Jacqueline Morales v. Evan Lowenberg

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00309-CV

Jacqueline Morales, Appellant

v.

Evan Lowenberg, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. C-1-CV-23-005422, THE HONORABLE ERIC SHEPPERD, JUDGE PRESIDING

OPINION

Jacqueline Morales appeals from an order enforcing a settlement agreement and

awarding attorney’s fees. Morales contends that an automatically generated email signature does

not support formation of an enforceable Rule 11 agreement, that the temporary restraining orders

and injunction were not proper, and that the award for attorney’s fees includes work unrelated to

enforcing the settlement agreement. We will modify in part the Order Granting Motion to

Enforce Settlement Agreement to reduce the attorney’s fees awarded and affirm that order

as modified.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns custody of a dog named Yuvi. The record is fairly slim

because the trial-court proceedings concluded based on enforcement of a settlement agreement.
According to plaintiff/appellee Evan Lowenberg’s pleadings, Morales and

Lowenberg began a romantic relationship sometime in 2019 and lived together until March

2023. 1 In February 2022, they visited her family in Brownsville. Her brother found a stray dog

that the family intended to take to an animal shelter, but Morales and Lowenberg decided to take

the dog with them to Austin. The parties separated in March 2023 and agreed to each keep the

dog half the time with adjustments for other obligations. This lasted until October 2023 when,

Lowenberg alleged, Morales kept the dog through his period of possession.

Lowenberg sued for conversion and breach of contract. He sought mediation and

later applied for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction preventing her from

moving the dog out of Travis County or taking the dog outside of Texas. He sought an order that

Morales return the dog to him in Travis County. He requested specific performance of an

agreement for equal, alternating possession of the dog.

On March 29, 2024, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order after an

ex parte hearing. Among other requirements, the court ordered Morales to deliver the dog to

Lowenberg in Austin no later than April 11, 2024; if the parties did not agree on an exchange

date by April 2, Morales’s delivery date accelerated to April 6, 2024. They would resume

alternating custody. The court set the temporary injunction to be heard on April 26, 2024.

The parties did not agree on a return date before April 2. Early on April 6,

Morales advised Lowenberg’s attorney and the trial court by email that she would not deliver the

dog to Lowenberg as required by the TRO because of concerns over missing work, travel

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Morales and Lowenberg dispute whether they broke up in 2021 (Morales, based on her
April 2024 email) or 2023 (Lowenberg, based on assertion in November 2023 petition).
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distance, and her safety. She said that Lowenberg could pick up the dog in Brownsville at a

location where she would not be and that she would not get rid of the dog or take it out of state.

Lowenberg moved for contempt, seeking $350 per day she violated the TRO. At

the April 17, 2024 Motion for Contempt hearing, the trial court opted not to hold Morales in

contempt for failing to give Lowenberg the dog as long as she did so on Friday, April 19, 2024.

The court ordered Morales to deliver the dog to Lowenberg’s attorney in Austin by Friday,

April 19, at noon.

Instead, at 2:48 a.m. on April 19, Morales emailed Lowenberg’s attorney the

following with the subject line “Settlement Offer”:

Ms. [Ashley] Morgan,
2.5 years after breaking up with Evan I’m still trying to be done with him even if
it means giving up my own dog. Here is my offer: I will surrender Yuvi to you. I
will relinquish all rights to her. I will meet you in Austin on Sunday, April 21 at 8
PM at 8314 State Hwy 71, Austin, TX 78735. Evan and I will sign mutual
releases. Each party will bear their own fees and costs. Evan will never contact
me or my family again, directly or through anyone other than you. The offer
stands until Friday, April 19, at 5 PM. Pass this on to your client.

