Ronald Anthony Elliott v. the State of Texas

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 21, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00790-CR

RONALD ANTHONY ELLIOTT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F20-76874-T

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Goldstein
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
Ronald Anthony Elliott appeals his murder conviction. A jury convicted

appellant and sentenced him to sixty years’ confinement. In six issues, appellant

argues the State failed to disprove that he acted in self-defense, the trial court erred

by failing to limit the culpable mental state in the jury charge and not submitting a

jury charge on apparent danger, he was harmed by cumulative error in the jury

charge, and the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing him to question a

detective about appellant’s statements to police and not allowing appellant to testify

about his statements to police. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND

In December 2020, appellant was charged by indictment with murder.

Specifically, the indictment alleged that, on or about November 1, 2020, appellant

(1) intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Patrick Richardson by shooting

him with a firearm and (2) further intended to cause serious bodily injury to

Richardson and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting

Richardson with a firearm, a deadly weapon, and thereby caused the death of

Richardson.1

At trial in July 2022, the State called nine witnesses in its case in chief, and

appellant testified as the defense’s only witness during the guilt innocence phase of

the trial.

1. Eye Witness: Derrick McWilliams

Derrick McWilliams testified that he owns Huge Guyz Kitchen, a restaurant

in Dallas. McWilliams was “mostly in the back” of the restaurant, and he had two

women, Jasmine Rogers and Markeidria Alberty, working “out front.” On

November 1, 2020, the restaurant did not open until approximately 1:30 p.m. even

though it normally opened at noon. People were waiting in line outside the restaurant

before it opened. Alberty was “making the plates” and McWilliams was “taking the

money and bagging up the food.”

1
The indictment thus charged appellant with murder under both alternatives provided by section
19.02(b) of the penal code. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2).
–2–
“A guy walked in.” McWilliams heard somebody say “What you . . . lookin

at?” McWilliams said, “Not up in here,” and did not pay any more attention until he

had finished “bagging up, like, two or three more customers” and saw “that he got

surrounded.” McWilliams “came from behind the counter, and that’s when the

shooting started.” McWilliams saw “a guy with dreads start shooting,” and then

McWilliams “fell back and everybody started running out.” McWilliams identified

appellant as the “guy with dreads.” McWilliams’ restaurant had video cameras

capable of recording, and the State played a video of events on the day of the

shooting while McWilliams testified as to what was depicted. The video showed

appellant, Alton Keaton, William Davis, Madarius Counter, and another man enter

the restaurant. About fifteen minutes later, the decedent, Richardson, entered the

restaurant. McWilliams testified and, after watching the video from inside the

restaurant, confirmed appellant shooting and established that he did not see

Richardson “grab a gun or pull a gun or have anything in his hands at all.”2 Shortly

thereafter, appellant ran out of the restaurant, and his companions followed.

Richardson also came out of the restaurant and fell down.

2. Eyewitness: Markeidria Alberty

Alberty testified she knew Richardson since she was fifteen years old, and

Richardson was friends with her “baby daddy,” McKendrick Taylor. Alberty did

2
On cross-examination, McWilliams confirmed that he “he didn’t see Mr. Richardson with a gun” but
also stated that he didn’t “know whether he had a gun or not.”
–3–
not have “a personal relationship” with appellant, but she knew him by his nickname,

“Pickles.” On November 1, 2020, the restaurant was “pretty hectic,” and customers

were waiting in line for food. Richardson walked in to the restaurant “with a smile

on his face saying he was ready to eat,” talking to Alberty from a distance. The

customers in the restaurant were “making small talk” while they waited on the food,

but it “started to be, like, a loud commotion.” When McWilliams said “not in here,”

Richardson put his hands up and said, “I don’t want no smoke, Big Homie. I don’t

want no problem. I just want to get my plate.” Appellant “reached, like, somewhere

from the side and he got a gun and he started shooting repeatedly” at Richardson and

appellant’s friends.

In response to step-by-step questioning in conjunction with the playing of a

video by the prosecutor, Alberty testified Richardson kept his hands on his belly and

not to his sides. When asked whether Richardson said “Pull yours before I pull

mine,” Alberty testified “He didn’t have one to pull.” Richardson’s “body started to

move” toward the door, and appellant’s hand “went from being on his side now to

up a little bit.” Richardson was “clearly trying to get towards the door,” and

appellant started shooting while Richardson was trying “to run out the door.” Once

Richardson was no longer in the restaurant, appellant continued to shoot at

Richardson as Richardson was running away. When Richardson fell down outside,

appellant was “still chasing him.”

