Colby Skyler Guy Rideout v. Hallie Frazier Rideout

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00231-CV
___________________________

COLBY SKYLER GUY RIDEOUT, Appellant

V.

HALLIE FRAZIER RIDEOUT, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Hood County, Texas
Trial Court No. CL2024146

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Colby Skyler Guy Rideout challenges a protective order entered

against him for the protection of Appellee Hallie Frazier Rideout under Chapter 7B of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Raising two issues, Colby1 argues (1) that the

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s decision to

issue the protective order and (2) that the statutes underpinning the protective order

are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Hallie and Colby were previously married and have a son together; they

divorced in October 2020.

In June 2021, Hallie moved from Cleburne to Granbury to “start over” with

her son. Shortly thereafter, Colby began attending Hallie’s church even though she

had told him that she “didn’t want him to come [into] that space.” Hallie asked him

to at least go to a different service, but Colby refused and continued to sit “caddy-

corner” from her in church and to repeatedly look back at her while she was trying to

worship. He also started attending a “Sunday school class that shared a wall with

[hers].”

Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first
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names to avoid confusion. See, e.g., Est. of Meyers, No. 02-25-00189-CV, 2025 WL
3723746, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).

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In August 2023, Hallie and Colby’s son began playing soccer. Colby drove

from Cleburne to Granbury to watch not only each game but also each 30-minute

practice session and always made it a point to sit right next to Hallie. Each time that

she got up to move because she felt uncomfortable, he picked up his chair to follow

her.

One night after the soccer team’s pictures were taken, Hallie took their son to

Sonic. According to Hallie, as she was trying to exit the parking lot, Colby blocked

her vehicle with his truck and angrily confronted her about failing to tell him about

the team pictures.

In October 2023, Hallie filed a motion to enforce Colby’s child-support

obligations because he had failed to make his required payments. In December 2023,

Hallie and Colby entered into a Rule 11 agreement that resolved the child-support-

enforcement motion and required them to communicate exclusively through

AppClose.2 The day after the Rule 11 agreement was signed, Colby sent Hallie a

message informing her that he was moving to the neighborhood “right behind” hers

in Granbury. After moving to Granbury, Colby joined Hallie’s gym, showed up at a

restaurant while she was eating, and shopped at the same grocery stores.

AppClose is a co-parenting communication app that “securely and
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automatically” time-stamps, encrypts, and stores every message. See AppClose,
https://www.appclose.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2026).

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After Hallie and Colby began communicating on AppClose, Colby sent Hallie

numerous messages criticizing her parenting skills, telling her that she was a horrible

mother, and attacking her family. Hallie testified that Colby’s constant messaging

“ma[de her] feel really scared” and that the torrent of messages was unrelenting.

Hallie stated that she had asked Colby to stop messaging her so much but that he had

not heeded her request.

In January 2024, Hallie visited a different church in Granbury because Colby

had made her uncomfortable at her current one. Right after the service, she received

a message from Colby stating that her Jeep was really easy to spot from the highway at

the new church and that if she decided to start taking their son to a different church,

Colby would “follow [him] wherever he went.”3 This frightened Hallie because she

had not told anyone that she would be visiting the new church.

In March 2024, in lieu of probation for failing to pay child support, Colby

agreed to a list of permanent injunctions, including one forbidding him from coming

within 30 feet of Hallie without written consent. In May 2024, Colby stood within 30

feet of Hallie at one of their son’s baseball practices and repeatedly tried to talk to her.

Colby stayed well after the practice ended, continued to hang around their son, and

insisted that he walk Hallie and their son to her vehicle. When Hallie asked Colby to

say goodbye to their son at the baseball field and reminded him that he was not

Colby had possession of their son at the time. Hallie had visited the new
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church by herself.

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supposed to be within 30 feet of her, Colby refused to say goodbye and asserted that

Hallie had consented to his being within 30 feet of her by coming up to talk to him.

He then became agitated and “started getting in [Hallie’s] face and raising his voice.”

Hallie feared that Colby “was going to get physical.” One of her male friends

eventually walked Colby to his truck to deescalate the situation.

