In the Guardianship of Landen Thomas Griswold, an Incapacitated Person v. the State of Texas

Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded; Memorandum Opinion
filed June 18, 2026.

In The

Fifteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 15-25-00017-CV

IN THE GUARDIANSHIP OF LANDEN THOMAS GRISWOLD,
an Incapacitated Person

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Cherokee County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. G00074

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The case underlying this appeal is a guardianship proceeding relating to
Landen Thomas Griswold, an adult with severe disabilities. Griswold’s biological
mother, Candice Jeffcoat—whose parental rights to Griswold were terminated years
before, applied to serve as his permanent guardian, and the Texas Health and Human
Services Commission (HHSC) sought to intervene in the proceedings. At the
hearing on HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene, the trial court not only granted
HHSC’s intervention but also decided the merits of Jeffcoat’s guardianship
application, denying it and appointing HHSC as Griswold’s permanent guardian.
We affirm the trial court’s order granting HHSC’s intervention, but we reverse
the trial court’s order on the merits of the underlying guardianship proceeding
because Jeffcoat had no notice that the hearing on HHSC’s motion for leave to
intervene would also serve as a final hearing on the merits of her application as well
as HHSC’s competing application, violating her due process rights. We remand to
the trial court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
Griswold is a severely autistic adult. There is no dispute that Griswold cannot
take care of himself and needs a permanent guardian. Jeffcoat is Griswold’s
biological mother, but her parental rights were terminated in 2012. The Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services filed the suit that resulted in the
termination of Jeffcoat’s parental rights due, in part, to her impending prison
sentence for possession of a controlled substance. In the trial court’s order of
termination, the Department was appointed as managing conservator; Griswold, then
seven years old, was placed in foster care.
Shortly after Griswold turned 18, Jeffcoat filed an application for appointment
as his permanent guardian. The trial court appointed an Attorney Ad Litem for
Griswold but refused Jeffcoat’s requests for appointment of a guardian ad litem and
a court investigator to serve as neutrals to evaluate Jeffcoat’s guardianship
application. HHSC then filed its application for appointment of a permanent
guardian and, separately, its petition in intervention and motion for leave, requesting
to intervene in the proceedings and to be appointed as Griswold’s permanent
guardian.
The trial court set a hearing on HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene. At the
hearing, the trial court heard testimony from two HHSC witnesses (an HHSC
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guardianship specialist and a caseworker) and Jeffcoat. In her testimony, Jeffcoat
explained that she voluntarily relinquished her rights in response to the Department’s
termination suit because she “was going to prison, and there was nobody else [to
take care of Griswold].” She further testified that she served 11 months in prison,
was released in 2013, and has not used a controlled substance since before going to
prison. According to Jeffcoat, since her release from prison, she has helped others
with drug addictions, working with the police department in Palestine, Texas, and
starting a rehabilitation center there.
The trial court granted HHSC’s intervention, found Jeffcoat unsuitable to
serve as guardian, and denied Jeffcoat’s guardianship application on the merits. It
also appointed HHSC permanent guardian of Griswold and issued findings of fact
and conclusions of law. There was no notice or trial setting informing Jeffcoat that
the trial court would consider the merits of her application at the hearing. Jeffcoat
moved for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS
There are two primary issues in this appeal. First, Jeffcoat challenges the trial
court’s order granting HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene in the guardianship
proceeding that she filed. Second, Jeffcoat complains that she did not receive
adequate notice that the trial court would also rule—based solely on the hearing on
HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene—on the merits of her guardianship
application and on HHSC’s competing application at the hearing on HHSC’s motion
for leave. Because our decision on these two issues disposes of all others raised by
Jeffcoat, we address only these issues. We begin with the issue of HHSC’s
intervention.

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HHSC’s Intervention

Many of the arguments in this appeal, as well as the flawed procedure
ultimately employed in the trial court, come, at least in part, as a result of a
fundamental misunderstanding of the procedural requirements for the guardianship
proceedings brought by Jeffcoat and HHSC.

Under Texas law, HHSC must file an application for guardianship of a minor
referred to HHSC by the Department if HHSC determines that the minor, because of
a physical or mental condition, will be incapacitated when they become an adult and
that there are no less restrictive alternatives to guardianship available. Tex. Hum.
Res. Code § 161.101(a); see id. § 48.209(a)(1) (requiring Department of Family and
Protective Services to refer minor for guardianship services if minor is at least 16
years of age and Department has reason to believe minor will be incapacitated when
they become adult). There is an exception, however, to the requirement that HHSC
file a guardianship application—if HHSC “becomes aware of a guardianship
program, private professional guardian, or other person willing and able” to provide
the guardianship services that HHSC would otherwise provide. Id. § 161.102(a). In
that situation, HHSC shall refer the incapacitated individual to the alternate person
or program for guardianship services. Id.