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When the shooting started, Alberty initially ducked down but then got up and

ran out the back door. Alberty walked to the side of the building to see what was

going on, and she saw Richardson alone on the ground. Alberty ran over to

Richardson, who had his cell phone and keys in his hand. Richardson gave Alberty

“his stuff” and told Alberty to lock his car door. Richardson tried to get up but went

into shock, “started foaming at the mouth and then it was done.” Alberty waited for

the ambulance and police to arrive, drove Richardson’s car to the hospital and gave

the car to Richardson’s friends.

While Alberty was driving away in Richardson’s car, appellant called Alberty

on Facebook messenger and asked “if there were cameras inside” the restaurant.

Alberty said there were cameras, and appellant said he was going to turn himself in.

Appellant sounded “paranoid” during the call.

3. Appellant’s testimony

Appellant testified that, on November 1, 2020, Richardson was out on bond

for the murder of Brandon Fisher, a friend of appellant’s. Appellant “knew”

Richardson was a drug dealer who was “known to carry weapons.” During an

incident at a strip club in 2018, Richardson confronted Fisher “about some theft or

robbery at one of his houses.” Richardson said to Fisher, “Make your move before

I make mine.” When Richardson left the club, appellant was “concerned” for Fisher,

but Fisher declined appellant’s offer to walk to the car with him. After Fisher left

the club with his girlfriend, “they yelled on the loudspeaker, ‘Pickle, [Richardson]

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just shot your friend in the head.’” Appellant went outside and saw Fisher lying on

the ground with a gunshot wound to the head.

Before November 1, 2020, appellant had never seen Richardson at Huge Guyz

Kitchen, but appellant had come into contact with Richardson “three or four times.”

Richardson had called appellant and others “snitches” because they were going to

testify about Richardson murdering Fisher.

On the day of the shooting, appellant had a gun “for protection” because he

had been “robbed, like, a week before.” When appellant arrived at Huge Guyz

Kitchen, Richardson was not there. Appellant testified he and his companions were

not engaged in any criminal activity, were not gambling, and were “[j]ust there to

eat.” About thirty minutes after appellant arrived at the restaurant, Richardson

arrived and yelled, “What you . . . lookin at?” at Counter, one of appellant’s

companions. Counter went back to where Richardson was, and the two began

arguing. Things “escalate[d],” and Richardson said, “Go for your move before I go

mine.” Counter looked back at appellant “like he was scared,” and appellant “pulled

mine” before Richardson could “pull his” and “started shooting first.” Appellant

testified he believed Richardson had a weapon and was “fixing to pull something.”

Appellant, when asked “[o]r is he grabbing here (indicating) like he has a weapon?”

responded “Like he has a weapon” and confirmed he had “seen that” “[l]ike three

times” on the video. Appellant was concerned he would kill them like he killed

[Fisher]. Appellant saw “the print” through Richardson’s T-shirt, which appellant

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clarified was the shape of a gun. While appellant was shooting at Richardson,

appellant “felt” that Richardson was “[t]rying to reposition to get his gun” even

though he was running away and was “[r]unning to reposition.” Appellant “didn’t

even know he hit” Richardson, and appellant “just was shooting” with all the people

around and “shooting towards several of [his] friends.” Appellant fired his gun “10

times, 12 times” and hit Richardson eight times: five times in the back, two times in

the side, and once in the shoulder. When appellant saw Richardson running toward

a car lot next door, appellant testified Richardson was “still breathing” and “could

have turned around and started shooting.” In response to questioning, appellant

testified that, when Richardson fell and was “on the ground dying,” appellant was

“running away” because he did not know if anyone else was coming to help

Richardson.

Appellant denied calling Alberty and testified he called a detective after he

“had [his] uncle drive to the scene and get the card” with the detective’s number on

it. Appellant told the detective he was willing to give his statement and turn himself

in. On cross-examination, appellant admitted he shot and killed Richardson and

“committed an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting [Richardson] and

murdering him that day.” At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury convicted

appellant of murder. This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION

A. First Issue: Legal Sufficiency

In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to

support his murder conviction “in that the State failed to disprove appellant’s

justification of self-defense.”

