Deshawn Dawayne Griffin v. the State of Texas

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-24-00414-CR

Deshawn Dawayne GRIFFIN,
Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,
Appellee

From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Kinney County, Texas
Trial Court No. 4565CR
Honorable Eugenia “Genie” Wright, Judge Presiding

Opinion By: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 22, 2026

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

A Kinney County jury convicted Appellant Deshawn Dawayne Griffin of five counts of

smuggling of persons by using a motor vehicle to transport an individual with the intent to conceal

that individual from a peace officer, in violation of Texas Penal Code section

20.05(a)(1)(A) 1. After Griffin pled true to the repeat offender enhancement paragraph, the jury

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The judgment signed by the trial court recites that the jury found appellant guilty of smuggling of persons but
incorrectly cites the statute for this offense as Texas Penal Code section 20.05(b) (subsection on punishment).
04-24-00414-CR

sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Griffin raises three issues. In his first

issue, he argues that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) facially violates the First Amendment. In his second

and third issues, he contends that the statute is field preempted and conflict preempted by federal

law as applied to his prosecution. Because Roberts v. State controls the constitutional challenges

presented here, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified.

BACKGROUND

On October 11, 2023, Galveston County Deputy Sheriff Jeremy B. Creech was on

assignment in Kinney County as part of Operation Lone Star. While patrolling U.S. Highway 90,

Deputy Creech observed a white sports utility vehicle (“SUV”) traveling eastbound towards

Brackettville. Deputy Creech noticed the vehicle was speeding, and a registration check revealed

the SUV was registered out of San Antonio and lacked insurance. Using a license plate reader

system, Deputy Creech reviewed the vehicle’s travel history and noted the vehicle took a route

that circumvented the U.S. Border Patrol checkpoint. Deputy Creech knew that Highway 674

lacked a Border Patrol checkpoint, so when the vehicle turned onto Highway 674 Deputy Creech

engaged his lights. Appellant, who was driving the SUV, pulled over and immediately five

passengers “bailed out” of the vehicle. U.S. Border Patrol agents arrived on scene and assisted

Deputy Creech in apprehending the passengers. Three of the passengers were apprehended,

brought back to the vehicle, and identified from Mexican identification cards each provided. Two

of the passengers were never located. Appellant was arrested and later indicted for five counts of

smuggling of persons under Texas Penal Code section 20.05(a)(1)(A). Appellant was convicted

following a jury trial and, after Appellant pled true to an enhancement, the jury assessed

punishment at fifteen years imprisonment. After conviction, Appellant filed a motion for new trial.

The trial court denied his motion and he timely appealed.

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STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review Appellant’s constitutional challenges de novo. See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. PHI Air

Med., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Tex. 2020); Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); State v. Flores, 679 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. ref’d).

FIRST AMENDMENT

Appellant, in his brief, argues section 20.05(a)(1)(A) facially violates the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution. From our review, the arguments in this case are substantively

the same as those in Roberts v. State, in which this Court rejected a First Amendment facial

challenge and concluded that any unconstitutional applications of section 20.05(a)(1)(A) are not

substantial when compared to the constitutional ones. Roberts v. State, No. 04-24-00485-CR, 2026

WL 290378, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 4, 2026, no pet. h). Accordingly, for the

reasons articulated in Roberts, we overrule Appellant’s First Amendment facial challenge. See id.

AS-APPLIED PREEMPTION

In his second and third issues, Appellant argues that section 20.05(a)(1)(A) is field and

conflict preempted by federal law as applied to his prosecution.

A. Applicable Law

For as-applied constitutional challenges, we must determine whether there was a

constitutional violation in the application of the statute to the defendant. See State ex rel. Lykos v.

Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This court analyzed a similar as-applied field

and conflict preemption challenge to section 20.05(a)(1)(A) in Roberts, 2026 WL 290378, at *5–

9. As such, while we will address the facts specific to Appellant’s case for his as-applied challenge,

the legal principles discussed in Roberts control our analysis here.

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B. Analysis

Appellant argues that federal law preempts section 20.05(a)(1)(A) as applied to his case

because Congress completely ousted the States from regulating in the “field of noncitizen

smuggling” and because Appellant’s prosecution conflicts with federal immigration laws and

prosecutorial prerogatives.

As we stated in Roberts, “unlike the instances where courts have found state statutes to be

field preempted, section 20.05(a)(1)(A) does not require prosecutors to prove a noncitizen’s illegal

presence in the United States.” Id. at *7. Here, similarly, Appellant’s conviction did not turn on

proof of the passengers’ immigration status. Instead, the evidence at trial focused on Griffin’s

intent to conceal the passengers from all law enforcement, including the unusual route he chose—

traveling along Highway 674, which has no Border Patrol checkpoint—and the dark

tinted windows on the vehicle.

The State was not required to prove the passengers’ unlawful status or that Appellant knew

his passengers’ actual immigration status. Therefore, because Appellant was prosecuted under a

neutral statute, and his conduct was criminal regardless of the passengers’ immigration status, we

hold that Appellant’s prosecution was not as-applied field preempted. See Id. at *8; Kansas v.

Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 208–09 (2020); State v. Flores, 679 S.W.3d 232, 245 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2023, pet. ref’d). See also Gutierrez v. State, 721 S.W.3d 639, 655 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2025, pet. ref’d) (holding section 20.05(a)(1)(A) was not as-applied field

preempted where the evidence showed Appellant “was not convicted merely because of the

citizenship status of the back seat passengers, but because she intended to conceal those individuals

from law enforcement”).

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As to conflict preemption, state anti-smuggling and harboring laws that target non-citizens

may be preempted if they conflict with federal immigration law. See Arizona v. United States, 567

U.S. 387, 399 (2012). “With an as-applied conflict preemption challenge, the application of the

law must conflict with federal law’s comprehensive immigration scheme or with the federal

government’s discretion over immigration related prosecutions.” Roberts, 2026 WL 290378, at *8

(citing Flores, 679 S.W.3d at 246–47). However, evidence from Appellant’s trial does not show

that his prosecution interfered with federal law or federal discretion over immigration-related

prosecutions. Further, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that federal prosecutors wished

to pursue federal charges against Appellant. On this record, we hold that Appellant’s prosecution

under section 20.05(a)(1)(A) was not preempted through conflict with federal law. See Roberts,

2026 WL 290378, at *8; see also Kansas, 589 U.S. at 211 (“the mere fact that state laws like the

Kansas provisions at issue overlap to some degree with federal criminal provisions does not even

begin to make a case for conflict preemption”); Gutierrez, 721 S.W.3d at 657 (citing Kansas in

rejecting appellant’s as-applied conflict preemption argument regarding section 20.05(a)(1)(A)).

CLERICAL ERROR IN WRITTEN JUDGMENT

The trial court’s judgment identified the “Statute for Offense” as “Sec. 20.05(b) Penal

Code.” Appellant, however, was charged and convicted under Texas Penal Code section

20.05(a)(1)(A). We have the authority to modify incorrect judgments when the necessary

information is available. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). See Minor v. State, No. 07-23-00397-CR, 2025

WL 211324, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 15, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). Accordingly, we modify the judgment of conviction to state that the “Statute for

Offense” is “20.05(a)(1)(A) Penal Code.”

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CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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