Christopher De La Rosa v. the State of Texas

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-24-00504-CR

Christopher DE LA ROSA,
Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,
Appellee

From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023CR1530
Honorable Joel Perez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 26, 2025

AFFIRMED

In three issues, appellant Christopher De la Rosa appeals his conviction for the aggravated

sexual assault of a child less than fourteen years old. In his first issue, De la Rosa complains the

trial court abused its discretion, violating article 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,

Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b), and the rules against hearsay when admitting into

evidence testimony regarding extraneous or bad acts. In his second issue, still concerning the same

extraneous or bad acts evidence, De la Rosa asserts the trial court’s admission of the evidence
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violated his right to present a defense and right to confront witnesses under the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In his third issue, De la Rosa argues

the trial court erred by allowing the State’s expert to testify about the veracity of the complainant’s

allegations when the expert opined that she was concerned the complainant had been sexually

abused. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

De la Rosa was indicted for the aggravated sexual assault of his daughter, C.C., 1 who was

less than fourteen years old at the time of the assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B). According to C.C., while she and her brother were visiting De la Rosa,

C.C. woke up to find her father sexually assaulting her by digitally penetrating her vagina. She

told him to stop, and C.C. said he got mad but stopped. C.C. was seven years old at that time and

stated at trial that the incident she testified about was not the first time her father had

inappropriately touched her. C.C. did not immediately tell anyone about the incident and even

denied being sexually abused by her father when interviewed by a Texas Department of Health

and Human Services investigator when C.C. was in fourth grade and her parents were going

through a divorce.

Later, however, when C.C. was in fifth grade, she spoke to a school counselor after playing

a “truth or dare” game at school with a schoolmate wherein the boy touched her inappropriately

and she was made to touch the boy. C.C. also finally expressed to the school counselor that her

father had touched her inappropriately as well. The school counselor reported the alleged abuse to

the police.

1
To protect the victim’s privacy, we refer to her by a pseudonym. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10.

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C.C. explained to the responding officer, San Antonio Police Officer Jesus Monsivais, the

details of her father’s sexual abuse. When Officer Monsivais testified, he corroborated C.C.’s

testimony. Officer Monsivais stated C.C. told him about the incident wherein C.C. woke up to find

her father digitally penetrating her vagina. According to Officer Monsivais, C.C. also told him

about the school incident and about previous sexual incidents with De la Rosa.

Other persons associated with the investigation also spoke with C.C., including the State’s

expert, who testified at trial that she examined and spoke to C.C. about her father’s sexual abuse.

C.C. also spoke with an independent forensic interviewer who interviewed C.C. after the sexual

abuse was reported.

The jury convicted De la Rosa for sexually assaulting his daughter by digital penetration

while she was under the age of fourteen years old. See id. The trial court assessed De la Rosa a

thirty-year prison sentence. De la Rosa appeals.

EXTRANEOUS OR BAD ACT EVIDENCE

Claiming both evidentiary errors and constitutional violations, De la Rosa argues in his

first and second issues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the forensic

interviewer, Myriam Sandoval, to testify regarding extraneous or bad acts she learned about during

C.C.’s forensic interview.

A. Applicable Facts

In a hearing outside the jury’s presence and prior to Sandoval’s testimony, De la Rosa

objected to the admission of Sandoval testifying that C.C. told her that De la Rosa would shower

with C.C., and it made C.C. feel uncomfortable. The State responded claiming it would not solicit

such evidence from Sandoval, and Sandoval did not later testify about it. Next, De la Rosa objected

to Sandoval testifying C.C. told her that De la Rosa “hit and punched her, leaving bruises[,]”

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because the evidence is more prejudicial than probative. The trial court overruled De la Rosa’s

objection, stating the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial as the prejudice did not outweigh its

probative value. It stated the testimony was relevant to establish the relationship between De la

Rosa and C.C. and that C.C. first told Sandoval about being hit by her father.

When the trial court attempted to clarify De la Rosa’s asserted objections that the evidence

was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and hearsay, De la Rosa added, “[T]o constitutionalize it, [the

objections to the admission of the testimony] would be the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth

Amendment under the United States Constitution to present a defense.” The trial court noted De

la Rosa’s objections and overruled them. The State then called Sandoval as its next witness.

