Bexar County Hospital District D/B/A University Health F/K/A University Health System v. Consuelo Levine

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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No. 08-25-00118-CV
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Bexar County Hospital District d/b/a University Health
f/k/a University Health System, Appellant

v.

Consuelo Levine, Appellee

On Appeal from the 73rd District Court
Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2021CI05115

M E MO R A N D UM O P I N I O N 1
Bexar County Hospital District d/b/a University Health f/k/a University Health System

(University Health) appeals the trial court’s order denying its plea to the jurisdiction and motion

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This case was transferred from our sister court in San Antonio, and we decide it in accordance with the precedent of
that court to the extent required by Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
for summary judgment in this employment discrimination suit brought by Appellee Consuelo

Levine. Because University Health did not conclusively show that Levine’s suit is barred by

limitations, we affirm the trial court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND
As a hospital district, University Health is responsible for “furnishing medical and hospital

care for indigent and needy persons residing in the district.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

§ 281.046; Tex. Const. art. IX, § 4. Levine, a former University Health employee, filed an age,

sex, and disability discrimination charge against it on September 18, 2020. The EEOC provided

University Health with a copy of the charge. After completing its investigation, the EEOC sent

Levine a right-to-sue letter dated December 30, 2020, again providing a copy to University Health.

On March 19, 2021, i.e., 79 days later, Levine filed this suit under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA), naming “University Health Systems, Inc.” as the sole defendant. Texas Secretary of

State records reflect that “University Health Systems, Inc.” is not a domestic or foreign entity

registered to do business in Texas.

On April 6, 2021, a process server left a citation and copy of Levine’s complaint at the

Office of Legal Services at University Hospital, which is owned and operated by University

Health. The documents were delivered to University Health’s counsel. Two days later, on April 8,

University Health’s counsel returned the documents to Levine’s counsel via email and regular

mail, advising that the documents had been “mistakenly delivered” and “[w]e have no knowledge

of ‘University Health Systems, Inc.’” Levine’s counsel responded via email, “Thank you, our

process server must have provided that on accident. You can disregard,” to which University

Health’s counsel responded, “There is no such entity doing business there.” The following day,

April 9, Levine’s counsel responded, “That’s not what our research has found or our process server.

How did you come across the paperwork?” University Health’s counsel responded, “Your process

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server came to University Hospital and asked for Legal Services. They delivered the documents to

me. If you have located such an entity, then please call that entity’s agent for service of process

and find where he/she is located.” The clerk’s case summary contains entries indicating that

“University Health Systems, Inc.” was served on April 6, 2021, and that the “Return Date/Time”

was April 14, 2021. 2

Six months later, on October 26, 2021, Levine filed an amended complaint, naming “Bexar

County Hospital District a/k/a University Health System” as the sole defendant. The record does

not reflect whether or when service of the amended complaint was effected, but University Health

filed an answer and plea to the jurisdiction on August 15, 2022. The plea asserted that this suit

“must be dismissed because [Levine] failed to file suit against and timely serve University Health

within the time frame mandated by the ADA,” which implicates a “jurisdictional bar.” University

Health later filed a motion for summary judgment similarly asserting that suit should be dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Levine “did not plead or prove, nor can she under

the undisputed facts in this case, that she complied with the applicable limitations period.”

Levine filed a summary judgment response raising misnomer as a defense, asserting that

“while [she] incorrectly identified the Defendant [in her initial complaint], [she] filed an Amended

Complaint . . . correcting the name,” and “[t]his was nothing more than a misnomer, which courts

have routinely held is sufficient to relate back to the filing of the original complaint.” Levine

further noted that University Health’s counsel “had received the original complaint that was timely

filed” and “acknowledged that it was ‘mistakenly delivered.’” Levine also cited out-of-jurisdiction

authority that courts “will not allow technicality to defeat proper administration of justice and will

2
While University Health requested that the “Return of Citation filed on 4/14/21” be included in the clerk’s record,
the record includes no such document. However, a copy of the citation and unexecuted return was attached as an
exhibit to University Health’s summary judgment motion. This document reflects that citation was issued on March
29, 2021, and received by the process server on March 31, 2021.

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allow misnomers to be amended and relate back as matter of course.”