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d

893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).

The factfinder is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be

given testimony. See Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

We may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the factfinder. Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 178 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume

that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that

determination.” Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

We measure the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the

hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997). This standard recognizes the trier of fact as the sole judge of the weight

and credibility of the evidence after drawing reasonable inferences from the

–8–
evidence, and on review, we determine whether the necessary inferences made by

the trier of fact are reasonable, based upon the cumulative force of all of the

evidence. Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

When it comes to sufficiency review of a self-defense claim, the court of

criminal appeals has stated the following:

[I]n a claim of self-defense or defense of third persons that would
justify a defendant’s use of force against another, the defendant bears
the burden to produce evidence supporting the defense, while the State
bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the raised issues. Zuliani v.
State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Saxton v. State, 804
S.W.2d 910, 913–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The defendant’s burden
of production requires him to adduce some evidence that would support
a rational finding in his favor on the defensive issue. Krajcovic v. State,
393 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). By contrast, the State’s
burden of persuasion “is not one that requires the production of
evidence; rather it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 (citing Saxton, 804
S.W.2d at 913). Thus, “[i]n resolving the sufficiency of the evidence
issue, we look not to whether the State presented evidence which
refuted appellant’s self-defense testimony, but rather we determine
whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential
elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would
have found against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914.

Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

A person commits murder if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death

of an individual or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act

clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL

CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). However, it is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in

question is justified under Chapter 9 of the penal code. Id. § 9.02. A person is
–9–
justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably

believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s

use or attempted use of unlawful force. Id. § 9.31(a). A person is justified in using

deadly force against another if the actor would be justified in using force against the

other under section 9.31 and when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes

the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use

or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id. § 9.32(a).

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show he shot

and killed Richardson; instead, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

disprove his justification of self-defense. In making this challenge, appellant

assumes he has met his initial burden to adduce some evidence that would support a

rational finding in his favor on the defensive issue. Appellant relies on several

different evidentiary bases to support his assertions under this issue. First, appellant

knew that Richardson “was violent, carried a weapon and was a cold-blooded killer”

out on bond for the murder of Fisher. Second, when Richardson walked into the

restaurant, he engaged appellant and his companions “and was the aggressor,”

yelling “What you . . . lookin at?” at one of appellant’s companions and remaining

in the restaurant even though he could have left. Third, appellant saw “the print”

through Richardson’s T-shirt, which appellant clarified was the shape of a gun, and

Richardson said, “Go for your move before I go mine.” Fourth, appellant ran away

after the shooting because he did not know if anyone else was coming to help

–10–
Richardson. Finally, appellant turned himself in voluntarily and gave a statement to

police. Appellant argues that this evidence corroborates his “testimony that

Richardson had a firearm and was reaching for it that day and that [appellant] acted

in self-defense and in defense of others.”

Appellant’s testimony is juxtaposed against other testimony and evidence

considered by the jury. McWilliams testified and video from inside the restaurant

showed that appellant was shooting and that Richardson did not “grab a gun or pull

a gun or have anything in his hands at all.” Alberty testified Richardson did not have

a gun to “pull.” Other than appellant’s testimony that he saw “the print,” there was

no evidence Richardson had a gun. Instead, the evidence showed Richardson was

not threatening appellant with a weapon but, according to Alberty, was “clearly

trying to get towards the door,” and appellant started shooting while Richardson was

trying “to run out the door.” No gun linked to Richardson was recovered from the

scene of the shooting.

Appellant argues further that Alberty was “not a credible witness” because

she was on probation for theft and had “about five different thefts.” Citing to the

fact that Alberty “tampered with evidence at the scene” by taking Richardson’s

property and car, appellant posits that Alberty or someone else that day took

Richardson’s firearm.” Justin O’Donnell, a Dallas police crime scene supervisor,

testified he recovered 9mm fired cartridge casings at the scene but also found a single

.40 caliber Smith & Wesson fired cartridge casing from the crime scene, but he could

–11–
not tell how long it had been there or how far away it was “from the white vehicle

where the bloodstains were found.” Nevertheless, appellant cites O’Donnell’s

testimony that it was “possible” there were two firearms at the scene, presumably in

support of appellant’s argument that the evidence showed Richardson had a gun.

