Christopher James Williamson v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00201-CR

CHRISTOPHER JAMES WILLIAMSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 123rd District Court
Panola County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024-C-151

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Panola County bench trial led to Christopher James Williamson’s conviction for

possession of child pornography and sentence of seventy-five years’ imprisonment. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(d)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp.). On appeal, Williamson argues that the trial

court abused its discretion by admitting a search warrant, a supporting affidavit, and a telephone

company’s records over his hearsay objections.1 Because we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence during a bench trial, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Travis Monk, a criminal investigator with the Collin County Sheriff’s Office, testified

that he obtained pornography online while he was operating undercover from a specific internet

protocol (IP) address, which “is unique to a host, to a router.” Monk said that he reached out to

special agent Dan Collins with the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) to report his

findings.

Collins confirmed that Monk’s “undercover computer program” downloaded child

pornography recordings coming from a specific IP address. Collins sent a subpoena to AT&T to

obtain records associated with the IP address. Collins testified that the subpoena resulted in the

revelation that the physical address associated with the IP address was 706 Church Street in

Carthage, Texas. From there, Collins conducted surveillance on the address and obtained a

1
In companion cause numbers 06-24-00202-CR through 06-24-00210-CR, Williamson appeals from nine other
convictions for possession of child pornography.
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warrant to search the home for electronic devices from the same judge that would later conduct

the bench trial.

Collins testified that Williamson, his brother, and his grandfather were at the residence

when the search warrant was executed with assistance from Samuel Nowell and Russell Clay

Steelman, who were both DPS special agents. Nowell and Steelman testified that Williamson

was the subject of the search warrant. Nowell, who was responsible for photographing evidence

found at the location, testified that he located evidence of child pornography on a desktop

computer and confiscated it. Without objection, the State introduced exhibit 22, which depicted

the images of child pornography. According to Nowell, five electronic devices were seized

during the search.

According to Steelman, the desktop computer monitor had Williamson’s name as the

profile. Steelman testified that Williamson provided the password to access the computer and

that, when accessed, he “open[ed] a file and s[aw] thumbnails of multiple images that were

obviously child porn.” Steelman described exhibit 22 as “multiple thumbnails of pornographic

activities being conducted by obvious underage children.”

Collins also testified that Williamson provided him with the password to his desktop

computer and that Collins viewed approximately six images and eighteen recordings on the

computer that depicted child pornography. Without objection, the State introduced exhibit 11,

which contained recordings depicting sexual assault of a child that were the subjects of the

indictments in this case and Williamson’s companion cases. Also, without objection, the State

admitted exhibit 12, Collins’s body-camera footage from the day the search warrant was

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executed. Collins testified, and his body-camera footage shows, that Williamson readily

admitted that he had child pornography on his desktop computer.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court found Williamson guilty of possession of child

pornography.

II. Standard of Review

“We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion.” Flowers v. State, 438 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d)

(citing Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “Abuse of discretion

occurs only if the decision is ‘so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable

people might disagree.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on

reh’g))). “We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court.” Id. (citing Moses

v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “We will uphold an evidentiary ruling if

it was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. (citing De La Paz v. State, 279

S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting the Evidence

During Collins’s testimony, Williamson objected to the admission of Collins’s affidavit

supporting the search warrant and the search warrant that had been signed by the trial judge “on

the basis of hearsay and bolstering the testimony of this witness.” The trial court immediately

overruled the objection. Williamson lodged the same objection to AT&T’s return of the

subpoena, which showed that the IP address belonged to the residence Williamson lived in and

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listed chrisw006@hotmail.com as the service address. The trial court also overruled that

objection.2 On appeal, Williamson argues that the trial court erred by overruling his hearsay

objections.

“Hearsay is a statement . . . other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial, which is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Richter v. State, 482 S.W.3d

288, 299–300 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (quoting Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330,

347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 801(d))). “An extrajudicial statement or

writing which is offered for the purpose of showing what was said rather than for the truth of the

matter stated therein does not constitute hearsay.” Id. at 300 (quoting Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at

347). “Thus, statements offered to explain how a defendant came to be a suspect of a crime are

not hearsay.” Id. (citing Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 347). Here, the State admitted the search

warrant, accompanying affidavit, and AT&T’s response to the subpoena, not for the truth of the

matter asserted but to show how Williamson became the suspect of Collins’s investigation.

Moreover, even had there been error in the admission of the evidence, we cannot see how

Williamson was harmed by it. The erroneous admission of hearsay testimony is non-

constitutional error and is disregarded unless the defendant’s substantial rights are affected. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “An

error does not affect substantial rights if the appellate court has ‘a fair assurance from an

examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the [fact-finder], or had but

2
On appeal, Williamson appears to raise an authentication issue with respect to the information submitted by AT&T
in response to the subpoena. However, Williamson did not raise any authentication issue with the trial court.
Because his authentication issue on appeal does not comport with the hearsay issue raised at trial, it was not
preserved. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
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a slight effect.’” Macedo, 629 S.W.3d at 240 (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).

By the time the State offered the search warrant, affidavit, and AT&T’s response, Monk,

Nowell, and Steelman had already testified. As a result, the trial judge had already heard that

Williamson admitted that the desktop containing the child pornography was his and that Nowell

and Steelman had found child pornography on the computer. Also, after the admission of the

objected-to evidence, the trial judge viewed Collins’s body-camera footage showing that

Williamson admitted to possessing child pornography. The images of the child pornography

located on Williamson’s computer were admitted without objection. Lastly, this was a bench

trial, and “it is presumed that the judge ignores improper testimony.” Richter, 482 S.W.3d at 300

(citing Ozack v. State, 646 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). Accordingly, even had

any evidence been improperly admitted, it would have been harmless. Id.

For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Williamson’s points of error related to the

admission of the search warrant, the affidavit in support, and AT&T’s records.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: May 21, 2025
Date Decided: May 22, 2025

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