Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Ralph Miranda and Saul Alfonso Paz

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, §
No. 08-24-00353-CV
Appellant, §
Appeal from the
v. §
171st District Court
§
RALPH MIRANDA and SAUL of El Paso County, Texas
ALFONSO PAZ, §
Appellees. (TC# 2024DCV0506)
§

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC filed this restricted appeal seeking to appeal from the

trial court’s order granting Appellees Ralph Miranda and Saul Alfonso Paz a permanent injunction.

Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, maintaining that the permanent injunction order is an

interlocutory order over which we have no jurisdiction. We agree and dismiss this appeal for want

of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellees sought a judicial declaration from the trial court that Appellant and Beverly

Mitrisin failed to comply with foreclosure sale requirements concerning the real property located
on Mount Whitney in El Paso County (the Property). They also requested injunctive relief

restraining Nationstar from directly or indirectly selling or disposing of the Property as well as

attorney’s fees.

The trial court granted Appellees an ex-parte temporary restraining order pending trial.

Appellant filed a general denial and affirmative defenses. Following a hearing at which Appellant

did not appear, the trial court granted Appellees’ request for a permanent restraining order.

On May 1, 2024, the signed judgment granting permanent injunction was filed, enjoining

Appellant and Mitrisin from foreclosing on, selling, disposing, or otherwise interfering with the

Property. On October 21, 2024, Appellant filed a notice of restricted appeal.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Section 51.012 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code vests this Court with jurisdiction

over an appeal by “writ of error.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012. Section 51.012

states in pertinent part, “a person may take [a] writ of error to the court of appeals from a final

judgment of the district or county court.” Id. (emphasis added). The Texas Supreme Court,

pursuant to its procedural rule-making authority, has established the procedures required to perfect

what the appellate rules now refer to as a “restricted appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d)(7),

26.1(c), 30. “Statutes pertaining to writ of error appeals to the court of appeals apply equally to

restricted appeals.” Tex. R. App. P. 30.

“[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not

final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or clearly

and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. Lehmann v. Har–Con

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001). The May 1 order neither contains finality language nor

disposes of Appellees’ claims for declaratory judgment and attorney’s fees. Id.; James v. Hubbard,

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985 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (stating an order granting a

permanent injunction is appealable unless issues or parties remain undisposed).

Because the order was not a final judgment, we have no jurisdiction over Appellant’s

restricted appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012; Federated Mut. Ins. Co., Inc.

v. Davenport, 85 S.W.3d 837, 838–39 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing

restricted appeal after concluding the order appealed was interlocutory).

Accordingly, we grant Appellees’ motion and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Costs will be taxed against Appellant.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

March 5, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

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