Brian Jacob Cole v. Lindsey Renee Cole

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00229-CV
___________________________

BRIAN JACOB COLE, Appellant

V.

LINDSEY RENEE COLE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 271st District Court
Wise County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV19-03-170

Before Kerr, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Brian Jacob Cole, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial court’s

final decree of divorce. He raises twelve appellate issues, contending that the trial

court (1) abused its discretion by permitting the withdrawal of Appellee Lindsey

Renee Cole’s1 attorney; (2) acted without jurisdiction; (3) failed to make mandatory

findings and apply the appropriate evidentiary burden; (4) violated due process;

(5) committed cumulative error; (6) signed a void judgment; (7) ignored his initial

motion to disqualify; (8) refused a jury-trial demand; (9) engaged in retaliation, bias,

and prejudice; (10) obstructed justice; (11) divided the marital estate unequally; and

(12) permitted Lindsey to engage in fraud and parental alienation. We will affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brian and Lindsey were married on or about September 10, 2011, and had two

children together. They ceased living together as spouses on or about February 28,

2019. That same month, Lindsey filed a petition for divorce in Wise County Court at

Law Number 2.

1
For ease of reference, we will use the parties’ first names.

2
During the case—which lasted nearly six years2—various motions were filed

and several attorneys represented the parties. On February 5, 2020, Brian’s then-

attorney filed a demand for jury trial and paid the jury fee. On November 9, 2021, the

trial judge of Wise County Court at Law Number 2 voluntarily recused himself, and

the case was transferred to the 271st District Court. On October 1, 2024, the 271st

District Court set the case for a final hearing. By that time, Brian’s attorney had

withdrawn, and he was pro se. On December 30, 2024, Lindsey’s then-attorney

moved to withdraw, and the trial court granted the withdrawal.

On January 27, 2025, the case proceeded to a final hearing before the trial

court.3 Brian objected to the case’s proceeding, arguing that he had filed a federal

lawsuit and that the case needed to be heard in federal court. The trial court denied

his request.

Lindsey testified that after marrying Brian, she moved into a residence that he

had purchased before their marriage. She explained that although the marital

residence was Brian’s separate property, she had invested between $50,000 to

$100,000 into the residence for improvements and had also contributed to the

Lindsey’s attorney at the final hearing ascribed fault to Brian for the six-year
2

delay. In April 2023 and June 2023, Brian filed bankruptcy petitions. Both petitions
were dismissed in 2024.

At the final hearing, Lindsey was represented by a different attorney, and Brian
3

remained pro se.

3
mortgage. She also explained that they had purchased a lake house and an investment

property during their marriage.

Lindsey further testified that on February 28, 2019—the day she moved out of

the marital residence—Brian had been violent with her.4 He grabbed her arms, threw

her on the ground, and pinned her down with his knee. Their oldest child retrieved a

plastic gun and a jump rope in an attempt to get Brian off her. That same day,

Lindsey called the police and permanently moved out of the marital residence with

their children. In response, Brian proceeded to sell the lake house, the marital

residence, and Lindsey’s clothing and personal belongings. He did not compensate

her for any of the property sold.

Lindsey explained that after moving out of the residence, the children5 were

doing well in her care and that they did not have a relationship with Brian because

they were scared of him.6 She requested that the trial court grant the divorce, award

her the investment property, and appoint her as the children’s sole managing

conservator.

4
She later explained that Brian had also been violent with prior and subsequent
girlfriends and that he had been arrested for committing family violence against a new
girlfriend.
5
At the time of trial, the children were eight and eleven.
6
She also testified that Brian had regularly used marijuana and cocaine inside
the marital residence while their children were present.

4
At the end of Lindsey’s direct testimony, Brian inquired about his request for a

jury trial. The trial court explained that it knew nothing about his request and that the

final hearing had already started. Brian testified and explained that he had been

alienated from his “offspring” because of Lindsey’s 9-1-1 call and advocated that the

trial court vacate any prior orders and “let the case reside in federal court.”

