Karen Kay Phillips v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00141-CR

KAREN KAY PHILLIPS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Smith County, Texas
Trial Court No. 002-2054-23

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Smith County jury found its former county clerk, Karen Kay Phillips, guilty of

interfering with public duties, a class B misdemeanor, in connection with an officer’s arrest of

her son, Derek Phillips. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(b). After a sentencing hearing, the

trial court sentenced Phillips to thirty days’ confinement in jail and ordered her to pay a $500.00

fine but suspended the sentence in favor of placing Phillips on community supervision for one

year.

On appeal, Phillips argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress and

contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt.1 She also

argues that a subpoenaed witness’s failure to testify violated her Confrontation Clause rights.

We find that the trial court properly denied Phillips’s suppression motion and that legally

sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of guilt. We also find that Phillips failed to

preserve her Confrontation Clause complaint. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. The Trial Court Properly Overruled Phillips’s Suppression Motion

Phillips filed a motion to suppress evidence “obtained as a result of an illegal warrantless

entry into her residence.” The State argues that there was no search or seizure related to

Phillips’s offense on the day of the incident, that Phillips’s cell phone was later seized pursuant

to a warrant, and that Phillips does not challenge the validity of the seizure of her cell phone,

which contained recordings of the incident. The State also argues that the exclusionary rule does

1
Originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the
precedent of the Twelfth Court of Appeals in deciding the issues presented. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
not apply because Phillips committed a new independent offense after any alleged unlawful entry

into her home. To fully appreciate Phillips’s arguments, we explain the circumstances

surrounding the officer’s warrantless entry into her home.

A. The Suppression Hearing

Evidence at the suppression hearing showed that this incident arose out of a March 28,

2023, traffic stop of Cody Voss that went awry after Phillips’s thirty-six-year-old son, Derek,

interfered with the traffic stop. A recording of the incident admitted by Phillips shows that

Jonathan Peters, a deputy with the Smith County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO), pulled Voss’s vehicle

over at night for not having working taillights. Voss and Derek, who was in his own vehicle,

pulled into Phillips’s driveway. Voss and Derek immediately exited their vehicles and began

recording the traffic stop on their cell phones as Peters exited his patrol car.

The recording shows that Voss began mistakenly arguing with Phillips that his lack of

taillights was not a crime, and Derek also began arguing with and yelling at Peters. See TEX.

TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 547.004, 547.322 (explaining that failure to have working taillights is a

misdemeanor offense). Voss refused to provide identification, another crime pursuant to Section

38.02 of the Texas Penal Code, and was placed in handcuffs. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 38.02 (Supp.). At that point, Derek became extremely belligerent, repeatedly interfered with

Peters’s traffic stop, threatened Peters’s job, and falsely accused Peters of kidnapping Voss.

Derek yelled multiple obscenities at Peters. The recording demonstrates Peters’s difficulty in

apprehending Voss on his own as Derek came closer to him while unhinged.

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At the suppression hearing, Phillips did not contest those facts. She testified that she

went outside after seeing red and blue lights at her window and found Derek and Voss outside.

According to Phillips, Voss was in handcuffs, and she approached Peters, who said that Voss

failed to provide him with identification after being pulled over for malfunctioning taillights.

Phillips went inside, obtained her cell phone, and began recording the incident with her phone

from the open garage.

SCSO deputy, Riley Rugg, arrived as backup to Peters. By that time, Derek had retreated

from the driveway into the open garage but was still yelling. According to Phillips, Rugg asked

Derek “to come out” of the garage, but Derek refused because “[h]e did not want to go outside

the home.” Derek then told Rugg to come to him, and Rugg agreed.

At that point, Phillips said that both officers charged into the garage and passed her while

Derek ran into the house. Both officers pursued Derek into a bedroom to arrest him for

interfering with a traffic stop. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(b). Derek required the

officers to tackle him and struggle to restrain him while screaming. Derek was found guilty by a

jury of interference with a public servant and resisting arrest while inside of Phillips’s home.