After a hearing, the trial court denied University Health’s motion for summary judgment

and plea to the jurisdiction. University Health filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal under

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). In one global issue, University Health argues

that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction,

asserting Levine: (1) “failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites of the ADA by failing to

sue her employer timely”; and (2) “effected no service upon University Health at the time of filing

her original Complaint against a non-existent entity,” thereby precluding any misnomer defense.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A hospital district possesses governmental immunity from state-law suits for damages

except where waived by the Legislature. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283

S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009). However, like other local governmental entities, a hospital district

possesses no immunity from federal-law suits for damages. See Hoff v. Nueces Cnty., 153 S.W.3d

45, 49 (Tex. 2004) (“[I]mmunity does not bar [federal-law] suit[s] [for damages] against ‘lesser

entities’ such as ‘a municipal corporation or other governmental entity which is not an arm of the

State.’”) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999)); Bansal v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson

Cancer Ctr., 502 S.W.3d 347, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)

(distinguishing between “a State entity,” which may possess immunity to a federal-law suit for

damages, and “a political subdivision” such as “a county or a hospital district,” which possesses

no such immunity). 3

Statutory prerequisites to suit—including limitations provisions—implicate subject-matter

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See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney, 936 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex. 1996) (“[T]he United States Supreme
Court has ‘consistently refused to construe [Eleventh] Amendment [immunity] to afford protection to political
subdivisions . . ., even though such entities exercise a slice of state power.’”); Klein v. Hernandez, 315 S.W.3d 1, 7
(Tex. 2010) (holding that hospital districts are political subdivisions).

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jurisdiction over claims asserted against governmental entities. Prairie View A&M Univ. v.

Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 515 (Tex. 2012). Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged through

a plea to the jurisdiction or motion for summary judgment. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590

S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019) (“[S]overeign immunity . . . ‘may be raised by a plea to the

jurisdiction, as well as by other procedural vehicles, such as a motion for summary judgment.’”)

(citing State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tex. 2009)). Such a plea or motion may challenge

“whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to

hear the case,’ ‘the existence of those very jurisdictional facts,’ or both.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2021) (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372

S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012)) (emphasis in original).

When, as here, the existence of jurisdictional facts is challenged, “we must move beyond

the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues, even if the

evidence implicates both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim.” Tex. Health &

Human Services Comm’n v. Pope, 674 S.W.3d 273, 281 (Tex. 2023). This analysis involves a

question of law which we review de novo and mirrors our evaluation of a traditional motion for

summary judgment. Id. at 280–81. That is, the governmental entity must satisfy the initial

traditional summary judgment burden of proof; if it does so, the plaintiff must show that a fact

issue exists. Id. at 281. If a fact issue exists, the plea must be denied. Id. If no fact issue exists, the

plea must be granted. Id.

As in the summary judgment context, we “take as true all evidence favorable to the

plaintiff, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor,”

but we “cannot disregard evidence necessary to show context,” and “cannot disregard evidence

and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff if reasonable jurors could not.” Id.

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III. DISCUSSION
Under the ADA, a plaintiff must file suit within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue letter

from the EEOC; otherwise, suit is barred. Teamah v. Applied Materials, Inc., 715 Fed. Appx. 343,

345 (5th Cir. 2017); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). It is undisputed that Levine

filed suit within the required 90-day period—her right-to-sue letter was issued on December 30,

2020, and she filed suit 79 days later on March 19, 2021. On April 6, 2021—no more than a week

after the 90-day limitations period expired—a process server left a citation and copy of Levine’s

complaint at the Office of Legal Services at University Hospital, which is owned and operated by

University Health. 4 However, “University Health Systems, Inc.,” the sole defendant named in

Levine’s initial complaint, is a non-existent entity. Six months later, on October 26, 2021, Levine

filed an amended complaint, naming “Bexar County Hospital District a/k/a University Health

System” as the sole defendant.

In the trial court, Levine raised the defense of misnomer, asserting that “while [she]

incorrectly identified the Defendant [in her initial complaint], [she] filed an Amended Complaint

. . . correcting the name,” and “[t]his was nothing more than a misnomer, which courts have

routinely held is sufficient to relate back to the filing of the original complaint.” Levine further

noted that University Health’s counsel “had received the original complaint that was timely filed”

and “acknowledged that it was ‘mistakenly delivered.’” In addition, Levine cited out-of-

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A suit is timely brought by filing a petition and serving it before limitations expires. Tex. State Univ. v. Tanner, 689
S.W.3d 292, 296 (Tex. 2024). If the petition is filed before limitations expires but served afterwards, service “can
relate back to the date the petition was filed and thus be considered timely” if the plaintiff shows he was “diligent in
attempting service from the time limitations expired until proper service was finally achieved.” Id. Here, suit was filed
on March 19, 2021, citation was issued on March 29, limitations expired no earlier than March 30, and the service
documents were left at University Hospital’s Office of Legal Services on April 6 a total timespan of 19 days.
University Hospital does not argue that diligence in attempting service was not exercised during this time, and we
conclude that at a minimum the evidence presents a fact question on this point. See Tex. State Univ. v. Tanner, 689
S.W.3d 292, 302 (Tex. 2024) (“Diligence normally raises a fact question[.]”); Harrell v. Alvarez, 46 S.W.3d 483, 486
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.) (holding that diligence in attempting service was conclusively established where
citation was served “only five days after citation issued, twenty-five days after plaintiffs filed their petition, and merely
fifteen days after limitations expired.”) (emphasis added).