Sandoval, a forensic interviewer with a child advocacy center, testified about her interview

with C.C. Sandoval told the jury that C.C. “made outcries of sexual abuse by being touched on her

vaginal area[,]” more specifically, “touched on her vagina with a finger on—skin-to-skin contact.”

Sandoval also testified C.C. disclosed that De la Rosa “hit and spanked” her. De la Rosa objected

to Sandoval’s testimony as hearsay. The trial court overruled De la Rosa’s objection, finding the

evidence was admissible under article 38.371 of the Texas Criminal Code of Procedure.

The trial court included in the jury charge a limiting instruction about evidence of any other

alleged acts of misconduct by De la Rosa against C.C. The limiting instruction informed the jury

that if such evidence was admitted, it was admitted only for “the purpose of showing the state of

mind of [De la Rosa] and [C.C.] and the previous and subsequent relationship between [De la

Rosa] and [C.C.], if it does, and for no other purpose.”

B. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.

Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under this standard, we will uphold

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the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence as long as it is within the zone of reasonable

disagreement and the trial court’s decision is correct under any applicable theory of law. Id.; De

La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The erroneous admission of

evidence qualifies as non-constitutional error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Garcia v. State, 126

S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

C. Challenged Rulings Pertaining to the Texas Rules of Evidence

Referring to Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b), the rules against hearsay, and Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.371, which is subject to the Texas Rules of Evidence, De

la Rosa argues in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Sandoval’s

testimony regarding De la Rosa’s sexual abuse of C.C. and that he spanked and hit her.

1. Applicable Law

Generally, hearsay evidence is not admissible unless an exception to the rule against

hearsay applies. See TEX. R. EVID. 802, 803. Texas Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as “a

statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and

(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” TEX. R. EVID. 801(d).

Relevant evidence is generally admissible if it tends to make a fact of consequence more

or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402; see also

Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 786–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). However, evidence of a crime,

wrong, or act other than the offense charged is not admissible to prove that the defendant acted in

conformity with his character but may be admissible for other purposes. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b);

see also Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Such evidence may be

admissible when it has relevance apart from character conformity, “such as proving motive,

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opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of

accident.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); see also Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 469.

In addition to rule 404(b), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.371 applies in

family-violence prosecutions and expressly allows “evidence of all relevant facts and

circumstances that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor committed the

offense[,] including testimony or evidence regarding the nature of the relationship” between the

victim and defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.371(b); see James v. State, 623 S.W.3d

533, 545 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). Areas of relevant and admissible extraneous-

offense evidence that complies with article 38.371, and that serve non-character-conformity

purposes in compliance with rule 404(b), “include evidence that: (1) explains why a victim of

domestic violence is unwilling to cooperate with prosecution; (2) confirms the victim’s initial—

and later recanted—statements to police; or (3) contextualizes the nature of the relationship

between victim and assailant.” Fernandez v. State, 597 S.W.3d 546, 565 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2020, pet. ref’d) (citing Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2017, no pet.)). Article 38.371, however, “does not permit the presentation of character evidence

that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable

law[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.371(b), (c).

Thus, relevant, admissible evidence “must be excluded when its probative value ‘is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’”

Reese v. State, 340 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (quoting TEX. R.

EVID. 403). “Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that

relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.” Id. at 840–41 (citing Gallo v. State,

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239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). To determine whether to admit or exclude evidence

when counsel asserts a rule 403 objection, the trial court balances the following factors:

(1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with (2) the
proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to
suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse
or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be
given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative
force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

2. Analysis

With respect to Sandoval’s testimony that C.C. conveyed to her that De la Rosa spanked

and hit her, the State did not offer the evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See TEX.

R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Rather, like the evidence in Koury v. State, “the objected-to question[] did not

impliedly convey the content[, if any, of the complainant’s] interview statements.” 684 S.W.3d

537, 550 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. ref’d). Sandoval’s objected-to statement did not provide

details or any incidents of physical abuse. See id. at 551.