Jacqueline Morales, Esq.
(she/her/ella)
[phone number]
[employer]

Morgan responded at 8:50 a.m.: “I’ve conferred with my client, and he accepts your offer. I’ll

send you a proposed Release later today.” Morgan sent a release at 11:04 a.m. for Morales’s

review. At 5:04 p.m., Morales asked for more time to review the language of the release and an

extension to deliver the dog on Saturday “in compliance with the TRO.” Morgan supplied an

editable version of the release and wrote:

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I suppose I ought to have stated it expressly in the draft Release, but now that
Mr. Lowenberg has accepted your settlement offer, the settlement resolves the
dispute over contempt.

I’m not available tomorrow night. I am still available for the time you proposed
in the offer (8pm on Sunday). I could also meet you earlier in the day on
Saturday (before 4:30pm) or on Sunday in the morning or early afternoon.

Morales delivered the dog consistent with her Settlement Agreement email on Sunday,

April 21.

On Monday, April 22, 2024, Lowenberg filed the email exchange as a

Rule 11 settlement agreement. Less than an hour later, Morales’s attorney filed his notice

of appearance. That same morning, Morales’s attorney sent an email announcing that

Morales revoked any settlement offers and denied that a Rule 11 agreement was formed.

Lowenberg filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and set a hearing for the

same day as the temporary-injunction hearing. Morales, now through counsel, responded

that she never stated that their emails would serve as a Rule 11 agreement, that there were

no signatures attached to the emails, and that she sent the emails under immense pressure

from the lawsuit.

At the April 26 hearing, the court granted the motion to enforce the

settlement and cancelled the temporary-injunction hearing.

DISCUSSION

Morales contends that Lowenberg’s acceptance of her settlement offer did not

form a binding Rule 11 agreement because the automated signature block did not constitute a

signature. She also contends that the court’s TRO and Lowenberg’s requested injunction were

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improper. Finally, she contends that the award of attorney’s fees was erroneous because it

included fees beyond those needed to enforce the settlement agreement.

I. Morales signed the Settlement Offer email sufficiently to form a Rule 11 agreement.

By issue one, Morales contends that her Settlement Offer email is not properly

part of a Rule 11 agreement because she did not sign it and because the circumstances

surrounding the agreement’s formation were unconscionable and made the agreement

unenforceable.

A. Underlying law

Rule 11 was created to avoid disputes over the terms of oral settlement

agreements. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. 1995). Accordingly, courts are

not to adhere too literally to the rule’s language when enforcing its intent. Kennedy v. Hyde,

682 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex. 1984); Thang v. Defy Int’l, LLC, 712 S.W.3d 647, 663–65 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.).

“A settlement agreement must comply with Rule 11 to be enforceable.” Padilla,

907 S.W.2d at 460. Generally, that means it must be “in writing, signed and filed with the

papers as part of the record” or “made in open court and entered of record.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 11.

The essential terms for a settlement agreement are the amount of compensation and the liability

to be released. Chowning v. Boyer, No. 03-20-00387-CV, 2021 WL 3233859, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Austin July 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases and citing Padilla,

907 S.W.2d at 460–61 (concluding that complete and enforceable agreement existed where terms

included agreement to pay amount in exchange “for full and final settlement of this case”)).

“Parties may enter into a binding settlement agreement even if they contemplate that a more

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formal document memorializing the agreement will be executed at a later date.” Andrews

v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 03-11-00271-CV, 2012 WL 1581137, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Austin May 3, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Ronin v. Lerner, 7 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).

A court can enforce a settlement agreement complying with Rule 11 even when

one side no longer consents to the settlement. Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 461. If a party withdraws

its consent to a settlement agreement, the party seeking enforcement may file a motion to enforce

the Rule 11 agreement as a binding contract under general contract law. See id.; Chowning,

2021 WL 3233859, at *6 (citing Mantas v. Fifth Ct. of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.

1996)). We review the trial court’s ruling on whether to enforce a Rule 11 agreement under the

same rules governing contract construction. See Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Texas

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 540 S.W.3d 553, 561 (Tex. 2018).