Phillips’s offense resulted from her reaction to Derek’s arrest. Recordings of the incident

show that Phillips yelled at the officers to leave her house while Derek told them to get away

from him. Phillips also repeatedly refused the officers’ instructions to get back and instead

remained close to Derek while recording the incident on her cell phone. The State accused her of

poking an officer and blocking the officers’ exit from the bedroom, but Phillips testified that she

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was getting their attention because Derek’s glasses were knocked to the floor during his arrest,

and she was concerned that Derek could not see without them because he was legally blind.

When questioned about what evidence she sought to suppress, Phillips argued that the

footage of the body cameras worn by the officers showing her reaction after they entered her

home without her permission should not be admitted into evidence. Even so, Phillips clarified

that there was no search of her residence or seizure of any item and that she was not arrested

until April 4, 2023.

After reviewing the evidence, which included the recordings taken by Phillips that were

admitted into evidence, the trial court denied Phillips’s suppression motion.

B. Standard of Review

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard.”

Johnson v. State, 682 S.W.3d 638, 647 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2024, pet. ref’d) (citing Hubert v.

State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress is

generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. (citing Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d

43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008)).

“We give almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts,

especially if those determinations turn on witness credibility or demeanor and review de novo the

trial court’s application of the law to facts not based on an evaluation of credibility and

demeanor.” Id. (citing Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). “At a

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suppression hearing, a trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’

credibility.” Id. (citing Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

“Accordingly, a trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s

testimony.” Id. (citing State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “However, a

trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.” Id.

(citing State v. Kurtz, 152 S.W.3d 72, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). “Thus, a failure by a trial

court to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Kurtz,

152 S.W.3d at 81).

The Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In order to legally “cross the threshold of a private residence, . . . the

State must leap two hurdles.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

“Probable cause that points like a beacon toward the location (but not necessarily any particular

person) is the first hurdle.” Id. The court in Dansby v. State stated,

Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists if, at the moment the arrest is made,
the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge, and of which
he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the person arrested had committed or was committing an offense.

Dansby v. State, 530 S.W.3d 213, 220–21 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Amador v.

State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). “The second hurdle is that exigent

circumstances, those which justify an immediate need to enter a residence without first obtaining

a search warrant, must also exist.” Parker, 206 S.W.3d at 597 (citing Estrada v. State, 154

S.W.3d 604, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “If either probable cause or exigent circumstances
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are not established, a warrantless entry will not pass muster under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

In our review,

Just as an officer, in the heat of the moment, will use all facts available to him in
deciding whether to enter a home without a warrant, so must [we] analyze each
piece of evidence as part of the totality of information, as it relates to both the
probable cause and the exigent circumstances determinations.

Id. at 601.

C. Analysis

Here, the evidence meets the first Parker factor, and Phillips does not argue otherwise.

See id. at 597. The trial court entered written findings that Derek “was approaching and yelling

at the deputy while he attempted to conduct the traffic stop,” that Phillips “also approached

Deputy Peters at [that] point,” that Derek and Phillips retreated into the garage after Rugg

arrived, and that Derek refused Rugg’s orders to come to him and instead “ran into the interior of

the residence.” As a result, the trial court found that “Rugg and Peters pursued [Derek] into the

residence and took him into custody.” Based on those facts, the trial court concluded that

officers had exigent circumstances to enter the residence, a conclusion that we examine.

The record establishes that Voss was properly detained by Peters for the defective

taillights since “[a] temporary detention is justified when a person commits a traffic violation in

an officer’s presence.” McFadden v. State, 283 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009,

no pet.) (citing Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Once Voss failed

to provide his identification, he committed a crime in Peters’s presence that justified his arrest.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02. Derek committed the crime of interfering with Peters’s

public duties during Voss’s arrest. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15. It is well-known that
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exigent circumstances are an exception to the warrant requirement, and “hot pursuit of a fleeing

suspect” is an exigent circumstance that allows “[p]olice officers [to] enter [a] premises without

a warrant.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141,

149 (2013). Such an action can be seen as reasonable to “prevent a suspect’s escape.” Lange v.

