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense[.]’” In re J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination proceeding

must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate

the alleged ineffectiveness and the resulting harm. In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195,

209 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). We may not speculate and

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find trial counsel ineffective when the record is silent regarding counsel’s reasons

for his actions. In re Z.M.R., 562 S.W.3d 783, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2018, no pet.). Mother bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability

that her parental rights would not have been terminated if not for her trial counsel’s

deficient conduct. See In re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548, 559-62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g en banc).

Appellant fails to cite to specific statements in the record that she claims

constitute unobjected to inadmissible hearsay, unobjected to expert testimony by a

lay witness, non-responsive answers to which there were no objections, and

unobjected testimony based on speculation and lack of personal knowledge. Without

specific citations to the record, we cannot speculate as to the admissibility or

inadmissibility of any such statements in the context in which they were made. An

appellant has a duty to show that the record supports her contentions and provide

citations to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); and see J.W. Garrett & Sons,

Inc. v. Snider, No. 09-14-00306-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 10201, at **12-13

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 1, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (additional citations

omitted) (the failure to cite to relevant portions of the record waives appellate

review).

Mother did not file a motion for new trial or present new testimony and

affidavits–or any other evidence–about the basis for counsel’s reasoning for not

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objecting on the grounds she alleges. Because the record is silent as to the reasons

for counsel’s conduct, we may not speculate to find counsel’s performance deficient.

See In re Z.M.R., 562 S.W.3d at 793-95; Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective

Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet denied).

Without evidence about strategic reasons for counsel’s behavior, Mother fails to

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance. See In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545; see also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support termination of Mother’s

parental rights under subsections (D), (E) and (O). Mother used drugs in the presence

of the children. Mother allowed the Father, who was a convicted sex offender, to

remain in the home and have contact with the child who had made an outcry of

sexual contact by the Father. Mother allowed the children to remain for significant

periods of time with maternal Grandparents who were also drug abusers. Mother

allowed the children to remain in unsafe environments that contributed to the

children’s deficiencies in their education levels. Mother failed to submit to drug

testing and drug treatment. Mother failed to follow the service plan by obtaining

suitable housing and employment or income. Even if Mother had met Strickland’s

first prong, we conclude she failed to show that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the

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result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

We overrule issue one.

Best Interest of the Children

In issue two, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights

is in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2).

Under legal sufficiency review, we review all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the finding to determine whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d

256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor

of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard all evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id. If

no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that

must be proven is true, the evidence is legally insufficient. Id.

Under factual sufficiency review, we must determine whether the evidence is

such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the

truth of the Department’s allegations. Id. We give due consideration to evidence that

the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id. We

consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not

have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its ruling. Id. If, in light of the entire

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record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in

favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have

formed a firm belief or conviction, the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.

The decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by clear and

convincing evidence, i.e., “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations

sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d

79, 84 (Tex. 2005). The movant must show that the parent committed one or more

predicate acts or omissions and that termination is in the child’s best interest. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); see also In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 84. We will

affirm a judgment if any ground is supported by legally and factually sufficient

evidence and the best-interest finding is also supported by legally and factually

sufficient evidence. In re C.A.C. Jr., No. 09-10-00477-CV, 2011 WL 1744139, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 5, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

There is a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served by

keeping the child with the parent. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006); In

re C.M.C., 554 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2018, no pet.); see also

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b). Prompt and permanent placement of the child

in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 263.307(a). The evidence addressing what is in the child’s best interest

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may include direct and circumstantial evidence, which may include subjective

factors such as observations the factfinder makes about the parents when they appear

in court. See In re R.A.S., No. 09-20-00140-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 8335, **5-

6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) Often, past conduct is

relevant to the trial court’s role in the case when it acts as the trier of fact in deciding

whether terminating the relationship between the parent and the child is in the child’s

best interest. Id. at **4-5.