In this case, there is no dispute that the Department referred Griswold to
HHSC for guardianship, that Griswold is incapacitated, and that no less restrictive
alternative to guardianship is available. Therefore, according to HHSC, because it
determined Jeffcoat was unable to serve as guardian due to the prior termination of
her parental rights, it was compelled to seek guardianship under Section 161.102,
and because Jeffcoat had filed her application first, HHSC was left with having to
seek intervention in that pending proceeding. In contrast, Jeffcoat argues that
Section 161.102 required HHSC to refer Griswold’s guardianship to her and
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prevented HHSC from intervening. In other words, under Jeffcoat’s understanding,
HHSC was precluded from intervening in the proceeding if the trial court found that
she was a “suitable” guardian for Griswold.

Jeffcoat’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of the import of Sections
161.101 and 161.102. These sections provide HHSC—not the trial court—with the
obligation to make a pre-litigation determination. That is, HHSC must decide
whether it is required to file an application for guardianship upon receipt of a referral
from the Department, see id. § 161.101(a), or whether, instead, it must refer the
minor to another qualified person or organization for guardianship, see id.
§ 161.102(a). Thus, while these sections govern the issue of whether HHSC was
required under Section 161.101 to file an application for guardianship, they have no
impact on the issue of whether HHSC may properly intervene in a pending
guardianship proceeding, like the one Jeffcoat commenced. Consequently, whether
HHSC could properly intervene is independent of the issue of Jeffcoat’s ability or
suitability to serve as Griswold’s guardian—or at least, it should have been.

When HHSC sought to intervene, the question before the trial court was
defined by statute and had nothing to do with Jeffcoat’s suitability to serve as
guardian. Under the Estates Code, an interested person may intervene in a
guardianship proceeding by filing a timely motion to intervene. Tex. Est. Code
§ 1055.003(a); see id. § 1002.018(2) (defining “interested person” as “a person
interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person”). A trial court has discretion to
grant or deny a motion to intervene in a guardianship proceeding, and there are only
two factors it “must” consider—whether:

(1) the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights; or
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(2) the proposed intervenor has such an adverse
relationship with the ward or proposed ward that the
intervention would unduly prejudice the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.

Id. § 1055.003(c)(1)-(2).

The trial court held a hearing and heard testimony from HHSC’s witnesses, as
well as testimony from Jeffcoat. Based on the evidence before it, the trial court was
within its discretion to grant HHSC’s motion to intervene in Jeffcoat’s guardianship
proceeding given HHSC’s role in providing services to disabled persons like
Griswold and upon hearing that Jeffcoat’s parental rights to Griswold previously had
been terminated. The trial court had no reason to believe based on the evidence
presented that HHSC’s presence would unduly prejudice or delay the adjudication
or that HHSC had an adverse relationship with Griswold.

We therefore affirm the trial court’s order granting HHSC’s motion for leave
to intervene. This conclusion does not end our inquiry, however, because the trial
court did not just grant HHSC’s intervention after the hearing on HHSC’s motion for
leave to intervene. It also decided the merits of Jeffcoat’s and HHSC’s competing
guardianship applications.

Lack of Notice

Following the hearing on HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene, the trial court
found that Jeffcoat was unsuitable to serve as guardian, denied her application for
guardianship, and appointed HHSC as Griswold’s permanent guardian. As a result,
the trial court decided the merits of Jeffcoat’s application for guardianship at a

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hearing set solely on HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene, without providing any
notice to the parties that it would do so.

On appeal, HHSC argues that Jeffcoat was not entitled to notice or,
alternatively, that she tried the issue of suitability by consent or waived any objection
to lack of notice. It notes that the Estates Code contains provisions that do not
require notice in a guardianship proceeding, citing Section 1051.001(a) and (b). See
Tex. Est. Code § 1051.001. That Section, however, entitled “Issuance of Notice or
Process in General,” pertains only to what persons are required to receive notice of
a guardianship proceeding and, as a result, of hearings during those proceedings.
Section 1051.001 certainly does not stand for the proposition that a party who files
an original guardianship proceeding, like Jeffcoat, is then not entitled to notice of a
trial in the very proceeding she filed.

