In the Interest of G.G., G.R., G.G., and G.G., Children v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00017-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF G.G., G.R., G.G., AND G.G., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 307th District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023-1577-DR

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Mother’s

parental rights to her two daughters, Gail and Gloria, and her two sons, Gable and Gary.1

Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding that

(1) she knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that

endangered their physical or emotional well-being, (2) she engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or

emotional well-being, and (3) termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best

interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2) (Supp.).

On appeal, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support either a ground of

termination or the trial court’s best-interests finding. Because we find that legally and factually

sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

I. Sufficient Evidence Supports a Statutory Ground for Termination of Parental
Rights

In her first point of error, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that statutory grounds existed to support the

termination of her parental rights.

A. Standard of Review

“The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional

dimensions.” In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting

1
We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the children. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
2
Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to

make decisions concerning ‘the care, custody, and control of their children.’” Id. (quoting Troxel

v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). “Because the termination of parental rights implicates

fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at

trial.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). “This Court is . . . required to

‘engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to

support the termination of parental rights.’” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500).

“[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied)

(quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20)).

“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that

termination is in the child’s best interest.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In re

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is that ‘degree of

proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of

the allegations sought to be established.’” Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (citing

In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009))). “This standard of proof necessarily affects our

review of the evidence.” Id.

“In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920

3
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005)

(per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). “We

assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a

reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have

reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id. (citing In re

J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).

“In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial

court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209

S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). “We consider only that evidence the fact-finder

reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘“whether the evidence is

such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the

. . . allegations.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002))) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex.

2002)). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could

not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably

have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. (quoting

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). “‘[I]n making this determination,’ we must undertake ‘“an

exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at

stake.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503 (quoting In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d at 26)). “We also recognize that the trial court, as the fact-finder, is the sole arbiter of

a witness’ demeanor and credibility, and it may believe all, part, or none of a witness’

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testimony.” In re A.M., No. 06-18-00012-CV, 2018 WL 3077784, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

June 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109).

“Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate

parental rights, ‘“the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is

paramount.”’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex.

2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994))) (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d

534, 547 (Tex. 2003)). “A child’s emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely

to preserve parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)).

B. The Evidence at Trial

Brittany Mosley, an investigator for the Department, testified that she received an intake

involving “concerns of drug use with the vulnerable children in the home,” specifically that

Mother was using methamphetamine and was allowing “strange men into her home.” As a

result, Mosley began her investigation in August 2023 by going to Mother’s home. Mosley

testified that Mother opened the door but did not allow her inside. Mosley noticed that Mother

had not combed her hair or two-year-old Gloria’s hair and that Mother’s and Gloria’s clothing

appeared “dingy and dirty.”

Mother refused to provide the name of the men coming into her home and denied the

allegations of drug use. She agreed to take a drug test, but her drug test was positive for

methamphetamine. Gloria’s drug test was also positive for methamphetamine. At that point,

Mother admitted she used methamphetamine but claimed that it was only while her children

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were playing outside. That signaled to Mosley that Mother was using drugs while caring for the

children. During her investigation, Mosley learned that Mother had a prior history with Child

Protective Services (CPS) involving allegations of drug abuse, had previously been given a

family service plan, and had not complied with the provisions of the plan, which resulted in

removal of the three oldest children from Mother’s home in 2018. Even so, they were eventually

returned to her care.

Mosley believed that Mother needed either inpatient or outpatient drug treatment.

Jhazmyne Johnson, a caseworker for the Department, built Mother’s most recent family service

plan with those considerations in mind, which the trial court ordered Mother to comply with on

September 27, 2023. Johnson also attempted to discuss the terms of the family service plan with

Mother, but Mother canceled the meeting a few times, would not return Johnson’s phone calls

and text messages, and would not sign the family service plan that Johnson eventually left in

Mother’s mailbox, despite the trial court’s order requiring her compliance.

Johnson testified that Mother failed to complete counseling and parenting classes and had

several presumed positive drug tests because Mother failed to take them. Johnson also testified

that she observed one visit between Mother and her children, found the visit appropriate, and

noticed that the children were bonded to Mother, who was bonded to them. However, Mother

admitted that she missed several visits with the children. When asked if she attended visits with

her children while under the influence, Mother said, “I don’t remember.”

The evidence also shows that Mother had several arrests during the pendency of the case.

Matthew Prescott, a detective with the Longview Police Department (LPD), testified that on

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November 10, 2023, he arrested Mother for possession of Xanax, methamphetamine, and ecstasy

located in her purse.

Darrell Youngblood, an officer with the LPD, testified that when he stopped Mother on

July 11, 2024, for an expired registration, her passenger exited the vehicle and fled on foot.

