Jesus Paramo v. Luis Murillo

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 2, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00189-CV

JESUS PARAMO, Appellant
V.
LUIS MURILLO, Appellee

On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-05462

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Pedersen, III, Smith, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Smith

Pro se appellant Jesus Paramo appeals from a default judgment entered against

him in a breach of contract suit brought by appellee Luis Murillo concerning a home

that Paramo sold to Murillo. In three issues, Paramo argues the judgment should be

reversed and remanded because Murillo did not present sufficient evidence that he

made payments to the mortgage holder, Paramo was never served with notice of the

bench trial or the hearing to enter judgment, and the final judgment was entered

without a hearing before the judge who presided over the bench trial. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background

Paramo sold Murillo a house in Mesquite in January 2016. The parties agreed,

in a Wraparound Real Estate Promissory Note, that Murillo would pay the remaining

mortgage held by SunTrust Mortgage. The note was secured by a vendor’s lien and

a Wraparound Deed of Trust. Paramo appointed Murillo power of attorney over real

property transactions concerning the house, including execution of his prior

promissory note to SunTrust. Thus, the parties agreed that Murillo would make

payments directly to SunTrust to fulfill the terms of the Wraparound Note.

Shortly thereafter Paramo began serving a sentence in federal prison for an

unrelated criminal conviction. On August 10, 2017, Paramo sent Murillo a letter

from prison notifying Murillo that he was terminating his power of attorney. He sent

another letter on August 30, 2017, claiming that Murillo was in default in the amount

of $15,865.53 and had ten days to cure. Paramo then directed the trustee of the

property to begin foreclosure proceedings against Murillo’s interest in the property.

Murillo responded to Paramo’s demands by offering to tender the amount that

Paramo could show was due and owing. When Paramo did not respond, Murillo

sued Paramo for breach of contract alleging that he had paid the balance due.

Murillo also sought a declaratory judgment that Paramo had no legal or equitable

right to foreclose and that he did not owe what Paramo claimed he owed.

Paramo answered the lawsuit and filed several motions for summary judgment

or dismissal of the claims. The motions for summary judgment or dismissal were

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never ruled upon. The case proceeded to a bench trial on March 24, 2022. The trial

was held via Zoom before the Honorable Judge Staci Williams. As noted by the trial

court, Paramo did not appear:

Let the record reflect although the Defendant, Jesus Paramo, was given
notice of this trial date, was also given the Zoom link, neither Mr.
Paramo nor anyone representing him has appeared on this link. The
Court has checked the Court’s email, and there’s been no e-mail
indicating any difficulty with getting into the Zoom room.

After Murillo presented his case, the trial court found in his favor.

On September 27, 2022, Murillo moved for entry of judgment. The hearing

on Murillo’s motion was conducted by Assigned Judge Charles Stokes on January

17, 2023. Paramo appeared telephonically. When Judge Stokes asked if Paramo

agreed to the judgment being entered and signed by him, Paramo responded, “Judge,

I have no idea what this phone call is about. I didn’t get any notice or any nothing.

I have no idea.” Judge Stokes construed Paramo’s response as an opposition toward

judgment being entered and advised the parties that he would not sign the judgment

because he did not try the case and Paramo did not agree to entry. The motion was

referred to Judge Williams.

Without conducting a hearing, Judge Williams entered judgment on January

30, 2023, including a declaratory judgment that (1) Murillo is owner of the property

subject only to the deed of trust held by SunTrust Mortgage and the Wraparound

Deed of Trust held by Paramo; (2) Murillo is not in default under the promissory

note and the note has been paid in full; (3) Murillo may act as Paramo’s agent and

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attorney in fact with respect to real property transactions concerning the property;

(4) Murillo is entitled to clear title to the property once the SunTrust mortgage is

paid in full; and (5) Murillo does not owe Paramo $15,865.53, or any other amount,

as alleged by Paramo. The trial court further entered judgment that Paramo breached

his contract with Murillo by attempting to revoke his power of attorney, by refusing

to provide a pay-off amount of the alleged debt, and by refusing to accept Murillo’s

tender of payment in full. The trial court also awarded Murillo trial attorney’s fees

in the amount of $7,500, conditional appellate attorney’s fees, costs, and post-

judgment interest.

Paramo did not file a motion for new trial but did file a timely notice of appeal.

On November 28, 2023, after Paramo filed his initial brief, this Court sent Paramo a

letter notifying him that his brief failed to satisfy the following requirements of Rule

38 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure: the table of contents does not indicate

the subject matter of each issue or point, the brief does not contain an index of

authorities, the brief does not contain a concise statement of the case supported by

record references, the brief does not contain a concise statement of facts supported

by record references, and the argument section of the brief does not contain

appropriate citations to authorities or the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(b)–(d), (g),

(i). Paramo then filed a corrected brief on January 22, 2024; however, his corrected

brief, specifically the argument section, remained noncompliant.

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Briefing Waiver

In his first issue, Paramo argues that Murillo did not present evidence proving

that he made the payments due to the mortgage holder from February 2016 through

August 2017, and thus, the district court erred in declaring that Murillo had paid the

amounts due. His third issue is presented as follows:

Murillo’s attorney tried to have a judge who had not held the bench trial
sign the final judgment for this suit. The judge properly admonished
Murillo’s attorney for the stunt, but the trial judge signed the final
judgment anyways without holding her own hearing. Does this
improper conduct warrant reversal and remand for a new bench trial?