Kialani Killinger, a trace evidence examiner at the Southwest Institute of Forensic

Sciences (SWIFS), testified she conducted an analysis of gunshot residue on

Richardson and recovered “one particle characteristic of primer gunshot residue

confirmed” on the back of Richardson’s left hand. Killinger testified it was possible

the gunshot residue indicated Richardson had handled or fired a firearm. Appellant

argues this testimony supports his own testimony that Richardson had a firearm.

However, Killinger also testified there was no way to tell if Richardson fired a

weapon, and there were different ways to get gunshot residue on your hands,

including “being nearby while you’re being shot” or “clutching your wound where

you got shot.” As with the other evidence admitted at trial, the jury was the sole

judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860.

Here, “viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of [the offense]

beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on the self-

defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608–09

(quoting Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914). Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is

legally sufficient to support appellant’s murder conviction and the jury’s rejection

–12–
of appellant’ claim that he acted in self-defense. See id. We overrule appellant’s

first issue.

B. Second and Third Issues: Jury Charge Error, Culpable Mental State
and Apparent Danger

In his second issue, appellant complains the trial court erred in not limiting

the culpable mental state of “knowingly” and “with knowledge” to the result of

appellant’s conduct. In his third issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by not

submitting a jury charge on apparent danger, thereby limiting the jury’s

consideration to only actual danger. In his fourth issue, appellant asserts he was

harmed by the cumulative jury charge error. Because appellant argues these issues

together, we address these issues together.

Our first duty in analyzing a jury-charge issue is to decide whether error exists.

Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If error exists, we must

determine whether the error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal. Ngo v. State,

175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App .2005). When, as in this case, the error

was not objected to, the error must be “fundamental” and requires reversal only if it

was “so egregious and created such harm that the defendant was deprived of a fair

and impartial trial.” Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)

(citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on

reh’g)). Egregious harm exists when the record shows that a defendant has suffered

actual, rather than merely theoretical, harm from jury-charge error. Nava v. State,

–13–
415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.

Egregious harm consists of error affecting the very basis of the case, depriving the

defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affecting a defensive theory. Villarreal, 453

S.W.3d at 433. “Egregious harm is a ‘high and difficult standard’ to meet, and such

a determination must be ‘borne out by the trial record.’” Id. (quoting Reeves v. State,

420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). We assess harm in light of (1) the

entirety of the jury charge, (2) the state of the evidence, including the contested

issues and weight of probative evidence, (3) the arguments of counsel, and (4) if

applicable any other relevant information revealed by the trial record as a whole.

Campbell v. State, 664 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

Appellant argues that murder is a result-of-conduct offense, which means that

the applicable mental state is only that related to result of conduct, citing Cook v.

State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Appellant points out that the

trial court’s definition of “intentionally” was limited to the result of conduct, but the

definition of “knowingly” or “with knowledge” was not limited to the result of

conduct. As a result, appellant argues he was egregiously harmed because the jury

was allowed to convict appellant “based not upon [a]ppellant’s intent to cause

Richardson’s death or serious bodily injury but instead upon the nature of conduct

and/or circumstances surrounding the conduct and not the required culpability to

effect the result.”

–14–
The jury charge in this case instructed the jury that a person commits the

offense of murder if the person (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an

individual or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly

dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. The trial court further

instructed the jury that:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his
conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.

“Section 6.03 of the Texas Penal Code sets out: four culpable mental states—

intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and criminally negligently; two possible

conduct elements—nature of the conduct and result of the conduct; and the effect of

the circumstances surrounding the conduct.” Price, 457 S.W.3d at 441; see also

TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03. The gravamen of the offense is utilized to determine

which conduct elements should be included in the culpable mental-state language of

the jury charge. Price, 457 S.W.3d at 441. If the gravamen of the offense is the

result of conduct, the jury charge definitions of culpable mental states should be

tailored to the result of conduct. Id. A trial court errs by failing to limit the

definitions of the culpable mental states to the conduct element or elements of the

offense to which they apply. Id.
–15–
The State concedes it was error to include the “full, unrestricted statutory

definition of knowing” without limiting the language of “knowing” to the

appropriate conduct element. See id. at 441. In considering whether appellant was

egregiously harmed by the error, we first consider the entire jury charge. See

Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. “In assessing harm resulting from the inclusion of

improper conduct elements in the definitions of culpable mental states, we ‘may

consider the degree, if any, to which the culpable mental states were limited by the

application portions of the jury charge.’” Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

The State argues that appellant has not shown he was egregiously harmed,

pointing out that the application paragraph for murder “clearly modified the alleged

result of appellant’s conduct” as follows:

Now, considering all the law contained in the Court’s charge, if you
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant, RONALD ANTHONY ELLIOT, on or about the 1ST day
of November, 2020, in the County of Dallas and said State, did
unlawfully then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the death of
PATRICK RICHARDSON, an individual, hereinafter called deceased,
by shooting deceased with a firearm, a deadly weapon, then you will
find the defendant guilty of Murder.