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court, among other things, granted the

divorce, awarded Lindsey the investment property, and appointed her as the children’s

sole managing conservator. On May 19, 2025, the trial court signed the final decree

of divorce. Brian then filed this appeal.7

III. DISCUSSION

Brian raises twelve appellate issues—all of which are either unsupported by

citation to applicable legal authority, unsupported by the record, unpreserved, or

inadequately briefed.8

Brian and Lindsey are both pro se on appeal.
7

8
Lindsey’s appellate brief was due Friday, December 19, 2025, but it was not
filed until Monday, December 22, 2025. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.6(b) (requiring
appellee’s brief to be filed within thirty days after the date the appellant’s brief is
filed). No motion for extension was filed. In response, Brian filed a motion to strike
her brief as untimely. We grant his motion. However, our striking of Lindsey’s
appellate brief does not cure Brian’s briefing inadequacies or change the disposition of
his issues.

5
A. LINDSEY’S ATTORNEY’S WITHDRAWAL

In his first issue, Brian argues that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 10 “mandates

written consent or a finding of no adverse effect for withdrawal within 30 days of

trial” and thus the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Lindsey’s attorney to

withdraw 28 days before trial.9 He fails to support this argument with citation to any

applicable legal authority and fails to show that he has standing to complain of her

attorney’s withdrawal.

A party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect him or that

affect only the rights of others. In re T.N., 142 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2004, no pet.). Brian has cited no authority for the proposition that he has

standing to complain about the withdrawal of an opposing party’s attorney, and he

does not complain that Lindsey’ attorney’s withdrawal injuriously affected him.10 His

cited authorities are inapposite because they address only a party’s objection to the

withdrawal of his or her own attorney11—not a party’s objection to the withdrawal of

an opposing party’s attorney. See Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986);

Moss v. Malone, 880 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, writ denied). Accordingly,

9
Brian misstates the law. Nothing within Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 10
requires an attorney to withdraw before thirty days of trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 10.
10
Despite Lindsey’s attorney’s withdrawal, the proceedings were not delayed,
and the final hearing was not continued.
11
No evidence suggests that Lindsey objected to her own attorney’s withdrawal.

6
we hold that Brian had failed to show that he has standing to complain about the

withdrawal of Lindsey’s attorney.12 See T.N., 142 S.W.3d at 524.

We overrule Brian’s first issue.

B. JURISDICTION

In his second issue, Brian asserts that the trial court “was divested of

jurisdiction by refusing mandatory Title IV-D referral.”13 He fails to support this

assertion with citation to any applicable legal authority.

“Jurisdiction” refers to a court’s authority to adjudicate a case. Reiss v. Reiss,

118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of

law, which we review de novo. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co. v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders,

LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). “In general, as long as the court entering a

judgment has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter and does not act

outside its capacity as a court, the judgment is not void.” Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 443.

Without subscribing to Brian’s reasoning, we note that even if he could
12

complain of Lindsey’s attorney’s withdrawal, he forfeited the complaint by failing to
preserve error. Brian appeared at the hearing on Lindsey’s attorney’s motion to
withdraw, but he did not object to the withdrawal. Cf. Ennadi v. Ennadi, No. 01-21-
00252-CV, 2023 WL 105109, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 5, 2023, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant who did not consent to his counsel’s
withdrawal motion failed to preserve error by not objecting at the withdrawal
hearing).

Brian does not articulate which court he believes the suit should have been
13

referred to or expound upon the alleged “Title IV-D referral.”

7
Brian does not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction over the parties or its

ability to hear the subject matter, nor does he allege that the trial court acted outside

its capacity as a court.14 Instead, he maintains that “OAG intervention on April 3,

2019, triggered mandatory referral under Tex. Fam. Code § 201.105” and that “[a]ll

orders, including the decree, are void.” This is his sole challenge to the trial court’s

jurisdiction, and he provides no relevant legal authority in support of his argument.15

Accordingly, we hold that Brian has failed to show that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction over the suit.16 See Reiss, 118 S.W.3d at 443.

We overrule Brian’s second issue.

See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 24.007, 24.008.
14

15
Brian cites inapplicable legal authorities. First, he points us to Texas Family
Code Section 201.105. Section 201.105 outlines the compensation of an associate
judge, but it does not touch on a trial court’s jurisdiction. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 201.105. Second, he cites two cases that discuss whether evidence was legally and
factually sufficient to support a trial court’s termination of parental rights. See In re
C.P.V.Y., 315 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.); In re M.N.G.,
147 S.W.3d 521, 536 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). As this is not a
parental-rights-termination case, we fail to see how either of those cases has anything
to do with the trial court’s jurisdiction in this case. Thus, Brian failed to support his
second issue with citation to any applicable legal authority.