We review a trial court’s decision regarding enforcement of a Rule 11 agreement

for abuse of discretion. See Mantas, 925 S.W.2d at 659; Staley v. Herblin, 188 S.W.3d 334, 336

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court

acted without reference to guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,

701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). A trial judge has no discretion in determining what the

law is or in applying the law to the facts of a case. Staley, 188 S.W.3d at 336. In applying this

standard, we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations so long as they are properly

supported by the record, and we review legal determinations made by the trial court de novo.

Eastman Gas Co., L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 456 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2015, pet. denied).

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Morales contends that a signature block is not, absent other indicia, a signature for

Rule 11 purposes. See Cunningham v. Zurich Am. Ins., 352 S.W.3d 519, 530 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2011, pet. denied). In Cunningham, the court looked to the Texas codification of the

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) for guidance on how electronic documents can

satisfy Rule 11’s signature requirements. Id. at 529 (citing Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 322.002).

The statute provides that “electronic signature” “means an electronic sound, symbol, or process

attached to . . . a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.”

Id. at 530. The disputed agreement included an email from a party’s attorney who closed her

email with a printed signature block displaying her name and contact information. The court

held that, while Rule 11 agreements could be formed through emails, an automatically appended

block that had the sender’s name and contact information was not a “signature” under Rule 11

absent some indication that it was typed by the sender or otherwise intended to be her signature.

Id. The court held that the email did not have a signature because the block did not have an “/s/”

followed by counsel’s name or a graphic mark indicating the typewritten name was her

signature. Id.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals declined to follow Cunningham in Thang.

712 S.W.3d at 663–65. The Thang court noted that courts have routinely enforced Rule 11

agreements that were made by email. See id. at 663 (citing Shamrock, 540 S.W.3d at 561). It

noted the Fort Worth Court of Appeals’s reliance on UETA in Cunningham to resolve whether a

Rule 11 agreement was “signed” was no longer tenable because the Texas version of UETA was

amended after Cunningham to expressly exclude “enforceability . . . of a document in any form

that is . . . governed by rules adopted by the supreme court . . . .” See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code

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§ 332.003(e); see also Act of May 26, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 606, § 7.01, sec. 332.003(e)

2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 1775, 1795; see also Thang, 712 S.W.3d at 662–63.

The Fourteenth Court held that a standard, printed signature block is sufficient to

support formation of a Rule 11 agreement. Thang, 712 S.W.3d at 664. It emphasized that Rule

11 was adopted to avoid disputes over the terms of oral settlement agreements. Id. at 663 (citing

Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 461). The Thang court noted that, though a signature was traditionally

the name of the signer handwritten in ink, a signature may also be “written in pencil, typed,

printed, made with a rubber stamp, or impressed into the paper.” Id. at 664 (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 134 cmt. A). In Thang, the parties exchanged a series of emails

concerning settlement and release of claims in a dispute over a land sale of leased property.

Each party’s representative sent an email offering, modifying, and ultimately accepting the

terms; each email had a “from” email address and closed with at least the first name of the

sender. Id. at 656. The parties continued to negotiate the terms of the formal settlement

document. Id. at 657. When one of the parties failed to sign the final documents, the original

offeror amended its pleadings to request enforcement of the agreement contained in the original

email exchange. Id. The Thang court held that the attorney of the recipient of the original offer

sent a reply making the counteroffer that was accepted and that the other party had accepted the

lawyer’s printed name as a signature when the parties later drafted, exchanged, and modified

formal settlement agreements. Id. at 664. The Thang court concluded:

Regardless of whether parties to a Rule 11 agreement type their names with a
typewriter, a computer keyboard, or a touchscreen, and regardless of whether they
type their names in an email or create a “signature block” to be included with
their email, the effect is the same. They have signed it.

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Id.2

We are persuaded by the Thang court’s reasoning concerning the applicability of

automated signature blocks supporting formation of Rule 11 agreements.

