Eduardo Rene Arambula v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-24-00420-CR
No. 02-24-00421-CR
No. 02-24-00422-CR
___________________________

EDUARDO RENE ARAMBULA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 1804899, 1805077, 1805593

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Eduardo Rene Arambula appeals the sentences assessed by the trial

court after he pleaded guilty––without an agreement on punishment1––to burglary of

a building, engaging in organized criminal activity (EOCA), and evading arrest or

detention with a vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.02(a)(1), (c)(1), 38.04(a),

(b)(2)(A), 71.02(a)(1), (b). Upon reviewing a presentence investigation report and

hearing punishment-related evidence, the trial court assessed sentences of two years’

confinement for the burglary, seven years’ confinement for the EOCA, and seven

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The trial court’s certifications of Arambula’s right to appeal in all three cause
numbers indicate that each case “is not a plea-bargain case” and that Arambula “has
the right of appeal as to punishment only.” But in cause number 1805077 and in
cause number 1805593, Arambula was charged in a two-count indictment, and the
signed plea admonishments indicate that the State agreed to waive one of the charged
counts in exchange for Arambula’s agreement to plead guilty to the other charged
count––without a punishment recommendation by the State. Therefore, the State and
Arambula entered into a charge bargain that falls within the scope of Rule 25.2(a)(2).
See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003); Harper v. State, 567 S.W.3d 450, 454–55 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no
pet.). Nevertheless, (1) because the trial judge told Arambula, “You have the right to
appeal . . . these three cases to the appropriate appellate court within certain time
limits,” and (2) because the trial court indicated in the appeal certifications that
Arambula could appeal “as to punishment only,” we conclude that the trial judge
impliedly gave Arambula permission to appeal punishment matters in trial court cause
numbers 1805077 and 1805593. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, No. 02-21-00208-CR, 2023
WL 3370723, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 11, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). But cf. Marsh v. State, No. 02-21-00150-CR, 2023 WL
2178406, at *4–5 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (concluding from different facts that trial judge’s
handwritten notations on appeal certification did not indicate permission to appeal).

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years’ confinement for the evading arrest or detention with a vehicle.2 See id.

§§ 12.34(a), 12.35(a). The trial court then sentenced Arambula accordingly and

ordered that the three sentences would run concurrently.

Arambula’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a

brief in which she argues that the appeals are frivolous. Counsel’s motion and brief

meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of

the appellate records demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See

386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Additionally, in compliance with Kelly

v. State, counsel provided Arambula with copies of the brief and motion to withdraw,

and she informed Arambula of his right to file a pro se response, to review the record,

and to seek discretionary review pro se should this court deny relief. See 436 S.W.3d

313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Although given the opportunity, Arambula did not

file a pro se response. The State declined to file a brief but, in a letter to this court,

agreed with appointed counsel that the appeals are frivolous.

After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel fulfills the requirements of Anders

and files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous, this court is

obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any

arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,

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The trial court included a deadly-weapon finding in the evading judgment.

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511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

After carefully reviewing the appellate records and counsel’s brief, we agree

with counsel that, but for a few minor corrections to two of the judgments and to the

bill of costs in all three cause numbers, these appeals are wholly without merit; we

have found nothing in the records that might arguably support the appeals. See Bledsoe

v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

The trial court’s judgments in all three cause numbers assess costs and

reimbursement fees.3 But because the cases were tried together, costs and

reimbursement fees should have been assessed in only one of the cause numbers. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 102.073; Johnson v. State, No. 02-23-00090-CR,

2024 WL 1318238, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). When a trial court erroneously assesses court

costs for multiple convictions that were tried in a single proceeding, we normally

retain the court costs for the offense of the highest category and modify the judgment

in the offense of the lower category to delete the duplicate court costs. Johnson,

2024 WL 1318238, at *3. For convictions in the same category of offense with

3
The Code of Criminal Procedure includes a “reimbursement fee” in the
definition of a “[c]ost” that a court may impose. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 43.015(3). In cause number 1804899, the judgment assessed $290 in court costs
and $65 in reimbursement fees. In cause number 1805077, the judgment assessed
$290 in court costs and $130 in reimbursement fees. And in cause number 1805593,
the judgment assessed $290 in court costs and $130 in reimbursement fees.

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identical assessed costs, the court costs should be based on the lowest cause number.

Id. Accordingly, we modify the judgment in trial court cause number 1804899, the

state jail felony, to delete the costs and reimbursement fees. And we also modify the

judgment in trial court cause number 1805593, the evading-with-a-vehicle third-

degree felony, to delete the costs and reimbursement fees. We also modify the bills of

costs in those cause numbers to show 0.00 due for “Total Reimbursement Fees.”4

In addition to assessing costs and reimbursement fees in the judgment for

cause number 1805077, the trial court made the following “special findings or

orders”: “COURT COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $290.00 AND

REIMBURSEMENT FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF $130.00 TO BE CREDITED

FOR TIME SERVED.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.09. A bill of costs

was included in the clerk’s record for this cause number that shows “Total Court

Costs” as 0.00 but “Total Reimbursement Fees” as $130.00. We therefore correct the

bill of costs in cause number 1805077 to show “Total Reimbursement Fees” of 0.00.

See Ochoa v. State, No. 02-23-00225-CR, 2024 WL 1792771, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Apr. 25, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Jones v. State,

691 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. ref’d); Bray v. State,

179 S.W.3d 725, 730 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

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Both bills of costs show 0.00 due for “Total Court Costs.”

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We modify the judgments in trial court cause number 1804899 and 1805593 to

delete the costs and reimbursement fees assessed. We reform the bills of costs in all

three trial court cause numbers––1804899, 1805077, and 1805593––to reflect “0.00”

owed for “Total Reimbursement Fees.” We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s

judgments in cause number 1804899 and 1805593 as modified, affirm the judgment in

cause number 1805077, and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 21, 2025

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