In the Interest of E.S.-A. and A.S.-A., Children v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00118-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF E.S.-A. AND A.S.-A., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 108th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 098234-E-FM, Honorable Timothy Pirtle, Presiding

August 18, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, L. S., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights

to her daughters, E.S.-A. and A.S.-A.1 By three issues, she maintains the evidence is

legally and factually insufficient to support (1) she constructively abandoned her children,

(2) she failed to complete her service plan, and (3) the best interest finding. By her fourth

1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to them by their initials.
See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 109.002(d). See also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). The father’s rights were also terminated but he
did not appeal.

L.S. has an older daughter with another man. A termination proceeding involving that child was
tried simultaneously with E.S.-A. and A.S.-A.’s case but did not result in termination of Mother’s or that
Father’s parental rights.
issue, she asserts the drug test alleging cocaine use was unreliable. We reverse and

remand.

BACKGROUND

L.S. (Mother) and C.S. (Father One) have a daughter who was five at the time of

the final hearing and who is placed with her maternal grandmother. Mother has two

younger daughters, the subject of this appeal, with A.A. (Father Two), whom she lived

with previously for more than four years.

In July 2023, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services opened a

Family-Based Safety Service case due to domestic violence between Mother and Father

Two. A protective order was issued,2 and a safety plan was implemented which

prevented Father Two from being around his children. Several months later, Mother

drove to a parking lot with her two younger daughters to meet Father Two and his new

girlfriend to “fight” her. While there, Father Two used his vehicle to hit Mother’s vehicle.

No one was injured and there was minor damage caused. He was convicted of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to confinement for three years.

He was also convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and punishment was

assessed at twelve months. The incident triggered a referral with the Department and

the younger children were removed from Mother’s care. The two younger children were

placed together in a foster home in Lubbock. The Department initiated termination

proceedings and in October 2023, implemented a family service plan which Mother

2 The protective order expired, and it is unknown if a new one had been imposed.

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signed. The primary goal at that time was family reunification. At the final hearing, the

caseworker testified the goal changed to unrelated adoption.

During the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from the caseworker, an

investigator, all three parents, the maternal grandmother, and one of Mother’s long-time

friends. The focus of the testimony was that Mother and Father Two have a volatile

relationship and Mother completed almost all of her services early in the case but failed

to complete inpatient rehab three times to address her marihuana use.3 Her failure

resulted in suspension of her visitation. The trial court did not make any endangerment

findings under section 161.001 (b)(1). After closing arguments, the trial court announced

it would defer its ruling to review what the Department’s counsel referred to as a “tough

case.” Counsel also remarked that Mother “has done well and worked services.”

Subsequently, the trial court found as follows:

• [Mother] constructively abandoned the children who had been in the
Department’s care for not less than six months after the Department made
reasonable efforts to return the children, L.S. had not regularly visited or
maintained contact, and did not demonstrate an ability to provide a safe
environment; and

• [Mother] failed to comply with a court order specifying the actions necessary
for her to obtain the return of the children who had been in the Department’s
care for not less than nine months and who had been removed for neglect
under chapter 262 of the Family Code.

3 Mother had one positive screen for cocaine but denied its use. Her fourth issue here addresses

the unreliability of the results based on various studies. But as the Department argues, Mother waived that
issue by not complaining in the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
3
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O).4 The trial court also found termination of

Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Id. at § 161.001(b)(2).

APPLICABLE LAW

The Texas Family Code permits a court to terminate the relationship between a

parent and a child if the Department establishes at least one of the predicate grounds

under section 161.001(b)(1) of the Code and that termination of the relationship is in the

best interest of the child. See § 161.001(b)(1), (2). See also In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d

370, 377 (Tex. 2023); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976). The Due

Process Clause of the United States Constitution and section 161.001 of the Texas

Family Code require application of the heightened standard of clear and convincing

evidence in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. See In re E.N.C.,

384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). See

also § 161.206(a). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of

proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” § 101.007.

Only one statutory ground is needed to support termination though the trial court

must also find that termination is in a child’s best interest. In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888,

894–95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied). In reviewing a termination proceeding,

the standard for sufficiency of the evidence is that discussed in In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d

4 Because the referring court did not make a finding under subsections (D) or (E), we need not

address either of those grounds. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235–36 (Tex. 2019).
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101, 112–13 (Tex. 2014). In reviewing a best-interest finding, appellate courts consider,

among other evidence, the factors set forth in Holley. Id. at 116.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The natural right existing between a parent and a child is of constitutional

dimensions. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed.