Hallie testified that Colby had been arrested in September 2024 for harassing

her. See Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a). Around the time of Colby’s arrest, Hallie filed an

application for a protective order. The trial court signed a temporary ex parte order

and set the application for hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court found that

there were reasonable grounds to believe that Colby had committed the offense of

stalking against Hallie and signed a final protective order preventing him from, among

other things, going within 200 feet of Hallie, her residence, or her place of

employment for two years. After a series of motions and countermotions, the trial

court signed an amended final protective order removing or striking language

restricting Colby’s ability to own or possess a firearm. Colby then appealed from the

amended order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first issue, Colby contends that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s protective order. We disagree.

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1. Standard of Review

When, as here, the trial court acts as factfinder, we review its findings under the

familiar legal- and factual-sufficiency standards. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex.

2000); see also Watts v. Adviento, No. 02-17-00424-CV, 2019 WL 1388534, at *3 n.3

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

a. Legal Sufficiency

We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence

challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of

law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to

prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn

v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018); Huskins v. Garcia, No. 02-21-00328-CV,

2022 WL 3905083, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we

must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and

we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent.

Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson,

168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible

from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658

(quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).

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b. Factual Sufficiency

When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to

support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all

the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the

finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that

the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,

715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176

(Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). If reversing for factual

insufficiency, we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and

clearly state why the finding is factually insufficient—that is, why the evidence

supporting the finding is so weak or is so against the great weight and preponderance

of the evidence that the finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly

demonstrates bias. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635.

Findings of fact are the exclusive province of the factfinder. Bellefonte

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1986). Acting as factfinder,

the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be

given to their testimony. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761

(Tex. 2003). An appellate court must not substitute its judgment for that of the

factfinder. Id.

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2. Analysis

Hallie’s application for protective order was brought under Chapter 7B of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. When an application is filed under that chapter,

the trial court must find whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the

applicant is the victim of sexual assault or abuse, indecent assault, stalking, or

trafficking. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7B.003(a). If the court finds that there are

reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has been the victim of stalking, “the

court shall issue a protective order that includes a statement of the required findings.”

Id. art. 7B.003(b); see id. arts. 7B.001(a)(1), .052.

As relevant here, a person commits the offense of stalking “if the person, on

more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct that is

directed at a specific other person, knowingly engages in conduct that” (1) constitutes

harassment under Penal Code Section 42.07; (2) causes the other person “to feel

harassed, terrified, intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or

offended”; and (3) would cause a reasonable person “to feel harassed, terrified,

intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended” under

the circumstances. Tex. Penal Code § 42.072(a)(1), (2)(B), (3)(D); see Garza v. Renteria,

726 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). Under Penal

Code Section 42.07, the following conduct constitutes harassment if done “with intent

to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another”: (1) “send[ing]

repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy,

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alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another” or (2) “track[ing] or

monitor[ing] the personal property or motor vehicle of another person, without the

other person’s effective consent.” Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7), (9).

As detailed above, Hallie presented evidence that Colby, among other things,

(1) had been arrested for harassing her, (2) had sent her repeated electronic

communications attacking her parenting skills and the members of her family, (3) had

refused to stop messaging her after she asked him to stop, and (4) had tracked or

monitored the location of her vehicle. Thus, Hallie presented credible evidence that

Colby had harassed her. See id. She also testified that Colby’s harassing conduct had

alarmed and frightened her. See id. § 42.072(a)(2)(B). And as the trial court pointed

out, Colby’s incessant messaging combined with his other behavior—such as trying to

sit next to Hallie at their son’s baseball practices even after she told him that it makes

her uncomfortable and his refusal to attend a different church (or even a different

service)—would cause a reasonable person to feel harassed, intimidated, and annoyed.

See id. § 42.072(a)(3)(D).

Thus, considering the entire record and applying the applicable standard of

review, we conclude that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that

there were reasonable grounds to believe that Hallie had been the victim of stalking

was not so weak that the finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly

demonstrates bias. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635. Accordingly, the evidence supporting

the trial court’s protective order is factually sufficient—and, by extension, legally

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sufficient.4 See id.; see also S.B. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 654 S.W.3d 246,

252 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pets. denied) (“Evidence that is factually sufficient to

support a trial court’s finding necessarily satisfies the legal-sufficiency standard.”).