The argument section for each of these two issues consists of one paragraph with no

additional legal analysis, citation to the record, or any citations to legal authorities.

As this Court cautioned Paramo in our November 28, 2023 letter, the rules of

appellate procedure require an appellant’s brief to contain a clear and concise

argument for the contentions made with appropriate citations to legal authorities and

to the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We liberally construe pro se briefs, but

we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them

to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d

211, 211–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v.

Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978)). “We cannot remedy deficiencies in a

litigant’s brief, nor can we supply an adequate record.” Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,

126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Otherwise, pro se

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litigants would have an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel. In

re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d at 212.

“Only when we are provided with proper briefing may we discharge our

responsibility to review the appeal and make a decision that disposes of the appeal

one way or the other.” Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d

893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). We are not responsible for identifying

possible trial court error, searching the record for facts that may be favorable to a

party’s position, or doing legal research that might support a party’s contention. Id.

If we were to do so, “we would be abandoning our role as judges and become an

advocate for that party.” Id.

Because Paramo failed to properly brief issues one and three, he has presented

nothing for us to review. Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 897; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c)

(providing appellate court may affirm the appealed judgment if appellant has failed

to comply with the appellate rules). We overrule Paramo’s first and third issues.

Rule 21a Notice

In his second issue, Paramo asserts he was never served with notice of the

bench trial or the hearing on Murillo’s motion to enter judgment under Rule 21a and,

therefore, never afforded his right to defend himself. He contends that prison staff

never contacted him about the trial and that the case should be reversed and

remanded for proper service and a new bench trial.

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When a defendant has made an appearance in a suit, due process requires that

he is entitled to receive notice of the trial setting or hearing on a dispositive motion.

LBL Oil Co. v. Int’l Power Servs., Inc., 777 S.W.2d 390, 390–91 (Tex. 1989) (per

curiam) (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988)). Rule 21a

provides that, when a party does not have an email on file with the electronic filing

manager, notice “may be served in person, by mail, by commercial delivery service,

by fax, by email, or by such other manner as the court in its discretion may direct.”

TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(a). “Service by mail or commercial delivery service shall be

complete upon deposit of the document, postpaid and properly addressed, in the mail

or with a commercial delivery service.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(b)(1).

The record on appeal does not contain a notice of trial.1 However, the final

judgment provides, “On March 24, 2022, the Court called this case to trial. [Murillo]

appeared in person and through counsel of record and announced ready. [Paramo],

although given due notice of trial and the opportunity to appear via remote electronic

means, wholly failed to appear and made default.” The trial court’s statement on the

day of trial that Paramo was given notice of this trial date and also given the Zoom

link, coupled with the above recitation in the final judgment, is “prima facie evidence

1
We note that, although the record does not include a notice of the trial setting, Paramo includes in his
appendix a February 9, 2022 letter from the trial court notifying the parties of trial on March 22, 2022, at
9:00 a.m. The letter is addressed to Paramo at his address in federal prison and instructs that the trial will
be held via Zoom and that all trial announcements must be made via email and include certain information.
The letter further provides, “Once the court has determined the order in which cases will be tried, the parties
will be notified of the day and time your case will be called to trial. . . . When NO announcement is made
for defendant, defendant will be presumed ready.” In his reply brief, Paramo concedes that he received this
notice for the trial but contends that he was notified trial was to be held on March 22, 2022, not March 24.
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of proper notice and must be accepted as true in the absence of proof to the contrary.”

P. Bosco & Sons Contracting Corp. v. Conley, Lott, Nichols Mach. Co., 629 S.W.2d

142, 143 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). “To rebut this presumption, an

appellant has the burden to affirmatively show a lack of notice by affidavit or other

competent evidence.” In re B.A.E., No. 05-12-01113-CV, 2013 WL 4041551, at *2

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 9, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.). No such evidence

appears in the record before us.

Although Paramo told the judge at the hearing on the motion for entry of

judgment that he had no idea what the phone call was about and did not get notice,

he did not specifically argue that he had no notice of the trial setting, nor did he offer

any evidence at the hearing showing that the trial notice was not received. Paramo

also did not file a response to Murillo’s motion for entry of judgment or a motion

for new trial after the default judgment was entered. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1)

(“[a] complaint on which evidence must be heard such as . . . failure to set aside a

judgment by default” must be presented in a motion for new trial to preserve the

complaint for appeal); In re M.M.M., No. 05-19-00392-CV, 2019 WL 4744694, at

*3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 30, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that

defendant forfeited lack of notice argument by failing to file a motion for new trial

satisfying the Craddock2 factors); In re X.C.J., No. 05-18-01233-CV, 2019 WL

2
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939).
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2336876, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining

that due process right to proper service of trial setting is waived if not brought to

trial court’s attention in a motion for new trial). Because Paramo failed to file a

motion for new trial raising his complaint that he did not receive notice of the trial

setting, Paramo has forfeited our review of his lack of notice argument. Therefore,

we overrule his second issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Paramo’s three issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court. We decline Murillo’s request to find that this appeal was brought

frivolously and award sanctions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 45 (providing court of appeals

may award prevailing party just damages if it determines that the appeal is frivolous).

/Craig Smith/
CRAIG SMITH
JUSTICE
230189F.P05

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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

JESUS PARAMO, Appellant On Appeal from the 101st Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-23-00189-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-05462.
Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
LUIS MURILLO, Appellee Justices Pedersen, III and Garcia
participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 2nd day of October 2024.

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