2d 599 (1982). A judgment terminating parental rights is “the ‘death penalty’ of civil

cases.” In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Tex. 2021) (citation omitted). A court’s decision

to impose this penalty demands more than bureaucratic or mechanical box-checking. In

re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 381. Thus, in seeking to permanently sever the parent-child

relationship, the trial court must “observe fundamentally fair procedures.” In re E.R., 385

S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012). Consequently, termination proceedings are strictly

construed in favor of the parent. Id. at 563. Parental rights, however, are not absolute,

and it is essential that the emotional and physical interests of a child not be sacrificed

merely to preserve those rights. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).

In a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence that supports the verdict if

reasonable jurors could have done so and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable

jurors could not have done so. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 112–13. However, the

reviewing court should not disregard undisputed facts that do not support the verdict to

determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 113. In cases requiring

clear and convincing evidence, even evidence that does more than raise surmise and

suspicion will not suffice unless that evidence is capable of producing a firm belief or

conviction that the allegation is true. Id. If, after conducting a legal sufficiency review, a

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court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that

the matter that must be proven is true, then the evidence is legally insufficient. Id. (citing

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due consideration to

evidence the trier of fact could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25). We must determine whether

the evidence is such that a trier of fact could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction

about the truth of the Department’s allegations. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We

consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could not have

resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the

disputed evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could not have credited in favor of the

finding is so significant that a trier of fact could not reasonably have formed a firm belief

or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.

PREDICATE GROUNDS

Assuming, without deciding, the Department provided clear and convincing

evidence of predicate grounds (N), (O), or both, it did not demonstrate by that same

standard that termination of Mother’s parental rights to her two younger daughters was in

the children’s best interests. With an insufficient best-interest finding, the termination

order fails. In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d at 894–95.

BEST-INTEREST ANALYSIS

The Department was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

termination of Mother’s parental rights to her two younger daughters was in their best
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interests. § 161.001(b)(2); In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 116. There is a strong

presumption the best interest of a child will be served by preserving the parent-child

relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Prompt and permanent

placement of a child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the child’s best

interest. See § 263.307(a). To assess the trial court’s best-interest finding, we consider

factors enumerated in the non-exhaustive list set forth in section 263.307(b) of the Family

Code.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has set out other factors to consider when

determining the best interest of a child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Those factors

include (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now

and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;

(4) the parental abilities of the individual seeking custody; (5) the programs available to

assist the individual to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by

the individual or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed

placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing

parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions

of the parent. Id. The absence of evidence of one or more of these factors does not

preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination

is in the child’s best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.

Evidence that supports one or more statutory grounds for termination may also

constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re C.F., 134 S.W.3d 343, 354 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet.

denied). See also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013). The best-interest
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analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the

evidence as well as direct evidence. See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2011, no pet.). Additionally, a child’s need for permanence through the

establishment of a “stable, permanent home” has been recognized as the paramount

consideration in determining best interest. See In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.).

It is significant to note the trial court did not include a predicate ground of

endangerment in its termination order. Comments throughout trial described the case as

“a close call,” “this is a tough case,” and the ad litem’s recommendation for termination

was accompanied by “it is close.” As previously noted, counsel for the Department

remarked Mother “has done well, and worked services.”

All three children were initially placed in foster care in Lubbock. After the oldest

child was moved to Amarillo and placed with her maternal grandmother the visits were

virtual. All three siblings are bonded and the Department did not offer a plan for the two

younger children to stay together if and when adopted.

A docket entry in the clerk’s record indicates Mother and Father One’s parental

rights were not terminated as to the oldest daughter. The trial court, however, observed

the situation between Mother and Father One as coparents is “very different” from that of

Mother and Father Two.

Father One, described as the “non offending parent” for removal purposes, testified

Mother is a “good mother” and the children are “clean, healthy, and well taken care of.”

He did not have any safety concerns about their daughter being in her home. He

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disclosed methamphetamine use and occasional marihuana use. He admitted he does

not take required drug screens. He excused his inability to work services due to his

employment and lack of transportation.5

Father One did not have much contact with the daughter he and Mother share. He

has a younger daughter with someone else which he has visitation with on the first, third,

and fifth weekends of the month. When asked by the trial court if he could make time for

his older daughter, he responded “I’ll make the time to juggle in my daughter. It’s always

been that way.” The court observed he had not worked services and showed no effort of

wanting to make time for his older daughter. He expressed indifference at possible

termination. He testified “I really ain’t too much of a case pleader . . . I ain’t really got no

excuses. There [sic] were put there, I couldn’t work them, because I had other things

going on. Whatever you decide, that’s what you decide. I’m grown enough to accept

that.” Despite his admitted drug use, failure to work services, and very little effort in

visitation with his older daughter, the trial court did not terminate his parental rights.

Mother exercised poor judgment in continuing contact with Father Two during his

imprisonment and describing him as an “amazing” father. When she was asked whether

he was a “good choice” to have around the children, she answered “yes,” but added they

were no longer living together and would not physically be around each other on his

release from prison. The Department did not counter with any evidence Mother intended

to reconcile after Father Two’s release. Even prior to termination, he had moved on from

Mother and was in a new romantic relationship. The court’s docket entry that Mother and

5 He testified the Department denied him transportation every time he asked yet he managed to

find transportation for work.
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Father Two as coparents was problematic infers a continued relationship between them.