OR

That on or about the 1st day November, 2020, in Dallas County, Texas,
the defendant, RONALD ANTHONY ELLIOT, did then and there
intend to cause serious bodily injury to PATRICK RICHARDSON,
hereinafter called deceased, and did then and there commit and act
clearly dangerous to human life, to-wit: shooting deceased with a
firearm, deadly weapon, and did thereby cause the death of PATRICK

–16–
RICHARDSON, an individual, then you will find the defendant guilty
of Murder as alleged in the indictment.

If you believe the defendant is not guilty of any offense, or have a
reasonable doubt thereof, then you will acquit the defendant and say by
your verdict “not guilty.”

See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). The application portion of the charge

instructed the jury that in order to convict appellant of murder, it was required to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused

Richardson’s death or intended to cause serious bodily injury to Richardson and

committed an act clearly dangerous to human life by shooting Richardson and did

thereby cause Richardson’s death. See Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 492. The application

paragraphs are the “heart and soul” of the jury charge. See Vasquez v. State, 389

S.W.3d 361, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “It is the application paragraph of the

charge, not the abstract portion, that authorizes a conviction.” Yzaguirre v. State,

394 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Crenshaw v. State, 378

S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). “Where the application paragraph

correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not egregious.”

Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Crenshaw, 378

S.W.3d at 466.

In the absence of contrary evidence, we presume the jury followed the trial

court’s instructions in the application paragraphs of the charge. See Williams v.

State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“[W]e assume that the jury

would follow the instruction as given, and we will not reverse in the absence of
–17–
evidence that the jury was actually confused by the charge.”). Nothing in the charge

in this case emphasized the inapplicable portion of the definition of “knowingly”

that appellant complains about, and the application paragraph properly placed the

culpable mental states. See Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 492; Delgado v. State, 944

S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (“Significantly,

the ‘nature of conduct’ language used in the court's definition paragraphs was not

repeated in the application paragraphs. We hold that this instruction appropriately

limited the overbroad language used in the court's definitions, and pointed the jury

to the proper issue to be resolved in a result-oriented offense.”). We conclude this

factor weighs against a finding of egregious harm.

The next factor is the “state of the evidence.” See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at

171. The evidence established, and appellant did not dispute, that appellant shot and

killed Richardson and “committed an act clearly dangerous to human life by

shooting [Richardson] and murdering him that day.” The trial court correctly

instructed the jury regarding intentional murder, and there was sufficient evidence

to support a conviction under that theory of the offense. Therefore, there was “at

least one theory of the offense upon which [appellant’s] conviction may stand.”

Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 640. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of a

conclusion appellant suffered some actual, rather than theoretical, harm from the

trial court’s error in the definition of knowingly in the jury charge.

–18–
The third factor requires that we consider the arguments of counsel. See

Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. The State’s closing argument focused on the jury’s

choice between a decision that appellant acted in self-defense or a decision that

Richardson’s murder was a “revenge killing.” The prosecutor emphasized the

elements of appellant’s self-defense theory: that appellant’s actions were reasonable

and immediately necessary. Referring to the video camera recording, the prosecutor

maintained the video showed Richardson was “not pulling” a weapon. The

prosecutor further contended that, “if anyone has the right to self-defense in this

situation, it was [Richardson] because he’s being surrounding by five guys who are

boxing him in.” The prosecutor argued appellant did not act in self-defense and

referred to the application paragraph in the charge and the allegations that appellant

“knowingly or intentionally caused the death of an individual by shooting an

individual, which we’ve proven, or if he intended to cause serious bodily injury to

an individual, and he committed an act clearly dangerous to human life.” Defense

counsel maintained that appellant was consistent in his belief that he shot Richardson

in self-defense. Counsel accused Alberty of tampering with the crime scene and

removing Richardson’s gun. Counsel described Richardson as “a known drug

dealer” with over $6200 in his pocket who was “armed and dangerous.” Referring

to Richardson’s murder of Fisher, counsel argued Fisher did not take Richardson

seriously and “lost his life because of that.” Counsel argued that, when appellant

was “confronted with the same killer,” appellant took the threat seriously and shot

–19–
Richardson in self-defense. The State did not erroneously argue the culpable mental

state necessary for the charged offense. Rather, the closing argument of both parties

focused on the issue of self-defense. We find nothing in the closing arguments to

indicate appellant suffered some actual, rather than theoretical, harm from the

erroneous definition of knowingly in the jury charge.

