Canton James Echols v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00079-CR

CANTON JAMES ECHOLS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 71st District Court
Harrison County, Texas
Trial Court No. 22-0377X

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Canton James Echols stabbed Blake Reddock thirty-eight times and set Reddock’s

vehicle on fire. Echols pled guilty to murder and arson. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02

(Supp.), § 28.02(a). After a punishment trial, a Harrison County jury found the State’s

punishment enhancement allegations true and assessed sentences of life imprisonment for

murder and twenty-five years’ imprisonment for arson.

On appeal, Echols argues that the trial court erred by refusing Echols’s request to recall

Reddock’s mother and by allowing the State to make “negative personal comments” about his

counsel. We find that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling regarding Reddock’s mother was not an

abuse of discretion. We further find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling

Echols’s objection to the State’s closing argument. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I. The Trial Court’s Evidentiary Ruling Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

During punishment, Reddock’s mother, Doyleine Eaves, testified that Reddock “was

born with a condition that prevented his right arm from straightening” and his right wrist from

turning. According to Eaves, Reddock’s right arm “was locked at a 45.” Because he was bullied

often, Eaves testified that Reddock knew how to fight to defend himself.

Eaves testified that Reddock texted her to advise that he had offered a ride to a person he

did not know, who turned out to be Echols. Eaves never heard from Reddock again. According

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to Eaves, Reddock had knives at the house but did not have a knife or any sort of weapon on his

person or in the vehicle.

After several witnesses testified in Echols’s favor by stating he was not a violent person,

defense counsel stated that he wanted to have a brief hearing outside of the jury’s presence to

“put something on the record” “about potentially recalling [Eaves].” During the hearing, defense

counsel said that Eaves was familiar with Reddock’s criminal history and that he intended to

recall her to “ask . . . of [Reddock’s] assault family violence conviction, of the fact that he was

on deferred adjudication for assault family violence, [and] of the fact that he forfeited two

firearms.” The State responded by saying that it was undisputed that Echols and Reddock did

not know each other, Reddock had only offered Echols a ride, and Reddock’s criminal history

was irrelevant because Echols would have no knowledge of that criminal history. Still, defense

counsel said he would like to call Eaves before putting Echols on the stand. When asked why he

had not previously cross-examined Eaves on the issue, defense counsel said that the “door had

not been opened,” because Eaves had not represented that Reddock was a peaceful person even

though sudden passion was the main issue at the punishment trial. The trial court overruled

defense counsel’s objection.

On appeal, Echols argues that he wanted to introduce Reddock’s criminal history to show

that Reddock was the first aggressor. The State responded by stating that Echols’s argument on

appeal does not comport with his argument at trial because he did not mention “using her

testimony to buttress a sudden passion defense, or any type of mitigation defense.” Even so, the

transcript of the record shows that the trial court understood Echols’s request to recall Eaves.

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B. Standard of Review

“We review [a] trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence” for “an abuse of

discretion.” Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Abuse of

discretion occurs only if the decision is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which

reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008); see Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g).

We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d

622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We will uphold an evidentiary ruling if it was correct under

any theory of law applicable to the case. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009).

C. Analysis

When a defendant is convicted of murder, he may argue at punishment that he caused the

death of the victim while “under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an

adequate cause.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d); McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If the defendant affirmatively proves sudden passion “by a

preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a” second-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.02(d). “‘Sudden passion’ means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation

by the individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time

of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 19.02(a)(2). “‘Adequate cause’ means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger,

rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable

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of cool reflection.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(1). Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone

raises the issue of sudden passion arising from adequate cause. Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d

206, 213–14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d).

To conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to allow Echols to recall Eaves,

Reddock’s criminal history had to be relevant. “Evidence is relevant if” it tends to make the

existence of any fact of consequence “more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401(a). At trial, the State argued that Reddock’s criminal history was

irrelevant because Echols met Reddock on the day he killed him and would not have known of

his criminal history. Echols readily admits in his brief that he did not know Reddock, removing

the “apprehension-of-danger theory” of admitting the evidence. See Seidule v. State, 622 S.W.3d

480, 490 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no. pet.). Even so, Echols cites to cases

dealing with first aggressors, an issue relating to self-defense, which does not apply here.