B. Application

Morales contends that her automatically generated email signature does not

satisfy the Rule 11 signature requirement for creating an enforceable agreement under Texas law.

She argues that the document contains no indication that she intended to sign the email and form

a Rule 11 agreement, that the email does not meet the signature requirements for a court filing,

that automatically affixed signature blocks are more like business cards than hand-written

signatures affixed to letters, and that the circumstances make the Rule 11 agreement

unconscionable and unenforceable.

1. Signature block

Morales contends that her email offer contains no indication that she intended to

sign the email and form a Rule 11 agreement. She relies on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

21(f)(7), which provides that filed documents are considered signed if the document includes an

electronic or scanned image of a signature or an “/s/” and a name typed in the space where a

signature would otherwise appear. Morales accurately observes that her “Settlement Offer”

email contained neither, in contrast to the pleadings she filed when proceeding pro se on which

she affixed an image of her handwritten signature.

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In Thang, the Fourteenth Court noted, without adopting, the First Court of Appeals
holding that an email address in the “from” field of an email functions as a signature under
UETA when assessing contract formation. Thang v. Defy Int’l, LLC, 712 S.W.3d 647, 663–65
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (citing Khoury v. Tomlinson, 518 S.W.3d 568,
576–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)). We likewise do not reach whether a
mere email address in the “From” field of an email would support formation of a Rule 11
agreement.
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Morales’s argument that the signature block does not meet the standards for

signatures on a court filing fails because the agreement is not a pleading. Rule 11 agreements are

enforced as contracts, and courts accordingly have looked to the requirements under the statute

of frauds. See Padilla, 907 S.W.2d at 460. This approach is consistent with the courts’ ability to

glean a Rule 11 agreement from a collection of emails from different parties—including the

opposition—rather than a single pleading that conforms to Rule 21. Shamrock, 540 S.W.3d at

561 (noting that Rule 11 agreement may be formed with series of writings such as emails).

Morales’s contention that automatically affixed signature blocks are more like

business cards than hand-written signatures is a variation on a theme that is unavailing. This

argument is not supported by statute or case law. Further, there is nothing preventing the

signature block from being both signature and business card.

If we look beyond the objective nature of the signature block, there is evidence

that Morales intended the email to be an offer that could be accepted to form an agreement. She

titled the email “Settlement Offer.” She showed settlement intent in the body of the email by

stating that she made the “offer” to “be done” with Lowenberg. She offered to “relinquish all

rights” to the dog even though Lowenberg pled only for a split possession. In return, Lowenberg

would agree to cease contact with her and her family except through his lawyer. She wanted

signed, mutual releases and discussed allocation of fees and costs. She asked that Lowenberg’s

lawyer pass the offer on to him and set an acceptance deadline of 5:00 p.m. She clearly offered

to make an “agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending” as described by

Rule 11. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11. The record supports the trial court’s view that Morales’s

automatically included name at the bottom of the email served as a signature for Rule 11

purposes. See Thang, 712 S.W.3d. at 664.

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2. Unconscionability and unenforceability

Morales contends that the circumstances make the Rule 11 agreement

unconscionable and unenforceable, citing Delfingen US-Tex., L.P v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d

791, 798 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (defining “unconscionability”) and Ski River Dev.,

Inc. v. McCalla, 167 S.W.3d 121, 135 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) (holding that

unconscionable contracts are unenforceable). Unconscionability has no precise legal definition.

Delfingen, 407 S.W.3d at 798. To assess procedural unconscionability, we examine (1) the

entire atmosphere in which the agreement was made; (2) the alternatives, if any, available to the

parties at the time the contract was made; (3) the “non-bargaining ability” of one party;

(4) whether the contract was illegal or against public policy; and (5) whether the contract is

oppressive or unreasonable. Id. (citing Ski River, 167 S.W.3d at 136); see also Angell

v. Culpepper, No. 03-19-00778-CV, 2021 WL 5018758, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 29,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms

unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may show that the weaker party had no meaningful

choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.