Moreover, Sandoval’s testimony that C.C. disclosed to her that De la Rosa spanked or hit

her falls within the hearsay exception as a statement of the declarant’s then-existing emotional,

mental, or physical condition. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(3) (defining the exception as “[a] statement

of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional,

sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health)”). The evidence

concerning C.C. being spanked or hit by her father related to C.C.’s state of mind and emotions as

she spoke to Sandoval during her forensic interview. See id.

Additionally, pursuant to article 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

concerning the admission of extraneous evidence, the admission of the evidence about De la Rosa

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spanking or hitting C.C. does not run afoul of the Texas Rule of Evidence as it reveals the nature

of the relationship between C.C. and De la Rosa, specifically in family-violence prosecutions. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.371(b) (providing for the admission of extraneous or bad act

evidence under certain circumstances in family-violence cases). When C.C. testified, she explained

that upon waking up with De la Rosa’s finger in her vagina and telling her father to stop, De la

Rosa got mad. This made her feel scared and nervous. De la Rosa also attempted to discredit C.C.

when asking her why she did not tell the Department’s investigator about the sexual abuse when

questioned during her parents’ divorce. Thus, Sandoval’s testimony about C.C. being spanked and

hit by her father helps to explain the family’s dynamics and possibly why C.C. delayed in reporting

her father. See Rodriguez v State, 678 S.W.3d 375, 387 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. ref’d)

(“Each of the challenged acts would assist the jury in determining whether [the defendant]

committed the assault, whether by illustrating [the defendant’s] motives (jealous paranoia and

control), by shedding light on the relationship’s dynamics, by establishing identity, or by allowing

the true version of events to shine through when [the complainant] changed her story.”); Brickley

v. State, 623 S.W.3d 68, 81 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence regarding prior

abuse in an aggravated sexual assault case was admissible under article 38.371 to contextualize

the nature of the relationship and help explain the complainant’s hesitancy to report the offense).

The evidence was admissible under article 38.371(b). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.371(b).

As for the trial court’s rule 403 ruling, extraneous evidence of C.C. being spanked or hit

had significant probative value to help explain C.C.’s delayed outcry by revealing the nature of

C.C.’s relationship with De la Rosa. In addition, the evidence had minimal potential for unfair

prejudice and required little time to present. The severity of the extraneous evidence dwarfed in

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comparison to the magnitude of the charged offense. See Dies v. State, 649 S.W.3d 273, 286 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2022, pet. ref’d) (stating that the potential for unfair prejudice is diminished where

the extraneous offense is “no more serious than” the charged offense). Sandoval’s testimony about

the extraneous evidence accounted for less than a page of the record. Moreover, any tendency to

draw impermissible inferences of character conformity “can be minimized through a limiting

instruction,” and the trial court gave such an instruction. See Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

We conclude that the trial court, after balancing the rule 403 factors, could have reasonably

concluded that the probative value of the evidence in question was not substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice or the remaining rule 403 factors. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d

at 641–42.

With respect to Sandoval’s testimony about C.C.’s disclosure surrounding the underlying

sexual assault itself, even if we assume without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting the

evidence, the error would not be reversible. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); see Reese v. State, 33

S.W.3d 238, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (providing that a non-constitutional error will not result

in reversal, if after examining the record as a whole, the reviewing court is reasonably assured the

error did not influence the jury’s verdict or had but a slight effect); Koury, 684 S.W.3d at 551; see

also Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“The erroneous admission of

evidence ‘will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection,

either before or after the complained-of ruling.’”) (quoting Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). C.C. testified about the details of De la Rosa’s sexual assault. Officer

Monsivais, the outcry witness, corroborated C.C.’s detailed account. Dr. Kissoon testified about

her concern that C.C. had been sexually abused based on the information C.C. disclosed during

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Dr. Kissoon’s medical evaluation. Thus, Sandoval presented no new evidence regarding the

charged offense; the jury had already heard the details from C.C. and other corroborating evidence.

See Koury, 684 S.W.3d at 551, see also Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 287 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999) (holding when challenged evidence is cumulative of other evidence properly admitted, any

erroneous admission of evidence is harmless).

De la Rosa’s first issue is overruled.

D. Alleged Constitutional Violations

In his second issue, De la Rosa complains that the admission of Sandoval’s testimony

violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See U.S.

CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. However, prior to Sandoval’s testimony, De la Rosa raised

constitutional violations to his right to present a defense under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, but at no time did he assert a Confrontation Clause violation under the Sixth

Amendment.

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party must present a timely

request, objection, or motion to the trial court which states the specific grounds for the desired

ruling unless the specific grounds are apparent from the context. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A);

see also Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Failure to preserve error

at trial forfeits the later assertion of that error on appeal.” Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citation omitted). “[A]lmost all error—even constitutional error—may be

forfeited if the appellant fail[s] to object” during trial. See id. (citing Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d

890, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “This is true even though the error may concern a

constitutional right of the defendant.” Id. Moreover, the issue on appeal must comport with the

objection made at trial. See Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “An

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objection stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal.”

Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

De la Rosa did not raise a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation at trial. De la

Rosa’s complaint on appeal that the admission of Sandoval’s testimony violated his right of

confrontation does not comport with De la Rosa’s objection at trial, and therefore he has waived

this complaint for appellate review. See Fuller, 253 S.W.3d at 232. Nevertheless, assuming De la

Rosa had preserved this issue for appeal, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated because C.C.

testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation

Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”); see also

Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Moreover, based on our review of De la Rosa’s appellate brief, De la Rosa failed to argue

how the admission of Sandoval’s testimony prevented De la Rosa from presenting a defense at

trial. To the extent De la Rosa now attempts to link his complaint about his inability to present a

defense to a violation of the Confrontation Clause, De la Rosa’s objection at trial does not comport

with his appellate argument. See Broxton, 909 S.W.2d at 918. Absent a specific appellate argument

about how the admission of Sandoval’s testimony allegedly violated his right to present a defense

under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, we cannot conclude De la Rosa’s Fifth or Fourteenth

Amendment constitutional rights, in addition to his confrontational rights discussed above, have

been violated either.

De la Rosa’s second issue is overruled.

ADMISSION OF EXPERT’S DIAGNOSIS TESTIMONY

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In his third issue, De la Rosa complains the trial court erred when it allowed the State’s

expert, Dr. Natalie Kissoon, to testify that “she believed and was concerned” that C.C. had been

sexually assaulted, claiming Dr. Kissoon’s testimony was tantamount to vouching for C.C.’s

credibility. The State argues De la Rosa failed to preserve this issue for appellate review; and, even

assuming he preserved error, the trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Kissoon’s testimony.

A. Applicable Facts

Prior to Dr. Kissoon testifying, the trial court conducted a Daubert 2 hearing regarding Dr.

Kissoon’s testimony. De la Rosa did not challenge Dr. Kissoon’s qualifications as an expert.

Instead, De la Rosa objected to Dr. Kissoon testifying that C.C. was in fact sexually assaulted by

De la Rosa.

After both parties questioned Dr. Kissoon, the State clarified Dr. Kissoon would not testify

that C.C. was sexually assaulted or that De la Rosa was the person who abused C.C. The trial court

then asked De la Rosa to state his objection, and he replied, “Well, I don’t have any objection - -

[.]” However, De la Rosa continued to express concern that in addition to Dr. Kissoon testifying

about C.C.’s medical diagnosis regarding Dr. Kissoon’s “concern for sexual abuse,” Dr. Kissoon

would also identify De la Rosa as the perpetrator. The State confirmed that while Dr. Kissoon

could testify about what C.C. told her, Dr. Kissoon “cannot say that she believes [De la Rosa]

committed the act[,]” to which De la Rosa responded, “That’s fine.” The Daubert hearing

concluded, and De la Rosa did not raise further objections concerning the admission of Dr.

Kissoon’s medical diagnosis.

Dr. Kissoon, whose practice involves conducting medical evaluations of children believed

to have been sexually abused, testified about her medical evaluation of C.C. When asked what

2
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

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percentage of children that Dr. Kissoon evaluates for suspected sexual abuse involves “an outcry

that’s of a delayed nature,” Dr. Kissoon replied, “Most of the children.” Dr. Kissoon added that in

her experience and as indicated by the medical literature, children usually wait two to two and a

half years before disclosing sexual abuse.

