Taylor Ryan Smith v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00020-CR

TAYLOR RYAN SMITH, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Childress County, Texas
Trial Court No. 7064, Honorable Dale A. Rabe, Jr., Presiding

March 16, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Taylor Ryan Smith, appeals from the trial court’s order adjudicating him

guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity, a first-degree felony, and sentencing him

to fifty years of confinement. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 71.02. By a single issue, Appellant

argues that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Because Appellant did not preserve this complaint and the record is

insufficient to support his claim, we affirm.
BACKGROUND

Appellant was about seventeen years old when he was charged by information

with engaging in organized criminal activity. The information alleged that Appellant,

acting with two others, struck a sixteen-year-old complainant with his hand and with a

piece of two-by-four lumber. Appellant pleaded guilty. The trial court placed him on

deferred adjudication community supervision for six years, with an affirmative finding that

Appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the offense.

Within two months, Appellant tested positive for drugs and admitted to using

cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. At his own request, Appellant was sent to the Concho

Valley Community Corrections Facility to participate in a rehabilitative program. He was

phased back to restart the program on four separate occasions for continued rule

violations. He was eventually discharged from the facility for failing to comply with its

requirements.

The State moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging Appellant failed to complete required

rehabilitative counseling, failed to obey the facility’s rules and regulations, and was

unsatisfactorily discharged. Appellant pleaded true to the allegations.

The parties presented conflicting evidence relevant to punishment. The correction

facility’s assistant director testified that Appellant’s conduct was a continuous downward

spiral of rule violations. Appellant’s community supervision officer confirmed the pattern

of noncompliance. Evidence was mixed regarding the extent of Appellant’s involvement

in the assault with the two-by-four.

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Appellant testified on his own behalf, asking the trial court to place him at Life

Challenge, a faith-based rehabilitative program, rather than impose a prison sentence.

On cross-examination, Appellant maintained that he did not take part in the assault but

conceded that his account of events had changed over time and that his credibility was

“not real great.”

The trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty and sentenced him to fifty years of

confinement. The punishment range for a first-degree felony is five to ninety-nine years

or life. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.32.

ANALYSIS

Preservation

To preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly

disproportionate, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection,

or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Smith

v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). When the sentence falls within

the prescribed punishment range, the failure to object at the time it is imposed or to

present the complaint through a post-trial motion waives error on appeal. Noland v. State,

264 S.W.3d 144, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). No particular

words or phrases are required for an effective objection, but the complaining party must

make the trial court aware of what relief is sought and why, at a time when the court is

positioned to act. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Pena v.

State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

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Although a motion for new trial may serve as a vehicle for preserving error, merely

filing one is not enough. The motion must be brought to the trial court’s attention.

Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 76, 79–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

Appellant raised his disproportionate-sentence claim in a motion for new trial, but

nothing in the record indicates he presented the motion to the trial court. Nor did Appellant

object when the sentence was imposed. His complaint is therefore unpreserved. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 79–80.

Merits

Moreover, even if Appellant had preserved his complaint for appeal, his claim

would fail on the merits for want of an adequate record.

We review a sentencing determination for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v.

State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A sentence assessed within the

legislatively prescribed range is generally not excessive, cruel, or unusual. Ex parte

Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that “the sentencer’s

discretion to impose any punishment within the prescribed range [is] essentially

‘unfettered’”); Foster v. State, 525 S.W.3d 898, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. ref’d).

A narrow exception exists where a sentence, though within the statutory range, is

grossly disproportionate to the offense. State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322–24 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016). However, our highest appellate courts on this question have observed

that outside the capital punishment context, successful challenges to the proportionality

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of a particular sentence are “exceedingly rare.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23 (citing

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)).

To determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, a court considers

the severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the

culpability of the offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated and unadjudicated

offenses. Id. at 323. Only in the rare case where this threshold comparison gives rise to

an inference of gross disproportionality does a court proceed to compare the imposed

sentence with those on other offenders. Id.

Appellant carries the burden to develop a sufficient record for appellate review,

and his failure to do so forecloses our assessment. See London v. State, 490 S.W.3d

503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Here, the record contains little information bearing on the

factors for assessing Appellant’s sentence for disproportionality. We know the basic

outline of the underlying offense and that the complainant was struck with hands and a

board, but we do not know the extent of the complainant’s injuries. Appellant’s degree of

culpability is disputed, as he maintained at the hearing that he was merely present while

conceding his account had shifted over time. The record reveals nothing about

Appellant’s prior adjudicated or unadjudicated offenses, whether as a juvenile or adult.

Nor does it contain evidence regarding comparable sentences in this or other

jurisdictions.

As indicated above, we hold that Appellant failed to preserve the issue for review.

Nevertheless, even if he had, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion

in imposing a sentence within the statutory range. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Lawrence M. Doss
Justice

Do not publish.

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