Ski River, 167 S.W.3d at 136. Factors that may contribute to an unconscionable bargaining

process include: (1) knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party will be unable to

receive substantial benefits from the contract; and (2) knowledge of the stronger party that the

weaker party is unable reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental

infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agreement. Id.

Morales sent the “Settlement Offer” email at 2:48 a.m. when, she contends, she

“was not in the right state of mind due to the immense pressure and emotional toll of the

lawsuit.” She asserts that she was representing herself, working full-time, and managing the

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emotional strain of a dispute with her ex-boyfriend over her emotional-support dog. She faced

the choice of missing a day of work to transport the dog to Austin or facing a contempt sanction.

She had lost a lot of motions. Her offer of complete surrender exceeds the relief of evenly

shared possession Lowenberg requested. She argues that “she never intended to completely

relinquish all her rights” to the dog.

The record supports the trial court’s rejection of Morales’s arguments. Morales

was under pressure of contempt, but she had alternatives of delivering the dog and continuing to

resist the lawsuit. She demonstrated in making the offer her awareness that she could bargain

with Lowenberg’s attorney regarding the delivery date. Though relatively new to the field, she

was a licensed attorney and in obtaining that license theoretically had learned the mechanics of

contract formation. She made the first settlement offer and set the timeline. Though she gave up

more possession than Lowenberg requested, she asked for more relief—the no-contact

provision—then she had requested in her pleadings. The contract is not illegal or against public

policy, and Morales’s choice to surrender the dog rather than continue to share possession with

someone she preferred to have no contact with is not unreasonable. There is no indication that

Lowenberg was the stronger party or that Morales was in any way infirm, ignorant, illiterate, or

unable to understand the language of the agreement she proposed. That she developed offeror’s

remorse after Lowenberg accepted her offer does not make the agreement unconscionable.

We overrule issue one and affirm the enforcement of the parties’ agreement.

II. Affirming the enforcement order moots the issues relating to the TRO.

By issues two and three, Morales argues that the TRO was void for procedural

and substantive reasons. These issues were argued in the event we reversed the final

enforcement order. The TRO was supplanted and the challenge to its merits was rendered moot

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by the order resolving the merits of the case. Cf. Isuani v. Manske-Shefield Radiology Grp.,

P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (holding appeal of temporary injunction mooted by final

judgment). Moreover, TROs are not appealable. See, e.g., In re Office of Attorney Gen.,

257 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (conditionally granting mandamus relief in part

because relator lacked remedy by appeal for TRO).

We need not address the merits of issues two and three.

III. Some attorney’s fees were erroneously awarded for temporary-injunction work.

Morales complains that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees for work

unrelated to enforcement of the Rule 11 agreement. The trial court expressly awarded attorney’s

fees incurred “[A] as a result of Defendant Jacqueline Morales’ breach of the parties Rule 11

Settlement Agreement and [B] in order to enforce the parties’ Rule 11 Settlement Agreement.”

Morales does not challenge the fees awarded in category B 3 but contends that Lowenberg is not

entitled to fees for preparation for the temporary-injunction hearing that was not part of the

enforcement action.

Lowenberg argues that he is entitled to the attorney’s fees incurred to prepare for

the temporary-injunction hearing because, but for Morales’s breach of the settlement agreement,

he would not have incurred those fees. The Texas Supreme Court held generally that, “[i]n an

action for breach of contract, actual damages may be recovered when the loss is the ‘natural

3
A litigant can recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred to enforce a contract. Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001(b)(8). A Rule 11 agreement is enforceable as a contract. See
Trudy’s Tex. Star, Inc. v. City of Austin, 307 S.W.3d 894, 914 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no
pet.). The unjustified breach of a settlement agreement exposes the breaching party to paying the
attorney’s fees incurred by the non-breaching party “in connection with its attempts to enforce
the Rule 11 Agreement.” American Fisheries, Inc. v. National Honey, Inc., 585 S.W.3d 491, 505
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Garcia v. Harding, 545 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). Thus, the trial court did not err in awarding Lowenberg attorney’s
fees incurred to enforce the settlement agreement.
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probable, and foreseeable consequence of defendant’s conduct.’” Mead v. Johnson Grp.,