California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021) (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 91 (1990)).

But, in Lange, the United States Supreme Court noted that, while “[a] great many

misdemeanor pursuits involve exigencies allowing warrantless entry” into a home without

permission, “whether a given one does so turns on the particular facts of the case.” Id. at 299.

Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding, that Derek’s offenses were

non-serious misdemeanors that required a warrant.

Even so, the trial court also overruled Phillips’s suppression motion on another ground.

The trial court found that “[n]o search was conducted of [Phillips] or her residence on March 28,

2023,” and that she was not arrested on that date. Instead, the trial court found that Phillips,

while inside the home, “approached the deputies as they were attempting to detain [Derek] and

then reached between the deputies and [Derek] while standing in between them and the door,”

that that provided evidence of a “new and independent offense,” and that Phillips was arrested

after warrants were obtained on April 4, 2023. Based on those facts, the trial court concluded

that “[e]vidence of a new and independent offense committed while in a residence and in the

presence of a law enforcement officer, even after an unauthorized entry into a residence, is

admissible.” We must examine this reasoning for overruling Phillips’s motion.

The Texas exclusionary rule states,

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No evidence obtained by an officer . . . in violation of any provisions of the
Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the
United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the
trial of any criminal case.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a). As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has

explained, the phrase “obtained in violation of the law” contained within Article 38.23

“contemplates that a crime has been committed; that evidence of that crime exists; and that

officers violate the law in attempting to obtain evidence of the previously committed crime.”

State v. Mayorga, 901 S.W.2d 943, 945–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (emphasis added). As a

result, to violate Article 38.23, “the officers must act illegally in obtaining existing evidence” of

a prior offense. Id. at 946.

Here, even assuming the officers entered Phillips’s home illegally, Derek committed the

offense of resisting arrest while in the home, which fell within the “new crime” exception to the

Texas exclusionary rule. See State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);

Day v. State, 614 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (finding that the “exclusionary rule

principles . . . do not apply to the offense of evading arrest”). In applying this exception, the

Tyler Court of Appeals has found that there is no “common law right to resist an unlawful arrest”

because “the use of self-help to prevent an unlawful arrest presents too great a threat to the safety

of individuals and society to be sanctioned.” Cooper v. State, 956 S.W.2d 95, 97–98 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d) (quoting Mayorga, 901 S.W.2d at 945). In explaining this

exception, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has written that, when a person resists arrest,

even where unlawful,

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the evidence of the resistance is not obtained in violation of . . . art. 38.23 . . . and
therefore, the exclusionary rule is not applicable. Excluding the evidence in a
case such as this would have no other result than to stymie a police officer in
carrying out his duties in the future.

Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d at 550 (quoting Mayorga, 901 S.W.2d at 946). Accordingly, the

exclusionary rule “does not . . . provide limitless protection to one who chooses to react illegally

to an unlawful act by a state agent.” Id. at 551.

We conclude that, just as Derek’s resisting arrest offense was “a subsequent independent

criminal act” occurring after the alleged unlawful entry into the home, Phillips’s offense of

interfering with Derek’s arrest was a subsequent independent criminal act that fell within the new

crime exception to the Texas exclusionary rule. Id. As a result, we find that the trial court

properly overruled Phillips’s suppression motion, and we overrule Phillips’s first point of error.

II. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding of Guilt

In her second point of error, Phillips argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the

jury’s verdict. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

“When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lymbery v. State, 686 S.W.3d

466, 472 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2024, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 n.19

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010)); see Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “The

factfinder is the ultimate authority on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to

their testimony.” Lymbery, 686 S.W.3d at 473 (citing Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343
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(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)). “The factfinder may accept one version of the facts and

reject another or reject any of a witness’s testimony.” Id. (citing Penagraph, 623 S.W.2d at

343).