We overrule Colby’s first issue.

B. Constitutional Complaint

In his second issue, Colby contends that the statutes underpinning the

protective order are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him. Specifically,

he asserts that (1) because Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure—

which incorporates Penal Code Section 47.072—authorizes the issuance of a

protective order even in the absence of a showing that the defendant “represents a

credible threat to the safety” of the applicant and (2) because Penal Code Section

46.04(c) makes it a criminal offense for a person who is subject to a Chapter 7B

4
Colby argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the trial court’s protective order because (1) Hallie “admitted her allegations of family
violence were ‘not true’ and asked the trial court to remove any family[-]violence
finding” from the protective order and (2) because the trial court’s decision to amend
the protective order to remove language restricting Colby’s right to possess a firearm
“show[s] that there was no ‘concern’ about [his] firearm possession and therefore no
physical threat.” But this argument ignores the language of Article 7B.003(b), which,
as noted, requires a trial court to issue a protective order if it finds that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant was the victim of stalking. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 7B.003(b). No family-violence or ongoing-physical-threat finding is
necessary. See id.; see also id. art. 7B.052 (providing that a trial court “shall issue a
protective order . . . if, in lieu of a finding that family violence occurred . . . , the court finds
that . . . probable cause exists to believe” that a stalking offense was committed and
“the nature of the scheme or course of conduct engaged in by the defendant in
committing the [stalking] offense indicates the defendant is likely in the future” to
engage in conduct prohibited by the stalking statute (emphasis added)).

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protective order to possess a firearm, the statutory scheme violates his Second

Amendment right to keep and bear arms. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 7B.003,

.052(b); Tex. Penal Code §§ 46.04(c), 47.072; see also U.S. Const. amend. II. We

disagree.

1. Standard of Review

When evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, we presume that it complies

with both the United States and Texas Constitutions. EBS Sols., Inc. v. Hegar,

601 S.W.3d 744, 754 (Tex. 2020). The party challenging a statute’s constitutionality

bears a “high burden” to show that it is unconstitutional. Id. (quoting Patel v. Tex.

Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015)).

There are two types of challenges to a statute’s constitutionality: facial

challenges and as-applied challenges. Lund v. Giauque, 416 S.W.3d 122, 127 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); see Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893

S.W.2d 504, 518 & n.16 (Tex. 1995). A facial challenge asserts that a statute, by its

terms, always operates unconstitutionally. Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera, 445 S.W.3d 698,

702 (Tex. 2014); In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 655 (Tex. 2005) (to prevail

on a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, a party “bears the heavy

burden” of showing that the statute “is unconstitutional in every possible

application”). An as-applied challenge asserts that a statute, while generally

constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to the claimant because of his particular

circumstances. Tenet Hosps., 445 S.W.3d at 702; Lund, 416 S.W.3d at 127.

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We review a constitutional challenge de novo as a question of law. Philipp v.

Methodist Hosps. of Dall., No. 05-21-00350-CV, 2022 WL 2448118, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas July 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610,

615 (Tex. 2011)); Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Live Oak Brewing Co., 537 S.W.3d

647, 654 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied). Nevertheless, “the determination [of

a statute’s constitutionality] will in most instances require [us] to consider the entire

record, including evidence offered by the parties.” Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 87.

2. Analysis

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary

to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not

be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Thus, it confers “an individual right to keep

and bear arms.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799

(2008); United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 2012). But this right is not

unlimited. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2799, 2816.

We have previously rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the firearm

restrictions in a Chapter 7B (formerly Chapter 7A)5 protective order. See Wargocz v.

Brewer, No. 02-17-00178-CV, 2018 WL 4924755, at *6–9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

5
Prior to January 1, 2021, the statutes currently codified in Chapter 7B were in
Chapter 7A, which was repealed and reenacted in Chapter 7B in a nonsubstantive
revision. See Act of May 21, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 469, art. 1, § 1.02, art. 3, § 3.01,
2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 1065, 1066, 1151; see also Caldwell v. State ex rel. Zimmerman,
No. 03-22-00464-CV, 2024 WL 3906789, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 23, 2024,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).