Yet, even if Reddock’s criminal history somehow made it probable that Reddock

provoked Echols, making the criminal history relevant to the issue of sudden passion, Rule 404

of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). As a result, even if evidence

is relevant, “Rule 404 bars character evidence . . . when offered to prove . . . that the victim acted

in conformity with his violent character.” Ex parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 618–19 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (orig. proceeding).

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Here, nothing shows that the State represented that Reddock was a peaceful person. This

meant that his prior convictions could not be used for impeachment purposes. The evidence

instead supports the idea that Reddock was a fighter who had knives and knew how to fight. As

a result, Echols could not present Reddock’s criminal convictions to prove that Reddock acted in

conformance with his propensity for violence. The trial court was within its discretion to

conclude that Rule 404(b)(1) barred admissibility of Reddock’s prior convictions. Finding no

abuse of discretion, we overrule Echols’s first point of error.

II. Overruling Echols’s Jury-Argument Objection Was Not an Abuse of Discretion

On appeal, Echols argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the

State’s closing argument. We review challenges to rulings on objections to improper closing

argument for an abuse of discretion. Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when it “act[s] without reference to any guiding rules

[or] principles.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380 (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators,

Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)).

“[P]roper jury argument generally falls within one of four areas: (1) summation of the

evidence, (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence, (3) answer to an argument of opposing

counsel, and (4) plea for law enforcement.” Milton v. State, 572 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2019). Arguments that “strike[] at a defendant over the shoulders of defense counsel [are]

improper.” Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

“In examining challenges to a jury argument, [a] [c]ourt considers the remark in the

context in which it appears.” Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

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During closing argument, defense counsel represented that Echols “accepted responsibility for

[his] actions” every time he committed a crime. Echols’s counsel also argued,

[F]rom 2011 to 2019, by this prosecutor’s own account, [Echols] committed
multiple offenses, but this district attorney’s office gave him three years on felony
in possession of a firearm.

If they had the information to show that he was violent, rule breaking,
didn’t care about the world, they would have brought you that information.

As a result, Echols suggested that the district attorney did not believe him to be violent because

they offered him only three years of imprisonment on a felony offense.

As shown by this portion of the transcript, the State responded in a manner that triggered

an objection:

[BY THE STATE:] Now, [defense counsel], very unfairly -- about all
these offenses, by the way, one was under this current administration. [Defense
counsel] very unfairly as a former prosecutor himself knows there could be
problems with individual cases. Each individual case has specific facts that might
warrant a specific recommendation. Doesn’t mean that’s what he deserved, but
that’s how those work, and he knows that.

He’s unfairly trying to put it the onus on the DA’s office that, Oh, well, we
didn’t do anything to stop this. Are you kidding me? We’re somehow then
responsible for a murder, 38 times?

[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, without being difficult, I never
accused anybody, and we’re starting to strike at shoulders, so I object to that.

THE COURT: Closing argument, overruled.

On appeal, Echols argues that the State’s argument improperly struck over defense

counsel’s shoulders. “[A] prosecutor runs a risk of improperly striking at a defendant over the

shoulder of counsel when the argument is made in terms of defense counsel personally and when

the argument explicitly impugns defense counsel’s character.” Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249,
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259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The State responds by stating that its closing did not impugn

defense counsel’s character.

In this case, the trial court could have agreed with the State by determining that it had not

impugned defense counsel simply by calling his argument unfair. The trial court could have also

determined that the State’s argument was proper because it was merely responding to the

argument Echols made in his closing argument. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the

trial court acted without guiding rules or principles when overruling Echols’s objection. As a

result, an abuse of discretion is not shown, and we overrule Echols’s last point of error.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: October 21, 2025
Date Decided: November 4, 2025

Do Not Publish

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