Dr. Kissoon testified that when talking to C.C. about her general history, C.C. disclosed to

Dr. Kissoon that De la Rosa had “digital vaginal contact on multiple occasions” with C.C. And

although C.C.’s physical exam was reported as “normal,” Dr Kissoon explained that ninety-five

percent to ninety-six percent of children examined for suspected sexual abuse have “normal”

physical exams. After concluding her evaluation of C.C., Dr. Kissoon opined that her final

assessment of C.C. was “concerning for sexual abuse.”

Dr. Kissoon never testified that C.C. was in fact sexually assaulted or that De la Rosa

committed the sexual abuse.

B. Preservation of Error

As previously stated, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party

must present a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court stating the specific grounds

for the desired ruling unless the specific grounds are apparent from the context. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see also Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 844. The appellate issue must also comport with

the objection made at trial. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339. And “an objection must be made each

time inadmissible evidence is offered unless the complaining party obtains a running objection or

obtains a ruling on his complaint in a hearing outside the presence of the jury.” Lopez v. State, 253

S.W.3d 680, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

During the Daubert hearing, De la Rosa objected to Dr. Kissoon testifying that C.C. indeed

was sexually assaulted and that De la Rosa committed the sexual assault, thereby, bolstering C.C.’s

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testimony regarding the sexual abuse. The State, however, clarified that Dr. Kissoon would not be

providing such testimony. Rather, Dr. Kissoon would only communicate to the jury what C.C.

conveyed to her as part of C.C.’s medical history and would not testify she believed De la Rosa

sexually assaulted C.C. When the State dispelled De la Rosa’s concerns, both De la Rosa and the

trial court indicated “that’s fine.” When Dr. Kissoon testified at trial that her “assessment of the

case was concerning for sexual abuse,” De la Rosa did not assert a new objection. Even after

agreeing to the admission of Dr. Kissoon’s report, which reflected redactions agreed to by the

parties, De la Rosa did not object. Thus, De la Rosa has not preserved his third issue for our review.

See Lopez, 253 S.W.3d at 684; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

As provided below, even if we assume without deciding that De la Rosa preserved error

regarding Dr. Kissoon’s expert testimony, the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony.

C. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony for an abuse of

discretion. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Under this standard,

we will uphold the trial court’s decision if it is within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.”

Beham, 559 S.W.3d at 478. As indicated above, if the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct on

any applicable theory of law, we will not disturb it even if the trial court gave the wrong reason

for its correct ruling. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344; Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 675 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d).

Rule 702 allows a witness who is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education” to “testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or

to determine a fact in issue.” TEX. R. EVID. 702. “Expert testimony does not assist the jury if it

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constitutes ‘a direct opinion on the truthfulness’ of a child victim’s allegations.” Reyes, 274 S.W.3d

at 729 (quoting Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)). “An expert may testify

that the witness exhibits symptoms consistent with sexual abuse, but not that a witness is truthful.”

Reyes, 274 S.W.3d at 729.

D. Analysis

Here, Dr. Kissoon did not comment on C.C.’s truthfulness. Rather, the record reflects Dr.

Kissoon performed a full examination on C.C. Although Dr. Kissoon testified she made no

physical findings of abuse during the examination, the information C.C. communicated to Dr.

Kissoon led Dr. Kissoon to provide a medical diagnosis of “concern[] for sexual abuse.”

Moreover, after reviewing Dr. Kissoon’s testimony, we cannot conclude it had any bearing

on the truthfulness of C.C.’s allegations. Dr. Kissoon’s testimony, much like the results of a

physical examination, was merely evidence corroborating the existence of a sexual assault. See

Johnson v. State, 432 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d) (holding expert

testimony that PTSD was caused by sexual abuse was corroborating evidence and did not

constitute comment on truthfulness). As stated by our sister court, such evidence “does not point

the finger at any particular person.” Id. “Instead, this type of evidence merely verifies that the child

was sexually assaulted.” Id.

Thus, even if we assume De la Rosa preserved error regarding Dr. Kissoon’s expert

testimony, the trial court did not err in admitting it.

De la Rosa’s third issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

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Because we overrule De la Rosa’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment

of conviction.

Irene Rios, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH

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