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Oct. 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).6 And we have also rejected a facial Second

Amendment challenge to Penal Code Section 46.04. See Ex parte Huell, 704 S.W.3d

246, 248–50 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2024, no pet.).7 As those opinions make clear,

the core right protected by the Second Amendment is the right of responsible, law-

abiding citizens to carry a firearm outside the home, and someone—like Colby—

found to have committed a stalking offense cannot be considered a law-abiding,

responsible citizen. See Huell, 704 S.W.3d at 249; Wargocz, 2018 WL 4924755, at *7.

Accordingly, to withstand Colby’s Second Amendment attack, the challenged statutes

must merely satisfy intermediate—not strict—scrutiny. See Wargocz, 2018 WL

4924755, at *7. Thus, to the extent that they reasonably fit a substantial statutory

objective, they pass constitutional muster. See id. at *8 (citing Chapman, 666 F.3d at

228).

In Wargocz, we recognized that Chapter 7B reasonably fit the substantial

statutory objective of protecting stalking victims and allowing them to seek protection

The appellant in Wargocz raised only an as-applied challenge. See 2018 WL
6

4924755, at *6. But our rejection of the appellant’s as-applied challenge necessarily
implies that any facial challenge to Chapter 7B’s constitutionality would likewise fail.
See City of South Padre Island v. Surfvive, No. 13-20-00536-CV, 2022 WL 2069216, at *8
n.3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 9, 2022), review denied, 678 S.W.3d 727
(Tex. 2023) (mem. op.).

Although the appellant in Huell had been convicted of possessing a firearm
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under Penal Code Section 46.04(a), see 704 S.W.3d at 247, we framed the appellant’s
complaint as a challenge to Section 46.04 as a whole, and our reasoning is equally
applicable to Section 46.04(c), see id. at 248–50.

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from their stalkers. See id. at *8–9. And by prohibiting stalkers subject to protective

orders from possessing firearms, Penal Code Section 46.04 works in conjunction with

Chapter 7B to achieve this statutory objective. Because the challenged statutes

reasonably fit a substantial statutory objective, they are not facially unconstitutional.8

See id. at *8 (citing Chapman, 666 F.3d at 225). And because we have already

determined that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that there

were reasonable grounds to believe that Colby had stalked Hallie, his as-applied

challenge also fails. See Netaji v. Roberts, No. 03-19-00840-CV, 2021 WL 5312489, at

*11 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 12, 2021) (mem. op.) (“Our analysis of whether the

stalking and harassment statutes are unconstitutional as applied to

[appellant] . . . dovetails with a legal sufficiency analysis concerning whether there was

8
Citing the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Rahimi, Colby
argues that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional because they allow for the
restriction of a stalker’s right to keep and bear arms even in the absence of a finding
that he “‘represents a credible threat to the safety’ of another.” See 602 U.S. 680, 699,
144 S. Ct. 1889, 1901–02 (2024). But in Rahimi, the Supreme Court actually upheld a
federal law temporarily disarming persons subject to restraining orders. See id. at 697–
98, 144 S. Ct. at 1901. Because the federal statute at issue in Rahimi bars a person
subject to a protective order from possessing a firearm only if the order contains an
explicit finding “that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of
a protected person, the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on whether an individual
found by a court to pose such a threat could be temporarily disarmed consistent with
the Second Amendment. See id. at 685–86, 702, 144 S. Ct. at 1894, 1903. But by
holding that a person explicitly found to pose such a threat can be temporarily
disarmed, the Supreme Court did not—as Colby suggests—hold that such a finding
was a prerequisite to disarmament under the Second Amendment. See id. at 702, 144
S. Ct. at 1903 (recognizing the limited nature of the court’s holding).

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any evidence that his conduct constituted stalking to support issuance of the

protective order.” (internal quotations omitted)).

We overrule Colby’s second issue.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Colby’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s protective

order.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice

Delivered: May 14, 2026

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