Ex Parte Michael Nicasio v. the State of Texas

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS

§ No. 08-25-00099-CR

EX PARTE: § Appeal from the

MICHAEL NICASIO, § 205th District Court

Appellant. § of Hudspeth County, Texas

§ (TC# CV-06067-205)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Michael Nicasio, appeals the trial court’s order denying his request for habeas

relief. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the trial court’s order denying habeas relief and

remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to either grant Nicasio’s request for a personal

bond or set Nicasio’s bond in an amount he can afford to pay.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2025, Nicasio filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Personal

Bond or Bond Reduction. In his application, Nicasio argued that because more than 90 days had

passed since the date of his arrest and the State had not obtained an indictment charging him with

an offense, he was entitled to release from custody subject to either a personal bond or a bond set

in an amount he could afford.
The trial court held a hearing on Nicasio’s habeas application on March 20, 2025. At the

hearing, Nicasio asserted that he was arrested on November 6, 2024; that the charges included

three felonies and a class A misdemeanor offense; that an indictment charging him with the

commission of these offenses had not been returned until March 7, 2025, which was 122 days after

the date of his arrest; and that he was therefore entitled, under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure, to release on either a personal bond or a bond set in an amount that he could

afford.

The State opposed Nicasio’s request for relief. The State conceded that Nicasio was not

charged by indictment within 90 days of the date of his arrest. The State contended, however, that

“since then, the case has been filed[, s]o that argument of the writ would be moot since the case

has since been filed.”

Although Nicasio argued that an indictment returned more than 90 days after his date of

arrest could not “cure the fact that the State was not ready at the 90th day,” the trial court declined

to reduce any of Nicasio’s bond amounts.

Finally, at the conclusion of the hearing on March 20, 2025, the trial court signed an order

denying Nicasio’s request for habeas relief.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a trial court’s decision to deny relief on a claim that the State violated article

17.151 for an abuse of discretion.” Ex parte Craft, 301 S.W.3d 447, 448 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam); see Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); Ex parte Alvarez, No. 13-23-00378-CR, 2024 WL 2970836, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi June 13, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A trial court abuses its

discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard or if “no reasonable view of the record could

support the trial court’s conclusion under the correct law and facts viewed in the light most

2
favorable to its legal conclusion.” Ex parte Smith, 486 S.W.3d 62, 64–65 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2016, no pet.) (quoting DuBose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493, 497–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996),

overruled on other grounds by Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

III. ANALYSIS

Under Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, “[a] defendant who is

detained in jail pending trial of an accusation against him must be released either on personal bond

or by reducing the amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for trial of the criminal action

for which he is being detained within: . . . 90 days from the commencement of his detention if he

is accused of a felony.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151, § 1(1). “When a defendant

complains the State was not ready within the statutory time period, the State ha[s] the burden to

make a prima facie showing that it was.” Ex parte Brosky, 8de63 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1993, no pet.); see Ex parte Ragston, 422 S.W.3d 904, 906 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Moreno v. State, 845 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,

pet. ref’d). The State cannot, however, be ready for trial without an indictment. See Ex parte

Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Ex parte Cardenas, 631 S.W.3d 758, 761

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). Further, the return of an indictment against a defendant who

has been in jail for more than 90 days does not moot the defendant’s complaint under

Article 17.151. See Alvarez, 2024 WL 2970836, at *2–3; Ex parte Castlino, No. 14-10-00110-CR,

2010 WL 2195829, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (per curiam); Pharris v. State, 196 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

Here, Nicasio filed an application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was entitled to

release from custody under Article 17.151. At the hearing on his application, the State both

admitted that Nicasio was not indicted within 90 days of the date of the commencement of his

3
detention and failed to “indicate in any way that it was prepared for trial.” Ex parte Brown, No. 06-

15-00219-CR, 2016 WL 529600, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). Further, the State filed a letter in this appeal stating that it agreed

that Nicasio’s point of appeal should be sustained and that Nicasio should be granted either a

personal bond or a bond in an amount that he can afford.

Because it is uncontested that the State did not make a prima facie showing that it was

ready for trial within the statutory time period, Nicasio was entitled to release under Article 17.151,

and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for habeas relief. See Lanclos,

624 S.W.3d at 927, 929; Cardenas, 631 S.W.3d at 762; Brown, 2016 WL 529600, at *3; Moreno,

845 S.W.2d at 469.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand this cause to the trial

court to either release Nicasio on a personal bond or to set Nicasio’s bond in an amount he can

afford to pay. We direct the Clerk of this Court to immediately issue the mandate. See Tex. R. App.

P. 2, 18.1. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice

July 11, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

4