Renee Abel v. Lisa Morgan F/K/A Lisa W. Guichet

Reversed and Remanded and Opinion Filed December 9, 2024

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-00349-CV

RENEE ABEL, Appellant
V.
LISA MORGAN F/K/A LISA W. GUICHET, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-04663-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Carlyle, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
Appellant Renee Abel appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her case. In two

issues, Abel asserts the trial court erred by: (1) sua sponte dismissing the case for

want of jurisdiction; and (2) dismissing the case without providing prior notice or an

opportunity to cure any jurisdictional defects. We sustain Abel’s first issue, reverse

the trial court’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
In June 2020, Abel and Appellee Lisa Morgan entered a Purchase Agreement

and a Company Agreement for the purchase and operation of a prosthetics company,
AmeriStep Prosthetics, LLC (AmeriStep). Abel acted as AmeriStep’s CEO, with

Morgan acting as CFO. The relationship quickly soured, and Abel alleged Morgan

usurped Abel’s authority over AmeriStep and took a number of ultra vires actions.

Abel demanded Morgan cease from these actions and initiated the wind-up process

for the company. Abel also terminated Morgan’s position and expelled her as a

member of the LLC.

Abel filed this suit on October 22, 2020, asserting breach of the Purchase

Agreement and Company Agreement, common-law fraud, and statutory fraud. Abel

sought monetary relief over $200,000 but not more than $1,000,000. Abel also

sought appointment of a receiver or liquidator for AmeriStep. Morgan was

personally served with citation and filed an answer and counterclaims.1

On September 12, 2022, the trial court dismissed the case for want of

prosecution and failure to follow a court order. Upon Abel’s motion, the court

reinstated the case on October 17, 2022. The case was ordered to mediation, which

took place on November 27, 2023. However, Morgan apparently failed to attend.

Then, on February 26, 2024, and without prior notice, the trial court dismissed the

case for want of jurisdiction. Abel timely appealed.

1
Morgan’s trial counsel withdrew on August 10, 2021, and Morgan has since proceeded pro se.
However, she did not file a brief in this appeal.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law we

review de novo. Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849,

855 (Tex. 2002). In determining whether jurisdiction exists, we look not to the merits

of the pleader’s claims, but to the allegations in the pleadings. County of Cameron

v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). We “construe the pleadings in favor of

the plaintiff and look to the pleader’s intent.” Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air

Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).

ANALYSIS
Abel raises two issues on appeal, asserting the trial court erred by: (1) sua

sponte dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction; and (2) dismissing the case

without providing prior notice or an opportunity to cure any jurisdictional defects.

We begin by addressing the jurisdictional question.

I. The Trial Court Erred by Dismissing the Case for Want of Jurisdiction
A. Jurisdiction – Dallas County Courts at Law
Dallas County courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction with Dallas County

district courts in civil cases, regardless of the amount in controversy. TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 25.0592. In turn, Texas district courts are courts of general jurisdiction.

Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000). Our constitution

provides that the jurisdiction of a district court “consists of exclusive, appellate, and

original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where

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exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution

or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” TEX. CONST. art.

V, § 8. By statute, district courts have “the jurisdiction provided by Article V,

Section 8, of the Texas Constitution,” and “may hear and determine any cause that

is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could be

granted by either courts of law or equity.” TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 24.007-.008. And,

for district courts, the minimum amount in controversy must exceed $500, exclusive

of interest. Id. § 24.007. As a court of general jurisdiction, the presumption is the

district court has subject matter jurisdiction unless a showing can be made to the

contrary. Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75. Thus, all claims are presumed to fall

within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has

provided that they must be heard elsewhere. Id.

The district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine breach of

contract and fraud claims. Haynes v. Hawkes, No. 05-17-00304-CV, 2018 WL

3134884, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Dubai

Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75); Lewis v. Foxworth, No. 05-06-00452-CV, 2007 WL

499649, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 16, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).

B. Application
Here, without prior notice to the parties, the trial court dismissed the case

without prejudice. The court’s order of dismissal states:

Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Dallas Civil court
rules, this case is hereby dismissed for the following reason(s):
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(x) Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction
However, we do not perceive anything in the record or rules to indicate the

trial court lacked jurisdiction. The trial court is a Dallas County court at law.

Accordingly, it has concurrent jurisdiction with Dallas County district courts in civil

cases, regardless of the amount in controversy. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.0592. The

amount in controversy pleaded by Abel exceeds $500, and the claims asserted are

civil claims for breach of contract, common-law fraud, and statutory fraud. As a

court of general jurisdiction, the county court at law had jurisdiction over Abel’s

claims. See Dubai Petroleum, 12 S.W.3d at 75; Haynes, 2018 WL 3134884, at *4;

Lewis, 2007 WL 499649, at *2. None of these claims are subject to the exclusive

jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal, or administrative body.

Furthermore, Morgan was personally served with the suit and appeared by

filing an answer and counterclaims. Therefore, the trial court acquired personal

jurisdiction over Morgan. See Page v. De La Cruz, No. 05-22-00020-CV, 2023 WL

5123751, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (party waives

the absence of personal jurisdiction by making a general appearance in the case or

by failing to timely object to the court’s jurisdiction, and the filing of an answer

constitutes a general appearance) (citing Phillips v. Dallas Cnty. Child Protective

Servs. Unit, 197 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied)).2

2
We note that in her answer, Morgan pleaded Abel lacked standing because she voluntarily
withdrew from AmeriStep. Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson

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We perceive nothing in Abel’s pleadings (or the record) depriving the trial

court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court had jurisdiction over

Abel’s case. The trial court erred in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. We

sustain Abel’s first issue.

II. Failure of Notice
In her second issue, Abel complains of the trial court’s dismissal of her suit

without prior notice and an opportunity to cure any jurisdictional defect. We need

not address this issue, given our disposition of Abel’s first issue. See TEX. R. APP. P.

47.1.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in dismissing Abel’s suit for want of jurisdiction. We

reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with

our opinion and judgment.

240349f.p05 /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
JUSTICE

Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). However, Morgan did not file a plea to the jurisdiction or
otherwise move for dismissal based on the alleged lack of standing. Furthermore, the record reflects Abel
brought contract claims based on breach of the Purchase Agreement, a document Abel signed in her
individual capacity and as the manager of AmeriStep. And, even if Abel’s withdrawal from AmeriStep is
factually true, any dispute over whether a claim belongs to Abel is a dispute over capacity, not constitutional
standing. See Moser, Tr. of Est. of Mason v. Dillon Invs., LLC, 649 S.W.3d 259, 270 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2022, no pet.) (citing Pike v. Texas EMC Management, LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2020)).

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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

RENEE ABEL, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at
Law No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-24-00349-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-04663-
A.
LISA MORGAN F/K/A LISA W. Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
GUICHET, Appellee Kipness. Justices Carlyle and Garcia
participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is ORDERED that appellant RENEE ABEL recover her costs of this
appeal from appellee LISA MORGAN F/K/A LISA W. GUICHET.

Judgment entered this 9th day of December, 2024.

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