In Re Robert Edward Davis v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00419-CV
___________________________

IN RE ROBERT EDWARD DAVIS, Relator

Original Proceeding
233rd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 233-704630-21

Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Robert Edward Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

attacking the trial court’s August 14, 2025 capias. After Davis filed his petition, on

August 18, 2025, the trial court vacated the August 14, 2025 capias. Accordingly, we

deny Davis’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as moot, and to the extent that Davis

seeks additional relief not within the scope of a habeas proceeding, we dismiss those

portions for want of jurisdiction.

I. Discussion

The purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to determine whether the relator

has been unlawfully restrained. See In re Lozano, 696 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2024, orig. proceeding). A capias constitutes a sufficient restraint of liberty to

support a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id.

Within his petition, Davis sought—in addition to other relief—that we compel

the trial court to vacate the August 14, 2025 capias. The trial court mooted this

requested relief when it vacated the capias on August 18, 2025. See Valley Baptist Med.

Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2000). Davis is no longer under any

restraint, lawful or unlawful. Accordingly, we deny Davis’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus as moot.

Within Davis’s petition, however, he sought other relief such as enforcing a

Section 18a(f) stay regarding recused or disqualified judges, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f);

prohibiting various individuals from future conduct; sanctioning various persons “up

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to $10,000 per violation”; referring others to the State Bar for disciplinary

proceedings; and referring other “actors” to the State and Federal authorities for

prosecution. These other requests for relief go well beyond our jurisdiction to grant in

a habeas proceeding, which is statutorily limited to determining whether a relator’s

liberty has been improperly restrained. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(d); see also

In re J.M., No. 10-25-00078-CV, 2025 WL 926505, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 27,

2025, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.); In re L.J., No. 02-21-00083-CV,

2021 WL 1685963, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 29, 2021, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.); In re Barrett, No. 03-13-00742-CV, 2013 WL 6921312, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Austin Dec. 23, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Thus, to the extent that Davis

seeks other relief, we dismiss those portions of his petition for want of jurisdiction.

II. Conclusion

We deny as moot Davis’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. To the extent that

Davis sought relief not related to any restraint on his liberty, we dismiss those

portions of his petition for want of jurisdiction.

/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice

Delivered: September 11, 2025

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