We finally must consider any other relevant information revealed by the

record as a whole. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. We have reviewed the entire record

and have found no other relevant information that requires our consideration.

On this record, we conclude the trial court’s error in failing to limit the

definition of “knowingly” to the applicable conduct element of the offense in the

abstract portion of the jury charge caused no actual, as opposed to theoretical, harm

to appellant. See Campbell, 664 S.W.3d at 254.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by not submitting a jury charge

on apparent danger. It is well-settled that a defendant has the right to defend oneself

against apparent danger to the same extent as if the danger was real. Hamel v. State,

916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Rider v. State, No. 05-20-00220-CR,

2022 WL 1769116, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 1, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held

that if the evidence at trial raises the issue of self-defense—whether against actual

or apparent danger—the defendant has the right to a jury instruction on the issue of

self-defense. Hamel, 916 S.W.2d at 493. And in Jones v. State, the court held that

–20–
when the issue is raised by the evidence, a defendant is entitled to a properly

requested instruction on his right to defend himself against an “apparent danger,” as

viewed from the standpoint of the actor. Jones v. State, 544 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1976); Rider, 2022 WL 1769116, at *2.

The Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently clarified its holding in Jones,

concluding that it was only error to refuse to give an “apparent danger” instruction

in cases in which the jury was not otherwise fully instructed on the law of self-

defense.3 Valentine v. State, 587 S.W.2d 399, 400–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). As

our sister court later summarized:

[W]hen a defendant claims self-defense, his rights are preserved (and
the concept of “apparent danger” is properly presented) when a jury
charge: (1) states that a defendant’s conduct is justified if he reasonably
believed that the deceased was using or attempting to use unlawful
deadly force against the defendant, and (2) correctly defines
“reasonable belief.”

Bundy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d)

(citing Valentine, 587 S.W.2d at 400–01); Rider, 2022 WL 1769116, at *3.

In complaining about the charge’s lack of an apparent danger instruction,

appellant cites only Jones and other authorities that do not reflect the current status

of the law on this issue. The jury charge in this case both stated that a person’s

conduct is justified if he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to

protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force and

3
The jury charge contained an instruction on self-defense, and appellant does not challenge that
instruction.
–21–
correctly defined “reasonable belief.” Thus, the charge preserved appellant’s rights

and properly presented the concept of “apparent danger” without a separate

instruction. See Valentine, 587 S.W.2d at 400–01; Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 430; Rider,

2022 WL 1769116, at *3. Accordingly, on this record, the trial court did not err in

failing to include in the charge a separate “apparent danger” instruction.

C. Fourth Issue: Cumulative Error

Appellant further complains that “the cumulative error doctrine encompassing

all of the jury charge errors set forth above when considered as a whole deprived

[him] of a fair and impartial trial.” “The doctrine of cumulative error provides that

the cumulative effect of several errors can, in the aggregate, constitute reversible

error, even though no single instance of error would.” Holloway v. State, No. 05-

14-01244-CR, 2016 WL 3098297, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 25, 2016, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Chamberlain v. State, 998

S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“It is conceivable that a number of errors

may be found harmful in their cumulative effect.”). We have already addressed the

single error in the court’s jury charge and determined that it did not result in

egregious harm to appellant. Thus, there are no errors to cumulate. See Taylor v.

State, No. 05-14-00821-CR, 2016 WL 7439194, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 27,

2016) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In other words, a single error is

not cumulative error. See id. We overrule appellant’s second, third, and fourth

issues.

