Kristy Berry A/K/A Kristina Marie Gilpin v. Cameron Brickell

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-23-00756-CV

Kristy Berry a/k/a Kristina Marie Gilpin, Appellant

v.

Cameron Brickell, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF BELL COUNTY
NO. 23CCV01011, THE HONORABLE PAUL A. MOTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O RAN D U M O PI N I O N

This is an appeal from the county court’s judgment in an eviction case. See

generally Tex. Prop. Code §§ 24.001-.011; Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.1-.13 (governing eviction cases).

The court granted appellee, Cameron Brickell, possession of the residential property at issue.

Appellant, Kristy Berry, a/k/a Kristina Marie Gilpin, argues for more time to vacate the property,

asserts claims about alleged theft and harassment by her neighbor (Brickell’s father), and requests

the return of the allegedly stolen property. Because Berry has not presented any cognizable issues

that challenge the county court’s judgment that Brickell is entitled to possession of the property,

we affirm.

BACKGROUND

According to Berry’s brief, she and her partner, Raymond Flores, had been tenants

at the property for ten years without a written lease. Berry asserts that they had entered into an
oral agreement with Brickell’s grandfather, Bill Brickell, that their monthly rental payments would

go towards purchasing the property for a total price of $10,000.1 However, before Bill passed

away, he gave the property to his grandson Brickell.

According to Brickell’s petition for eviction, which was filed in justice court on

July 19, 2023, the parties had an oral agreement and Berry and Flores had an “at will tenancy.”

See Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2013) (“Because

tenants at will remain in possession with their landlords’ consent, their possession is lawful, but it

is for no fixed term, and the landlords can put them out of possession at any time.”). Brickell

alleged in the petition that on December 11, 2022, he delivered a written notice to vacate the

premises within 14 days to Berry and Flores in person. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.005(b)

(establishing that landlord must give tenant at will at least three days’ written notice to vacate

before filing forcible-detainer suit); id. § 24.002(a)(2) (establishing that tenant at will “commits a

forcible detainer” if tenant refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand). Berry and

Flores failed to vacate the premises by December 26, 2022, and in July, Brickell filed the petition

for eviction on the grounds of environmental hazards at the property. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3.

All parties appeared in justice court for a bench trial on August 1, 2023. The justice

court issued a final judgment awarding Brickell possession of the property and no damages. The

court set a bond at $500 for appeal to the county court. See id. R. 510.9(b). Berry perfected her

de novo appeal to the county court by filing a “Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court

Costs or an Appeal Bond” with the justice court. See id. R. 510.9(a). Brickell did not contest the

Statement. See id. R. 510.9(c). In her pleadings before the county court, Berry stated that she had

1
We refer to Brickell’s grandfather by his first name for clarity.

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been unable to find another place for her and Flores to live due to financial concerns, vehicle

troubles, limited credit history, and Flores’s ongoing health challenges.

The county court conducted a de novo bench trial on November 2, 2023, at which

Berry and Brickell both appeared. That same day, the county court signed a judgment awarding

Brickell possession of the property and court costs in the amount of $179.00. The court ordered

that the property be restored to Brickell by midnight on November 9, 2023, unless Berry filed a

supersedeas bond in the amount of $3,000. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.007 (“A judgment of a county

court may not under any circumstances be stayed pending appeal unless, within 10 days of the

signing of the judgment, the appellant files a supersedeas bond in an amount set by the

county court.”).

Berry timely perfected appeal to this Court. 2

ANALYSIS

Berry raises three issues in her appellate brief. As we understand them, Berry’s

issues on appeal can be summarized as follows: (1) a request for more time to vacate the premises

and remove her possessions, including building materials, a boat, and a trailer; (2) a request for

the Court to stop her next-door neighbor, Brickell’s father, Miles Brickell, from harassing her by

cutting off her water supply and taking her possessions, among other things; and (3) a request for

the return of the allegedly stolen property, including a trailer allegedly taken by Miles. In her brief,

Berry does not challenge any aspect of the eviction proceeding or assert any challenge to the county

court’s ruling awarding Brickell possession of the property. Berry’s stated issues raising

2
Due to health issues, Flores had moved away from the property by the time Berry
appealed. He is not a party to the appeal.
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allegations of harassment and theft by Miles and requesting more time to vacate the property do

not present a cognizable challenge to the trial court’s judgment.

A forcible-detainer suit is intended to be a “speedy, simple, and inexpensive means

to obtain immediate possession of property.” Marshall v. Housing Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782, 787

(Tex. 2006); see also Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919. As noted above, a tenant at will commits

forcible detainer if she refuses to surrender possession of the property on written demand by the

person entitled to possession of the property. See Tex. Prop. Code § 24.002(a)(2). “The only issue

in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises.” Marshall,

198 S.W.3d at 785–86 (citing Tex. Prop. Code § 24.001). Accordingly, Rule 510.3 provides

as follows:

The court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title. Counterclaims
and the joinder of suits against third parties are not permitted in eviction cases. A
claim that is not asserted because of this rule can be brought in a separate suit in a
court of proper jurisdiction.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e).