“A reviewing court must give full deference to the factfinder’s responsibility to fairly

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from

basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “If the record contains

conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved such facts in favor of the

verdict and defer to that resolution.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 n.13; Clayton v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “In addition, we determine whether the

necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the

evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. (citing Clayton, 235

S.W.3d at 778).

“Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v.

State, 521 S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v.

State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011))). “Each fact need not point directly and

independently to the appellant’s guilt, provided that the cumulative force of all the incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id. (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).

“The factfinder may draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported

by the evidence presented at trial.” Id. (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15).

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“The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge.” Johnson, 682 S.W.3d at 650 (citing Malik v. State, 953

S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Such a charge would include one that ‘accurately

sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the [S]tate’s

burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the [S]tate’s theories of liability, and adequately

describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953

S.W.2d at 240).2

A person commits the offense of interference with public duties if that “person with

criminal negligence interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with . . . a peace officer

while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law.”

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(a)(1). Here, the State alleged that Phillips “did then and there

while Jonathan Peters, . . . a peace officer, was performing a duty or exercising authority

imposed or granted by law, namely attempting to detain Derek Phillips, with criminal

negligence, interrupt, disrupt, impede, or interfere with [Peters] by reaching between [Peters] and

Deputy Riley Rugg and Derek Phillips.”

B. The Evidence at Trial

Peters testified that, during Voss’s detention, Derek “was interjecting himself into the

traffic stop, convincing Mr. Voss not to provide his identifying information.” Peters said that

Derek approached him multiple times, causing him to focus on Derek instead of Voss.

2
Although Phillips raises a factual sufficiency complaint in her brief, we decline to conduct such a review since the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that a legal-sufficiency standard of review is indistinguishable
from a factual-sufficiency standard of review. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
12
According to Peters, Phillips came out of her home to ask what was happening. When Rugg

arrived on the scene, Peters and Rugg attempted to detain Derek, who ran into the house and into

a bedroom to prevent his detention. Peters testified that, because of Derek’s noncompliance,

they had to forcefully detain him.

According to Peters, they had a difficult time getting Derek out of the home because

Phillips was blocking the door. Peters said he “had to kind of push her out of the way so [he]

could get by” and tell her to get back, but Phillips refused to step away. Peters said that Phillips

“poked” his vest and reached her arm out to Rugg. Peters testified that Phillips impeded his

ability to perform his duties in detaining and arresting Derek. Peters’s testimony was

corroborated by his body-camera footage, which showed Phillips’s actions during Derek’s arrest.

The footage shows that Phillips grabbed Rugg, poked Peters, and stood between Peters and

Derek, and Peters and the bedroom doorway.

Philip Greanead, a detective with the SCSO, was assigned to investigate Phillips’s case.

Greanead testified that his review of the body-camera footage showed probable cause that

Phillips had interfered with a public servant. Messages retrieved from Phillips’s phone showed

that she agreed they were “using a high volume of language and language that is considered

insulting and offensive, which isn’t a crime.” Phillips also wrote that she “interrupt[ed]” a police

officer because she was “extremely confused as to why [she] wasn’t arrested as well.” Greanead

noticed that Rugg was having to swerve to get around Phillips and concluded that, after

reviewing the arrest footage, Phillips interfered with Derek’s detention.

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The jury saw a photograph of Phillips’s hands between Derek and Peters. The jury was

also read an excerpt of a federal complaint filed by Phillips against Smith County, Peters, Rugg,

Greanead, and Sheriff Larry Smith, in which Phillips admitted, “The video clearly shows me

using my pointer finger on the shoulder of Jonathan Peters and poke him four times.”