We note that transfer is mandatory but only when the county has a Title IV-D
16

court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.101(d); Office of Att’y Gen. v. C.W.H., 531
S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex. 2017).

8
C. THE FINAL DECREE

In his third issue, Brian contends that the final decree is void for a lack of clear

and convincing evidence and findings, presumably to support the conservatorship

order. He fails to adequately brief this issue.

An appellant must identify and explain how the trial court erred.17 Gunderson v.

Nat’l Indoor RV, LLC, No. 02-24-00025-CV, 2024 WL 3365233, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 11, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A crucial part of that burden is the

appellant’s responsibility to “present argument that will enable the [appellate] court to

decide the case” by filing a brief that “state[s] . . . the facts . . . supported by record

references” and “contain[s] a clear and concise argument for the contentions made,

with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g),

(i), 38.9; see Gunderson, 2024 WL 3365233, at *2.

While we construe appellate briefs liberally and attempt to reach the merits of

the dispute whenever reasonably possible, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; Horton v. Stovall,

591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019), without “appropriate ‘citation[s] to the record[,] . . .

citations for legal references,’ and ‘substantive [legal] analysis,’ a brief is inadequate to

present an issue for our review, and the issue is waived.” Gunderson, 2024 WL

A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must
17

comply with applicable laws and procedural rules. In re T.H., No. 02-19-00300-CV,
2020 WL 5833624, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 1, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam)
(mem. op.); Flores v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. 02-10-00311-CV, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

9
3365233, at *2 (quoting NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. United Dev. Funding IV, 674 S.W.3d

437, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, pets. denied)); see In re Guardianship of

Onyebuchi, No. 02-13-00401-CV, 2014 WL 4463114, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Sept. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (recognizing that “arguments raised on appeal

that are unsupported by analysis or appropriate citation to legal authority and to the

record present nothing for us to review”).

The entirety of Brian’s briefing on this issue is as follows:

A. Constitutional Standard
Fit parents’ rights are fundamental; restrictions require clear-and-
convincing evidence of unfitness (Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Santosky,
455 U.S. at 769).

B. Texas law
Equal rights are presumed (Tex. Fam. Code § 153.073); findings are
mandatory (In re J.R. III, 672 S.W.3d at 363).

C. Empty Record
Post-trial exhibits are mere prayers (CR 601-614),[18] insufficient (In re
E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 555; Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167). The decree is
void.

We have attempted to review Brian’s briefing on this issue, but we cannot

ascertain the challenges to the final decree that Brian intended to present for our

review because his arguments are not discernible and contain no appropriate citations

to legal authority and to the record as required by Rule 38.1(i). See Tex. R. App. P.

38.1(i). To the contrary, instead of providing any sort of meaningful explanation and

We note that Brian’s citation to the clerk’s record includes pages 601 through
18

614; however, the clerk’s record provided to this court ends at page 515.

10
analysis, Brian’s argument is saturated with generalized statements and unsupported

arguments.

His briefing on this issue is so inadequate that attempting to address its merits

would require us to speculate on what he seeks to challenge, to abandon our role as a

neutral adjudicator, and to develop his legal arguments for him—which we cannot do.

See DSW Masters Holding Corp. v. Tyree, No. 02-11-00296-CV, 2012 WL 4661455, at *5

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that it would be

inappropriate for the court to re-draft and articulate what appellant may have intended

to raise as error on appeal). Here, Brian has made bare assertions of error without any

analysis and appropriate citations to authority and to the record. See Gray v. Nash,

259 S.W.3d 286, 294 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).

Because arguments raised on appeal that are unsupported by analysis or

appropriate citation to legal authority and to the record present nothing for us to

review, we are unable to evaluate the merits of this issue.19 See Gray, 259 S.W.3d

at 294; Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Griesing, 150 S.W.3d 640, 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet.

19
Without reaching the merits of this issue, we note that if Brian intended to
complain of the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law, our review of the
record reveals that he did not request the trial court to make such findings. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 296. In addition, the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard applicable
to parental-rights termination cases does not apply to conservatorship determinations
in suits affecting the parent–child relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.005; In
re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007).

11
dism’d w.o.j.) (stating that bare assertions of error, without citations to authority or

record, waive error). Accordingly, we hold that this issue is waived.