Youngblood said he was able to capture the passenger and discovered narcotics in his pocket.

As a result, Youngblood extended Mother’s traffic stop to search the vehicle. Youngblood

testified that he located a lockbox on the floorboard of the driver’s seat where Mother was

sitting, obtained the code from Mother, and found a “crystal-like substance” that he identified,

based on his training and experience, as methamphetamine. As a result, Youngblood arrested

Mother on a third-degree felony charge for possession of a controlled substance.

Mother knew she had a long history of drug use and was addicted to drugs. She testified

that she had been placed in two inpatient treatment facilities and was currently residing in a

second sober living facility. Mother admitted she had been arrested four times during the

pendency of the case and had a pending felony case open for credit or debit card abuse. Mother

had obtained a job at Subway, saved to obtain transportation, but had not obtained housing for

the children and did not have a plan for them. She was also attending counseling.

Mother testified that Gail wanted to be with her and her siblings and said that Gary

wanted to come home. Mother could not imagine being kept from her children and begged the

trial court not to terminate her parental rights. According to Mother, the children were depressed

and anxious because of their removal, but Mother agreed they would be devastated if they were

7
returned to her only to be removed again. Mother also knew that a relapse would result in jail

time and that she would have no plan for the children.

After hearing that evidence, the trial court found that the evidence was sufficient to

support statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Mother challenges the trial court’s findings under both grounds: D and E.

C. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Ground D and E Findings

“Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a

judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best

interest.” Id. at 923 (quoting In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet.

denied) (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362) (citing In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.))). Even so, when the trial court’s findings under grounds D or

E are challenged on appeal, due process demands that we review the evidence supporting the

findings under both grounds. In re C.C., No. 06-25-00004-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2025 WL

2147793, at *8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 30, 2025, no pet. h.).

This is because termination of parental rights under these grounds may implicate the

parent’s parental rights to other children. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M)

(Supp.) (providing as a ground for termination of parental rights that the parent “had his or her

parent-child relationship terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that the

parent’s conduct was in violation of Paragraph (D) or (E)”). Ground D permits termination of

parental rights “if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . .

knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which

8
endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D). Ground E permits termination of parental rights “if the court finds by clear

and convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the

child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-

being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Ground D focuses on

endangering factors in the child’s environment, and ground E focuses on a parent’s endangering

conduct.

Endanger “means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a

less-than-ideal family environment.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012).

“‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v.

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d 358, 367 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533); see In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at

923. “It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer

injury.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923.

Under Ground “(E), it is sufficient that the child’s well-being is jeopardized or exposed to

loss or injury.” Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367). “Further,

termination under [Ground] (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission. Instead, a

‘voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.’” Id. (quoting

Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2004, no pet.) (citing In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.)));

see Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 366–67.

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“Ground E ‘refers only to the parent’s conduct, as evidenced not only by the parent’s

acts, but also by the parent’s omissions or failures to act.’” In re R.G., No. 06-24-00035-CV,

2024 WL 4142842, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting

In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)). “The endangering

conduct may also occur ‘either before or after the child’s removal by the Department.’” Id.

(quoting In re Z.J., No. 02-19-00118-CV, 2019 WL 6205252, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Nov. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied))). In our analysis

under Ground E, we may also consider a parent’s failure to complete relevant requirements of a

family service plan. In re Z.J., No. 02-19-00118-CV, 2019 WL 6205252, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re U.H.R., No. 07-18-00318-CV, 2019

WL 81874, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The evidence at trial showed, and Mother admitted, that she had a long history of drug

abuse and that the Department had previously removed three of the children in 2018 because of

it. Even so, Mother continued to use drugs while the children were in her care and continued to

invite strange men into her home. Mother’s methamphetamine was found in Gloria’s system,

who tested positive for the drug at two years old. Although her children were again removed

from her, Mother had two drug arrests during the pendency of the case and missed her court-

ordered drug testing, which resulted in presumed positive drug tests. She was found in

possession of methamphetamine, Xanax, and ecstasy.

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“‘Because it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or

imprisoned, illegal drug use may support termination under’ Ground E.” In re H.M.J., No. 06-

18-00009-CV, 2018 WL 3028980, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (quoting In re A.L., No. 06-14-00050-CV, 2014 WL 5204888, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617)). Mother’s “failure to

remain drug-free while under the Department’s supervision will support a finding of endangering

conduct under [Ground] (E) . . . .” Id. (quoting In re J.A.W., No. 02-08-215-CV, 2009 WL

579287, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (citing

Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 190 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied))). Also, the evidence shows that, after the children’s removal,

Mother continued to associate with men who possessed drugs. She also had two non-drug-

related offenses, including a felony arrest for debit or credit card abuse.