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jurisdiction authority that courts “will not allow technicality to defeat proper administration of

justice and will allow misnomers to be amended and relate back as matter of course.” Under Texas

law, misnomer occurs “when the plaintiff misnames the correct defendant, and the correct

defendant is actually served”; in that circumstance, “the limitations period is tolled, and a

subsequent amendment of the petition (correcting the defendant’s name) will ‘relate back’ to the

date of the original petition/service.” Salazar v. Pena, No. 08-23-00298-CV, 2024 WL 4512349,

at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 17, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Enserch Corp. v. Parker, 794

S.W.2d 2, 4–5 (Tex. 1990)).

University Health argues that misnomer is inapplicable here because “University Health

was not served with citation to [Levine]’s original Complaint on or before [her] deadline to file

suit, March 30, 2021—no entity was.” But the evidence does not conclusively establish that the

correct defendant—Bexar County Hospital District d/b/a University Health—was not actually

served on April 6, 2021. According to University Health, “a process server left a citation and

[Levine’s] Complaint at the office of Legal Services at University Hospital.” Without more

information, it is unclear whether this apparent attempt at service failed or succeeded. See Zhao v.

Sea Rock Inc., 659 S.W.3d 119, 128 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied) (holding that service

is effected on entity if individual receiving documents on its behalf “was allowed to receive

service” or “could accept service”) (citing Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply, Inc., 690

S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) and Master Cap. Sols. Corp. v. Araujo, 456 S.W.3d

636, 642 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)); see also, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Sanchez, 521

S.W.2d 133, 135–36 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (merely “walk[ing] into the room,

put[ting] an envelope on the table, and le[aving] without saying a word” may not effect service of

process); Dosamantes v. Dosamantes, 500 S.W.2d 233, 236–37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1973, writ

dism’d) (merely pushing documents under a door may not effect service of process).

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“A defendant moving for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of limitations has

the burden to conclusively establish that defense.” Gill v. Hill, 688 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. 2024).

Further, to succeed on this defense at the summary-judgment stage, the movant “must also

conclusively negate application of . . . any tolling doctrines pleaded as an exception to

limitations.”5 Id. Misnomer qualifies as such a doctrine. Levinson Alcoser Associates, L.P. v. El

Pistolon II, Ltd., 670 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Tex. 2023) (“[I]n cases involving misnomer—where the

petition merely misnames the correct defendant—‘limitations is tolled and a subsequent

amendment of the petition relates back to the date of the original petition.’”) (citing Enserch Corp.

v. Parker, 794 S.W.2d 2, 4–5 (Tex. 1990)).

Accordingly, in the absence of evidence conclusively showing that service was not effected

on University Health on April 6, 2021—i.e., conclusively negating Levine’s misnomer defense—

we conclude that University Health was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on limitations

and the trial court correctly denied its motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s order denying University Health’s

motion for summary judgment and plea to the jurisdiction and remand this case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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While Levine did not expressly plead the defense of misnomer, renaming the defendant appears to be the only
substantive change in her amended complaint. Further, University Health’s motion for summary judgment anticipated
such a defense, stating that “[Levine] may attempt to assert . . . misnomer . . . as a defense to the statute of limitations.”
And when Levine’s response in fact raised such a defense, asserting that “while [Levine] incorrectly identified
[University Health] [in her Complaint], [she] filed an Amended Complaint on October 26, 2021, correcting the name,”
which involved “nothing more than a misnomer, which courts have routinely held is sufficient to relate back to the
filing of the original complaint,” University Health did not object. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
misnomer was tried by consent. See Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex. 1991) (holding
that affirmative defense was tried by consent because it was relied on in summary judgment briefing without
objection); see also id. (“[C]laims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of the parties are treated as
if they had been raised by the pleadings.”).

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LISA J. SOTO, Justice

November 25, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
Palafox, J., dissents without opinion.

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