We overrule Brian’s third issue.

D. DUE PROCESS

In his fourth issue, Brian maintains that the trial court violated his due-process

rights by conducting the final hearing with him in handcuffs. This issue is

unsupported by the record and unpreserved.

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial

court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the

desired ruling, if not apparent from the request’s, objection’s, or motion’s context.

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). If a party fails to do this,

error is not preserved. Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (op. on reh’g).

The objecting party must also get a ruling—either express or implied—from the trial

court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A), (b); see Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13

(Tex. 2002).

Brian claims that he “was arrested en route and appeared in handcuffs” and

that “prejudice is clear here.” But he has not pointed us to anything in the record

supporting his claim that he was handcuffed or otherwise restrained at the final

hearing. Indeed, in our review of the record, we have found no mention of his being

restrained. But even if Brian was restrained at the final hearing, he failed to preserve

that complaint for our review because he did not object to wearing the restraints and

12
because the trial court did not rule on the objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

Accordingly, we hold that this issue is unpreserved. See id.

We overrule Brian’s fourth issue.

E. CUMULATIVE ERROR

In his fifth issue, Brian argues that the trial court’s cumulative error denied him

due process. He fails to adequately brief this issue.

The entirety of Brian’s briefing on this issue is as follows:

Multiple errors—jurisdictional, procedural, and constitutional—deny
fairness (Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Smerke, 158 S.W.2d at 304).
Combined defects require reversal (In re Marriage of Harrison,
557 S.W.3d at 118).

Brian’s briefing on this issue consists of generalized statements, speculative

arguments, and bare assertions of error without any analysis and appropriate citations

to authority20 and to the record. See Gray, 259 S.W.3d at 294. He fails to identify

which allegedly “combined defects” require reversal. We conclude that such

inadequate briefing presents nothing for our review. Accordingly, we hold that this

issue is waived. See id.

We overrule Brian’s fifth issue.

Our review of Brian’s cited authority reveals that none of his cases discuss or
20

address cumulative error. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902
(1976); Smerke v. Office Equip. Co., 158 S.W.2d 138, 241 (Tex. 1941); In re Marriage of
Harrison, 557 S.W.3d 99, 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
Thus, he failed to support his fifth issue with citation to any applicable legal authority.

13
F. SIGNING OF THE FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

In his sixth issue, Brian asserts that the final decree of divorce is void because it

was untimely signed. He cites no applicable legal authority.

The final hearing was held on January 27, 2025, and the trial court signed the

final decree on May 19, 2025. Because of the trial court’s delay in signing the final

decree, Brian maintains that the final decree is void. But he has citied no authority—

nor have we found any—that renders a decree void if the trial court does not sign it

within a specific period.21 C.f. Blackburn v. Blackburn, No. 02-12-00369-CV, 2015 WL

2169505, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (addressing

a divorce decree signed approximately five months after the trial court’s oral rendition

of judgment). Accordingly, we hold that Brian failed to show that the trial court’s

delay in signing the final decree rendered it void. See Gunderson, 2024 WL 3365233,

at *2.

We overrule Brian’s sixth issue.

Brian cites Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 306a and 329b and Texas Code of
21

Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(8)—none of which are applicable. Rule 306a discusses
periods to run from the signing of a judgment and Rule 329b outlines the time for
filing motions, but neither rule mandates a judgment’s signing within a specified
period of time. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a, 329b. Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3B(8) prohibits ex parte communications and is unrelated to a judgment’s
signing. See Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(8). Brian has thus failed to support
his sixth issue with citation to any applicable legal authority.

14
G. MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY THE TRIAL-COURT JUDGE

In his seventh issue, Brian contends that the trial-court judge reversibly erred

by ignoring motions to disqualify him. He fails to support this argument with citation

to the record.

Brian maintains that the final decree is void because he filed motions to

disqualify the trial-court judge on September 26, 2024; July 17, 2025; and July 18,

2025, and the trial-court judge failed to refer the recusal motions to the regional

presiding judge pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a. See Tex. R. Civ. P.

18a.

It is well settled that “[t]he appellant bears the burden to bring forward on

appeal a sufficient record to show the error committed by the trial court.” Huston v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,

pet. denied) (citing Nicholson v. Fifth Third Bank, 226 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)); see Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843

(Tex. 1990) (per curiam). Brian cannot demonstrate reversible error because the

motions that he references are not in the appellate record.22 Accordingly, we hold

that Brian has failed to bring forward a sufficient record to show that the trial-court

judge failed to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a. See Tex. R. Civ. P.