–22–
D. Fifth and Sixth Issues:

In his fifth and sixth issues, argued together, appellant argues the trial court

abused its discretion in not allowing appellant to question a detective concerning

appellant’s cooperation and statement to the police and in not allowing appellant to

testify about his cooperation and statement to the police. Appellant asserts the

statements in question were admissible pursuant to the rule of optional completeness,

citing Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 264–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A

trial court does not abuse its discretion if the decision to admit evidence is within the

zone of reasonable disagreement. Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018). If the trial court’s ruling on admissibility is correct under any applicable

theory of law, the trial court’s decision should not be disturbed, even if the trial court

gives the wrong reason for its ruling. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016).

At a pretrial hearing, the trial court addressed the State’s “Allridge motion.”

The prosecutor made the following statement with respect to the motion:

The State filed a motion called the Allridge motion, which I have
presented to the Defense, as well as to the Court, which will say that no
one can allude even to the fact that the defendant was interviewed. The
law is that any statement made by the defendant outside of court would
be hearsay, and as a result, the State is asking not even any mention be
made that he was interviewed.

–23–
In response, defense counsel said he was “going to tell exactly what happened,

that there was a shooting and my client turned himself in and immediately talked to

the police.” Counsel stated he was also going to tell the jury that “they’re going to

hear from my client.” The prosecutor responded, “That’s fine as long as we don’t

talk about the interview that he did.” Defense counsel reiterated his intention to “say

that he turned himself in and immediately talked to a detective. I won’t go into the

technicality of whether he was interviewed, and all that, but I’m saying that he

immediately went to law enforcement.”

Appellant complains about the exclusion of evidence at both the

guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial. At guilt/innocence, the State called

Dallas homicide detective Phillip Wheeler, who testified that, once another detective

identified appellant from the surveillance video, police began working on “securing

a warrant for murder.” Appellant “reach[ed] out and said he did want to come and

talk about what – what happened that day, and he did come and talk to me.”

Meanwhile, a SWAT team responded to the house where appellant was staying and

recovered some 9mm bullets and a “Glock magazine.”

On cross-examination, Wheeler testified appellant called him, defense

counsel asked if he could approach the bench, and the trial court held a discussion

outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel asserted the following:

Judge, I believe that the door’s been opened. They, in their motion in
limine, said that we couldn’t talk about any -- I guess the fact that the
defendant gave a written or oral statement to the police regarding this

–24–
case. And I believe that they opened the door when they say -- have
their witness to say before this jury that my client called them and
contacted with them and came down and turned himself in. That that
opens the door, not necessarily to the -- to me introducing the video,
Your Honor; however, under optional completeness, for me to at least
refer to -- when he says my client came down -- and I’m trying to make
sure I’m specific -- that my client contacted them and -- and -- and
turned himself here [sic].

I think that I’m entitled to go into exactly to what extent my client
contacted them, especially to the extent that, based on information that
my client gave them, they went to his home looking for a firearm and
recovered all this -- you know, this ammunition that the State has now
paraded in front of the jury.

And I think that I’m entitled to go into, not exactly -- not necessarily --
again, Judge, I’m not trying to offer his interview, but I do want to be
able to say that my client immediately went there and told them what
happened. And I think I’m entitled to that because they opened the
door.

The prosecutor pointed out that there had already been “a hearing on this,” and the

parties agreed that “all that we would say is that [appellant] was interviewed.” The

prosecutor noted that the defense “brought up the fact that he had turned himself in,”

which the parties agreed they were going to do. However, the prosecutor argued

“[h]earsay does not allow a defendant to bring up his own statement under any

circumstances.”

At this point, the trial court asked defense counsel what additional information

he was “trying to get into.” Counsel replied:

The only thing I’m getting him to [sic] is -- I guess, I believe I'm entitled
to because he's had not just this witness, but also another witness, say
that my client turned himself in, called her and said, “Well, I’m going
to turn myself in.”

–25–
So I’m entitled to say, not only did he turn himself in, but, again, he
told you what happened. And based on what he told you, you went to
the house. And I believe because they – they’re talking about him going
to the house, trying to recover the weapon, that my client told them
would be at the house, I'm entitled to go into it.

Again Judge, I’m not trying to offer his statement, but I do believe that
I'm entitled to – that the jury should know that -- that -- that he not only
-- he didn’t just turn himself in and then they locked him up. That’s –
that’s the image that they’ve given them right now.