“[I]llegal drug use by a parent . . . supports the conclusion that the children’s

surroundings endanger their physical or emotional well-being.” In re D.R., 631 S.W.3d 826, 834

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (alteration in original) (quoting In re K.B., No. 06-20-

00074-CV, 2020 WL 7702179, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing In re N.B., No. 06-12-00007-CV, 2012 WL 1605457, at *9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May

8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[U]nlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s home or

with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in his home is a part of the

‘conditions or surroundings’ of the child’s home under [Ground] D.” (second alteration in

11
original) (quoting Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,

pet. denied))))).

Based on the testimony at trial, the trial court could find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical

and emotional well-being and that she knowingly placed or knowingly allowed her children to

remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

We overrule Mother’s first point of error.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Best-Interests Finding

Next, Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the

trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

A. Standard of Review

“There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best

interest.” In re R.G., 2024 WL 4142842, at *6 (quoting In re J.A.S., Jr., No. 13-12-00612-CV,

2013 WL 782692, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 28, 2013, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (citing In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam))). “Termination

‘“can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons.”’” In re N.L.D., 412

S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d

349, 352 (Tex. 1976)).

In determining the best interests of a child, courts consider the following Holley2 factors:

(1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now
and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in

2
See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976).
12
the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals, (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent
that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9)
any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Id. at 819 (citing Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807; see also TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).

The Department is not required to present proof of each Holley factor. See In re M.C.,

482 S.W.3d 675, 688 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at

27). “When considering the child’s best interest, we may take into account that a parent is

unable to provide adequate care for a child, lacks parenting skills, or exercises poor judgment.”

Id. (citing In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)). “Parental

drug abuse, which reflects poor judgment, is also a factor that may be considered when

determining the child’s best interest.” Id. (citing In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2007, no pet.)). “[T]he parent’s . . . past performance as a parent [is] relevant in

determining the child’s best interest.” Id. (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28). Further, we may

consider evidence used to support the grounds for termination of parental rights in the best-

interest analysis. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002).

B. The Evidence at Trial

In addition to the evidence recited above, the trial court heard evidence regarding the

children’s best interests.

Marie Zoungrana, a permanency specialist with 4Kids4Families, testified that Gail, who

was seventeen at trial, was placed in a relative’s home. Because she was almost an adult, the

13
Department’s plan for Gail was to have the Department become her permanent managing

conservator so she could remain with the relative until her age of majority. Zoungrana testified

that Gable was placed with his father, who gave the Department no concern, and that Gary and

Gloria were placed in a stable adoptive home. Zoungrana testified that it was in Gable’s best

interests to remain with his father, that it was in Gary’s best interests to remain in his adoptive

home, and that it was in Gloria’s best interests to be placed in one of the approved foster

placements who wanted to adopt her. Zoungrana agreed that Gail and Gary wanted to return to

Mother and that Gable loved Mother and wanted to see her. Zoungrana also said that Mother’s

last drug test result was negative and that Mother had completed many items of her family

service plan and was doing well in the sober living facility.

Mother’s godmother, Janet, testified that Gary and Gloria were placed in her home, that

they all loved each other, and that the children called her “mom.” Even so, Janet said that, at

first, Gary would be upset after visits with his Mother because he wanted to go back to his old

home but was doing better after Mother moved into a sober living facility and could not visit.

According to Janet, when the children first arrived, they would only eat cereal and nothing else,

and she had to introduce them to different foods. Janet testified that Gary was seeing a

psychiatrist who was helping him. Janet testified that it was in the children’s best interests for

Gary and Gloria to remain with her because they needed “normalcy” and offered to also take

Gail and Gable. She testified that she wanted to adopt the children.

Christie, the children’s maternal grandmother, testified that Gail was doing wonderfully

in her placement. Even so, Christie believed that all the children should be returned to Mother,

14
who had “improved so much.” Christie testified that the children were attached to Mother and

that it was not in their best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Christie noted

that the children did well in school, that Mother made sure they did their bookwork, and that

even Gloria exhibited advanced knowledge for her age.

Betty, Christie’s good friend, testified that Gail was in her care and doing well and that

she was willing to be a permanent placement for her. Betty testified that the children were all

bonded to Mother, who was bonded to them.

Randy, Gable’s father and Gable’s placement, testified that Gable’s grades had improved

since he was first placed with him. Randy said that Gable would act out in school after visits

with Mother. Randy believed that Gable should not be made to go through a third CPS removal

but also said it would be detrimental to Gable to keep Mother from him if she were sober.

Jackie Starr, the Court Appointed Special Advocate, recommended that all the children

remain with their current placements and that Mother’s parental rights be terminated because it

was the only way “to ensure that these children have stable permanency.”

