Enrique Rios, Jr. v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00330-CR

ENRIQUE RIOS, JR., APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 222nd District Court
Deaf Smith County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-2023D-058, Honorable Roland D. Saul, Presiding

August 14, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Enrique Rios, Jr., appeals his conviction for the offense of robbery1 with

the punishment range enhanced by a prior felony conviction2 and resulting sentence of

twelve years’ incarceration and $2,000 fine. Appellant contends that the evidence is

insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court violated his right to present a

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02.

2 See id. § 12.42(b).
complete defense by excluding certain evidence. We modify the judgment and affirm it

as modified.

BACKGROUND

In the early morning of March 9, 2022, Santos Garcia, a native of Guatemala who

was not a legal resident of the United States, met with April Medeles and made

arrangements to pay her money to have sex with another woman. Medeles directed

Garcia to follow her to a residence. At the residence, Garcia entered a bedroom where

the woman in the room requested him to remove his pants. Garcia removed his boots

and pants while the woman turned off the bedroom light. One of the women took Garcia’s

pants, which contained his wallet and keys. Almost immediately after Garcia removed

his pants, Appellant, who was armed with a handgun, entered the bedroom and ordered

Garcia to leave. Garcia fled the residence wearing only his boxers and a shirt. Upon

reaching a safe distance, Garcia called his friend, Cecilia Garza, for help. When Garza

arrived, they reported the incident to police.

Appellant was eventually arrested and charged with the offense of aggravated

robbery with a deadly weapon.3 At trial, Medeles testified that the plan to rob Garcia was

devised by herself, the woman Garcia was to have sex with, and another woman. While

not part of the planning of the robbery, Medeles testified that she offered to pay Appellant

if he would scare Garcia away from the residence after the robbery was completed. Garza

testified about what she observed that night after Garcia called her. During her testimony,

she began to discuss a “U visa” program, which purportedly grants a visa to nonresidents

3 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2).

2
who have been the victim of a violent crime. The State objected to this testimony and,

after discussions outside of the presence of the jury, the trial court sustained the objection.

The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding Appellant not guilty of the charged offense

of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, but guilty of the lesser-included offense of

robbery. Appellant timely filed the instant appeal.

EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY

By his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to

establish that he intended to deprive the victim of his property. Specifically, he argues

that “there is no evidence to establish he knew of or was part of any plan to unlawfully

deprive the complaining witness of property.”

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on the evidence and

reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in character, weight, and

amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of the offense has been

proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a conviction.” Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Cochran, J., concurring). When reviewing

all the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is whether

the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906–07 n.26. In our review, we

defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge

of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See id. at 899.
3
We must evaluate all the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, regardless

of whether that evidence was properly or improperly admitted. Jenkins v. State, 493

S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). When the record supports conflicting

inferences, we presume that the jury resolved any conflicts in favor of the verdict and will

defer to that determination. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012). Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Thomas v. State,

444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997)).

Appellant was convicted of the offense of robbery. A person commits the offense

of robbery “if, in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to obtain or maintain

control of the property, he . . . intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in

fear of imminent bodily injury or death.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(2). A person

commits theft “if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of

property.” Id. § 31.03(a). In the present case, the State sought to prove Appellant’s guilt

under the law of parties. See id. § 7.02(a)(2), (b). A person is criminally responsible for

an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist

the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid

the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2). Similarly, if, in the attempt to

carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the

conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having

no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose

4
and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the

conspiracy. Id. § 7.02(b).

Appellant does not contest that the evidence established that he was paid to scare

Garcia away from the property. He also does not contest that his actions were in

furtherance of the commission of the robbery of Garcia. Rather, he argues that he was

unaware of the plan by the conspirators to rob Garcia at or before the crime was

committed. However, Medeles, one of Garcia’s robbers, testified that Appellant knew of

the plan to rob Garcia prior to his actions to scare Garcia away from the residence.4 Thus,

contrary to Appellant’s contention, there is record evidence that Appellant had knowledge

of the planned robbery and acted with the intent to assist the commission of the offense

by scaring Garcia away from the property. See Rodriguez v. State, 521 S.W.3d 822, 828

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (to prove defendant’s liability as party,