18a.

22
And his appellate brief does not articulate the grounds for disqualification that
he allegedly raised in his motions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(a).

15
We overrule Brian’s seventh issue.

H. JURY-TRIAL DEMAND

In his eighth issue, Brian maintains that the trial court denied him his Texas

constitutional right to a jury trial. This issue is forfeited.

1. Applicable Law

One of our “most precious rights,” the right to trial by jury, occupies “a sacred

place in English and American history.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469,

476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding). Both the United States and Texas Constitutions

guarantee the right to trial by jury. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Tex. Const. art. I, § 15.

The Texas Family Code also entitles a party to a jury trial in a suit for the dissolution

of a marriage and to determine conservatorship issues. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§§ 6.703, 105.002(c)(1). To perfect this right, a party demanding a jury must file a

written request at least thirty days before trial and pay a fee. Tex. R. Civ. P. 216(a),

(b).

But a perfected right to a jury trial in a civil case may be waived by a party’s

failure to act when the trial court proceeds with a bench trial. See In re W.G.O., III,

No. 02-12-00059-CV, 2013 WL 105661, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 10, 2013,

pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re D.R., 177 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that objection to bench trial was untimely and

perfected right to jury trial was waived); Walker v. Walker, 619 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex.

Civ. App.—Tyler 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (explaining that even if jury demand was

16
made and jury fee paid, a party waives a right to a jury trial when he fails to object to

proceeding without a jury when the case is called to trial). In order to preserve a trial

court’s error in conducting a bench trial despite a party’s perfected right to a jury trial,

the party must timely object to the trial court’s action or affirmatively indicate that it

intends to exercise its right to a jury trial. See In re E.S., No. 02-20-00407-CV,

2021 WL 2149627, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 27, 2021, pet. denied) (mem.

op.).

2. Waiver of Jury Trial

On February 5, 2020, Brian’s then-attorney filed a demand for a jury trial in

Wise County Court at Law Number Two and paid the jury fee. See Tex. R. Civ. P.

216(a), (b). On November 9, 2021, the case was transferred from Wise County Court

at Law Number Two to the 271st District Court. Following the case’s transfer,

Brian’s attorney withdrew, and Brian proceeded pro se.

On January 27, 2025, the parties appeared for a final hearing before the trial

court without a jury. The final hearing proceeded without objection to the jury’s

absence,23 and the trial court heard Lindsey’s testimony, admitted exhibits, and

We note that Brian did object pretrial to proceeding with the final hearing,
23

but it was on the ground that he had allegedly filed a federal lawsuit removing the suit
to federal court pursuant to “28 U.S.C 1146.” He did not, however, object to
proceeding without a jury at that time.

17
considered Brian’s various objections to the testimony. Nearly halfway through the

final hearing,24 Brian raised his jury-trial demand for the first time.

The following exchange ensued between Brian and the trial court:

[BRIAN]: This is not a jury trial. I was given a jury trial in the very
beginning of this case back in 2019.

THE COURT: I don’t know anything about that, Mr. Cole. If you had
wanted a jury trial, there are procedures to file for one. And we have
already started this final hearing, and now you bring that up[,] so I have
nothing to hear about that. This is your opportunity to ask questions to
this witness. If you want to ask questions, you may do so.

[BRIAN]: Yes, I will do that, but I’d like to know who took away my
jury trial. Who would that have been in this process --

THE COURT: I have already addressed that, sir. I’m not going to –
I’m not going to have an argument with you about it or try to explain it
to you. If you want to ask questions to this witness, this is your
opportunity now to ask your questions.

[BRIAN]: And you said this is a final trial?

THE COURT: As you know, this case has been set for a final hearing
today.

Here, although he knew the case was set for a final hearing, Brian did not

object—prior to proceeding with the final hearing—to the trial court’s failure to hold

a jury trial. Moreover, he actively engaged in the final hearing—making at least twenty

separate objections to Lindsey’s evidence—before attempting to raise his jury-trial

demand.

24
The reporter’s record of the final hearing is 117 pages. Brian’s first reference
to his jury-trial demand is found on page 54.