In the discussion that followed, defense counsel acknowledged that appellant

was going to testify, so counsel did not need appellant’s statement, but he did want

the jury “to know that he was fully cooperative.” The prosecutor cited Allridge for

the proposition that self-serving statements of the accused are generally inadmissible

at trial on his behalf. The trial court stated, “I am not going to allow you to go into

the interview any further than what we discussed at the ruling I had last week.”

Thus, defense counsel sought to admit evidence that appellant turned himself

in to police and gave a statement. Although appellant did not “need appellant’s

statement” because appellant intended to testify, counsel sought to develop evidence

that the statement led police to “the house” and “trying to recover the weapon” or a

“firearm” and recovered “ammunition.”

After the discussion outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel

continued his cross-examination of Wheeler. After confirming with Wheeler that

everything said in the interview with police was recorded, the following exchange

occurred:

–26–
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t want to get in to what Mr. Elliott said,
but was he cooperative?

[DETECTIVE WHEELER]: He gave a statement.

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor. That’s the question. I’m
going to object to violating the motion in limine we talked about just
now.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge – I’ll rephrase, Judge.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Him coming to Jack Evans to come and talk
to you, do you consider that cooperating? Did that help in your
investigation?

[DETECTIVE WHEELER]: Himself turning himself in definitely
helps --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. Y’all didn’t have to go look for him,
correct.

[DETECTIVE WHEELER]: Right.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So to that extent, he cooperated, correct.

[DETECTIVE WHEELER]: He -- he did come down and give me a
statement.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Now, as far as -- the gun in the case
was never recovered, right?

[DETECTIVE WHEELER]: Right.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But he told you where he thought it was,
right? That’s why you went to the house, right?

[DETECTIVE WHEELER]: Right.

Appellant characterizes this questioning as an exchange in which appellant “was not

allowed to have the detective answer the questions.” In support of this

characterization, appellant cites the following exchange later during cross-

examination:
–27–
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. And as far as the house, I think you
indicated that y’all went out. How did you end up at the house?

[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor. That’s -- is that violating
the motion in limine as well that we just spoke about?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’ll rephrase.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You testified earlier about this house were
y’all found these cartridges and all that?

[DETECTIVE WHEELER]: Right.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Where did you get the information...

THE COURT: I want all counsel to remember the ruling that I just gave.

Appellant follows this quoted exchange with the assertion that his “counsel was

prevented from letting the jury know that [appellant] cooperated and gave the

detective information about where he left the gun at his house and that [appellant’s]

information helped the police to locate ammunition, a magazine to a Glock as well

as other evidence based upon [appellant’s] cooperation and statement.”

Consequently, appellant argues, “the trial court abused its discretion by preventing

the admission of this line of questioning and same affected [appellant’s] substantial

rights thereby harming him by depriving him of a fair and impartial trial.”

Appellant asserts the same argument with respect to the punishment stage

where, he argued, he was entitled to present a complete version of the facts that

included appellant making a statement to police and providing information to police

that led to police “going to get all this ammunition and stuff.” Appellant specifically

complained that, without this information, the evidence was only that “all he did was

–28–
go down there and turn himself in.” Appellant requested that, “under optional

completeness and under this Allridge,” he “would like to have presented to the jury

the complete facts regarding what took place” when appellant met with Wheeler. As

counsel asserted previously, he did not seek to have his statement to police entered

into evidence.

We agree with the State that the evidence appellant sought to introduce was

before the jury. Wheeler testified appellant gave a “statement,” and the trial court

did not rule on the prosecutor’s objection to this testimony. As defense counsel

continued the cross-examination, Wheeler testified that appellant “turning himself

in definitely helps,” appellant “did come down and give [Wheeler] a statement,”

police never recovered “the gun in the case,” but appellant “told [Wheeler] where he

thought it was,” and “[t]hat’s why [police] went to the house.” Although the trial

court did not permit appellant to testify to this same evidence at punishment, the jury

at the punishment phase could consider the evidence admitted at the guilt-innocence

phase as well. Christopher v. State, 851 S.W.2d 318, 322 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993,

pet. ref’d). Because the evidence appellant sought to develop was already before the

jury, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Colone, 573 S.W.3d

at 264–65. We overrule appellant’s fifth and sixth issues.

–29–
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
220790F.U05

–30–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

RONALD ANTHONY ELLIOTT, On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial
Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F20-76874-T.
No. 05-22-00790-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice
Goldstein. Justices Molberg and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Pedersen, III participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 21st day of August 2024.

–31–