Phillips testified in her defense. Initially, she admitted that, after Rugg entered the

garage, it was her intention to stop him from detaining Derek, but she immediately recanted the

statement by saying she was protecting herself because she thought Rugg was charging toward

her. Phillips said she was in shock and did not know what was happening. Phillips testified that

she stuck her arm between Derek and Peters while they were in the bedroom to get Peters’s

attention. She also claimed that she was not interfering with the arrest but was merely trying to

get the officers to return Derek’s glasses, which had fallen to the floor, because he could not see

without them. Phillips admitted that she was grabbing her son’s arm when he was “in handcuffs

and they’re leading him out of the house.” She also admitted that she was “standing in front of

the only exit” of the bedroom but claimed there was nowhere else to go.

C. Analysis

Peters testified that Phillips impeded his ability to perform his duties in detaining and

arresting Derek. In her brief, Phillips does not contest that her actions impeded Derek’s arrest.

Instead, Phillips argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction because

(1) “there was no physical action by Phillips towards Peters,” and (2) she did not intend to

interfere with Peters’s official duties.

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As for Phillips’s first argument, it is a defense to the offense of interference with public

duties “that the interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech

only.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(d). Contrary to Phillips’s argument, the evidence

established that Phillips took physical action that impeded Peters’s arrest of Derek. The State

was required to prove in its indictment that Phillips reached between Peters, Rugg, and Derek

during the arrest. The recordings reviewed by the jury, and Phillips’s own testimony, established

that that occurred. Accordingly, the State proved the actus reus, as alleged.

Next, Phillips questions whether the State proved the mens rea element of the offense.

The State had the burden to prove that Phillips acted with “criminal negligence,” which is

defined as follows:

A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to
circumstances surrounding [her] conduct or the result of [her] conduct when [s]he
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor’s standpoint.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(d). Therefore, the State was required to prove that Phillips ought

to have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her actions interrupted, disrupted,

impeded, or otherwise interfered with Peters’s arrest of Derek and that Phillips’s failure to

perceive the risk was a “gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would

exercise.” Id.

In this case, Phillips’s offense occurred due to her failure to heed warnings to stay back

during the arrest. The evidence establishes that she kept getting close to the officers and Derek

15
while they were attempting to arrest him. Peters testified that he had to “kind of push” Phillips

“out of the way” and that Phillips refused to step back. The evidence also shows that Phillips

poked Peters, up to four times. Although Phillips testified that she was merely getting the

officers’ attention so that Derek’s glasses could be returned to him, the jury was free to reject

Phillips’s self-serving testimony. Peters also testified that Phillips blocked the bedroom door.

From the recorded evidence introduced of the incident, the jury was free to find that a person of

reasonable prudence would have obeyed the officer’s instructions instead of repeatedly

disregarding them. As a result, the jury was free to find that, when Phillips reached between

Peters and Derek during the arrest, she ought to have been aware of a substantial and

unjustifiable risk that her action interfered with Peters’s arrest of Derek or that Phillips’s failure

to perceive the risk was a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would

exercise. See id.; see also Segovia v. State, 543 S.W.3d 497, 500–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (disregarding multiple commands from a peace officer was sufficient to find

criminal negligence).

Because we find that Phillips’s conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we

overrule Phillips’s second point of error.

III. Phillips Did Not Preserve Her Confrontation Clause Complaint

At trial, the defense called Rugg, but he was not present. Phillips announced that Rugg

was subpoenaed, but did not appear. The State noted that the return of service for Rugg’s

subpoena showed that Rugg was in Colorado. In her last point of error on appeal, Phillips argues

that Rugg’s failure to appear for trial violated her Confrontation Clause rights.

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Generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the party must make her

complaint “to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion” that states the grounds for

the ruling sought “with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.”

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Confrontation Clause complaints are subject to this general preservation

requirement. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A defendant’s

failure to object on Confrontation Clause grounds at trial waives a Confrontation Clause

complaint for appellate review. Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Here, at no point did Phillips raise any Confrontation Clause complaint. Accordingly, we

conclude that Phillips’s last point of error is unpreserved, and we overrule it.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: March 17, 2025
Date Decided: April 4, 2025

Do Not Publish

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