Wanda Daniels, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carles B. Daniels v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00086-CV

WANDA DANIELS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF CARLES B. DANIELS, DECEASED, Appellant

V.

TOTAL QUALITY LOGISTICS, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2021-1518-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This Court received a petition for permissive appeal styled Wanda Daniels, Individually

and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carles B. Daniels, Deceased v. Total Quality

Logistics, LLC. As explained below, we deny the petition because Wanda Daniels died before

the filing of the petition for permissive appeal, and there has been no determination as to who is

authorized to represent her estate.

It is well-established that an appellate court’s decision to accept or deny a properly

certified permissive appeal is discretionary. See Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa

AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 731–32 (Tex. 2019); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 51.014(f) (Supp.) (court of appeals “may accept an appeal permitted by [Section 51.014(d)]” if

appealing party files petition showing why immediate appeal is warranted (emphasis added)).

We also have discretion to reject a permissive appeal “even when the requirements [for

permissive appeal] are met.” Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Refin. Co., 652 S.W.3d 11, 21

(Tex. 2022) (plurality op.).

The documents attached to the petition and a filing by Total Quality Logistics1 show that

the trial court questioned Wanda’s purported heirs’ capacity to continue the litigation in Wanda’s

name after her death. Noticing that glaring defect, we sent the parties a letter to address the

question of capacity because “[a] plaintiff must have both standing and capacity to bring a

lawsuit.” Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005) (citing Coastal

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Total Quality Logistics wrote, “[A]t this point in the litigation it is unclear if Christopher Daniels and Carles
Daniels, Jr. have the authority to represent both Wanda Daniels’ and Carles Daniels, Sr.’s Estates as the Probate
documents for each have not been finalized.”
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Liquids Transp. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001)). The issue of

standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a

“justiciable interest” in its outcome, whereas the issue of capacity “is conceived of as a

procedural issue dealing with the personal qualifications of a party to litigate.” Id. (quoting 6A

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1559 (2d ed. 1990)); see Armes v. Thompson, 222 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.); Loffler v. Univ. of Tex. Sys., 610 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).

Here, suit was originally brought by Wanda Daniels, individually and on behalf of Carles

B. Daniels, Sr., deceased. Because the appendix originally contained no suggestion of death

related to Wanda, we sent a letter to Wanda’s attorney to determine if the parties had complied

with Rules 151 and 153 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 151 provides a procedure for substitution upon the death of a plaintiff, as follows:

“If the plaintiff dies, the heirs, or the administrator or executor of such decedent may appear and

upon suggestion of such death being entered of record in open court, may be made plaintiff, and

the suit shall proceed in his or their name.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 151. Rule 153 states that, when a

plaintiff dies or ceases to be the executor or administrator of another’s estate, “the suit may be

continued by or against the person succeeding h[er] in the administration, or by or against the

heirs, upon like proceedings being had as provided in the two preceding rules.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

153.

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A response was filed by Wanda’s counsel attaching a suggestion of death filed by

Wanda’s living heirs, Carles Daniels, Jr., and Christopher Daniels, who are both residents of

Georgia. The response attached a suggestion of death filed on August 19, 2024, which was

before the petition for permissive appeal was filed on November 12, 2024. The response stated

that the trial court had inquired about the issue of capacity, and, in response, Wanda’s counsel

filed “an update of the probate matters pending in Georgia.”

A review of the suggestion of death raises questions. First, the suggestion stated that

Carles Jr. and Christopher were Wanda’s “two living children.” It did not say that the two were

the only children or that they were authorized to represent Wanda’s estate. With respect to Rule

151, “[t]he administrator or executor referred to in the rule must be an administrator or executor

appointed by the courts of Texas.” Eikel v. Burton, 530 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Further, Section 71.021 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code “provides that only a personal representative, administrator, or heir may sue on

behalf of an estate.” Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. 1998) (citing TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021(b)); see Armes, 222 S.W.3d at 83 (“[A] decedent’s estate is

not a legal entity and may not properly sue or be sued as such. In general, only the estate’s

representative has the capacity to act on behalf of the estate.” (Citation omitted)). Here, the

supplemental record establishes that Wanda’s probate is currently pending in Clayton County

Probate Court and that no one has yet been appointed to represent her estate.

Further, the suggestion of death also recognized that Wanda “brought forth claims on

behalf of the Estate of Carles B. Daniels, Sr. in this cause.” It continued, “Plaintiffs anticipate

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the need for the appointment of a new administrator.” While we received a supplemental record

showing that, on December 2, 2024, a Georgia court appointed Carles Jr. and Christopher as

temporary administrators of Carles’s estate “until a personal representative is appointed,” no

disbursements are allowed from estate expenses without further court order, and the powers of

the temporary administrators are limited. The supplemental appendix also contradicts Carles Jr.

and Christopher’s statements in the petition for permissive appeal that they were named as

plaintiffs “individually and as personal representatives of the estates of Carles B. Daniels, Sr.,

Deceased, and Wanda Daniels, Deceased” at the time the petition for permissive appeal was

filed. Nothing yet shows that the trial court here has substituted Carles Jr. and Christopher as

party plaintiffs.

Moreover, “[a]n attorney owes a legal duty only to his client.” Dutton v. Clay Dugas &

Assocs., P.C., No. 09-07-00363-CV, 2008 WL 2369149, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 12,

2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appeal after remand). The attorney in this case, R. James Amaro, was

hired by Wanda, but she is no longer alive. Because “[o]nly certain individuals can qualify to act

in the estate’s behalf,” and “only the appointed personal representative may bring survival claims

on behalf of an estate,” only the personal representative can authorize Amaro to represent

Wanda’s estate. Id. Here, Amaro filed a letter with the Court on November 12, the same day

that he filed a petition for permissive appeal, which said, “Plaintiffs’ counsels are not licensed to

practice law in Georgia and do not attempt to do so by way of this letter. Rather, the information

below is based on information obtained from Plaintiffs’ probate attorney that is licensed in

Georgia and handling both probate matters.”

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In this case, the record shows, at a minimum, that the trial court order on which

permissive appeal is sought was entered after Wanda died at a time where no one was authorized

to bring claims on her behalf. As a result, at this stage, a proper plaintiff has failed to make an

appearance. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3.

Because this matter is styled in Wanda’s name, Wanda has died, and no one has been

appointed to represent her estate, we deny the petition for permissive appeal purportedly filed on

Wanda’s behalf. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (Supp.); TEX. R. APP. P.

28.3(e)(4), (l).

Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice

Date Submitted: January 8, 2025
Date Decided: January 9, 2025

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