Eunice Villanueva v. Structural Repair, LLC; Isabel Alcantara; Frederick Marshall; Francis Check; Bradley Bertelsen; Michael Ellington; And Jarrod McBride

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-24-00797-CV

Eunice VILLANUEVA,
Appellant

v.

STRUCTURAL REPAIR, LLC; Isabel Alcantara; Frederick Marshall; Francis Check;
Bradley Bertelsen; Michael Ellington; and Jarrod McBride,
Appellees

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023CI22284
Honorable Norma Gonzales, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 14, 2026

AFFIRMED

Eunice Villaneuva appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellees,

Structural Repair, LLC, Isabel Alcantara, Frederick Marshall, Francis Check, Bradley Bertelsen,

Michael Ellington, and Jarrod McBride. In two issues, Villaneuva complains that the trial court

erred in granting summary judgment because appellees failed to carry their burden, or she

presented issues of material fact. We affirm.
04-24-00797-CV

I. BACKGROUND

Villaneuva and Advanced Foundation Repair, L.P., a Texas limited partnership, entered

into an agreement wherein Advanced Foundation agreed to perform repair work on the foundation

of Villaneuva’s home for $69,168. Villaneuva paid half of the contract price. After Advanced

Foundation began working on the project, a dispute arose over the scope of the work. Villaneuva

declined to pay the remaining balance, and Advanced Foundation instituted an arbitration

proceeding. The trial court, over Villaneuva’s objection, compelled the parties to arbitration and

stayed the trial court proceeding pending completion of the arbitration.

In the arbitration, Villaneuva counter claimed against Advanced Foundation for common

law fraud, fraud in the inducement, fraud by non-disclosure or omission, alleged violations of the

Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), negligent hiring, and negligent misrepresentation.

Villaneuva also attempted to interplead Structural Repair into the arbitration. However, at one of

the arbitration hearings, the arbiter noted that Villaneuva had no contract with Structural Repair,

and he held that Structural Repair was not a party to the arbitration proceeding. The final arbitration

award found against Villaneuva on her common law fraud claim, but in her favor on her alleged

DTPA violation — though it was not committed knowingly or intentionally. It awarded

Villaneuva a total of $148,621.22 in damages, including attorney’s fees. The arbitration award

further provided that “[a]ll claims and counterclaims not expressly granted herein are hereby

denied.” The trial court, upon Villanueva’s request, confirmed the arbitration award.

Approximately a week later, Advanced Foundation issued a check in the amount of the arbitration

award to the trust account of Villanueva’s counsel.

While the case was pending in arbitration, Villaneuva amended her trial court petition to

assert claims of common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure or omission, alleged DTPA violations,

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and negligent misrepresentation against appellees. Appellees pleaded — and then they moved for

summary judgment on — affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and arbitration

and award.

In support of their motion, appellees attached: (1) Villaneuva’s contract with Advanced

Foundation; (2) Villaneuva’s second amended counter claim filed in the arbitration proceeding;

(3) the arbiter’s award; (4) a copy of the check from Advanced Foundation satisfying the arbiter’s

award; and (5) affidavits signed by each of the individual appellees. Appellees’ summary judgment

evidence provided that Advanced Foundation and Structural Repair are related because Structural

Repair is the general partner of Advanced Foundation. Alcantara is both the president of Structural

Repair and a limited partner of Advanced Foundation. Alcantara, along with Marshall, Check,

Bertelsen, Ellington, and McBride, are limited partners of Advanced Foundation. Like

Villaneuva’s arbitration counter claim, her trial court petition centered on allegedly deficient

foundation repair work. At the time appellees filed their motion for summary judgment,

Villaneuva’s petition asserted against appellees claims of common law fraud, fraud by non-

disclosure or omission, alleged DTPA violations, and negligent misrepresentation.

Villaneuva responded to appellees’ motion and further amended her petition to reassert her

previously pleaded claims and an additional request that Structural Repair’s corporate veil be

pierced and Marshall be held personally liable.

The trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment without specifying any

grounds, and it later made the summary judgment order a final judgment. Villaneuva timely

appeals.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The movant for traditional summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that: (1)

no genuine issue of material fact exists, and (2) it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.

R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003);

KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). If

the movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the

nonmovant to respond to the motion and present any issues that would preclude summary

judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979); see

also Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996). We must affirm a summary judgment if

any of the grounds asserted in the motion are meritorious. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient

Advocates of Tex., 136 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004).

B. Res Judicata Elements

A claim is barred by res judicata if there is proof of: “(1) a prior final judgment on the

merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them;

and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the

first action.” Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996). An arbitration award

has preclusive effect for purposes of res judicata. Premium Plastics Supply, Inc. v. Howell, 537

S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (collecting cases).

C. Res Judicata Analysis

Villaneuva argues that appellees failed to satisfy the first element of their res judicata

defense because the arbitration award was not a “final judgment on the merits.” The arbitration

award was, according to Villaneuva, merely an interlocutory order. The only authority Villanueva

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references for her contention is Harrell v. Evans, No. 01-21-00666-CV, 2023 WL 3634318, at *3

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.), for its holding that “[i]n cases

in which a judgment has been rendered without a conventional trial on the merits, the judgment is

not final unless it (1) actually disposes of all pending claims and parties or (2) clearly and

unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do

so.” Appellees reference Dauz v. Valdez, 571 S.W.3d 795, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2018, no pet.), a case wherein the plaintiff sought to enforce an arbiter’s decision against the parties

involved in the arbitration. There, the First Court of Appeals held that the first and second res

judicata elements were satisfied. Id.

Villaneuva’s reliance on the general rule regarding finality of judgments is misplaced in

light of the legal authority that an arbiter’s award that has been enforced satisfies the first res

judicata element. See id.; see also Tanox, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 105

S.W.3d 244, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“[C]ourts have held that

an arbitration award can have preclusive effect, even though it is not confirmed and a judgment is

not entered.”). In this case, appellees established that the trial court signed an order confirming

the arbiter’s award in Villaneuva’s favor, upon Villanueva’s urging, and Villanueva, through her

counsel’s trust account, had obtained the money the arbiter awarded to her. Thus, appellees

established the first res judicata element.

As for the second element, Villaneuva emphasizes the arbiter noted that she had no contract

with Structural Repair, and that the arbiter held Structural Repair was not a party to the arbitration

proceeding. This, according to Villaneuva, creates a fact issue as to the second res judicata element.

Appellees argue that Villaneuva fails to appreciate how they were in privity with Advanced

Foundation. Appellees reference Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 653, for its rule that:

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People can be in privity in at least three ways: (1) they can control an action even
if they are not parties to it; (2) their interests can be represented by a party to the
action; or (3) they can be successors in interest, deriving their claims through a
party to the prior action.

Appellees also reference the affidavits filed with their summary judgment motion. These affidavits

provide that Structural Repair is the general partner of Advanced Foundation, which is a limited

partnership. The affidavits further provide that Marshall is the sole member of Structural Repair,

and he is also a limited partner of Advanced Foundation. Alcantara, Check, Bertelsen, Ellington,

and McBride are limited partners of Advanced Foundation. Alcantara, who is also president of

Structural Repair, specifically testified that:

Any work performed by Structural [Repair], Marshall, Check, or me related to the
Contract or the Residence was done on behalf of Advanced [Foundation] in
furtherance of Advance’s responsibilities under the Contract. Any conversations
or representations between Marshall, Check, me, or anyone affiliated with
Structural, on the one hand, and Plaintiff, on the other hand, were made on behalf
of Advanced in furtherance of Advance’s responsibilities under the Contract.

The affidavits of Marshall and Check echo Alcantara’s assertion. Alcantara noted that she was

“fully authorized to speak for Advanced [Foundation] and Structural [Repair] in” her affidavit.