That concern was extinguished and became moot due to termination of his rights and his

failure to successfully appeal. Any connection between him and the two younger children

has been permanently severed. But termination of Mother’s rights to her younger children

and separate placements in different cities severs the siblings’ bond and negatively

impacts their best interests.

Mother’s inability to complete inpatient rehab weighs against her but at the time of

the final hearing, she had five months of sobriety.6 She had stable employment

throughout the proceeding but was terminated approximately a week before the final

hearing when she was unable to show for a shift due to a medical issue. She testified

that while looking for new employment, she was earning money styling hair and selling

her plasma.

The evidence shows a viable plan to keep the siblings together. Maternal

grandmother testified she is willing to assume responsibility for all three children and has

a safe and stable home with beds for all three children. She is in her late forties and is

employed as a caregiver on Saturdays and Sundays. She has no criminal history or any

mental health or drug issues. She does have some health issues but none so serious to

prevent her from working or caring for the children. She has a support system in the form

of relatives who are ready and willing to help with the children while she is at work. She

has reliable transportation which is insured and can accommodate all the children. She

6 She claimed her long period of sobriety made it difficult to be accepted in a rehab program. She

testified she contacted six different facilities which deny treatment if sobriety extends beyond three months.
The Department did not refute her testimony.
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is protective of her grandchildren and testified she would not allow any unauthorized

visitation.

The caseworker testified the maternal grandmother and the oldest child have an

appropriate relationship and are bonded. She further testified the oldest child is bonded

to her younger sisters. They enjoyed in-person visits when they were all in foster care in

Lubbock. When the oldest child moved in with her grandmother in Amarillo, the visits

continued, albeit virtually.

The caseworker testified the two younger sisters are “doing well” in foster care in

Lubbock. No other specifics on their situation were provided. Nor was any testimony

offered on a permanent placement for them or whether they would remain together. She

testified the Department’s goal for the oldest child was unrelated adoption which if

accomplished had no assurances she would enjoy a relationship with her younger sisters.

The trial court’s best-interest finding is harsh and irrevocably severs the siblings’

bond. The Department offered no plan for the future of the younger children which would

allow them to remain together.

The Department’s original goal of reunification seems disingenuous when it is

willing to sever the siblings’ bond while maternal grandmother is willing and able to

physically and emotionally care for all three children. A permanent separation among the

children would not be in their best interests.7

7 Maternal grandmother’s home study was very positive overall but was denied due to the
Department’s concerns she had not obtained a pack and play and crib from Mother. She had also not
obtained a doctor’s note to clear her to provide for the girls. Background checks for back-up caregivers
had not been returned. These concerns can be easily resolved.
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Although evidence supporting a predicate ground for termination may constitute

evidence to support a best-interest finding, it does not relieve the Department of the

heightened burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence. In re C.A.M., 633 S.W.3d

68, 75–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, no pet.). Mother was commended for mostly

completing her services except for her inability to complete inpatient rehab. She

established sobriety for five months prior to the final hearing. Considering her relationship

with her older daughter was not terminated, it strains credulity to sever the parent-child

relationship with her youngest daughters and along with it, the siblings’ bond.

The presumption of preserving the parent-child relationship should not be

rebuttable by considering the parent’s conduct prior to initiation of termination

proceedings alone. Id. at 77. Rather, the presumption is rebutted when a parent acts

contrary to a child’s best interest. Id. Here, the Department argues the domestic violence

between Mother and Father Two which led to removal of the children supports the best-

interest finding. But by using Mother’s original misconduct which led to removal, the

Department set her up for failure and deprived her of an opportunity for redemption. Id.

Preserving the siblings’ bond and safeguarding Mother’s parental rights have to

take precedence over a civil death penalty which irrevocably severs their relationship,

especially when a family member is willing and able to provide a safe and permanent

home. The presumption that the children’s best interests are served by preserving the

parent-child relationship was disregarded. Consideration of the Holley factors and the

totality of the evidence show the trial court’s best-interest finding is supported by legally,

but not factually sufficient evidence. Issue three is sustained and issues one, two, and

four are pretermitted.
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CONCLUSION

That portion of the trial court’s order terminating L.S.’s parental rights to her two

younger children is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial, including issuance

of any temporary orders concerning conservatorship and support, as well as possession

of and access to the children. Any proceedings on remand must commence within 180

days of the Court’s mandate. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4(c). The remainder of the order affecting

the parental rights of A.A., the father who did not appeal, remains undisturbed.

Alex Yarbrough
Justice

Doss, J., dissenting.

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