As to the best interest inquiry, we consider a non-exhaustive list of factors

sometimes referred to as the Holley factors: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the child’s

emotional and physical needs now and in the future; (3) emotional and physical

danger to the child now and in the future; (4) parental abilities of the individuals

seeking custody; (5) programs available to assist these individuals to promote the

child’s best interest; (6) plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency

seeking custody; (7) stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) acts or

omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship

is not proper; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v.

Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §

263.307(b). No particular Holley factor is controlling, and evidence of one factor

may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in a child’s best interest. In

re R.A.S., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 8335, at **4-5. A parent’s inability to provide a

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stable home supports a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. In

re T.J., No. 09-22-00224-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 8963, at **9-10 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Dec. 8, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

The trial court heard evidence that the Department had concerns about the

parents’ home because Mother and Father were still living together despite Kim’s

allegations against Father. The trial court considered evidence that the parents failed

to complete their services, and that Mother failed to follow the recommendations of

her assessments and enroll in counseling, continued to have sobriety issues, and

refused to submit to drug testing. The trial court heard that the Department was

addressing the children’s medical, emotional, and academic needs and wanted to

find a foster home for all three children to have permanency, but the trial court did

not hear about Mother’s and Father’s plans for the children because they chose not

to testify. The trial judge also considered evidence that the children were doing well

and it was in the children’s best interest to remain in their current placement, which

was providing the services the children needed. The trial court heard evidence that

the children did not want to live with Mother because they were concerned about

their safety. The trial judge also heard evidence that it was in the best interest for

Mother’s parental rights to be terminated so that Kendra and Kevin could have

permanence and be placed in an adoptive placement and Kim could age out of the

system and receive benefits.

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As the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

to their testimony, the trial court could reasonably conclude that termination of

Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of Kim, Kendra, and Kevin. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(2), 263.307(a); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at

266; In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d at 821; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. We conclude the

Department established, by clear and convincing evidence that termination of

Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); In re C.A.C. Jr., 2011 WL 1744139, at **1, 5.

Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial

court’s findings of predicate grounds (D), (E), or (O). The unchallenged predicate

findings are binding on this court and sufficient to affirm the termination order. See

In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet.

denied); see In re R.S.C. Jr., No. 09-19-00174-CV, 2019 WL 5996358, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Nov. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we also

conclude that the Department established, by clear and convincing evidence, that

Mother committed the unchallenged predicate acts enumerated in sections

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E),

(O); In re C.A.C. Jr., 2011 WL 1744139, at **1, 5. We overrule issue two.

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Appointment of Department as Permanent Managing Conservator

In issue three, Mother challenges the trial court’s appointment of the

Department as the permanent managing conservator. Mother argued that the

Department’s appointment is only a consequence of the termination, which was

supported by insufficient evidence.

Conservatorship determinations are subject to review for abuse of discretion.

In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). We will reverse the trial court’s

appointment of a managing conservator only if we determine it was arbitrary or

unreasonable. Id.; In re E.G.P., No. 09-22-00330-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 4197,

at **29-30 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 15, 2023, pet. ref’d). The Family Code

creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent will be named the child’s managing

conservator unless that court finds that such appointment would not be in the best

interest “because that appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical

health or emotional development[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(a).

Section 161.207 of the Texas Family Code provides that if the trial court

terminates the parent-child relationship with respect to both parents, the Court shall

appoint a suitable, competent adult, the Department, or a licensed child-placing

agency as managing conservator of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.207(a).

Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents. Having

determined that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s order terminating

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Mother’s parental rights, Mother’s challenge to the conservatorship appointment

was subsumed in the issues related to the termination of her parental rights. See In

re D.N.C., 252 S.W.3d 317, 318-19 (Tex. 2008). We cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion by appointing the Department as the children’s managing

conservator. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d at 616; In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 480-81.

We overrule issue three. Having overruled each of Mother’s issues, we affirm the

trial court’s Order of Termination.

AFFIRMED.

JAY WRIGHT
Justice

Submitted on June 11, 2024
Opinion Delivered August 15, 2024

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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