18
We conclude that Brian, despite his perfecting his request for a jury trial,

“waived that right by failing to object to proceeding without a jury when the case was

called for trial.” W.G.O., 2013 WL 105661, at *2; Walker, 619 S.W.2d at 198. As a

result, he has waived any right to complain on appeal that the trial court deprived him

of his right to a jury trial. See W.G.O., 2013 WL 105661, at *2; see also Sunwest Reliance

Acquisitions Grp., Inc. v. Provident Nat’l Assurance Co., 875 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1993, no writ) (holding that if a party waives her right to a jury trial by her own

inaction, she also waives her right to complain on appeal that the trial court deprived

her of her right to a jury trial). Accordingly, we hold that this issue is forfeited. See

W.G.O., 2013 WL 105661, at *2.

We overrule Brian’s eighth issue.

I. ACCUSATIONS OF MISTREATMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT

In his ninth issue, Brian levels several far-reaching and grave accusations

against the trial court, including that it engaged in retaliation and antagonism and

acted with bias and prejudice. He fails to adequately brief this issue.

The entirety of Brian’s briefing on this issue is as follows:

Antagonism, prejudice, and denial of hearings since October 14, 2018,
are evident (various RR). This violates Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
Canons 3B(4) (courtesy), 3B(5) (bias), 3B(6) (manifesting bias), and Tex.
R. Civ. P. 18b(2). Reversal and disqualification are warranted.

Brian’s briefing on this issue consists of generalized statements, speculative

arguments, and bare assertions of error without any analysis and appropriate citations

19
to the record. See Gray, 259 S.W.3d at 294. He fails to identify which actions allegedly

taken by the trial court constitute retaliation or antagonism or show bias or prejudice.

We conclude that such inadequate briefing presents nothing for our review.

Accordingly, we hold that this issue is waived. See id.

We overrule Brian’s ninth issue.

J. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

In his tenth issue, Brian alleges that the trial-court judge obstructed justice by

withholding records. He fails to adequately brief this issue.

The entirety of Brian’s briefing on this issue is as follows:

Requests for court records on July 17, 2025, and August 6, 2025, were
withheld. This violates Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 51.201 (clerk duties) and
552.001 (Public Information Act), and Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3B(9). Obstruction requires reversal.

Brian’s briefing on this issue consists of generalized statements, speculative

arguments, and bare assertions of error without any analysis and appropriate citations

to the record.25 See Gray, 259 S.W.3d at 294. He fails to identify when he requested

the records or which records were allegedly withheld. We conclude that such

inadequate briefing presents nothing for our review. Accordingly, we hold that this

issue is waived. See id.

As discussed in his seventh issue, “[t]he appellant bears the burden to bring
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forward on appeal a sufficient record to show the error committed by the trial court.”
Huston, 434 S.W.3d at 636. Here, Brian’s “requests for court records” are not in the
appellate record.

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We overrule Brian’s tenth issue.

K. DIVISION OF PROPERTY

In his eleventh issue, Brian argues that “the unequal property division

constitutes reversible error.” He fails to support this argument with citation to the

record.

The entirety of Brian’s briefing on this issue is as follows:

The court assigned Appellant’s separate lot to Appellee without
agreement (CR 438), violating Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 (just division),
§ 3.002 (separate property), and § 4.202 (written agreement). This is an
abuse of discretion.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The Texas Family Code requires the trial court to divide community property

in a “just and right” manner “having due regard for the rights of each party and any

children of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001. The trial court has broad

discretion when dividing the marital estate. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698

(Tex. 1981). If the evidence demonstrates a reasonable basis for doing so, the trial

court may order a disproportionate division of the community property. See id.

at 698–99. “To disturb a trial court’s division of property, a party must show that the

court clearly abused its discretion by a division or an order that is manifestly unjust or

unfair.” Barras v. Barras, 396 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013,

pet. denied). When we review a property division for an abuse of discretion—which

in family-law cases includes considering legal and factual sufficiency as relevant

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factors—we must determine (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon

which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court erred in applying that

discretion. Rice v. Rice, No. 02-21-00413-CV, 2023 WL 109817, at *8 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Jan. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

To determine whether the assets of the community estate were divided in a

“just and right” manner, an appellate court must have the trial court’s findings on the

value of those assets. Goode v. Garcia, No. 01-20-00143-CV, 2021 WL 6015296, at *6

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Brown v. Wokocha,

526 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). In a divorce

case, a trial court must file written findings of fact, “including the characterization and

value of all assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets on which disputed evidence has been

presented” if a party so requests. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.711(a). Without such

findings, an appellate court cannot know the basis for the trial court’s division of

property, the values the trial court assigned to the community assets, or the

percentage of the marital estate each party received. Goode, 2021 WL 6015296, at *6;

Brown, 526 S.W.3d at 507.

