Robbie Wennermark v. Felecita Quintanilla

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00272-CV

ROBBIE WENNERMARK, APPELLANT

V.

FELECITA QUINTANILLA, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the County Court At Law No. 10
Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017CV03548, Honorable David Rodriguez, Presiding

June 13, 2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
Before QUINN, C. J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Robbie Wennermark challenges the trial court’s order granting the no-evidence

motion for summary judgment filed by Felecita Quintanilla. We affirm.

Background

In April 2016, a chain-reaction accident involving seven vehicles occurred on

Route 281 in San Antonio, Texas. Due to traffic in front of her caused by an accident

across the highway, Smith in vehicle one stopped on the road. Quintanilla, the driver of

1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Fourth Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent

should it conflict with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
vehicle two, then hit Smith. Evidence was mixed as to whether Quintanilla had stopped

before striking Smith or whether she struck Smith without first stopping. Nevertheless,

Sanabria in vehicle three struck Quintanilla from behind. 2 Drivers in vehicles four, five

and six, (Duarte, Bhachawat, and Wennermark, respectively) succeeded in stopping

behind Sanabria without striking anyone in front. Yet, seconds later, Spangler, in vehicle

seven, failed to stop, and struck Wennermark. That forced Wennermark to hit

Bhachawat, Bhachawat to hit Duarte, Duarte to hit Sanabria, Sanabria to hit Quintanilla,

and Quintanilla to hit Smith a second time.

The collision resulted in a lawsuit between multiple parties. For our purposes, the

aspect of the dispute before us is Wennermark’s claim of negligence against Quintanilla.

Quintanilla filed her no-evidence motion for summary judgment, contending that

Wennermark had no evidence of either a breached duty or causation. The trial court

granted that motion and severed the claim. Wennermark then appealed, asserting

multiple issues. Only the first requires more than cursory discussion.

Issue One

Via her first issue, Wennermark argues the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment in Quintanilla’s favor because she raised genuine issues of material fact

concerning duty and causation. We overrule the issue.

To resolve the appeal, we turn the page to the year 1962 and a writing from the

San Antonio Court of Appeals. The court told us at the time that a driver has no duty to

“lookout to the rear” when 1) a lead driver slowed down or stopped because his travel

was impeded by traffic or 2) the driver is stopped in obedience to traffic signals or traffic

2 If Quintanilla had successfully stopped before striking Smith, then the impact from Sanabria’s

vehicle caused Quintanilla’s vehicle to move forward and hit Smith.

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controls. Scott v. McElroy, 361 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio writ ref’d

n.r.e.). On the other hand, “[w]hen one in a stream of traffic slows his vehicle, or stops it,

or changes his course, a duty arises to see what is behind when he makes the change.”

Id. at 434-35; accord, Berry v. Sunshine Laundries & Dry Cleaning Corp., 387 S.W.2d

948, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same).

Irrespective of whether Quintanilla maintained a proper lookout viz-a-viz vehicles

ahead of her (e.g., the Smith vehicle), it is undisputed that vehicles ahead of Smith and

Quintanilla impeded forward progress. Thus, Smith, Quintanilla, and those behind them

were forced to slow or stop as well. That scenario triggered the rule voiced in Scott; a

driver has no duty to “lookout to the rear” when a lead driver slowed down or stopped

because his travel was impeded by traffic. Thus, Quintanilla owed no duty to Wennermark

who was several cars behind. Therefore, the trial court cannot be said to have erred in

finding the absence of a duty.

Of further note is Wennermark’s concession that she had come to a “complete stop

and had been at a stop for a few seconds at least” before being struck from behind.

Quintanilla did not strike her, rather, Spangler did. And, he so struck her because traffic

had stopped in the lane ahead of him. In short, Wennermark successfully avoided a

condition on the road created by either third parties ahead of Smith or Quintanilla striking

Smith. Assuming arguendo the latter, Quintanilla was no longer traveling; she was no

longer moving. Instead, her action resulted in the creation of a condition which others,

i.e., Spangler, failed to observe or heed for whatever reason. It is that condition, i.e.,

vehicles stopped on the highway for whatever reason, that gave rise to Wennermark’s

being susceptible to collision from behind by Spangler.

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Yet, the creation of a condition does not expose Quintanilla to liability for

Spangler’s failure to also stop. As recognized by our Supreme Court, “[l]egal cause is not

established if the defendant’s conduct . . . does no more than furnish the condition that

makes the plaintiff’s injury possible.” Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 776

(Tex. 1995). The San Antonio Court of Appeals applied this principle in a scenario

involving a motor vehicle collision where the decedent rear-ended a tractor trailer; the

tractor trailer and other vehicles had stopped on the road way due to an earlier collision.

Bethke v. Munoz, No. 04-12-00047-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10458, at *5 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Dec. 19, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Union Pump Co., 898

S.W.2d at 776). Because the initial accident did no more than furnish the condition which

made the decedent’s injuries possible, the individual who caused the first accident was

not the cause of the decedent’s injuries. Id. at *7-8.

Here, all purported acts or omissions charged against Quintanilla, e.g., failure to

keep a proper lookout, failure to operate her car in a reasonably safe manner, or

speeding, had run their course. Others could and had stopped their progress on the road

in response to them. What remained was the condition Quintanilla allegedly created, a

condition that exposed Wennermark to injury by a third party who failed to stop as others

did. This too permitted entry of summary judgment adverse to Wennemark on the basis

of causation. See Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tex. 1968) (involving

successive motor vehicle accidents and finding the absence of causation because “[a]ll

acts and omissions charged against respondents had run their course and were

complete. Their negligence did not actively contribute in any way to the injuries involved

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in this suit. It simply created a condition which attracted Payton, Bell, and Bransford to

the scene, where they were injured by a third party”). 3

Issues Two through Eight

Through Wennermark’s final seven issues, we are asked to assess the accuracy

of various findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court. The court

entered them in support of its order granting summary judgment. Findings of fact and

conclusions of law have no place in a summary judgment setting. Tyson v. Freeman, No.

04-16-00789-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11308, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 6,

2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d

440, 441 (Tex. 1997)); accord, La Tour Condos., Inc. v. Keating, No. 07-17-00201-CV,

2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3012, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (same). And, if entered, we disregard them. La Tour Condos., Inc., 2018 Tex. App.

LEXIS 3012, at *6. So, the findings and conclusions entered by the trial court at bar being

irrelevant, we disregard them and overrule the issues involving them.

The order granting summary judgment is affirmed.

Brian Quinn
Chief Justice

3 Quintanilla alluded to merely creating a condition in her motion for summary judgment. Indeed,
she posited that “legal cause is not established if the defendant’s conduct did no more than furnish the
condition that made the plaintiff’s injury possible.” On appeal, though, Wennermark says little about this.
Nor does she attempt to substantively explain why that rule was inapplicable. At best, she simply concludes
that “not a large enough time lapse[d] to break the causal link in this multi-vehicle, chain reaction accident.”
Why her having enough time to stop and avoid the circumstances transpiring in front of her failed to
attenuate, as a matter of law, the nexus ala Union Pump, Bethke, and authority alluded to in the motion for
summary judgment went unmentioned. This too is fatal because her burden consisted of negating the
legitimacy of all grounds upon which summary judgment could have been granted. See Magness v. Baker,
No. 04-18-00716-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2862, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 10, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see also In re Est. of Taylor, 07-23-00342-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1268, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Feb. 21, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

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