Amanda Canida v. B&H Realty, LLC

CourtListener 10871706Txctapp2Jun 4, 2026

Full text

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00315-CV
___________________________

AMANDA CANIDA, Appellant

V.

B&H REALTY, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CIV-25-0146

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Amanda Canida, acting pro se, attempts to appeal from the trial

court’s April 6, 2026 order granting Appellee B&H Realty, LLC’s motion to dismiss

and awarding B&H Realty attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

91a. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. While the order expressly disposes of Canida’s claims

against B&H Realty, it does not dispose of B&H Construction, LLC’s claims against

Canida.1 The order also clearly states that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded has

not yet been determined.

We have jurisdiction to consider appeals only from final judgments and from

certain interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v.

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 51.014. A final judgment is one that (1) “actually disposes of every pending claim

and party” or (2) “clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims

and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Unless one of the statutory exceptions

listed under Section 51.014(a) applies, an order that does not dispose of all pending

parties and claims remains interlocutory and unappealable until the trial court signs a

final judgment. Id.

1
Canida portrayed her filing as a “Protective Notice of Appeal” and reasoned
that it was filed “due to uncertainty regarding finality in the consolidated proceedings,
including the continued pendency of Plaintiff B&H Construction, LLC’s claims and
ongoing injunctive relief.”

2
We notified Canida of our concern that we do not have jurisdiction over her

appeal because the trial court’s order does not appear to be a final judgment or an

appealable interlocutory order. We cautioned her that unless she or another party

filed with this court a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we could

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. We

received a response from Canida, but it does not show grounds for continuing the

appeal.2

Because the appealed-from order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable

interlocutory order, we lack jurisdiction over it. See Paschal v. Belden, No. 02-25-00381-

CV, 2025 WL 2736512, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 25, 2025, no pet.)

(holding appealed-from order was not final when claims remained pending in trial

court and dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we dismiss this

appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Paschal, 2025 WL

2736512, at *1.

/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice

Delivered: June 4, 2026

2
Her response seemingly concedes that the trial court’s April 6, 2026 order is
not a final judgment, stating that “the lead consolidated proceeding remained pending,
including B&H Construction, LLC’s claims in Cause No. CIV-25-0146. No severance
order was entered, and the April 6 order did not expressly state that it disposed of all
claims and all parties in the consolidated matter.”

3

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