Thus, to prevail in a forcible-detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title;

instead, he “is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior

right to immediate possession.” 3 Haddox v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 03-15-00350-CV,

2016 WL 2659695, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 6, 2016, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (quoting Rice

v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)). After the de novo trial, the

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“[A] judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is a determination only of the
right to immediate possession and does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties to any other
issue in controversy relating to the realty in question.” Lopez v. Sulak, 76 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg, 2002, no pet.); see also Tex. Prop. Code § 24.008 (providing that
“[a]n eviction suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits”).
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county court concluded that Brickell “is entitled to possession of the property.” Berry has not

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented by Brickell on this issue.

In addition, we note that Berry filed her brief without requesting the reporter’s

record. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(1) (establishing that “appellant must request in writing that the

official reporter prepare the reporter’s record”). In the absence of a reporter’s record, “we do not

know what, if any, evidence was presented to the trial court.” In re Spiegel, 6 S.W.3d 643, 646

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1999, no pet.). Without a reporter’s record, we must presume that the

missing evidence supported the trial court’s judgment. Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 230

(Tex. 2002). Moreover, “statements in a brief that are unsupported by the records cannot be

accepted as facts by an appellate court.” J. W. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

No. 03-23-00151-CV, 2023 WL 5208035, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 15, 2023, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (quoting In re A.F.S., No. 05-16-01123-CV, 2018 WL 3434509 at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas July 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Furthermore, “we do not know what issues were

presented to and ruled on by the county court at law as generally required to preserve error.” See

Loredo v. Williams, No. 03-25-00052-CV, 2025 WL 2325166, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 13,

2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.1).

Although we “construe pro se pleadings and briefs liberally,” pro se litigants must

still follow the same rules and laws as litigants who are represented by a licensed attorney, Canada

v. State, 547 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.), including all applicable rules of

procedure. Loredo, 2025 WL 2325166, at *2 (citing Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex.

2005) (per curiam)). The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant’s brief to

concisely state all issues or points presented for review. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f). In addition, an

appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

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appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” See id. R. 38.1(i); see also id. R. 34.1 (“The

appellate record consists of the clerk’s record and, if necessary to the appeal, the reporter’s

record.”). While we are required to treat an appellant’s issue statements in briefs as “covering

every subsidiary question that is fairly included,” id. R. 38.1(f), an issue statement is sufficient

only “if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the error about which [the] complaint is

made.” Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting

Anderson v. Gilbert, 897 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1995)). In this case, the issues raised by Berry do

not direct us to any complained-of errors by the trial court.

“We generally hesitate to turn away claims based on waiver or failure to preserve

the issue.” First United Pentecostal Church v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 221 (Tex. 2017). We

“construe briefing ‘reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by

waiver.’” Id. at 222 (quoting Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam)). To

preserve a point for appellate review, a party must make a timely, specific objection or motion to

the trial court that both states the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity, unless

the grounds are apparent from the context, and complies with the rules of evidence or procedure,

and the trial court must rule on the party’s objection or request. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). A

party’s complaints and arguments on appeal must correspond with the complaints made at the trial-

court level to preserve error for appeal. See Blackstone Med., Inc. v. Phoenix Surgicals, L.L.C.,

470 S.W.3d 636, 651 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). While we are mindful of the Texas

Supreme Court’s direction that we “should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably

possible,” Perry, 272 S.W.3d at 587, in this case we are precluded from doing so by the lack of

both a complete record and a properly preserved challenge to the trial court’s disposition of the

sole issue before it—whether Brickell had the right to immediate possession of the property.

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A pro se appellant is required to properly present her case both at trial and on appeal.

Strange v. Continental Cas., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). An issue

on appeal unsupported by argument or citation to any legal authority presents nothing for the court

to review. Id. at 678. An appellate court has no duty to perform an independent review of the

record and applicable law to determine whether error occurred. See id. “Were we to do so, even

on behalf of a pro se litigant, we would be forced to stray from our role as neutral adjudicators and

become an advocate for that party.” Taylor v. Meador, 326 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2010, no pet.).

In this case, the issues presented by Berry are not challenges to the trial court’s

ruling on the right of possession of the property, which was the only issue before the trial court.

Berry has not demonstrated that she preserved error in the trial court on the issues she raises on

appeal, nor has she provided legal authority or substantive analysis addressing those issues. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a), 38.1(i). Berry’s issues presented are therefore overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Berry’s issues on appeal, we affirm the county court’s judgment.

__________________________________________
Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Kelly

Affirmed

Filed: September 30, 2025

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