In fact, the Estates Code provides for the right to a jury trial, stating that “[a]
party in a contested guardianship proceeding is entitled to a jury trial on request.”
Id. § 1055.052. This provision and its predecessors have led Texas courts to
conclude that guardianship proceedings cannot be summarily disposed of without
45 days’ notice of trial under Rule 245 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
e.g., In re Guardianship of Vavra, 365 S.W.3d 476, 484 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012,
no pet.) (concluding that trial court erred in dismissing guardianship without
providing parties notice and trial); In re Guardianship of Norman, 61 S.W.3d 20, 23
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied) (concluding that trial court erred in
dismissing guardianship proceeding without jury trial on disputed issues); see also
Tex. R. Civ. P. 245 (providing that court “may set contested cases . . . with reasonable
notice of not less than forty-five days to the parties of a first setting for trial”). This
timing requirement makes sense. Because a party to a contested guardianship
proceeding is entitled to a jury trial, it must request one at least 30 days before trial

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and therefore must have adequate notice of a trial setting. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 216(a)
(requiring written request for jury to be filed “a reasonable time before the date set
for trial[,] but not less than thirty days in advance”); Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v.
Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996).

At the intervention hearing and again at the hearing on Jeffcoat’s motion for
rehearing, the trial court suggested that by taking the stand and putting her suitability
at issue during the hearing on HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene, Jeffcoat had
put that issue before the court to decide on the merits. HHSC likewise urges in this
appeal that Jeffcoat tried the issue of suitability by consent or waived her objection
and should not now be heard to complain about a lack of notice or due process
concerns. Neither the trial court nor HHSC is correct.

For an issue to be tried by consent, there must be a trial. To be sure, both
sides presented evidence at the hearing on HHSC’s motion for leave to intervene,
and Jeffcoat did raise her suitability as a defense to HHSC’s intervention, but it is
apparent from the record that neither party thought it was trying the ultimate merits
of Jeffcoat’s application for guardianship vis a vis HHSC’s request to be appointed
guardian if HHSC was allowed to intervene.1 As the Texas Supreme Court has
recognized, an issue is not tried by consent “merely by hearing testimony thereon.”
Sage St. Assocs. v. Northdale Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 438, 446 (Tex. 1993) (quoting
Harkey v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 208 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. 1948)). An

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For example, at the hearing, Jeffcoat (who appeared pro se) informed the court that she
intended to call witnesses at a later time to testify as to her suitability. These witnesses, including
the police officers who arrested her prior to her parental rights termination and the district attorney
who prosecuted her, would testify about how she has changed her life. Similarly, for its part,
HHSC noted for the trial court that “the main issue today is really just the intervention, and that’s
what we would like to do is just keep this to the intervention.” And HHSC counsel later reiterated
that “[w]e are trying to intervene here, and then after that we can set this for the actual guardianship
hearing, your Honor, if we’re allowed in.”

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appellate court “must examine the record not for evidence of the issue, but rather for
evidence of trial of the issue.” Bos v. Smith, 556 S.W.3d 293, 307 (Tex. 2018)
(emphasis in original). Jeffcoat did not try the merits of the ultimate issue of whether
she is suitable to serve as Griswold’s guardian; rather, she raised the issue of her
suitability as a defense, albeit mistakenly, to HHSC’s intervention and informed the
court that she intended to call additional witnesses before its ultimate ruling on this
issue at trial.

Because Jeffcoat was entitled to 45 days’ notice of a hearing on the merits of
her guardianship application, in part so that she could decide whether to exercise her
right to request a jury trial, the trial court violated her due process rights by ruling
on the merits of her application without sufficient notice. See Wade v. Valdetaro,
696 S.W.3d 673, 676–77 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam) (holding due process rights
violated when notice of trial setting sent to wrong address and rejecting idea that
party waived such rights by participating in final hearing and failing to move for
continuance); In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 118–19 (Tex. 2014) (noting that failure
to give father 45 days’ notice of merits hearing violated his right to due process).

CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order granting HHSC’s motion for leave to
intervene. We reverse the Order Appointing Permanent Guardian of the Person with
Full Authority and the Order Denying Application for Guardianship Due to
Unsuitability, signed on August 1, 2024. We reinstate Jeffcoat’s application for
permanent guardianship and remand to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

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/s/ Scott K. Field
Scott K. Field
Justice

Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris.

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