Devon Young v. THE STATAE OF TEXAS

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 1, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00861-CR
No. 05-23-00862-CR

DEVON YOUNG, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F22-75225-S and F22-77113-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Reichek
Following a jury trial, appellant Devon Young appeals his convictions for

murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He contends the evidence is

legally insufficient to prove he was a party to the offenses. For reasons that follow,

we affirm the convictions.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing the death of

Gerardo Pardo by shooting him with a firearm on or about January 17, 2022. He
was also charged with intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing bodily injury

to Kenny Portillo, by shooting him with a firearm on the same date.

Evidence showed that shortly after 6 p.m. on January 17, 2022, a silver

Mercedes pulled up and stopped near Pardo, who was on foot, on Storey Lane in

Dallas. Appellant was the driver of the Mercedes. A passenger named Clifford

Henry got out and fired a gun at Pardo. Pardo returned fire. Portillo happened to be

in a truck on Storey Lane at the time. He was hit by a stray bullet fired by a passenger

in the car, either Desmond Roberts or a fourth occupant who was never identified.

Immediately after the incident, appellant drove Henry to a nearby hospital and left.

Both Pardo and Henry died from their gunshot wounds.

In addition to testimony about what happened from Portillo and others, the

shootings, and Pardo’s actions immediately prior, were captured on surveillance

cameras in the area. Pardo was first seen on video running past a convenience store

with a gun in his hand. He looked over his shoulder once. Pardo had come from a

nearby apartment complex through a hole in a fence. Police later found multiple

fresh shell casings near the hole. One was from the gun Henry used to kill Pardo.

After he passed the convenience store, Pardo hid out behind the fence of a

glass business on Storey Lane for several minutes, keeping an eye on the street.

Portillo drove by in a truck with a flat tire, on his way to a repair shop. When Portillo

pulled over to let other cars pass, Pardo left the glass business and ran to the

passenger side of the truck. He told Portillo he needed help and asked him to get

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him out of the area. Within seconds, the Mercedes pulled up and stopped next to the

driver side of the truck. Henry exited the Mercedes from the rear driver side and

fired shots at Pardo around the truck. Portillo got down on the truck floor, but was

shot in the back of his shoulder. Henry fell down, but got back in the Mercedes, and

it sped away. The incident, from the time Pardo approached Portillo to when the

Mercedes drove away, lasted less than a minute.

Appellant drove Henry to UT Southwestern Hospital. Appellant’s actions at

the hospital were captured on hospital surveillance cameras. Videos from the

hospital cameras, as well as still photographs taken from them, were admitted into

evidence. Appellant and the others pulled up to the hospital entrance, alerted

hospital staff that Henry needed help, and sped away as soon as Henry was on a

gurney.

Dallas police detectives got the Mercedes’s license plate number from the

hospital videos and issued a lookout for it. Nine days’ later, appellant was seen

driving the vehicle and was arrested. Police were unable to find evidence that

appellant knew Henry or the other occupants of the Mercedes before the shootings.

One witness testified for the defense, appellant’s sister Roma Johnson. The

Mercedes was her car, but was registered to her fiancé. She allowed appellant to

drive it from time to time. As a safety feature, when the door handle was pulled

while the car was in motion, the emergency brake kicked in so the car would

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automatically slow down. Her brother was unaware of that feature. Appellant never

mentioned the incident to Johnson; she found out about it when he was arrested.

The jury was charged on the law of parties. It found appellant guilty of murder

and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed punishment

at fifteen years’ confinement for murder and five years’ confinement for aggravated

assault.

ANALYSIS

In this appeal, appellant raises one issue in which he challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence. Appellant does not dispute that he was the driver of the Mercedes

at the time of the offenses. He argues the evidence is insufficient to show he acted

with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offenses. We disagree.

The United States Constitution requires that a criminal conviction be

supported by evidence “necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable

doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d

181, 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316

(1979)). A reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Proper deference

must be given to the jury’s determination of the credibility of the evidence. Id.

A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is

committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally

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responsible, or by both. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a). A person is criminally

responsible for the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the

commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid

the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2).

To determine whether an individual is a party to an offense, we may look to

events before, during, and after the commission of the offense. Gross, 380 S.W.3d

at 186. Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove one is a party to an offense.

Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). There must be

sufficient evidence of an understanding and common design to commit the offense.

Gross, 380 S.W.3d at 186. Mere presence at the scene of a crime, or even flight

from the scene, without more, is insufficient to support a conviction as a party to an

offense. Id.

Appellant contends the manner in which he drove the car did not show his

intent to promote or assist the commission of the shootings. In making this

argument, he emphasizes the lack of evidence to show a preexisting relationship

between him and the shooters. Appellant suggests the other men in the Mercedes

could have approached him and asked for a ride that night. He argues his stopping

the car at Pardo’s location was consistent with one of his passengers having told him

to stop. Appellant also claims we cannot infer the requisite intent from the fact that

he sped away from the scene because he did so to get Henry medical attention.

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The jury saw video of appellant’s actions at the shooting location and at the

hospital. Despite the lack of evidence to show how appellant was connected to the

men who shot Pardo and Portillo, the jury could have found that all occupants of the

Mercedes had an understanding and common design to commit the offenses. As the

prosecutor put it, they were “stalking” Pardo. Within seconds of Pardo emerging

from his hiding place to seek help, appellant drove the Mercedes to Pardo’s location

and stopped. Moments later, he sped off to get medical help for Henry. At the

hospital, appellant pulled into a circle drive and stopped at the entrance. Roberts,

who was distraught, got out of the back seat to alert hospital staff. Appellant got out

of the driver’s seat and opened the left rear door to check on Henry. Henry was

slumped over and did not move. While they waited for help, appellant pointed at

and spoke to Roberts. Later, the two of them stood in close proximity to each other

for a few seconds and appeared to be talking. Several hospital workers came outside

and got Henry out of the car and onto a gurney. One man appeared to be hospital

security, but appellant did not speak to him. Instead, as soon as Henry was on the

gurney, appellant and the other occupants of the Mercedes got back in the car and

left before Henry was even inside the hospital. Appellant’s demeanor and

interaction with his passengers at the hospital was circumstantial evidence they all

had a common design to commit the offenses. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have rationally determined that

appellant’s actions showed he acted with intent to aid the commission of the

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offenses. The evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. We overrule

appellant’s sole issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/Amanda L. Reichek/
AMANDA L. REICHEK
Do Not Publish. JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
230861F.U05

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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

DEVON YOUNG, Appellant On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-23-00861-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F22-75225-S.
Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Reichek. Justices Goldstein and
Garcia participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 1st day of August, 2024.

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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

DEVON YOUNG, Appellant On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-23-00862-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F22-75113-S.
Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Reichek. Justices Goldstein and
Garcia participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 1st day of August, 2024.

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