State must prove defendant knowingly assisted in commission of the offense). In

addition, the record establishes that Appellant was paid for his participation in the robbery

when the conspirators met after the crime was committed. Id. (in assessing whether

defendant was party to offense, we may consider events before, during, and after its

commission). The jury was entitled to believe the testimony of Medeles and to draw

reasonable inferences as to Appellant’s knowledge of the conspiracy to rob Garcia based

on the totality of the evidence. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018) (jury is sole judge of weight and credibility of evidence and reasonable

inferences from the totality of evidence are entitled to deference). Because we conclude

4 Immediately after questioning Medeles about who had knowledge of the plan to rob Garcia, the

prosecutor asked her “[a]nd did [Appellant] have knowledge at the time you were talking to him and offering
him money to scare off [Garcia]?” Medeles responded in the affirmative.
5
that sufficient evidence establishes that Appellant knew of the plan to rob Garcia and

acted with an intent to aid in the commission of the crime, we overrule Appellant’s first

issue.

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

By his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court violated his Sixth

Amendment right to present a complete defense by preventing him from inquiring into

Garcia’s motivation to fabricate his allegation that he was the victim of a crime. 5 The

State responds arguing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the

testimony about which Appellant complains.

We review a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Id. If the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct under any applicable

theory of law, it will not be disturbed even if the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient

reason for the ruling. Id.

The constitutional right to present a complete defense is “qualified by the

requirement that the evidence be relevant and not excluded by an established evidentiary

rule.” Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 329 n.26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “A bedrock

5 While Appellant couches his appellate argument in terms of a violation of his Sixth Amendment

rights, this argument does not comport with his contention at trial. To preserve error for appellate review,
the issue on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). This is true even when the error may concern a constitutional right of the defendant.
Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Consequently, we will review the trial court’s
exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion relating to its ruling that the evidence in question was not
relevant and was hearsay.
6
condition of admissibility of evidence in any legal contest is its relevance to an issue in

the case—that is to say, its tendency to make a fact of consequence to determination of

the action more or less probable.” Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012).

In the present case, Appellant began questioning Garza, a friend of Garcia, about

her knowledge of a “U visa” program, a program under which she claimed that a

nonresident could be given residency if he had been the victim of violent crime. The State

took Garza on voir dire during which she admitted that she never informed Garcia about

the “U visa” program “in any way . . . .” Garza testified that she discussed the “U visa”

program with a person who was helping Garcia with his immigration paperwork, but she

never discussed the program with Garcia. After sustaining the State’s hearsay objection,

the trial court also noted that the testimony was not relevant. The trial court advised

Appellant that he could recall Garza if he established that Garcia had personal knowledge

of the “U visa” program. Notably, Appellant never inquired into Garcia’s knowledge of the

“U visa” program or any other visa program. Since Garza specifically testified that she

did not inform Garcia of the “U visa” program and no evidence was otherwise elicited that

he was aware of any such program, we fail to see the relevance of the testimony.

Consequently, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding

Garza’s testimony.6 We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

6 Even after the trial court excluded this evidence, in his closing argument, Appellant contended

that Garcia had a motive to fabricate this crime to get a visa, which would allow him to stay in this country.
See Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc) (“That [the defendant] was unable
to . . . present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not prejudicial where, as here, he was
not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury.”).
7
MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT

Although not raised by Appellant, the judgment incorrectly states that Appellant

was convicted under section 29.03 of the Texas Penal Code. The jury’s verdict expressly

found Appellant not guilty of aggravated robbery, the offense described in section 29.03.

Rather, the jury found Appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of robbery, which is

described in section 29.02. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 with § 29.03. In

addition, the judgment identifies the “degree of offense” as a “1st degree felony w/

enhancement.” The offense of robbery is a second-degree felony. Id. § 29.02(b). Based

on Appellant’s previous final conviction for felony DWI, the applicable punishment range

was enhanced to that of a first-degree felony. Id. § 12.42(b). But the judgment is in error

when it states that Appellant was convicted of a first-degree felony. A court of appeals

has the authority to correct and reform a judgment to make the record speak the truth

when it has the information to do so. Mayo v. State, 690 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2024, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g). Accordingly, we modify the judgment to identify

the “statute of offense” to be section 29.02 of the Texas Penal Code and the “degree of

offense” to be second degree.

CONCLUSION

We modify the judgment to identify the “statute of offense” as Texas Penal Code

section 29.02 and the “degree of offense” as a second-degree felony. As modified, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker
Justice
Do not publish.
8