C. Analysis of the Holley Factors

As for the first factor, Gloria was too young to speak her desires. Even so, Mother,

Johnson, Zoungrana, Christie, Betty, and Randy all testified that Mother was bonded to the

children, who were bonded to her. There was also express testimony that Gail and Gary wanted

to return to Mother and Gable would be devastated if he was kept from Mother. As a result, and

due to the fundamental interests implicated in terminating a parent-child relationship, we find

that the first Holley factor weighs in Mother’s favor.

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Next, the emotional and physical needs of Gail, who was almost an adult, was less than

those of her siblings, but the record also shows that Gail was found using a “THC vape pen.”

Janet testified that seven-year-old Gary needed psychiatric treatment, and the record shows that

then four-year-old Gloria’s and eleven-year-old Gable’s physical and emotional needs were great

given their young age. The older three children had been previously removed from Mother due

to allegations of drug abuse, and the record shows they suffered emotionally from that incident.

Even so, the evidence at trial shows that Mother continued to use drugs and physically

endangered Gloria, who tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother had placed all four

children in danger by using methamphetamine while they were in her care. Mosley testified that

methamphetamine use impaired Mother’s ability to parent and endangered the children because

she could not “pay attention to all of them while being under the influence of

methamphetamines.” Also, Mother was homeless and unemployed, and “[a] parent who lacks

stability, income, and a home is unable to provide for a child’s emotional and physical needs.” 3

In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (alteration

in original) (quoting In re J.R.W., No. 14-12-00850-CV, 2013 WL 507325, at *9 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 12, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). We find that the second and third

Holley factors weigh in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Next, Mother’s refusal to provide the names of the strange men coming into her home

and her drug use while the children were in her care demonstrates a lack of parental ability.

3
Johnson testified that Mother was required to provide her paycheck stubs to the Department since her family
service plan required her to maintain employment, but she failed to do so. According to Johnson, Mother was
evicted from her home and failed to provide Johnson with her new address.
16
Mother missed visits with the children during the pendency of the case and answered, “I don’t

remember,” to the question of whether she was under the influence during her visitations. She

also continued to commit crimes during the pendency of the case and was facing felony charges.

Accordingly, we find the fourth Holley factor weighs in favor of terminating Mother’s parental

rights.

As for the programs available to assist Mother, the record shows that Mother had a

previous CPS case that resulted in the removal of her three oldest children, had been offered a

family service plan at that time, and failed to comply with the terms of that family service plan.

Johnson testified that she created a new family service plan for Mother in the current case, but

that Mother refused to sign the plan, canceled meetings to discuss the plan, and did not complete

it. Mother also initially refused the Department’s offer to provide daycare for the children.

Although Mother had been to inpatient treatment and was in a sober living facility, the trial court

could find there was no guarantee of her continued sobriety after she left the facility. In light of

Mother’s failure to avail herself of the assistance provided by the Department, we find that the

fifth Holley factor weighs against her.

As for the sixth factor, the Department presented ample evidence of the plans for the

children, which consisted of the children remaining in their current placements. Mother, who did

not have a home, admitted at trial that she had no place for the children to go if they were

returned to her.4 Accordingly, the sixth Holley factor weighs against Mother.

4
Mother testified, “I wouldn’t know what my plan would be since it’s like I don't know my plan now. I mean, I
know where they’re at, but you’re asking me about something futuristically that far out. I can’t think past this point
as I’m siting here.”
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As for the remaining factors, “[e]vidence of past misconduct or neglect can be used to

measure a parent’s future conduct.” In re Z.M., 456 S.W.3d 677, 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2015, no pet.) (quoting In re I.R.K.-N., No. 10-13-00455-CV, 2014 WL 2069281, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Waco May 15, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d

436, 451 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex.

App.—Waco 1992, no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”))). The record shows that Mother’s home

was unstable due to drug use and because Mother allowed strange men, whom she refused to

identify, into her home. Mother’s three older children had been previously removed from her

and, while being aware of the dangers of another CPS investigation, Mother continued to use

methamphetamine, which demonstrated that the existing parent-child relationship was not

appropriate. Despite knowing that she had to submit negative drug tests, Mother missed several

drug tests, continued to possess illegal drugs, and was arrested four times during the pendency of

this case. Mother had no excuse for her drug use or recent criminal activity, which included a

pending felony charge. In light of this evidence, we find that the last three Holley factors weigh

in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights.

After weighing the Holley factors, we conclude that legally and factually sufficient

evidence supports the trial court’s best-interests finding against Mother. As a result, we overrule

Mother’s last point of error.

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III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: July 17, 2025
Date Decided: August 18, 2025

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