In a bench trial in which no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the

trial court’s judgment implies all fact findings necessary to support it. Shields Ltd.

P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017). We must affirm the judgment if

we can uphold it on any legal theory supported by the record. Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq,

331 S.W.3d 764, 766–67 (Tex. 2011). If a party in a divorce case does not request

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findings of fact from the trial court, that party cannot establish whether the trial court

intended the division to be equal or disproportionate, and if disproportionate, what

factors the trial court found to warrant an unequal distribution if one was intended.

Brown, 526 S.W.3d at 507.

2. Just-and-Right Division

In the final decree, the trial court awarded Lindsey the investment property.

Brian contends that this award resulted in a disproportionate share of the marital

estate, but he fails to point to anything in the record to support his contention that

this award resulted in a division that was not just and right. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 7.001.

Lindsey testified that during their marriage, the couple owned three real

properties: (1) the marital residence, (2) a lake house, and (3) an investment property.

The marital residence was Brian’s separate property, but the lake house and the

investment property were purchased during the marriage. Following their separation,

Brian sold the marital residence, the lake house, the furniture, and Lindsey’s

belongings; he did not share any of the proceeds or otherwise compensate her for any

of the property sold. Because Brian kept all the proceeds, Lindsey requested that the

trial court award her the investment property to make a just and right division of the

marital estate.

Here, the evidence presented at trial was some evidence upon which the trial

court could have awarded Lindsey the investment property. See Murff, 615 S.W.2d

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at 698. The investment property was not the only property awarded and debt

assigned to the parties in the final decree, nor does the decree reflect the monetary

value of the property and debt so that it can be determined whether the ultimate

awards to Brian and Lindsey were equal or disproportionate. The decree merely states

that the division of the marital estate “is a just and right division of the parties’ marital

estate, having due regard for the rights of each party and the children of the

marriage.”

Nor did the trial court make any fact findings regarding the value of any

property or debt, and, as noted, the record does not reflect that either party requested

that the trial court make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The record thus

does not contain fact findings reflecting the values that the trial court assigned to each

community asset or liability or what percentage of the marital estate that each party

received. Without such findings, we cannot know the basis for the trial court’s

division of the marital estate, the values assigned to the community assets and debts,

or the percentage of the marital estate awarded to each party. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 6.711(a). Similarly, the absence of findings precludes Brian from establishing

whether the trial court intended the division of property to be equal or

disproportionate, whether the division was disproportionate, or what factors the trial

court found to warrant an unequal distribution if one was intended. In short, “it is

impossible for [us] to determine that the trial court abused its discretion in its division

of the community property.” Brown, 526 S.W.3d at 508 (quoting Vasudevan v.

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Vasudevan, No. 14-14-00765-CV, 2015 WL 4774569, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Accordingly, we hold that Brian

failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in its division of the marital

estate. See Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698.

We overrule Brian’s eleventh issue.

L. FRAUD AND PARENTAL ALIENATION

In his twelfth issue, Brian asserts that Lindsey’s alleged “fraud and parental

alienation” requires reversal. He fails to adequately brief this issue.

The entirety of Brian’s briefing on this issue is as follows:

False accusations and alienation since February 28, 2019, with the court
refusing modification hearings, violate Tex. Fam. Code §§ 105.002
(sanctions), 261.107 (false reports), and 156.101 (modification). Reversal
is required.

Brian’s briefing on this issue consists of generalized statements, speculative

arguments, and bare assertions of error without any analysis and appropriate citations

to the record. See Gray, 259 S.W.3d at 294. He fails to identify which actions allegedly

taken by Lindsey constitute false accusations, fraud, or alienation. We conclude that

such inadequate briefing presents nothing for our review. Accordingly, we hold that

this issue is waived. See id.

We overrule Brian’s twelfth issue.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Brian’s twelve issues, we affirm the trial court’s final decree

of divorce. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker
Justice

Delivered: February 19, 2026

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