615 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. 1981). Building on that precedent, the Waco court held that a litigant

can recover “prior attorney’s fees” that were incurred in litigation that continued because of the

breach of a settlement agreement. Ganske v. WRS Grp., Inc., No. 10-06-00050-CV, 2007 WL

1147357, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Waco court

reversed a trial-court judgment that denied attorney’s fees incurred in defending against claims

that were settled by a Rule 11 agreement and that nevertheless, because of a breach of that

agreement, continued to be litigated. Id. at *1. It wrote that “[t]here could be no more

foreseeable consequence of a breach of the settlement agreement than the cost of litigation that it

was specifically designed to avoid” and that “[t]here is nothing sacrosanct about attorney’s fees

per se that forbids their award as damages.” Id. at *3 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Holmes,

842 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, pet. denied) (awarding prior attorney’s

fees as actual damages in DTPA claim)).

Since the Waco court’s opinion in Ganske, however, the Texas Supreme Court

has plainly stated that attorney’s fees incurred in the prosecution or defense of a claim are not

compensatory damages. In re Nalle Plastics Fam. L.P., 406 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Tex. 2013) (orig.

proceeding). The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied that concept to attorney’s fees incurred in

continued litigation of a suit that had been settled by agreement. See Wang v. Whittenburg,

726 S.W.3d 516, 519 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2025, pet. granted); see also Haubold v. Medical

Carbon Rsch. Inst., LLC, No. 03-11-00115-CV, 2014 WL 1018008, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin

Mar. 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Amarillo court squarely rejected a request for attorney’s

fees as the lost “benefit of the bargain” when a settlement agreement was breached causing

further litigation and attorney’s fees as “consequential damages” from that breach. Wang,

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726 S.W.3d at 518–19. That court pointed to previous cases holding that attorney’s fees as

consequential damages to the breach of a Rule 11 agreement were not available. See id. at 519

(discussing Tomorrow Telecom, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 07-19-00427-CV, 2021 WL 937121 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo Mar. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op) & Berg v. Wilson, 353 S.W.3d 166 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. denied)). Lowenberg’s attorney’s fees strictly in preparation for the

temporary-injunction hearing—a hearing that did not happen and a motion on which he did not

prevail—fall into this precluded category.

Lowenberg’s attorney filed an affidavit supporting the award of attorney’s fees

and attached a billing summary describing work done and hours spent on those tasks. Morales

highlights five entries from the billing summary as relating to the temporary-injunction hearing.

Two of the entries are not shown to be specifically tied to the temporary injunction and are

consistent with work supporting Lowenberg’s basis for recovery: “Bates label supplemental

document production” and “Call with Jesus Lowenberg regarding upcoming hearing and address

questions regarding potential testimony.” The record does not support reversing these fees.

Three entries are expressly limited to the temporary-injunction hearing: “Preparation for hearing

on temporary injunction,” “Work on draft cross examination in preparation for hearing on

temporary injunction,” and “Review and analyze Defendant’s Response to Application for

Temporary Injunction.” As these entries describe work done specifically to prepare for the

temporary-injunction hearing, we conclude that they were not properly part of the attorney’s fees

award for enforcement of the Rule 11 agreement. The fees for these entries total $1,015. We

sustain in part issue four.

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CONCLUSION

We therefore modify the Order Granting Motion to Enforce Settlement

Agreement by reducing the attorney’s fees award to $6,555 and affirm the order as modified.

__________________________________________
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly

Affirmed in Part; Modified and, as Modified, Affirmed in Part

Filed: May 28, 2026

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