We find Hill v. Tx-An Anesthesia Management, LLP, 443 S.W.3d 416, 425 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2014, no pet.), instructive. In Hill, an anesthesiologist was the sole member of a

professional association. Id. at 419. The professional association was a partner with a practice

management services company. Id. at 425. In the first lawsuit, the anesthesiologist individually

asserted claims for breach of a partnership agreement and fiduciary duty against the practice

management services company on behalf of the professional association. Id. Although the

anesthesiologist nonsuited his claims, he continued to defend against the practice management

services company’s counter claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. In the second lawsuit, the

anesthesiologist and the professional association sued the practice management services company

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for breach of the same partnership agreement at issue in the first lawsuit. Id. The Third Court of

Appeals recognized that “[p]rivity exists if the parties share an identity of interests in the basic

legal right that is the subject of litigation.” Id. (quoting Truck Ins. Exchange v. Mid–Continent

Cas. Co., 320 S.W.3d 613, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.)). It held that the professional

association’s interests could be represented by the anesthesiologist as evidenced by the first

lawsuit, and the anesthesiologist and the professional association share an identity of interests in

the basic legal rights that were the subject of litigation. Id.

Here, Alcantara noted that she was authorized to speak for both Advanced Foundation and

Structural Repair. Her affidavit indicates that she knew the arbiter’s award had been deducted

from Advanced Foundation’s bank account. Alcantara was the president of Structural Repair, the

general partner of Advanced Foundation. Similarly, the other appellees — Marshall, Check,

Bertelsen, Ellington, and McBride — were limited partners of Advanced Foundation. This

evidence establishes that appellees shared an identity of interests in the basic legal rights that were

the subject of the arbitration. See id.; see also Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 653.

Villanueva’s brief does not challenge the third res judicata element. As detailed above, all

the claims Villaneuva asserted in her fifth amended petition regarding the foundation repair work

in her contract with Advanced Foundation — common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure or

omission, alleged DTPA violations, and negligent misrepresentation — were also asserted in the

arbitration proceeding. Accordingly, appellees established the third res judicata element. See

Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 652.

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D. Sufficiency of Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Villaneuva filed a fifth amended petition seven days before appellees’ motion for summary

judgment was heard. Rather than amend their summary judgment motion, appellees stood on their

already filed motion. Villaneuva acknowledges that an appellate court:

may affirm the summary judgment if (1) the amended or supplemental petition
essentially reiterates previously-pleaded causes of action, (2) a ground asserted in
the summary-judgment motion conclusively negates a common element of the
newly- and previously-pleaded claims, or (3) the original motion is broad enough
to encompass the newly asserted claims.

Peregrine Oil & Gas, LP v. HRB Oil & Gas, Ltd., No. 01-17-00180-CV, 2018 WL 4137026, at *5

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30, 2018, pet. denied). Nevertheless, she argues that her

fifth amended petition “amplified the allegations against” appellees and that it rendered appellees’

pending motion for summary judgment insufficient. Appellees argue that, aside from a request to

pierce the corporate veil, Villaneuva’s fifth amended petition asserted no new claims.

In Keyes v. Weller, referenced by appellees, the Texas Supreme Court held that “[a] veil-

piercing doctrine is not a substantive cause of action but ‘a method to impose personal liability on

shareholders and corporate officers who would otherwise be shielded from liability for corporate

debts.’” 692 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2024), (quoting Shandong Yinguang Chem. Indus. Joint Stock

Co. v. Potter, 607 F.3d 1029, 1035 (5th Cir. 2010)). We hold that Villaneuva’s fifth amended

petition reiterated her previously pleaded claims, and that her request to pierce the corporate veil

did not constitute a new claim so as to have precluded the trial court from considering appellees’

motion to summary judgment.

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We overrule Villanueva’s two issues. 1

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

1
Because of our disposition on appellees’ res judicata ground, we need not consider the other grounds asserted by
appellees in their motion for summary judgment. See Garcia v. Garza, 311 S.W.3d 28, 35–36 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2010, pet. denied) (citing Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989)) (“When the order granting
summary judgment does not specify the particular grounds the trial court sustained, the appellate court must uphold
the summary judgment on any ground asserted by the movant that is supported by the evidence and pleadings.”).

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